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THESIS SUMMARY 
This thesis aims to analyze the capital structure and performance of French family firms going public. From 
a sample of 90 family firms belonging to CAC All-Tradable from 2010 to 2013, we find that the capital 
structure of family firms is characterized by a low level of debt with a preference for short-term debt relative 
to long-term debt. Moreover, the capital structure of family firms is in line with the classical theories of 
financing, the hypothesis of market timing, the theory of optimal debt ratio and the pecking order theory. 
Then we analyze the short-term and long-term performance of French family firms going public through 
Initial Public Offerings. The results show the different expropriation techniques employed by the family 
firms’ owners. On the initial public offering date, the majority of family firms’ owners are simultaneously 
CEOs and Chairmen of boards of directors. After going public, the family firms’ owners hold around 80% 
of the firms’ cash flow rights and we observe that the difference between their cash flow rights and their 
voting rights has increased. First-day underpricing is around 2% which shows that family firms are almost 
fairly priced upon issuance. The family firms outperform the market index in the first three months of 
issuance and after the third year. We also find that the ownership and control rights change from pre- to 
post-IPO date explains the short-term and long-term performance unlike governance mechanisms. 
 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, IPO, Firm Performance, Capital Structure, Family Firms. 
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RÉSUMÉ DE THÈSE 
Cette thèse a pour objectif d’analyser la structure du capital et la performance des entreprises familiales 
Françaises qui s’introduisent en Bourse. A partir d’un échantillon de 90 entreprises familiales appartenant 
à l'indice CAC All-Tradable de 2010 à 2013, nous constatons que la structure du capital des entreprises 
familiales est caractérisée par un faible niveau d’endettement avec une préférence pour l’endettement à court 
terme par rapport au long terme. De plus, la structure de capital des entreprises familiales vérifie les théories 
classiques du financement, l’hypothèse de ‘market timing’, la théorie du ratio d’endettement optimal et de 
la théorie du financement hiérarchique. Ensuite, nous analysons les performances à court terme et à long 
terme des entreprises des entreprises familiales Françaises qui s’introduisent en Bourse. Les résultats 
montrent les différentes techniques d'expropriation employées par les propriétaires des entreprises 
familiales. A la date de l’introduction en bourse, la majorité des propriétaires des entreprises familiales sont 
à la fois les directeurs généraux et les présidents des conseils d’administration. Après l’introduction en 
bourse, les propriétaires des entreprises familiales détiennent environ 80% des droits des flux de trésorerie 
et nous constatons que la différence entre leurs droits aux flux de trésorerie et leurs droits de vote a 
augmenté. La sous-évaluation au premier jour est voisine de 2%, ce qui révèle que les entreprises familiales 
sont correctement évaluées lors de l'émission. Les entreprises familiales surperforment l'indice de marché 
dans les trois premiers mois de l'émission et après la troisième année. Nous trouvons aussi que le 
changement des droits de propriété et de contrôle avant et après l’introduction en Bourse explique les 
performances à court et à long terme contrairement aux mécanismes de gouvernance. 
 
 
Les Mots Clés : Gouvernance des Entreprises, Introduction en Bourse, Performance, Structure de Capital, 
Entreprises Familiales. 
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CHAPITRE 1: LA STRUCTURE DU CAPITAL DES 
ENTREPRISES FAMILIALES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Ampenberger et al. (2013) expliquent que le « puzzle de la structure du capital » (choix de l’entreprise 
d’une structure de capital optimale), reste l’un des grands problèmes non résolus dans la littérature de 
l’économie financière. De nombreux travaux de recherche ont été menés en essayant d’expliquer la 
théorie de la structure du capital à partir de différents points de vue depuis 1958. Modigliani et Miller 
(1958), considérés comme les pères de la théorie de la structure du capital, ont été les premiers à 
présenter un théorème expliquant la décision de l’entreprise de lever des capitaux. 
Une théorie majeure dans la structure du capital, est la théorie statique ou la « théorie de l’arbitrage ». 
Cette théorie remonte à Kraus et Litzenberger (1973) et a été plus tard développée par Miller (1977). 
Elle suppose l’existence d’un ratio d’endettement ciblé où le coût marginal d’une unité supplémentaire 
de la dette (c’est-à-dire les coûts de détresse financière), est égal aux bénéfices marginaux d’une unité 
supplémentaire de la dette (c’est-à-dire le bouclier fiscal de la dette). La deuxième grande théorie de la 
structure du capital est la « théorie d’ordre hiérarchique » qui a été fondée sur une perspective dynamique 
des opportunités d’investissement et les asymétries d’information. La théorie a été proposée par 
Donaldson (1961) et modifié par Myers et Majluf (1984). Elle suppose que, d’abord, les entreprises 
préfèrent financer des opportunités de croissance avec des fonds internes (disponibles de flux de 
trésorerie à partir des bénéfices non répartis) sur la délivrance des titres de créance ou de participations, 
puis, en second lieu, préfèrent émettre des titres de créance sur les titres de participation, et, en troisième, 
préfèrent émettre des titres de participation. Leland et Pyle (1977) ont porté sur les aspects de 
signalisation derrière la décision de la structure du capital. Alternativement, Fama (1980), Berger et al. 
(1997) et Masulis (1988) ont porté sur les perspectives de l’aversion au risque dans la détermination des 
décisions de la structure du capital, tandis que Harris et Raviv (1988), Stulz (1988) et Ellul (2008) ont 
porté sur les considérations relatives au contrôle des entreprises, où ils ont principalement discuté le 
risque de prise de contrôle. En outre, Baker et Wurgler (2002) ont soulevé la théorie des problèmes de 
synchronisation de marché mentionnant que, à différents moments, différentes possibilités peuvent se 
poser pour financer la croissance, soit par emprunt, soit par actions, en fonction du coût de chaque 
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option. Jensen et Meckling (1976), Easterbrook (1984) et Jensen (1986) ont discuté le coût de l’agence 
comme un déterminant efficace de la théorie de la structure du capital. 
Le coût de l’agence a toujours été un point focal pour de nombreux chercheurs dans le domaine de la 
finance d’entreprise, qui de nombreuses théories ont été établies sur. Selon de nombreux aspects 
importants tels que les environnements juridiques et des droits la protection des investisseurs, la fiscalité 
d’un pays, les systèmes économiques et bien d’autres, les coûts d’agence varient en conséquence. Par 
conséquent, dans des circonstances différentes, les gestionnaires ont réagi différemment et ont adopté 
des politiques différentes pour atténuer les coûts d’agence, ce qui a eu des répercussions sur les décisions 
en matière de structure du capital de leurs entreprises. Néanmoins, malgré les recherches généralisées 
menées sur la théorie de la structure du capital couverte de plusieurs aspects et perspectives, les 
chercheurs ne convergent pas sur les déterminants finis de la structure du capital ultime, qui reste 
énigmatique spécifiquement dans le contexte des entreprises familiales. En outre, l’asymétrie de 
l’information impose son poids sur les investisseurs, qui cherchent plus hautes normes de transparence 
en temps de fraudes sophistiquées et innovantes qui, malheureusement, de nombreux gestionnaires et 
les vérificateurs indépendants, parfois se sont impliquées dans (par exemple, Enron, Arthur Andersen, 
Worldcom, Parmalat, etc.). En conséquence, les actionnaires sont de plus en plus conscients de la 
nécessité de scruter et d’inspecter les états financiers des établissements, les notes complémentaires aux 
états financiers, et tous les rapports publics en raison de scandales d’entreprises récents résultant des 
pertes énormes qui sont liés principalement soit à des problèmes d’agence ou d’asymétries 
d’information. En conséquence, dans ce chapitre, nous allons essayer d’analyser à la fois la théorie de 
l’agence et la théorie de l’asymétrie de l’information en tant que déterminants de la structure du capital 
des entreprises familiales Françaises. 
2. REVUE DE LA LITTÉRATURE ET HYPOTHÈSES 
2.1. La Théorie de l’Agence et le Financement de la Dette 
Ampenberger et al. (2013) affirment que la littérature et les résultats empiriques sur la théorie du 
financement et la structure du capital des entreprises familiales sont brèfs et peu concluants. En raison 
de nombreux scandales financiers qui ont été associés au problème de l’agence, les entreprises ont 
adopté un large éventail de mécanismes de gouvernance pour atténuer son impact et ses coûts financiers. 
Financement de la dette à travers toutes ses exigences en matière de processus et de surveillance a été 
trouvé pour être l’un des principaux mécanismes de gouvernance et donc eu un impact sur les décisions 
7 
 
 
des entreprises. Ci-dessous, nous allons discuter les principales théories de la littérature qui suggèrent 
la relation entre l’entreprise familiale et le niveau de la dette. 
2.1.1. Théorie de l’Agence et le Niveau Bas de la Dette dans le Cas des Entreprises Familiales 
 L’aversion au risque des entreprises familiales: Jensen et Meckling (1976), Fama (1980), et 
Grossman et Hart (1982) affirment que les gestionnaires des entreprises familiales préfèrent un levier 
financier bas parce qu’il réduit le risque de faillite et protège leur capital humain qui est sous diversifié. 
Les propriétaires des entreprises familiales sont bien conscients que, en augmentant la dette, le risque 
financier sera considérablement augmenté qui va augmenter la volatilité de leurs entreprises, surtout 
dans les moments difficiles.  
 La perte de contrôle des entreprises familiales: Mishra et McConaughy (1999) ont constaté 
que les entreprises familiales ont un niveau de dette significativement plus faible que les entreprises non 
familiales parce que les fondateurs des entreprises familiales craignent de perdre contrôle de leurs 
entreprises à la suite d’une détresse financière grave ou dans le cas de dépôt de bilan, au cours de laquelle 
les détenteurs de titres d’emprunt peuvent prendre contrôle de leurs entreprises.  
 Le contrôle efficace de la propriété de la famille: Friend et Lang (1988), Jensen et al. (1992) 
et Holderness et Sheehan (1988) trouvent que le ratio de la dette est lié négativement à la propriété 
managériale. Selon la théorie de l’agence, les créanciers de prestations de surveillance éventuellement 
augmentée quand il y a l’absence d’actionnaires véritables et efficaces des représentants sur le conseil 
d’administration de l’entreprise, qui ne peuvent pas exercer les tâches de surveillance à proximité de la 
gestion de cabinet, et quand les agents se comportent pour leur propre intérêt plutôt que les intérêts des 
actionnaires. Donc, dans les entreprises familiales où les fondateurs des entreprises sont présents et 
impliqués dans la gestion des entreprises, le rôle de détenteurs de titres d’emprunt diminue et le niveau 
de la dette diminue ainsi. 
2.1.2. Théorie de l’Agence et le Niveau Supérieur de la Dette dans le Cas des Entreprises 
Familiales 
 L’expropriation et l’enracinement par les propriétaires des entreprises familiales: Shyu et Lee 
(2009) soutiennent que généralement dans les entreprises familiales, les actionnaires principales utilisent 
des droits de contrôle excédentaires à affaiblir la capacité des mécanismes de contrôle interne qui 
pourrait survenir par l’intermédiaire de porteurs de capitaux propres supplémentaires et la présence des 
membres indépendents représentants sur le conseil d’administration, contraignant leur enracinement et 
leur activité d’expropriation. Quand il y a une séparation significative entre la propriété et le contrôle au 
8 
 
 
sein des entreprises familiales, et, par conséquent, la possibilité d’extraction de la richesse à l’esprit, le 
niveau d’endettement plus élevé pourrait être un mécanisme efficace pour conserver le contrôle et 
l’expropriation des actionnaires minoritaires. 
 Le risque de perdre le contrôle de leurs entreprises: Stulz (1988) avance que les entreprises 
ayant un actionnaire de contrôle doivent présenter supérieur effet de levier financier, car elle augmente 
leurs droits de vote. Kim et Sorenson (1986) et Ugurlu (2000) montrent qu’une entreprise avec une forte 
concentration de propriété par les initiés familiaux est associée à un niveau d’endettement plus élevé. 
 Les flux de trésorerie mécanisme disciplinaire pour les propriétaires des entreprises 
familiales: Jensen (1986) soutient que les actionnaires préfèrent un endettement plus élevé, car il réduit 
le problème de surinvestissement, notamment dans des entreprises ayant des flux de trésorerie 
disponibles. En conséquence, les propriétaires des entreprises familiales peuvent obtenir un financement 
de la dette dans une tentative pour améliorer le comportement de leurs dépenses et donc établir une 
gestion des flux de trésorerie stable. 
 Le marché du contrôle des sociétés et de la menace pour les propriétaires des entreprises 
familiales: De nombreuses études (Harris et Raviv, 1988; Stulz, 1988, et John et Litov, 2010) trouvent 
une relation forte entre l’endettement des entreprises et l’activité sur le marché du contrôle. 
Dans ce chapitre, nous allons suivre la méthode présentée par Jensen et Meckling (1976) et Fama (1980), 
qui ont discuté que les gestionnaires des entreprises familiales préfèrent un levier financier bas parce 
qu’il réduit le risque de faillite. En outre, nous allons également suivre Mishra et McConaughy (1999), 
qui ont constaté que les entreprises familiales utilisent un niveau bas de la dette, car ils craignent de 
perdre le contrôle de leurs entreprises à la suite d’une détresse financière grave. En conséquence, nous 
allons tester les deux hypothèses suivantes: 
Hypothèse 1: Dette et propriété d’initié sont liés négativement. 
Hypothèse 2: la dette et la propriété institutionnelle sont liés négativement. 
2.2. La Théorie de l’information asymétrique et le financement de la dette  
Tout d’abord, nous allons expliquer le modèle de Flannery (1986) en expliquant la relation entre la 
théorie de l’asymétrie de l’information et le financement de la dette. Dans ce modèle, les hypothèses 
suivantes ont été amorcées: deux entreprises qui sont équivalents, et ont une valeur actuelle nette (VAN) 
positive et des informations privées, mais un type est plus risqué que l'autre. Dans ce modèle, les 
entreprises avec des informations privées favorables sont désignées comme ceux ayant des projets à 
faible risque, alors que les entreprises avec des informations privées défavorables sont désignées comme 
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ceux qui ont des projets à haut risque. Il est également supposé que les deux types d’entreprises auront 
besoin de financement de la dette pour leurs projets. À la fin d’une période, les créanciers apprennent si 
les projets ont été améliorés ou non. Entreprises avec des informations privées favorables ont une plus 
forte probabilité de mise à niveau de leurs projets que ceux avec des informations défavorables. Les 
entreprises avec des informations privées défavorables sont prêtes à payer un taux élevé de la dette à 
long terme pour éviter des coûts attendus en roulant sur la dette à court terme. Les créanciers peuvent 
déduire une partie de ce qui était initialement informations privées d’une entreprise, et de l’utiliser dans 
l’attribution des notes de risque. Donc, ils attribuent des notes de risque inférieurs à des entreprises qui 
choisissent de dette à court terme, et des notes de risque supérieur à ceux qui choisissent la dette à long 
terme. 
Deuxièmement, le modèle de Diamond (1991) a également étudié la relation entre l’asymétrie 
d’information et le financement de la dette, bien que d’un point de vue différent. Le modèle de Diamond 
diffère du cel de Flannery que les entreprises ne sont pas équivalentes et que pas tous les projets ont un 
VAN positive. Les entreprises ont des informations privées que leurs projets ont un VAN positive ou 
négative, qui ne seront pas révélés aux créanciers. Les créanciers ne peuvent pas observer si les projets 
ont un VAN positive ou négative, mais ils sont capables pour attribuer des notes de risques initiaux sur 
la base d’autres différences d’observation. Mais de façon similaire à cel de Flannery, les créanciers 
apprennent si les projets ont été mis à jour à la fin d’une période. Parce que certains de ces projets ont 
un VAN négative, les créanciers peuvent refuser de refinancer la dette à court terme à la fin d’une 
période, créant un risque de liquidité pour les entreprises de la dette à court terme. En conséquence, les 
entreprises avec des informations privées favorables et défavorables aux notes de risque faibles ou 
intermédiaires peuvent choisir dette à court terme, alors que les entreprises avec des informations privées 
favorables avec des notes de risque intermédiaires peuvent choisir dette à long terme. 
Troisièmement, Rajan (1992) met l’accent sur le pouvoir de négociation d’une entreprise demandant le 
financement de la dette. Lorsque le pouvoir de négociation d’une entreprise est faible, l’entreprise tend 
à préférer les prêts à long terme, même si elle doit payer des intérêts plus élevés parce que, en vertu du 
financement bancaire à court terme, la banque dispose d’un droit explicite à renégocier les termes du 
contrat. L’auteur explique que dans le financement bancaire à long terme, la renégociation a lieu 
seulement si la banque abandonne une partie de son contrôle des loyers. Les entreprises à faible pouvoir 
de négociation préfèrent le financement à long terme pour empêcher de rouler la dette à court terme, et 
de limiter ainsi le financement de la banque. L’inverse vaut pour les entreprises à fort pouvoir de 
négociation. 
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Beaucoup d’autres études empiriques également précisaient les mesures de l’asymétrie d’information, 
indépendamment du fait que l’information privée est favorable ou défavorable. Par exemple, Barclay et 
Smith (1995) constatent que les entreprises avec des valorisations plus faibles, les dépenses de recherche 
et de développement plus élevés, et plus le potentiel de croissance ont tendance à émettre plus de dette 
à court terme, en accord avec l’idée que plus les asymétries d’information sont associées à plus courte 
échéance. De même, Ortiz-Molina et Penas (2008) trouvent que les petites entreprises, qui, sont 
susceptibles d’être relativement opaques, ont tendance à faire usage de plus la dette à court terme.  
3. ÉCHANTILLON, DONNÉES ET MÉTHODOLOGIE 
3.1. Échantillon 
Dans ce chapitre, nous visons à fournir des preuves supplémentaires sur les théories de la structure de 
capital et d’analyser l’effet d’une multitude de variables sur la structure du capital des entreprises 
Françaises et nous allons également tester la différence dans la structure du capital entre les entreprises 
familiales et non familiales en France. Notre échantillon est constitué d’entreprises cotées sur l’indice 
CAC All-Tradable. La plateforme Bloomberg est la source des données. Nous avons effectué une 
recherche intensive et recueilli de l’information pour chaque entreprise individuellement. Si aucune 
information ne se trouve, nous excluons la société de la recherche. Le test d’hypothèse ne soit pas mené 
sur les données mensuelles de séries chronologiques; plutôt, nous avons transformé les données de séries 
chronologiques dans les données transversales faisant la moyenne des valeurs de chacune des variables 
de 2008 à 2013 pour chaque entreprise. Par conséquent, le test d’hypothèse a été menée sur la valeur 
moyenne par mois par variable par entreprise (Buferna et al., 2005). L’indice CAC All-Tradable inclus 
330 entreprises à la date de sélection, cependant, après l’exclusion du secteur financier, notre étude a 
été menée sur 293 entreprises (dont 90 sont des entreprises familiales et 203 sont des entreprises non 
familiales). 
3.2. Statistiques Descriptives 
Notre échantillon est composé de 293 entreprises, 203 sont des entreprises non familiales (NFF) et 90 
sont des entreprises familiales (FF). 
Tableau 1: Comparaison de la structure de propriété  
Structure de Propriété 
Entreprise 
Familiale 
(Moyenne) 
Entreprise Non-
Familiale 
(Moyenne) 
Résult 
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Pourcentage des initiés actions en circulation 27.73 2.86 >0*** 
Pourcentage d’actions institutionnelles en suspens 14.70 32.04 <0*** 
Comme le montre, le pourcentage moyen des initiées actions en circulation pour les entreprises 
familiales et les entreprises non familiales cotées sont 27,73% et 2,86% respectivement. Le pourcentage 
moyen d’actions institutionnelles en suspens pour la famille et les entreprises non familiales est de 
14,7% et 32,04% respectivement. Cela montre à quelle structure mesure de propriété diffère entre les 
entreprises familiales et non familiales de en termes d’initié et la propriété institutionnelle. Les 
entreprises familiales ont beaucoup plus de concentration de la propriété d’initié à partir des propriétaires 
des entreprises familiales qui ont des droits de flux de trésorerie élevés. Cependant, les entreprises 
familiales ont une structure de propriété institutionnelle beaucoup plus faible par rapport à des 
entreprises non familiales, qui peut être attribuée à plusieurs raisons, surtout à la crainte de perdre le 
contrôle par les propriétaires de la famille entreprises, et la crainte de mécanismes de surveillance plus 
strictes actionnaires institutionnels utilisent habituellement chaque fois qu’ils sont présents dans les 
conseils des entreprises. Inversement, les entreprises non familiales ont beaucoup plus faible propriété 
d’initié en raison de la grande dispersion et la structure diffuse parmi beaucoup plus grand nombre 
d’actionnaires, et en raison de la présence d’actionnaires institutionnels supérieurs qui reçoivent 
habituellement des sièges au conseil d’administration des sociétés d’administration, mais ne concernent 
pas directement dans La direction de l’entreprise. 
Tableau 2: Distribution des variables de la dette dans les entreprises familiales par industrie 
Industrie 
Médiane 
dette 
totale 
Poids 
Médiane 
dette-
capitaux 
propres 
Poids 
Médiane 
% des 
emprunts à 
court 
terme de la 
dette totale 
Médiane % 
des 
emprunts à 
long terme 
de la dette 
totale 
Emprunts à 
court terme% 
-Emprunts à 
long terme% 
Les matériaux de base 161 12% 0.51 10% 15% 24% -9% 
Communications 81 6% 0.42 8% 8% 11% -3% 
Consommation cyclique 119 9% 0.58 12% 17% 16% 1% 
Consommateurs, non 
cyclique 298 23% 0.35 7% 9% 8% 1% 
Énergie 484 37% 2.31 46% 20% 60% -40% 
Industriel 122 9% 0.67 13% 16% 18% -2% 
La technologie 48 4% 0.20 4% 6% 7% -1% 
Moyenne pondérée 136 100% 0.46 100% 11% 13% -2% 
 
Tableau 3: Distribution des variables de la dette dans des entreprises non familiales par industrie 
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Industrie 
Médiane 
dette 
totale 
Poids 
Médiane 
dette-
capitaux 
propres 
Poids 
Médiane 
% des 
emprunts 
à court 
terme de 
la dette 
totale 
Médiane % 
des 
emprunts à 
long terme 
de la dette 
totale 
Emprunts à 
court 
terme% -
Emprunts à 
long terme% 
Les matériaux de base 301 4% 0.38 10% 9% 18% -9% 
Communications 365 5% 0.35 9% 6% 4% 2% 
Consommation cyclique 800 10% 0.84 21% 11% 23% -12% 
Consommateurs, non 
cyclique 565 7% 0.63 16% 9% 27% -18% 
Énergie 4,810 62% 0.51 13% 8% 23% -15% 
Industriel 761 10% 0.87 22% 10% 28% -18% 
La technologie 95 1% 0.34 9% 7% 9% -2% 
Moyenne pondérée 648 100% 0.61 100% 9% 20% -11% 
Tableaux 2 et 3 permettent une comparaison de la structure de capital par branche entre les entreprises 
familiales et non familiales. Nous avons décidé d’utiliser la médiane plutôt que la moyenne pour 
éliminer l’effet de la valeur aberrante sur notre analyse. Le passif total médian dans les entreprises non 
familiales est d’environ 4 fois le médian des engagements totaux des entreprises familiales, qui pourrai 
être expliqué par la plus grande taille des entreprises non familiales et le besoin plus élevé de 
financement. Le ratio médian dette-capitaux propres par entreprise dans les entreprises familiales est 
beaucoup plus faible que dans les entreprises non familiales, ce qui indique que les entreprises non 
familiales ont tendance à compter sur la dette de financement plus que les entreprises familiales. En 
particulier, toutes les entreprises ont tendance à compter de manière significative sur les emprunts à long 
terme plus les emprunts à court terme dans presque toutes les industries. Cependant, par rapport aux 
entreprises non familiales, les entreprises familiales utilisent plus les emprunts à court terme et moins 
emprunts à long terme. 
Les tableaux ci-dessous représentent les tests les plus importants pour l’hypothèse alternative des 
différences de moyens entre les entreprises familiales et non familiales pour diverses variables de la 
structure du capital et de contrôle à 1% (***), 5% (**) et 10% (*) des niveaux de signification. Le 
tableau 4 montre la taille des deux types d’entreprises. En utilisant trois définitions distinctes pour la 
taille (capitalisation boursière actuelle, le total des actifs et le capital total), le t-test indique que les 
entreprises familiales Françaises sont beaucoup plus petites que les entreprises non familiales Françaises 
au niveau de 1%, qui auront une incidence sur la structure du capital des entreprises comme nous le 
verrons. 
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Tableau 4: Comparaison par taille de l’entreprise 
Taille de l’entreprise 
Entreprise 
Familiale  
Moyenne 
Entreprise Non-
Familiale 
Moyenne 
Résult 
La capitalisation boursière actuelle 1,465 4,342 < 0*** 
L’actif total 1,924 10,397 < 0*** 
Capital total 1,965 7,091 < 0*** 
Le tableau 5 montre la comparaison de la structure du capital des deux types d’entreprises. Pour définir 
la structure du capital des entreprises, nous avons inclus le total du passif, les emprunts à court terms, 
les emprunts à long terme, les emprunts à court term pour le total du passif, les emprunts à long term 
pour le total du passif, le ratio total de la dette, le ratio de la dette aux capitaux propres, dette à long 
terme sur le capital total, passifs à cour terme aux passifs à long terme, le coût de la dette, le coût des 
capitaux propres. Le t-test indique que les entreprises familiales Françaises ont des niveaux 
significativement plus faibles de la dette que les entreprises non familiales au niveau de 1%. Les chiffres 
de la dette des entreprises sont en milliers d’euros. 
Tableau 5: Composition du Structure du Capital 
La Structure du Capital Entreprise 
Familiale 
Moyenne 
Entreprise Non 
Familiale 
Moyenne  
Résult 
Le passif total 1,233 6,989 <0*** 
Les emprunts à court terme 16 105 <0*** 
Les emprunts à long terme 234 1,973 <0*** 
Les emprunts à court terme pour le total du passif 12 10 >0** 
Les emprunts à long terme pour le total du passif 16 24 <0** 
Ratio total de la dette 33 29 <>0** 
Ratio de la dette aux capitaux propres 40.34 61.10 <0*** 
Dette à long terme sur le capital total 13.99 21.92 <0*** 
Passifs à court terme aux passifs à long terme 1.61 2.25 =0*** 
Le coût de la dette 1.82 2.12 <0*** 
Coût des capitaux propres 9.69 10.97 <0*** 
Nous constatons que le passif total moyen des entreprises familiales est significativement plus petit que 
cel des entreprises non familiales au niveau de signification de 1%. Les emprunts à court terme et à long 
terme dans les entreprises familiales sont moins que celles des entreprises non familiales. Cela peut être 
dû au fait que la taille des entreprises familiales est plus petite que celle des entreprises non familiales. 
Les entreprises familiales ont un pourcentage plus élevé de dette à court terme au passif total et un 
pourcentage inférieur des emprunts à long terme pour le total du passif au niveau de signification de 
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5%. Proportionnellement, les entreprises familiales ont un pourcentage de la dette portant intérêt plus 
faible par rapport aux entreprises non familiales, ce qui se reflétera dans le coût d’emprunt. Les 
pourcentages de l’emprunt pour le total du passif impliquent que les entreprises familiales Françaises 
tentent d’emprunter sur une base à court terme par rapport au passif total plus que les entreprises non 
familiales. Cela va en ligne avec les conclusions de Bevan et Danbolt (2002) qui rapportent que la taille 
et la dette à court terme sont corrélées négativement, tandis que la taille et la dette à long terme sont 
corrélées positivement. En outre, lorsqu’on compare la proportion du total des fonds levés par les 
porteurs d’obligations à des fonds totaux soulevées par les détenteurs d’actions capturés par le ratio 
dette-capitaux propres, nous remarquons que les deux types d’entreprises avaient une moyenne 
inférieure à 1,00, ce qui signifie que les détenteurs d’actions sont la principale source de financement 
qui est cohérent avec les conclusions de Gallo et Vilaseca (1996). Nous remarquons que le coût de la 
dette des entreprises familiales est significativement inférieur à cel des entreprises non familiales au 
niveau de 1%, et le coût des capitaux pour les entreprises familiales est également plus faible que cel 
des entreprises non familiales au niveau de 1% aussi. Par conséquent, le coût moyen pondéré du capital 
des entreprises familiales est presque inférieure à celle des entreprises non familiales. 
4. RÉSULATATS DES REGRESSIONS ET INTERPRÉTATIONS 
Après avoir effectué le test d’hypothèse et avoir un aperçu sur les principales composantes de la structure 
du capital des entreprises familiales Françaises, nous allons tenter d’expliquer la structure du capital des 
entreprises familiales Françaises qui comptaient 90 entreprises par l’intermédiaire d’un modèle de 
régression linéaire multiple. Nous avons présenté trois types d’estimations de régression qui sont les 
MCO communs, "entre" des estimations aussi appelé le modèle à effets aléatoires, et "dans" estimations 
a également évoqué le modèle à effets fixes. 
La propriété interne semble avoir une faible relation positive avec le niveau de la dette et en particulier 
la dette à court terme, car presque toutes les estimations significatives sont positives et ont la même 
petite ampleur. Cependant, la propriété d’initié ne semble pas affecter le pourcentage de dette à long 
terme ou le pourcentage de dette à court terme puisque les estimations sont proches de 0. La relation 
positive entre le pourcentage des actionnaires initiés et la dette à court terme pourrait être expliquée par 
le fait que la dette à court terme peut atténuer les problèmes d’agence. Comme toute tentative par les 
actionnaires pour extraire la richesse de détenteur de titres d’emprunt est susceptible de restreindre 
l’accès des entreprises à la dette à court terme dans l’avenir immédiat (Buferna et al., 2005). Cette 
relation peut être due aux effets controversés de la propriété d’initié, l’effet négatif de l’enracinement et 
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de l’effet d’alignement positif. Cependant, les résultats concernant l’effet de la propriété institutionnelle 
sur la performance de l’entreprise sont très robustes et indiquent clairement la relation négative entre la 
surveillance et le niveau de la dette. Cette relation pourrait être expliquée par le fait que plus le 
pourcentage d’action institutionnelle en suspens, le moins nécessaire devient le rôle de surveillance et 
de réglementation de la dette dans les entreprises familiales. Cela est particulièrement le cas puisque les 
entreprises familiales ne souffrent pas beaucoup de coûts d’agence en raison des niveaux élevés de 
propriété d’initié qui distingue les entreprises familiales et donc ne nécessitent pas un niveau élevé de 
la dette pour surveiller les actions des gestionnaires. 
En ligne avec la théorie de l’arbitrage et de la théorie d’ordre hiérarchique, l’état que les entreprises 
rentables ont beaucoup bénéfices et donc un besoin moindre pour le financement externe et donc la 
dette, et l’hypothèse de market timing retenu, de plus en plus l’entreprise familiale Française ne compte 
pas sur l’endettement pour financer leurs investissements. Titman et Wessels (1988) et de Rajan et 
Zingales (1995) prouvent la relation négative entre le niveau de la dette et la croissance dans les pays 
développés comme la France. En outre, les entreprises avec des options de croissance ont des coûts plus 
élevés de détresse financière (Rajan et Zingales, 1995) et par conséquent devraient avoir une dette 
inférieure. L’asymétrie d’information est positivement liée au niveau de la dette sans effet remarquable 
sur leur échéance comme prévu. Selon Gugler et al. (2008), les entreprises familiales sous-investissent 
en raison de problèmes d’asymétrie d’information et donc aura un faible besoin de financement externe. 
Grâce à notre analyse, les résultats concernant l’effet de la performance sur la préférence du gestionnaire 
de la dette sont importants et très robuste. En outre, l’effet du ratio de distribution sur la maturité de la 
dette a été significatif. Ceci pourrait être expliqué par la variété des hypothèses éprouvées sur l’effet 
négatif et positif de dividendes sur l’effet de levier. Les résultats démontrent clairement une relation 
négative entre le ratio de distribution du dividende et de la dette à long terme, et une relation positive 
entre le ratio de distribution du dividende et de la dette à court terme. 
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CHAPITRE 2: LA PERFORMANCE À COURT TERME DES 
ENTREPRISES INTRODUITES EN BOURSE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Une offre publique initiale (IPO) est un processus long et complex impliquant une incertitude élevée 
(Daily et al., 2003) qui se traduit par la transformation d’une entreprise d’une société privée é une société 
cotée en bourse, permettant aux entrepreneurs, employés, investisseurs en capital risque, et d’autres 
investisseurs d’encaisser leurs investissements (Yang et al., 2011). En raison de leurs importances pour 
l’entreprise, les introductions en bourse ont été l’objet de recherches de la gestion depuis les années 
1960 (Reilly et Hatfield, 1969) et largement couverts par la littérature théorique et empirique (Peterle, 
2013). Les entreprises cherchent de multiples avantages à rendre publique, et ces motivations sont 
influencées par la structure de propriété, la taille et l’âge de l’entreprise, et par l’environnement 
institutionnel et réglementaire du pays d’accueil (Bouzouita, Gajewski et Gresse, 2015). Ces avantages 
comprennent, entre autres, la réalisation de la croissance, la résolution des problèmes de succession, 
cherchant à profiter des périodes haussières, l’amélioration de la surveillance externe, le renforcement 
du pouvoir de négociation avec les créanciers, l’augmentation de la liquidité du titre, l’augmentation de 
capital de réputation et social, et le partage de risque des investisseurs. 
La sous-évaluation de l’IPO, qui mesure la performance de l’IPO au court terme, est définie comme la 
différence entre le prix de l’offre au prix du marché, ce qui représente la valeur intrinsèque des actions. 
La littérature financière concernant les performances des IPO a documenté deux anomalies que de 
nombreux chercheurs ont tenté d’observer et d’expliquer de différentes perspectives et théories. À court 
terme, la sous-évaluation est observée après la première journée de négociation (Ibbotson, 1975), tandis 
que dans le long terme, généralement de un à cinq ans plus tard, la sous-performance est observée pour 
la plupart des introductions en bourse (Ritter, 1991). 
Ljungqvist (2005) a documenté que l’asymétrie de l’information entre les investisseurs et les émetteurs 
est un facteur clé de tels sous-évaluation. L’ampleur de la sous-évaluation représente le niveau 
d’incertitude associé aux investissements (Ritter, 1984). Particulièrement, McDonald et Jacquillat 
(1974) ont montré l’existence de la sous-évaluation de 31 nouvelles introductions en bourses Françaises 
sur la période 1968-1971 lors de leur cote officielle sur le marché secondaire. Le rendement ajusté 
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marché a été calculé selon l’indice CAC40 et était égal à 3% sur le premier jour, de 4,42% dans la 
première semaine et de 5% dans le premier mois après la date de l’IPO. En outre, dans une étude sur 
131 IPOs Françaises entre 1983 et 1986, Husson et Jacquillat (1990) ont rapporté que le rendement 
moyen initial ajusté marché était de 4%. Derrien et Womack (2003) ont documenté une sous-évaluation 
de 9,5% en France, de 1992 à 1998. En outre, Derrien et Degeorges (2001), basés sur un échantillon de 
243 introductions en bourse sur la période 1991-1998, ont trouvé un rendement initial moyen de 17,5%. 
De même, Ginglinger et Faugeron-Crouzet (2001), dans un échantillon de 292 introductions en bourse 
entre 1983 et 1994, ont trouvé un rendement moyen de 18,67%. Bouzouita, Gajewski et Gresse (2015) 
ont aussi constaté une sous-évaluation sur le marché Français pour les entreprises introduites en bourse. 
Dans cette thèse, nous allons étudier les mécanismes de gouvernance des entreprises familiales 
Françaises lors de leur émission sur les sous-évaluations. Nous allons essayer d’observer les droits de 
propriété et de contrôle pour les fondateurs des entreprises, les initiés non familiaux et les actionnaires 
publics sur les dates pré et post-IPO, et leurs effets sur la performance à court terme. 
2. REVUE DE LA LITTÉRATURE ET HYPOTHÈSES 
2.1. La Sous-Evaluation des Entreprises Familiales et Propriété 
Une étude récente suggère que les pratiques améliorant l’efficacité dans les entreprises familiales telles 
que l’engagement d’objectifs à long terme et le développement du capital humain (Bertrand et Schoar, 
2006) sont plus forts que ceux des entreprises non familiales. L’absence de conflit d’intérêts entre les 
propriétaires et les gestionnaires dans les entreprises familiales serait très apprécié à la fois par le 
souscripteur et les investisseurs et donc pourrait conduire à une sous-évaluation inférieure sous 
l’hypothèse que la sous-évaluation est en quelque sorte le prix que les entreprises doivent payer pour 
faire l’introduction en bourse réussir d’une part, et d’autre part, est ce que les investisseurs reçoivent en 
acceptant de prendre des risques et d’investir dans des introductions en bourse. 
Hypothèse 1: Il existe une relation négative entre le niveau de la propriété de la famille et de l’IPO 
sous-évaluation. 
2.2. IPO sous-évaluation et les mécanismes de gouvernance des entreprises familiales 
Filatotchev et Bishop (2002) ont constaté que les investisseurs pré-commercialisation sont susceptibles 
de payer des prix plus élevés pour les actions des entreprises familiales lorsque les émetteurs adoptent 
de bonnes pratiques de gouvernance d’entreprise. 
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o Fondateur - Directeur Général au moment de l’introduction en bourse 
Malgré le grand impact le fondateur peut avoir sur une sous-évaluation, le test de l’effet du statut 
fondateur et directeur général sur la sous-évaluation est assez inexploré et montre des résultats ambigus 
(Daily et Dalton, 1992). 
Hypothèse 2: Il existe une relation négative entre la présence d’un fondateur-directeur général et la 
sous-évaluation IPO. 
o La dualité du Directeur Général / président du conseil d’administration 
La dualité du Directeur Général / président du conseil d’administration peut réduire l’efficacité de la 
surveillance par le conseil d’administration et prévoit la possibilité de se bénéficier plus que la société 
(Salancik et Pfeffer, 1977). Certaines études rapportent que cette dualité peut entraîner l’abus de pouvoir 
par un Directeur Général / président du conseil d’administration (Daily et Dalton, 1993). 
Hypothèse 3: Il existe une relation négative entre la dualité de la position Directeur Général / président 
du conseil d’administration de l’entreprise et de la sous-évaluation IPO dans les entreprises familiales. 
o La taille du conseil d’administration 
La taille du conseil d’administration a été suggérée comme un facteur important lié au contrôle de 
l’entreprise et a été étudié dans de nombreux articles. Cependant, les résultats de ces études ont été 
mixtes. Dans les entreprises familiales, l’effet de la taille du conseil d’administration sur la performance 
de l’IPO est encore incertain. 
o La nomination d’administrateurs indépendants 
Jensen (1993) a suggéré que le conseil peut surveiller sa firme de plus près et prendre les mesures de 
gouvernance appropriées si il est suffisamment petit, mais avec suffisamment d’administrateurs 
indépendants pour assurer un suivi efficace. Anderson et Reeb (2004) ont constaté que les intérêts des 
actionnaires minoritaires sont mieux protégés lorsque les administrateurs indépendants ont plus de 
pouvoir par rapport à détenteurs de blocs de la famille. 
Hypothèse 4: Il existe une relation négative entre la proportion d’administrateurs indépendants et la 
sous-évaluation dans les entreprises familiales. 
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o La propriété des membres du conseil d’administration 
Beatty et Zajac (1994) ont trouvé une relation négative entre la propriété des membres du conseil 
d’administration et le niveau de surveillance. Les auteurs ont conclu que l’augmentation de leur 
propriété se traduira par une plus faible proportion d’administrateurs externes et une structure de 
direction unitaire. 
Hypothèse 5: Il existe une relation négative entre la participation de membres du conseil et la sous-
évaluation pour les entreprises familiales. 
Hypothèse 6: Il y a une forte relation entre la sous-évaluation et la partie du capital retenue par le 
fondateur. 
o La dualité des classes des actions de sociétés familiales 
Lorsque les fondateurs ou leurs familles utilisent des mécanismes de renforcement du contrôle pour 
créer un fossé entre leurs flux de trésorerie et les droits de contrôle, la valeur de l’entreprise est réduite. 
Claessens et al. (2002) et Cronqvist et Nilsson (2003) ont trouvé des effets de valorisation positifs 
associés à des augmentations des droits de flux de trésorerie, et des effets négatifs à des droits de contrôle 
au-delà des droits de flux de trésorerie. 
o Le capital détenu par le fondateur 
De nombreux auteurs ont mis en évidence l’association entre le niveau du capital retenu par les initiés 
et la valeur de l’entreprise. Du point de vue de la théorie de l’agence, en raison des risques 
d’expropriation, un haut niveau de capital détenu par le fondateur peut être associé à des risques plus 
élevés d’expropriation des droits des minorités, et dans de telles circonstances, les investisseurs 
potentiels vont acheter des actions uniquement lorsque qu’ils sont gravement sous-évalués. Pourtant, du 
point de vue de la théorie du signal, plus les propriétaires / dirigeants sont confiants quant aux 
perspectives futures de la société, plus ils conservent une forte proportion du capital. Cette confiance 
permet de réduire l’incertitude des investisseurs du marché secondaire (Certo et al., 2001a), résultant en 
une réduction de la sous-évaluation. 
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3. ÉCHANTILLON, DONNÉES ET MÉTHODOLOGIE 
3.1. Échantillon 
Nous avons extrait toutes les entreprises de l’indice CAC All-Tradable à l’exception des sociétés 
financières (SIC 6000-6999) qui sont soumis à des réglementations juridiques particulières. Notre choix 
de l’indice CAC All-Tradable a été pris pour poursuivre le travail accompli dans chapitre 1, en utilisant 
le même échantillon de la plateforme Bloomberg et parce que nous avions besoin d’une référence large 
et représentatif à comparer nos résultats. Notre échantillon final est constitué de 86 entreprises familiales 
Françaises sur 107 entreprises familiales cotées de 1994 à 2013. Nous avons également extrait les prix 
quotidiens de l’indice et de chaque entreprise dans notre échantillon en utilisant Thomson Reuters 
Datastream, ainsi que les prix d’offre, les dates et le nombre d’actions émises. Le reste des données ont 
été recueillies manuellement auprès du prospectus de chaque entreprise. 
3.2. Mesure de la sous-évaluation 
Dans notre thèse, nous allons mesurer la performance de l’IPO à court terme en se référant à la 
déclaration initiale ajustée pour le rendement de l’indice de marché. 
U � = EP − OPOP − Iͳ − IͲIͲ = EPOP − IͳIͲ  or U � = ln (EPOP) − ln (ܫͳܫͲ) 
EP désigne le prix d’équilibre de l’IPO qui est le prix de clôture au jour n (au jour 1, au jour 2, etc.) et 
OP désigne le prix d’offre de l’IPO. I1 désigne le prix de clôture de l’indice au jour n (au jour 1, au jour 
2, etc.) et I0 désigne le prix d’ouverture de l’indice le jour de l’introduction en bourse de l’action.  
3.3. Statistiques Descriptives 
Le nombre d’offres totales pour les entreprises familiales qui ont appartenu à l’indice CAC All-Tradable 
de 1994 à 2013 qui répondent à nos critères énoncés ci-dessus sont 86 entreprises et celles-ci sont 
réparties entre sept industries: (1) les matériaux de base; (2) les communications; (3) la consommation 
cyclique; (4) la consommation, non cyclique; (5) l’énergie; (6) les industriels; et (7) la technologie. Le 
montant brut est basé sur le nombre d’actions émises à la date de l’IPO fois le prix d’offre. Le total du 
produit brut relatif était égal à 2,316.3 millions d’euros pour les 86 entreprises familiales Françaises, ce 
qui rend un produit moyen par entreprise de 26,9 millions d’euros. Cette moyenne est considérée comme 
extrêmement faible par rapport à une société Française, ou à d’autres sociétés Européennes, qui sont en 
moyenne de 1,058.2 millions d’euros et 580,8 millions d’euros par entreprise (Torstila, 2001).  
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Tableau 6: Statistiques descriptives du sous-évaluation 
Variable Moyenne Médiane Minimum Maximum Quartile 
Infér. 
Quartile 
Supér. 
Gamme Écart 
type 
Asymétrie 
UP_1d 1.92% 0.00% -12.56% 30.86% -0.61% 1.11% 43.42% 6.74% 2.59 
UP_2d 7.30% 1.51% -16.39% 61.57% -0.46% 16.38% 77.97% 12.09% 1.43 
UP_3d 15.00% 5.50% -17.61% 405.99% -0.19% 20.06% 423.61% 45.50% 7.65 
UP_4d 17.94% 6.32% -16.08% 406.15% -0.14% 23.46% 422.23% 46.72% 6.96 
UP_5d 18.96% 10.11% -18.96% 408.62% 0.51% 24.12% 427.58% 47.41% 6.76 
UP_10d 26.58% 13.56% -16.20% 394.34% 1.12% 35.22% 410.54% 50.67% 4.86 
UP_15d 29.63% 13.35% -26.27% 381.13% 2.95% 38.81% 407.40% 54.34% 3.68 
UP_30d 35.16% 13.00% -28.98% 682.84% 0.00% 37.52% 711.82% 87.29% 5.38 
Up_1d, UP_2d, UP_3d, etc. réfèrent à la sous-évaluation mesurée après 1 jour, 2 jours, 3 jours, etc. de 
l’émission. Nous remarquons que, en moyenne, les 86 entreprises familiales Françaises ont été valuées 
très équitablement parce que la sous-évaluation au premier jour était en moyenne de 1,92%, avec une 
médiane de 0,00%, et un quartile inférieur et supérieur de -0,61% et 1,11%, respectivement. 
Globalement, ces chiffres nous amènent à croire que les entreprises familiales étaient presque au juste 
prix le jour de leur émission, et donc il ne devrait pas être une grande préoccupation de la part des 
principaux actionnaires de ces entreprises sur l’argent laissé sur la table car aucune grande sous-
évaluation avait eu lieu lors de leur émission. Ici, nous pouvons supposer que la présence de la famille 
dans la gestion de ces entreprises et dans le conseil d’administration et d’être les principaux actionnaires, 
empêche leurs entreprises de la sous-évaluation profonde, qui est généralement commis par les 
souscripteurs à favoriser leurs principaux clients, faciliter l’introduction en bourse et réduire le risque 
de l’émission, comme vu précédemment. Cependant, on constate que dans les jours suivants, et jusqu’à 
le premier mois de l’émission, une période de modes rapides a été créée l’augmentation de la sous-
évaluation moyenne de 1,92% sur le premier jour de l’émission à 35,16% le trentième jour de l’émission. 
Cette augmentation rapide et forte des rendements IPO peut être expliquée par l’optimiste forte des 
investisseurs et les spéculateurs exigeant d’acquérir des actions IPO pour la recherche de rendements 
élevés à court terme.  
Tableau 7: Statistiques descriptives pour le control et propriété 
Variable 
Statistiques Descriptives 
(Suppression des données manquantes) 
Moyenne Médiane Min Max Quartile Infér. 
Quartile 
supér. Gamme 
écart-
type Asymétrie 
%_CF_FF_Pre-IPO 74.9% 76.3% 12.7% 100.0% 58.4% 96.6% 87.3% 23.0% -65.3% 
%_CF_Others_Pre-IPO 25.1% 23.7% 0.0% 87.3% 3.4% 41.6% 87.3% 23.0% 65.4% 
%_CF_Public_Pre-IPO 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.1% 927.4% 
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%_VO_FF_Pre-IPO 76.2% 79.2% 12.7% 100.0% 63.8% 97.4% 87.3% 22.7% -82.8% 
%_VO_Others_Pre-IPO 23.8% 20.8% 0.0% 87.3% 2.6% 36.2% 87.3% 22.7% 82.9% 
%_VO_Public_Pre-IPO 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.1% 927.4% 
%_CF_FF_Post-IPO 62.3% 63.9% 10.3% 98.3% 47.7% 79.1% 88.0% 20.8% -39.7% 
%_CF_Others_Post-IPO 18.2% 17.0% 0.0% 65.4% 3.0% 26.7% 65.4% 16.4% 76.5% 
%_CF_Public_Post-IPO 19.6% 18.2% 0.0% 50.6% 10.0% 26.0% 50.6% 11.8% 60.4% 
%_VO_FF_Post-IPO 66.9% 68.8% 10.3% 98.3% 50.9% 84.6% 88.0% 21.0% -61.6% 
%_VO_Others_Post-IPO 17.9% 16.5% 0.0% 65.4% 2.6% 26.3% 65.4% 16.8% 86.4% 
%_VO_Public_Post-IPO 15.3% 13.5% 0.0% 50.6% 6.7% 21.3% 50.6% 10.8% 110.2% 
Chge_Dif_CF_VO_FF 3.3% 2.1% -6.4% 17.1% 0.0% 5.5% 23.5% 4.1% 106.1% 
FF_%_CF_Chge -16.2% -16.9% -51.1% 94.6% -25.0% -9.5% 145.7% 17.4% 295.5% 
FF_%_VO_Chge -11.0% -10.7% -50.2% 149.1% -17.7% -5.1% 199.3% 20.9% 519.1% 
Dif_CF_VO_Public -4.3% -2.9% -15.5% 0.0% -8.5% 0.0% 15.5% 4.5% -68.1% 
CF_Board_Pre-IPO 78.5% 85.5% 0.1% 100.0% 66.8% 97.6% 99.9% 23.4% -137.9% 
CF_Board_Post-IPO 64.4% 66.3% 0.1% 98.3% 53.4% 79.3% 98.2% 21.9% -78.9% 
Board_CF_Change -18.3% -17.3% -47.7% 1.4% -25.0% -10.0% 49.1% 11.5% -56.6% 
% _CF_FF_Pre-IPO et% _CF_FF_Post-IPO: Pourcentage des droits de flux de trésorerie pour les propriétaires 
des entreprises familiales à la date de pré-introduction en bourse et post-IPO jour. 
% _CF_Others_Pre-IPO et% _CF_Others_Post-IPO: Pourcentage des droits de flux de trésorerie pour les autres, 
tels que les banques d’investissement, les administrateurs et les employés non familiaux à la date pré-IPO et sur 
post-IPO jour. 
% _CF_Public_Pre-IPO et% _CF_Public_Post-IPO: Pourcentage des droits de flux de trésorerie pour les 
actionnaires publics sur pré-IPO date et sur la date post-IPO. 
% _VO_FF_Pre-IPO et% _VO_FF_Post-IPO: Pourcentage des droits de vote pour les propriétaires des 
entreprises familiales à la date de pré-introduction en bourse et post-IPO jour. 
% _VO_Others_Pre-IPO et% _VO_Others_Post-IPO: Pourcentage des droits de vote pour les autres, tels que les 
banques d’investissement, les administrateurs et les employés non familiaux à la date pré-IPO et sur post-IPO 
jour. 
% _VO_Public_Pre-IPO et% _VO_Public_Post-IPO: Pourcentage des droits de vote pour les actionnaires publics 
sur pré-IPO date et sur la date post-IPO. 
Chge_Dif_CF_VO_FF: variation de la différence entre les droits de flux de trésorerie et des droits de vote pour 
les propriétaires des entreprises familiales. 
FF _% _ CF_Chge: propriétaires pourcentage des flux de trésorerie des entreprises familiales du changement 
droite. 
FF _% _ VO_Chge: les propriétaires des entreprises familiales de pourcentage voter changement droite. 
Dif_CF_VO_Public: différence entre le bien des flux de trésorerie et de droit de vote pour les actionnaires publics. 
CF_Board_Pre-IPO et CF_Board_Post-IPO: FLUX DE TRÉSORERIE droit de propriété pour les membres du 
conseil d’administration sur les pré-IPO date et le post-IPO jour. 
Board_CF_Change: la trésorerie Changer droit pour les membres du conseil d’administration de pré-date post-
IPO. 
Nous avons remarqué une différenciation nette entre les droits de flux de trésorerie donnés aux porteurs 
de parts des entreprises et des droits de vote. Nous rappelons que les droits de flux de trésorerie sont 
soumis à des créances résiduelles de la société, y compris tous les types de dividendes, le bénéfice et les 
pertes selon le pourcentage des droits de flux de trésorerie chaque investisseur détient à leur égard au 
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total des droits de flux de trésorerie accordées pour tous les actionnaires. Toutefois, les droits de vote 
accordés pour les entreprises familiales pour les initiés et pour les actionnaires publics dépendent des 
entreprises de statuts internes décidées par le conseil d’administration. Ces droits de vote peuvent alors 
être totalement différents entre ces deux types d’actionnaires, même en présence d’un nombre égal des 
droits de flux de trésorerie accordées pour les deux types. Le pourcentage de droits de flux de trésorerie 
des propriétaires de l’entreprise familiale avant l’introduction en bourse a une moyenne de 74,9% et une 
médiane de 76,3%, un quartile inférieur et supérieur de 58,4% et 96,61% et un écart type de 22,97%. 
Cela montre clairement que les propriétaires des entreprises familiales et leurs descendants contrôlent 
strictement l’entreprise en ayant les droits de trésorerie relativement élevé. Pourtant, tous ces 
pourcentages se baissent après l’IPO. Le pourcentage de la moyenne et la médiane des droits de flux de 
trésorerie des propriétaires de l’entreprises familiales après l’introduction en bourse a enregistré 62,3% 
et 63,9%. Ces chiffres ne révèlent pas grand-chose sans les comparer à, et en regardant, la variation en 
pourcentage des droits de vote pour les propriétaires de l’entreprise familiale, qui se baisse de 11% et 
de 10,7% pour la moyenne et la médiane, respectivement. Ainsi, la diminution moyenne en pourcentage 
des droits de flux de trésorerie a enregistré 16,2% tandis que celle des droits de vote enregistré de 11%. 
Cela signifie qu’en moyenne, les propriétaires des entreprises familiales ont eux-mêmes bénéficié de 
l’introduction en bourse en se consacrant davantage de droits de vote par rapport à leurs droits de flux 
de trésorerie. En conséquence, la séparation entre les droits de flux de trésorerie et les droits de vote a 
empiré depuis l’introduction en bourse. 
Tableau 8: Les statistiques descriptives sur les mécanismes de gouvernance 
Variable 
Statistiques descriptives - Valide N = 86 
Moyenne Médiane Min Max Quartile Infér. 
Quartile 
supér. Gamme 
écart-
type Asymétrie 
Offering_Price 17.23 16.65 1.88 51.83 8.00 24.39 49.95 9.77 0.60 
Board_Size 4.67 4.00 3.00 11.00 3.00 6.00 8.00 1.82 1.20 
%_Independent 20.5% 16.7% 0.0% 66.7% 0.0% 37.5% 66.7% 22.8% 58.6% 
Separation_Shares 0.67 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.47 -0.76 
CEO/Chair Duality 0.77 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.42 -1.29 
CEO_Founder 0.80 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.40 -1.55 
High_Tech 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.42 1.37 
Age 16.9 12.5 0.9 187.0 5.8 20.7 186.1 22.1 5.7 
Le tableau 8 montre que les prix moyens et médians des entreprises sont 17,23 € et 16,65 €, avec un 
quartile inférieur et supérieur de 8 € et 24,39 €, respectivement. Cela montre que le prix de l’action le 
plus préférable pour émission de nouvelles actions est entre la gamme modeste de 8 € et 25 € pour des 
préférences de liquidité. Nous remarquons que la moyenne et le médian de la taille du conseil 
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d’administration de l’entreprise familiale est 4,67 et 4,00, respectivement, avec un minimum et un 
maximum de 3 membres et 11, respectivement. Cela nous indique que, en moyenne, les entreprises 
familiales Françaises ont un conseil de taille réduite par rapport à une entreprise Française ou 
Européenne. Cela peut être dû au refus des entreprises familiales d’augmenter la taille du conseil 
d’administration en comprenant des administrateurs professionnels et indépendents qui peuvent exercer 
des activités de surveillance supplémentaires sur ces entreprises. Ceci est également montré dans le 
pourcentage d’administrateurs indépendants, qui a une moyenne de 20,5% et une médiane de 16,7% 
avec un quartile inférieur et supérieur de 0% et 37,5%, respectivement. Le pourcentage 
d’administrateurs indépendants des entreprises familiales Françaises est également inférieur à la 
moyenne pour une entreprise Française. 
Comme le montre, 67% des entreprises familiales Françaises ont séparation des actions, ce qui est 
clairement considéré comme une tentative d’exproprier la richesse des actionnaires minoritaires. Les 
propriétaires des entreprises familiales favorisent considérablement leurs intérêts tout au long de 
l’émission par l’attribution de droits de vote double à eux-mêmes, leurs descendants et parents directs. 
Cela va certainement exacerber la séparation entre les droits de flux de trésorerie et les droits de vote et 
de détruire l’image de l’intégrité des entreprises envers le public. 
En outre, environ 77% des entreprises familiales Françaises ont leurs dirigeants qui occupent le poste 
de président du conseil d’administration sur le jour de l’IPO. Ceci est aussi une autre méthode de 
contrôle que les propriétaires des entreprises familiales exercent fortement au cours de leurs entreprises. 
D’une part, le côté négatif de telle action est lié à l’expropriation des actionnaires minoritaires à travers 
le contrôle direct et l’influence des décisions du conseil d’administration de l’entreprise et de la direction 
de la firme de l’opération quotidienne. D’autre part, le côté positif de telle action est la meilleure 
communication entre les membres de la direction et les membres du conseil d’administration par le biais 
d’une personne, ce qui peut améliorer les performances de l’entreprise comme de nombreux chercheurs 
conviennent. Cependant, après les nombreux scandales les marchés financiers ont été témoins au cours 
des dernières décennies, en particulier ceux liés aux mécanismes de gouvernance d’entreprise, et 
conformément à la loi Sarbanes-Oxley, il a été fortement recommandé que les entreprises se 
différencient clairement entre la position du chef de la direction de l’entreprise et celui du président du 
conseil d’administration. 
Nous avons également constaté que près de 80% des entreprises familiales Françaises étaient gérées par 
la même personne qui a fondé l’entreprise. De même, les dirigeants fondateurs étaient présents dans près 
de 80% des entreprises familiales. Cela révèle trois idées importantes à discuter. La première est que, 
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en moyenne, les entreprises sont prêts à aller publique, même pendant le temps où le PDG de la firme 
est le même que le fondateur d’entreprise et pas ses descendants, ce qui nécessite une action courageuse. 
Le second montre que les fondateurs des entreprises familiales trouvent que IPOs sont des moyens pour 
la croissance et des solutions possibles pour le passage des entreprises à leurs descendants allant au-delà 
de la vie des fondateurs. Et la troisième montre la robustesse et de la persistance des fondateurs d’une 
entreprise dans la gestion de l’entreprise qu’ils ont créée et qui est resté au sommet de la direction de 
l’entreprise jusqu’à ce que le jour de l’émission. En outre, on constate que près de 22% de toutes les 
entreprises familiales appartiennent à l’industrie de la haute technologie et les 78% restants 
appartiennent aux six autres industries. Pour l’âge des entreprises, nous affirmons que la moyenne et la 
médiane des entreprises familiales sont égales à 16,9 ans et 12,5 ans, respectivement. Cependant, nous 
remarquons ici que l’écart type de l’âge des entreprises est égal à 22,1 ans. Cela montre que les 
entreprises publiques en cours sont assez jeunes.  
4. RÉSULATATS DES REGRESSIONS ET INTERPRÉTATIONS 
Pour expliquer la sous-évaluation à partir des droits de vote et de contrôle et certains mécanismes de 
gouvernance, nous allons utiliser deux modèles de régression linéaire multiple en changeant les 
prédicteurs qui répondent à ces variables. Dans le premier modèle, nous allons aborder la propriété et 
les droits de contrôle pour les propriétaires des entreprises familiales et le changement entre les deux 
droits après l’émission. Dans le second modèle, nous allons aborder certains mécanismes de 
gouvernance spécifiques fixés par les entreprises familiales le jour de l’émission. 
4.1. Les droits de contrôle et les droits de vote 
Nous allons inclure dans ce modèle quatre variables de contrôle qui sont l’éclatement de la bulle, 
l’industrie de la haute technologie, le logarithme naturel de produit brut, le logarithme naturel de l’âge 
et les trois variables indépendantes restantes liées aux droits de vote et de contrôle pour une tentative 
d’expliquer la sous-évaluation de la première journée. 
Toutes les variables utilisées dans le modèle ont des niveaux très acceptables de variance de l’inflation 
(VIF), car ils sont tous moins que le seuil de 4 utilisé et soutenu par Pan et Jackson (2008). On peut donc 
supposer que nous ne disposons pas d’un problème de multicolinéarité et nous pouvons inclure toutes 
les variables dans la régression linéaire multiple. Nous notons que le R-carré du modèle est égale à 
16,15% et le R-carré ajusté a enregistré 8,62%. En outre, le p-valeur du modèle est inférieure à 5%. 
Concernant les variables de contrôle, nous avons mentionné que seule la variable pré-DotCom est 
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statistiquement significative au niveau de 5% avec un bêta de coefficient de -0,246, tandis que le high-
tech, le produit brut et l’âge sont tous statistiquement non significatifs et leurs bêtas standardisés ne sont 
statistiquement pas différents de zéro. Concernant les variables indépendantes, nous notons que les 
changements des droits de flux de trésorerie pour les familles et les droits de flux de trésorerie des 
actionnaires publics sont statistiquement significatifs à 10% et 1% respectivement. Leurs bêtas 
standardisés sont égaux à -0,295 et -0,506 respectivement. Cependant, la différence entre les droits de 
flux de trésorerie et les droits de vote de la variable des actionnaires publics est statistiquement 
insignifiante. Nous attribuons ce résultat à la possibilité de domination des investisseurs et opportunistes 
envisagés au court terme qui se soucient moins à des droits de vote que de réaliser des rendements élevés 
et rapides. 
4.2. Mécanismes de Gouvernance 
Nous avons remarqué d’abord qu’il n’y a pas de problème de colinéarité entre les variables puisque tous 
les VIFs sont beaucoup moins que le seuil de 4. Toutefois, bien que le R-carré enregistré 9,75%, le R-
carré ajusté est tombé à zéro et la p-valeur est supérieure de 51%. En outre, et de façon surprenante, 
aucune des variables indépendantes et de contrôle semble être statistiquement différente de zéro ou à 
présenter une amélioration dans l’explication de la sous-évaluation. Par conséquent, aucune de ces 
variables de contrôle ne contribue à une explication de la sous-évaluation combinée avec des 
mécanismes de gouvernance. Nous attribuons ce résultat à la possibilité que les investisseurs des 
introductions en bourse se soucient plus de la variation de propriété et de contrôle, que sur les 
mécanismes de gouvernance. Par conséquent, les mécanismes du gouvernement ne constituent pas une 
variable importante pour expliquer les rendements anormaux de l’IPO du premier jour. 
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CHAPITRE 3: LA PERFORMANCE À LONG TERME DES 
ENTREPRISES INTRODUITES EN BOURSE  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Comme nous l’avons vu dans le chapitre précédent, l’offre publique initiale (IPO) est une étape très 
importante et fondamentale dans la vie de l’entreprise et une question centrale dans la finance 
d’entreprise, car il transforme la firme d’une société privée à une société détenue par le public, changer 
considérablement la structure de propriété, la structure du capital, le potentiel de croissance, les 
exigences législatives, les normes d’information et de communications publiques, les objectifs 
stratégiques, les inspections par les analystes, les niveaux de concurrence, l’image social, le capital 
humain, et les règles générales de l’entreprise. Dans le chapitre précédent, nous avons parlé des 
anomalies de performance des IPOs résumées par une sous-évaluation à court terme et d’une sous-
performance à long terme. Ces deux anomalies ont été les points centraux de nombreuses recherches à 
travers le monde, pour tenter d’expliquer ces sources. 
La sous-performance à long terme décrit l’observation que les entreprises IPOs, au cours de la période 
postérieure à l’introduction en bourse de un à cinq ans, ont tendance à sous-performer par rapport au 
marché et par rapport aux entreprises publiques ayant des caractéristiques similaires, telles que la taille, 
l’industrie, la structure du capital, etc. (Loughran et Ritter, 1995; Ritter, 1991). Par exemple, de 
nombreuses études menées dans différents pays ont confirmé la sous-performance d’un (Aggarwal et 
Rivoli, 1990), deux (Hanley, 1993), trois (Loughran et al., 1994; Ritter, 1991), et cinq ans (Loughran et 
Ritter, 1995 ) après l’émission. La performance à long terme de l’IPO est devenue le centre de l’attention 
plus que tout temps avant (Espenlaub et al., 2000) et donc le champ est d’attirer plus de recherches pour 
expliquer la performance de l’IPO de différents aspects. 
En France, Leleux (1993) a étudié la performance à long terme de 69 introductions en bourse lancées 
entre 1985 et 1991 et a trouvé un rendement anormal ajusté de -11,2%. Remarquablement, en résumant 
les études existantes, Loughran et al. (1994) ont montré que la sous-performance à long terme est 
seulement 4,8% pour la France. Loughran et al. (1994) commentent que le marché Français est fiable 
pour les investisseurs axés sur le long terme, car ils ne perdent pas l’argent investi au cours de la période 
de prix de l’offre, comme cela a été documenté par Gounopoulos et al. (2007). En outre, Chahine (2008) 
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a également examiné la performance à long terme pour les actions Françaises pour la période 1996-1998 
et a trouvé des rendements anormaux cumulés de -9,94%. 
Nous allons examiner l’introduction en bourse performance à long terme des 86 entreprises familiales 
Françaises qui ont été choisis dans le chapitre précédent dans le cadre de mécanismes de gouvernance 
d’entreprise et la structure de propriété pré- et post-IPO, avec d’autres variables. Nous allons aussi 
observer la relation entre les niveaux de sous-évaluation de ces entreprises et leur performance à long 
terme. En conséquence, l’objectif de notre recherche dans ce chapitre est de plus savoir sur les 
performances à long terme des entreprises familiales Françaises, compte tenu de leurs mécanismes de 
gouvernance et la structure de propriété pré et post-IPO, en appliquant différents modèles et de tests, 
allant de six mois à six ans après introduction, en tenant compte de toutes les entreprises lancées entre 
1994 et 2013 (qui est, sur une période de 20 ans). Tout d’abord, nous allons mesurer la performance à 
long terme; d’autre part, nous allons expliquer les sources et les raisons de ces performances via 
différents mécanismes et variables, visant à prévoir et à améliorer la performance subséquente.  
2. REVUE DE LA LITTÉRATURE ET HYPOTHÈSES 
2.1. Sources de sous-performance 
Il est crucial de noter que nous ne pouvons pas ignorer, isoler ou de séparer les raisons et les sources 
d’introduction en bourse de la sous-évaluation de l’IPO à la sous-performance. Il en est ainsi parce que 
la sous-évaluation et la sous-performance sont liées entre eux: ils dérivent d’un et un seul événement, 
qui est l’offre publique initiale. Ritter (1991) soutient que les explications possibles pour la sous-
performance observée dès 1.526 offices de propriété industrielle aux États-Unis pendant la période 
1975-1984 comprennent (1) l’erreur de mesure des risques, (2) la malchance, ou (3) les modes et plus 
d’optimisme. 
2.1.1. La relation entre la sous-évaluation et la sous-performance 
Aggarwal et Rivoli (1990) font valoir que la mauvaise performance de l’IPO à long terme peut être dûe 
à des bulles spéculatives. Une explication sur les rendements anormaux à court terme est que l’offre est 
initialement sous-évaluée, ce qui signifie que les actions sont vendues ci-dessous de leur valeur 
intrinsèque à l’émission. Ainsi, un rendement anormal initial au premier jour aura lieu, illustré par un 
cours de clôture très élevé en fin de journée par rapport au prix d’offre. L’explication des modes a été 
mentionné par Shiller (1990) pour expliquer la sous-performance à long terme, qui a affirmé que les 
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entreprises vont publique lorsque les investisseurs sont irrationnellement trop optimistes sur le potentiel 
futur de certaines industries. 
Nous allons supposer que les entreprises familiales ne se comportent pas très différente de celle d’autres 
entreprises sur le long terme, et l’association qu’Aggarwal et Rivoli (1990) ont discuté entre la sous-
évaluation et la sous-performance sera également testée. 
Hypothèse 1: Les entreprises familiales Françaises seront sous-performées à long terme. 
Hypothèse 2: La sous-performance à long terme des entreprises familiales Françaises disparaîtra 
lorsqu’on utilise le prix d’émission à la place de la clôture du premier jour dans le calcul du rendement. 
Hypothèse 3: Pour les entreprises familiales Françaises, il existe une relation négative entre la sous-
évaluation et la sous-performance. 
2.1.2. La Relation entre le Phénomène de Marché d’émission chaude et la Sous-Performance 
L’une des variables explicatives les plus importants pour la performance à long terme qui a été largement 
discutée, testée et constatée par de nombreux chercheurs pendant plusieurs décennies est le phénomène 
de marché « émission chaude ». Son importance réside dans le fait que cela affecte profondément non 
seulement la performance à court terme mais aussi à long terme. Yi (2003) fait valoir qu’au cours des 
30 à 40 dernières années, de nombreux chercheurs ont observé le motif récurrent de cycles à la fois le 
volume et les rendements moyens initiaux des IPOs, qui est généralement désigné comme le phénomène 
de marché d’émission chaude. Marchés d’émission chaudes, qui sont des périodes avec des rendements 
initiaux anormalement élevés se trouvent à être associée à une augmentation du volume des 
introductions en bourse. D’autre part, les marchés «d’émission froide», avec des rendements initials 
relativement faibles, ont tendance à se produire vers la fin des périodes de haut volume. 
Hypothèse 4: La performance à long terme des entreprises familiales Françaises est positivement 
associée à la synchronisation des introductions en bourse pendant les périodes d’émission chaude. 
2.1.3. La relation entre Venture Capital soutenu IPO et Sous-performance 
Jain et Kini (2000) montrent que les introductions soutenues par des sociétés capital-risque sont plus 
susceptibles de survivre par rapport à d’autres parce qu’ils attirent des investisseurs prestigieux, 
influencent les gestionnaires dans les décisions stratégiques, influencent les investisseurs institutionnels, 
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et attirent plus d’analystes à la suite de la ferme. Lorsque les introductions en bourse sont soutenues par 
des sociétés capital-risque, les investisseurs estiment que leurs investissements sont plus sûrs.  
2.1.4. La relation entre la réputation des souscripteurs et la sous-performance 
De nombreux chercheurs se sont intéressés à mesurer et évaluer la sensibilité de l’IPO et à la 
performance à long terme selon le nom, la réputation, l’expérience, le profil, les dossiers antérieurs, et 
le professionnalisme des souscripteurs. Carter, Dark et Singh (1998) document qui la sous-performance 
des actions des IPOs par rapport au marché sur une période de détention de trois ans est moins sévère 
pour les introductions en bourse souscrits par plusieurs souscripteurs prestigieuses.  
3. ÉCHANTILLON, DONNÉES ET MÉTHODOLOGIE 
3.1. Échantillon 
Nous nous référerons au même échantillon d’entreprises familiales Françaises que nous avons travaillées 
dans chapitre 2.  
3.2. Les modèles de performance à long terme 
Certains des modèles que nous avons menées sont les rendements cumulatifs moyens ajustés (CAR), le  
modèle à trois facteurs de Fama et French (1993), et deux modèles de régression linéaire multiples 
adaptées, visé au modèle 1 et 2. Dans modèle 1, nous allons tenter d’expliquer la performance à long 
terme prenant les droits de propriété et de contrôle avant et après l’introduction, et dans modèle 2, nous 
allons plutôt envisager les mécanismes de gouvernance établis par les entreprises familiales le jour de 
leur émission. Dans les deux modèles, nous allons utiliser le cinquième jour de la sous-évaluation 
comme une variable de contrôle pour l’examen de performance à court terme pour toutes les entreprises, 
en plus de leurs mécanismes de propriété et de gouvernance.  
3.2.1. Le rendement cumulatif anormal ajusté 
Le rendement cumulatif anormal ajusté (CAR) de l’événement mois q à l’événement mois s est la somme 
de la moyenne des rendements anormaux de référence ajusté et est calculé comme suit: ܥܣܴ�,௦ =  ∑ ܣܴ௧ st=q   
3.2.2. Le modèle à trois-facteurs de Fama et French 
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La performance des introductions en bourse est mesurée sur l’alpha du Jensen, de la régression suivante: ܴሺ�,௦ሻ − �ܴ = ߙሺ�,௦ሻ + ߚሺ�,௦ሻ[ܴ�,ሺ�,௦ሻ − �ܴ] + �ሺ�,௦ሻܵܯܤሺ�,௦ሻ + ℎሺ�,௦ሻܪܯܮሺ�,௦ሻ + �ሺ�,௦ሻ 
3.2.3. Les Régressions Linéaires Multiples 
Comme indiqué, nous essayons d’expliquer la performance à long terme au moyen de deux modèles. Le 
modèle 1 comprend les droits de propriété et de contrôle, tandis que le modèle 2 inclut des mécanismes 
de gouvernance. 
3.3. Statistiques Descriptives 
L’OP représente le prix d’offre et le CP représente le prix de clôture du premier jour. Le 1M, 6M, et 
12M se réfèrent à l’achat et à l’inclusion de toutes les actions IPO dans le portefeuille après 1, 6 et 12 
mois suivant leur émission. Nous constatons que le plus grand nombre d’offres appartient à l’industrie 
de la technologie, qui représente 19 introductions en bourse de 1996-2001, qui est, pendant le rallye de 
la bulle d’internet, avec un pic en 2000 avec 8 IPOs. Après 2001, aucune introduction n’a été émise liée 
à l’industrie de la technologie. Le deuxième plus grand nombre d’introductions en bourse appartient à 
la fois à l’industrie non cyclique consommateur et l’industrie, avec un total de 17 introductions en bourse 
pour chaque industrie, qui est très proche de l’industrie de la technologie avec 19 introductions en 
bourse. Les troisième et quatrième chiffres les plus élevés concernent les communications et les 
industries de consommation cycliques, avec un nombre total de 16 et 15 introductions en bourse, 
respectivement. Les industries des matériaux de base et de l’énergie ont eu le plus faible nombre 
d’introductions en bourse, qui est, seulement 1 IPO pour chacune. 
4. RÉSULTATS DE LA PERFORMANCE À LONG TERME 
4.1. Résultats de l’indice de référence ajusté cumulatifs rendements anormaux 
Parmi toutes les cinq dates d’entrée (OP, CP, 1M, 6M, et 12M), l’OP et le CP génèrent en moyenne les 
plus hauts rendements anormaux de 31% et 28,8%, respectivement au premier mois après introduction, 
comparativement à un rendement mensuel anormal moyen de seulement 0,95%. En conséquence, cela 
a certainement eu une influence considérable sur les résultats de CAR et BHAR sur les soixante-
deuxième mois. Les investisseurs entrant dans le portefeuille des IPOs à l’OP ou au CP peuvent générer 
un rendement anormal cumulé de 106,8% et 104,2%, respectivement, à la fin de soixante-deuxième 
mois. Les investisseurs entrant dans le portefeuille des IPOs après 1M, 6M et 12M peuvent générer un 
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rendement anormal cumulé de 74,8%, 73,9% et 78,5%, respectivement, à la fin de soixante-deuxième 
mois. 
Ainsi, les investisseurs qui ratent l’occasion d’investir dans l’introduction en bourse sur le premier jour 
de l’émission sont mieux d’attendre 12 mois avant d’entrer dans le portefeuille des IPOs que d’entrer à 
seulement 1 ou 6 mois plus tard. Cependant, investir ailleurs devrait générer sur une période de 1 an un 
rendement qui est au moins égal ou supérieur au rendement généré si les actions d’IPO devaient être 
investi après 1 ou 6 mois, ce qui représente le coût d’opportunité. Cependant, même si on exclut le très 
haut premier mois avec un rendement anormal de 28,8% à l’OP et de 31% au CP, les entreprises 
familiales génèrent encore un CAR positif dans le long terme. Ces rendements positifs à long terme 
commencent à apparaître à la fin de la deuxième année après l’émission pour les trois dates d’entrée, 
qui sont 1M, 6M, et 12M. Cela signifie que les investissements dans le portefeuille des IPOs, génèrent 
des rendements anormaux négatifs dans les premiers mois, permettra d’atteindre des rendements 
anormaux positifs à long terme de plus de 70%. En outre, cela montre que les rendements positifs à long 
terme de ces entreprises familiales observées ne proviennent pas uniquement du premier mois, qui sont 
directement associés à l’effet IPO, mais qu’en outre ces entreprises familiales semblent surperformer 
leur indice de référence du marché sur le long terme, mois après mois, pour atteindre des niveaux bien 
au-dessus de 70%. 
4.2. Les résultats du modèle à trois-facteurs de Fama et French 
Nous avons réalisé quatre régressions en utilisant le modèle à trois facteurs de Fama et French pour les 
quatre périodes de détention de 3, 4, 5, et 6 ans en utilisant les rendements équipondérés. Nous 
remarquons que le R-carré est de 43% pour le portefeuille de période de 3 ans et 56% pour la période 
de 6 ans. Cela signifie que moins de 44% de la variance du portefeuille demeure inexpliquée par ces 
variables. Le p-value des 4 régressions sont statistiquement significatives au niveau de 0,01 ‰, avec F-
statistiques très élevées. 
Nous remarquons que les alphas de Jensen pour les quatre périodes de détention sont tous positifs et 
statistiquement significatifs au niveau de 5% pour le portefeuille tenant de 3 ans et 4 ans et au niveau de 
1% pour les 5 ans et 6 ans. Par conséquent, dans ce cas, les investisseurs qui achètent des actions d’IPO 
de chaque entreprise familiale et en les tenant pour des périodes de 3, 4, 5 et 6 ans peuvent générer des 
rendements anormaux de l’ordre de 1% par mois, ce qui est statistiquement significative. Pour les 
versions bêta de coefficients standardisés, nous remarquons que le facteur lié à la dette (HML) pour les 
quatre périodes de détention différents ne soit pas statistiquement significativement différent de zéro. 
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La prime de risque de marché (Rm-Rf) et le facteur lié à la taille (SMB) sont statistiquement très 
significativement différent de zéro au niveau de 1 ‰ et ils sont tous positifs. La version bêta de 
coefficient positif et statistiquement significatif pour les PME peut être attribué au fait que la plupart 
des entreprises familiales Françaises sont de petite taille. En fait, la taille de l’émission moyenne des 
entreprises familiales Françaises est d’environ 27 millions d’euros, tandis que la taille de l’émission 
moyenne des entreprises Françaises typiques est 1,058 millions d’euros. Par conséquent, nous 
constatons que le modèle de Fama et French présente un haut degré d’explication des rendements des 
IPOs des entreprises familiales, qui atteint 56% pour la période de détention de 6 ans comparativement 
à 27% dans le modèle de CAPM. 
4.3. Résultats des régressions linéaires multiples 
En regardant les résultats de la régression du Modèle 1 pour les rendements à long terme anormales 
calculées suivant la méthode de la CAR, nous remarquons que le R-carré est 18,62% pour la période de 
détention de 4 ans et 21,28% pour la période de détention de 5 ans avec une p-value inférieure à 1% 
pour toutes les périodes de détention. Nous remarquons aussi un alpha positif et statistiquement 
significatif au niveau de 1% pour toutes les périodes de détention, allant de 62,66% pour la période de 
détention de 3 ans à 171,89% pour la période de détention de 6 ans. La différence entre les flux de 
trésorerie et les droits de vote pour les actionnaires publics et le pourcentage des droits de flux de 
trésorerie après l’émission pour les actionnaires publics sont à la fois statistiquement significativement 
différent de zéro. Nous notons que ce modèle montre que près de 20% de la variance des rendements 
anormaux calculés par la CAR peut être expliqué par le changement de droits de propriété et de contrôle 
avec une signification statistique très élevée. 
Dans Modèle 2, nous essayons d’expliquer la performance à long terme calculée par la CAR pour de 
périodes différentes via des mécanismes de gouvernance. Nous remarquons que le R-carré est 14% pour 
la période de détention de 3 ans et 21% pour la période de détention de 6 ans avec des niveaux de 
signification statistique acceptables. Nous remarquons également que la sous-évaluation du cinquième 
jour est statistiquement significativement différente de zéro au niveau de 1% pour les 4 périodes de 
détention. Les résultats du modèle montrent également que pour tous les mécanismes de gouvernance 
les bêtas sont statistiquement significativement différents de zéro, sauf pour la séparation en actions 
pour la période de détention de 6 ans, ce qui montre une version bêta négative au niveau de signification 
statistique de 5%. Nous pouvons en déduire que les mécanismes de gouvernance présentés dans notre 
modèle ne présentent pas un bon niveau d’explication de la performance de l’IPO à long terme. 
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Toutefois, les deux modèles 1 et 2 ne semblent pas être très fiables dans l’explication de la performance 
à long terme mesurée à la fois par la CAR pour les 4 périodes de détention. Bien que le R-carré pour 
certaine régressions est d’environ 20%, il change tout au long des périodes de détention. Par conséquent, 
nous pouvons rejeter l’hypothèse que le changement de droits de propriété et de contrôle avant et après 
la date de l’émission avec les mécanismes de gouvernance sont des fiables et robustes pour expliquer le 
CAR de la période de conservation de 3 ans à 6 ans. 
4.4. Test d’hypothèse 
Hypothèse 1: Les entreprises familiales Françaises seront sous-performées à long terme. 
Hypothèse 2: La sous-performance à long terme des entreprises familiales Françaises disparaîtra 
lorsqu’on utilise le prix d’émission à la place de la clôture du premier jour dans le calcul du rendement. 
Ci-dessous, nous présentons un résumé des deux calculs de performance à long terme en utilisant les 
rendements anormaux cumulés (CAR) en supposant que les actions de l’IPO ont été achetées à 
seulement l’OP et le CP, qui sont suffisantes pour tester ces deux hypothèses.  
Tableau 9: Test de moyens pour la performance à long terme 
T Test de moyens contre la constante de référence (0,00%) 
 
CAR_CP Moyenne et p-
value 
CAR_OP Moyenne et 
p-value 
1 28.8%*** 0.000 31.0%*** 0.000 
6 27.4%*** 0.002 29.7%*** 0.001 
12 26.4%** 0.015 28.7%*** 0.009 
18 21.1%* 0.060 23.4%** 0.040 
24 29.0%** 0.014 31.4%*** 0.009 
30 34.9%*** 0.003 37.3%*** 0.002 
36 46.4%*** 0.000 48.8%*** 0.000 
42 48.8%*** 0.000 51.2%*** 0.000 
48 75.0%*** 0.000 77.4%*** 0.000 
54 81.4%*** 0.000 83.9%*** 0.000 
60 83.9%*** 0.000 86.5%*** 0.000 
66 89.8%*** 0.000 92.4%*** 0.000 
72 104.2%*** 0.000 106.8%*** 0.000 
Les sommaires des résultats présentés dans le tableau 9 viennent de rejeter la première hypothèse en 
montrant clairement que, en moyenne, la performance de l’IPO à long terme est positive avec une 
signification statistique suffisante, calculée sur la base soit du prix d’offre (OP) ou au prix à la fermeture 
du premier jour (CP). Cependant, les rendements anormaux calculés en utilisant la CAR semblent être 
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statistiquement significative. En outre, on observe également dans le tableau 9 que la performance à 
long terme des IPOs calculée soit par l’OP ou le CP ne change pas de beaucoup. Ceci est principalement 
dû au modeste rendement de l’IPO au premier jour des entreprises familiales Françaises ce qui est près 
de 2%. Nous rejetons l’hypothèse qui stipule que les entreprises familiales Françaises seront sous-
performer leur indice de référence du marché ainsi que l’hypothèse qui indique que la sous-performance 
à long terme, si elle devait exister, disparaît quand y compris le rendement du premier jour, car nous 
avons vu que la différence entre les deux rendements calculés, soit à l’OP ou au CP, est non significative. 
Hypothèse 3: Pour les entreprises familiales Françaises, il existe une relation négative entre la sous-
évaluation et la sous-performance. 
Les rendement des IPOs à long terme des actions achetées que dans leur premier jour de l’émission, que 
ce soit à leur prix d’offre ou à leur cours de clôture du premier jour, semblent être en corrélation positive 
avec la sous-évaluation des cinq premiers jours, excluant le premier jour sur la base de calculs de CAR. 
Donc on peut rejetter l’hypothèse 3.  
Hypothèse 4: La performance à long terme des entreprises familiales Françaises est positivement 
associée à la synchronisation des introductions en bourse pendant les périodes d’émission chaude. 
Comme indiqué précédemment, 59 sur 86 introductions en bourse des entreprises familiales ont été 
délivrés avant 2001 (éclatement de la bulle d’internet), ce qui représente 69% de toutes les introductions 
en bourse de notre échantillon. Cependant, comme dans le chapitre précédent, nous allons prendre cette 
année comme une période de coupure et de tester la performance à court terme IPO en considérant l’effet 
pré- et post-2001, lorsque tester la relation entre la performance à long terme IPO et la détermination si 
le moment de l’émission se produit avant ou après cette année. Fondamentalement, la période de la bulle 
d’internet a été remarquable à la fois la quantité et la taille des introductions en bourse émises et qui est 
explicable pour considerer la période de mode. Ainsi, nous rappelons que nous avons utilisé la variable 
fictive 1 si l’introduction en bourse a eu lieu avant 2001 et 0 sinon. Par conséquent, même si il était très 
clair que la période de la mode existait avant la bulle d’internet, aucune corrélation n’a été observée 
entre le rendement à long terme des entreprises familiales, qui nous conduit à rejeter la quatrième 
hypothèse, qui stipule que la performance des IPOs à long terme est associée positivement avec le 
calendrier des introductions en bourse pendant les périodes de bulle. 
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CONCLUSION 
Dans cette thèse, nous avons cherché à découvrir la structure du capital des entreprises familiales 
Françaises en démarrant de la théorie de l’agence et la théorie d’asymétrie d’information. Nous avons 
également observé le prospectus des IPOs de chaque entreprise familiale composante de l’indice CAC 
All-Tradable et nous avons enregistré le changement de propriété et de contrôle et de principaux 
mécanismes de gouvernance. Nous avons calculé la performance des IPOs au court et au long terme en 
utilisant différentes méthodes et modèles, et en utilisant l’analyse transversale et séries chronologiques 
de données. 
Dans chapitre 1, nous constatons que les entreprises familiales se caractérisent par un faible niveau de 
la dette que les entreprises non familiales. En outre, les entreprises familiales semblent moins compter 
sur les emprunts à long terme que sur les emprunts à court terme, ce qui signifie qu’ils préfèrent rouler 
sur leur effet de levier à court terme le plus souvent et ne pas avoir gravement préoccupé par l’approche 
créanciers chaque fois qu’ils ont besoin de financement supplémentaire. Concernant le niveau 
d’endettement faible des entreprises familiales, nous pouvons l’expliquer en basant sur la théorie 
présentée par Jensen (1986), qui a fait valoir que la présence des propriétaires au sein de leurs entreprises 
augmente leur capacité à surveiller les gestionnaires et réduire ainsi les coûts de type 1 de l’agence, 
rendant le rôle disciplinaire de la dette moins pertinent et nécessaire. En outre, comme nos études et de 
plusieurs différentes études indiquent (par exemple Anderson et Reeb, 2003a; Villalonga et Amit, 2006), 
les entreprises familiales Françaises démontrent une meilleure performance que leurs homologues non 
familiales, qui signale leurs meilleures capacités à générer des fonds internes et des flux de trésorerie 
constants. Par conséquent, ils dépendent moins du financement extérieur (à la fois la dette et capitaux 
propres). 
Dans chapitre 2, nous avons observé que les entreprises familiales Françaises avaient une sous-
évaluation moyenne de 1,92% et une médiane de 0,00%. Nous avons attribué cette sous-évaluation 
inférieure du premier jour à l’alignement des intérêts entre les directeurs et les agents. D’autre part, le 
problème de type 2 de l’agence discuté par Zingales (1995) est bien présente entre la majorité et les 
actionnaires minoritaires de ces entreprises familiales. Nous avons remarqué que, en moyenne, les 
propriétaires des entreprises familiales ont essayé clairement à étendre leur contrôle sur leurs entreprises 
en assurant des niveaux plus élevés de droits de contrôle par rapport à leurs niveaux de droits de flux de 
trésorerie. Dans les modèles que nous avons utilisées, nous avons constaté que près de 16,2% de la 
variance de la sous-évaluation peut être expliquée par le changement de droits de propriété et de contrôle. 
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À l’inverse, seulement 9,8% de la variance de la sous-évaluation IPO peut être expliquée par des 
mécanismes de gouvernance.  
Dans chapitre 3, nous avons mesuré les performances des IPO à long terme et nous avons essayé de 
l’expliquer à travers de deux modèles, l’un à travers le changement de droits de propriété et de contrôle 
et l’autre à travers les mécanismes de gouvernance. Cependant, les deux modèles semblent présenter 
des résultats explicatifs pauvres pour les quatre, cinq et six ans. Nous avons également essayé d’utiliser 
le CAPM et le modèle Fama et French en assumant différentes dates d’entrée dans les actions des IPOs. 
En outre, nous avons vu que les entreprises familiales Françaises ont tendance à surperformer l’indice 
large du marché trois ans après l’émission, tout en présentant des performances faibles de un à trois mois 
après la délivrance et jusqu’à la troisième année. Les rendements anormaux à long terme sont devenus 
stagnés pendant presque trois ans dans lequel non seulement n’avaient pas de valeurs ajoutées pour les 
investisseurs des IPOs, mais aussi les pertes ont été observées au cours de cette période. Après la 
troisième année, les entreprises familiales ont semblé récupérer toutes les pertes et de commencer à 
générer des rendements anormaux positifs, atteignant 100% avec la méthode de la CAR et de 67% avec 
la méthode BHAR. Nous mentionnons que si nous étions pour mesurer la performance à long terme en 
utilisant un, deux ou trois ans après leur publication, nous serions certainement trouver une sous-
performance. Mais lors de la mesure de la performance à long terme quatre, cinq ou six ans après 
l’émission, nous trouvons des rendements anormaux positifs. 
Ainsi, comme nous l’avons mentionné, nous visons dans les futurs projets de recherche à agrandir la 
taille de notre échantillon en incluant plus d’entreprises familiales et donc nous cherchons à réaliser une 
analyse comparative approfondie entre les entreprises familiales et non familiales sur une plus grande 
échelle en incluant des entreprises d’autres pays. En outre, nous cherchons à inspecter les mécanismes 
de gouvernance étendus sur la période de l’échantillon et non seulement prises à la date de l’IPO. Nous 
avons également mentionné qu’il est préférable de travailler sur des périodes d’échantillonnage plus 
récent. En plus, nous voulons travailler sur des échantillons Européens en prenant des pays où il y a des 
entreprises familiales qui ont les mêmes caractéristiques que les entreprises familiales Françaises en 
faisant des études de comparaisons approfondies. 
 
 
 
iii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
PRELIMINARY CHAPTER 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 8 
2. Classifications and Characteristics of Family Firms ................................................................................ 13 
2.1. Classification of Family Firms .............................................................................................................. 13 
2.2. Major Characteristics of Family Firms’ Owners ................................................................................... 14 
3. Agency Theory and Conflicts .................................................................................................................. 18 
3.1. Agency Theory Review ......................................................................................................................... 18 
3.2. Nature of Conflicts between Shareholders ............................................................................................ 21 
4. Expropriation Strategies ........................................................................................................................... 23 
4.1. Dual-Class Stock ................................................................................................................................... 23 
4.2. Pyramidal Ownership ............................................................................................................................ 24 
4.3. Ownership Structure with Multiple Large Shareholders ....................................................................... 25 
4.4. Excessive Compensation and Special Dividends .................................................................................. 26 
4.5. Tunneling .............................................................................................................................................. 27 
4.6. Earnings Management ........................................................................................................................... 27 
4.7. Collusion between Family Shareholders and CEO ............................................................................... 28 
5. Corporate Governance Mechanisms In Family Firms ............................................................................. 29 
5.1. Definition and Importance .................................................................................................................... 30 
5.2. Types and Inter-relationships ................................................................................................................ 33 
6. The IPO Process, Benefits, and Timing ................................................................................................... 47 
6.1. IPO Process ........................................................................................................................................... 47 
6.2. IPO Benefits .......................................................................................................................................... 52 
6.3. IPO Timing ............................................................................................................................................ 56 
7. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................ 58 
CHAPTER 1: CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF FAMILY FIRMS 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 59 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses .......................................................................................................... 65 
2.1. The Agency Theory and Debt Financing .............................................................................................. 65 
2.2. The Asymmetric Information Theory and Debt Financing ................................................................... 72 
3. Sample, Data and Methodology ............................................................................................................... 78 
3.1. Sample ................................................................................................................................................... 78 
3.2. Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................................................................. 79 
3.3. Hypotheses Testing ............................................................................................................................... 89 
3.4. Regression Variables ............................................................................................................................. 97 
4. Results and Interpretations ..................................................................................................................... 100 
5. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 105 
 
 
iv 
 
CHAPTER 2: IPO SHORT-TERM PERFORMANCE 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 107 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses ........................................................................................................ 112 
2.1. Sources of IPO Underpricing .............................................................................................................. 112 
2.2. The Uniqueness of Family Firms in an IPO Context .......................................................................... 128 
3. Sample, Data and Methodology ............................................................................................................. 139 
3.1. Sample ................................................................................................................................................. 139 
3.2. IPO Underpricing Measurement ......................................................................................................... 140 
3.3. Descriptive Statistics ........................................................................................................................... 141 
3.4. Hypothesis Testing and Results .......................................................................................................... 168 
3.5. Regression Analysis ............................................................................................................................ 171 
4. Regression Results and Interpretations .................................................................................................. 175 
5. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 177 
 
CHAPTER 3: IPO LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 182 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses ........................................................................................................ 188 
2.1. Sources of IPO Underperformance ..................................................................................................... 188 
2.2. Varying Results on IPO Long-Term Performance .............................................................................. 212 
3. Sample, Data and Methodology ............................................................................................................. 214 
3.1. Sample ................................................................................................................................................. 214 
3.2. Models of Long-Term Performance .................................................................................................... 217 
3.3. Descriptive Statistics ........................................................................................................................... 226 
4. Results of the Long-term Performance Models ..................................................................................... 235 
4.1. Results of the Benchmark-Adjusted Abnormal Returns ..................................................................... 235 
4.2. Results of the Cumulative Benchmark-Adjusted Abnormal Returns .................................................. 239 
4.3. Results of the Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns ................................................................................ 244 
4.4. Results of the Holding Period Returns ................................................................................................ 248 
4.5. Results of the Wealth Relative Ratio .................................................................................................. 249 
4.6. Results of the Capital Asset-Pricing Model ........................................................................................ 252 
4.7. Results of the Fama and French Three-Factor Model ......................................................................... 254 
4.8. Results of the Multiple Linear Regressions ........................................................................................ 256 
4.9. Hypothesis Testing .............................................................................................................................. 261 
4.10. Robustness Check ............................................................................................................................. 273 
5. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 274 
 
v 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Page 
Table 1: Summary of debt financing and asymmetric information .............................................................. 76 
Table 2: Distribution of firms per industry .................................................................................................. 79 
Table 3: Ownership structure comparison ................................................................................................... 82 
Table 4: Distribution of debt variables in family firms per industry ............................................................ 83 
Table 5: Distribution of debt variables in nonfamily firms per industry ...................................................... 84 
Table 6: Ownership and management characteristics of family firms per industry ..................................... 85 
Table 7: Debt-to-equity of family and nonfamily firms in percentiles ........................................................ 86 
Table 8: Firm size comparison ..................................................................................................................... 91 
Table 9: Capital structure comparison ......................................................................................................... 92 
Table 10: Asymmetric information comparison .......................................................................................... 94 
Table 11: Share turnover ratio ...................................................................................................................... 96 
Table 12: Regression estimates .................................................................................................................. 103 
Table 13: Hausman test .............................................................................................................................. 105 
Table 14: Distribution of IPOs per industry ............................................................................................... 142 
Table 15: Average gross proceeds of main European countries ................................................................ 145 
Table 16: Distribution of IPOs per year ..................................................................................................... 146 
Table 17: Distribution of IPOs pre and post the DotCom bubble burst ..................................................... 149 
Table 18: Descriptive statistics of IPO underpricing ................................................................................. 150 
Table 19: Descriptive statistics of over- and under-valued IPOs ............................................................... 152 
Table 20: Gross proceeds in subgroups and underpricing ......................................................................... 153 
Table 21: Descriptive statistics on ownership and control ......................................................................... 154 
Table 22: Pearson correlation table for the ownership and control rights model ....................................... 158 
Table 23: Descriptive statistics on governance mechanisms ..................................................................... 160 
Table 24: Pearson correlation table of the governance mechanisms .......................................................... 163 
Table 25: Comparative study of board size in Europe ............................................................................... 165 
Table 26: Comparative study of independent directors in Europe ............................................................. 166 
Table 27: Pearson correlation table ............................................................................................................ 169 
Table 28: Regression of the ownership and control rights ......................................................................... 175 
Table 29: Regression results of the governance mechanisms .................................................................... 176 
Table 30: Small IPO sample sizes treating long-term performance ........................................................... 216 
Table 31: Distribution of IPOs per year and per industry .......................................................................... 228 
Table 32: Distribution of IPO proceeds per year and per industry ............................................................. 230 
Table 33: IPO summary per industry ......................................................................................................... 231 
Table 34: The IPO weight of proceeds per year and per industry .............................................................. 233 
Table 35: Correlation matrix for ‘Model 1’ ............................................................................................... 234 
Table 36: Correlation matrix for ‘Model 2’ ............................................................................................... 235 
Table 37: Monthly benchmark-adjusted abnormal returns (CP) ................................................................ 236 
Table 38: Monthly benchmark-adjusted abnormal returns (OP) ................................................................ 236 
Table 39: Cumulative benchmark-adjusted abnormal returns (CP) ........................................................... 239 
Table 40: Cumulative benchmark-adjusted abnormal returns (OP) ........................................................... 240 
Table 41: Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (CP) ......................................................................................... 244 
Table 42: Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (OP) ......................................................................................... 245 
Table 43: Holding period returns (CP) ....................................................................................................... 248 
Table 44: Holding period returns (OP) ...................................................................................................... 248 
vi 
 
Table 45: Wealth relative ratios ................................................................................................................. 249 
Table 46: CAPM results for the three-year holding period ........................................................................ 252 
Table 47: CAPM results for the four-year holding period ......................................................................... 252 
Table 48: CAPM results for the five-year holding period .......................................................................... 252 
Table 49: CAPM results for the six-year holding period ........................................................................... 252 
Table 50: Fama and French model results for the three-year holding period ............................................ 254 
Table 51: Fama and French model results for the four-year holding period .............................................. 254 
Table 52: Fama and French model results for the five-year holding period .............................................. 255 
Table 53: Fama and French model results for the six-year holding period ................................................ 255 
Table 54: ‘Model 1’ regression for a three-year holding period using CAR (CP) ..................................... 256 
Table 55: ‘Model 1’ regression for a four-year holding period using CAR (CP) ...................................... 257 
Table 56: ‘Model 1’ regression for a five-year holding period using CAR (CP) ....................................... 257 
Table 57: ‘Model 1’ regression for a six-year holding period using CAR (CP) ........................................ 257 
Table 58: ‘Model 1’ regression for a three-year holding period using BHAR (CP) .................................. 258 
Table 59: ‘Model 2’ regression for a three-year holding period using CAR (CP) ..................................... 259 
Table 60: ‘Model 2’ regression for a four-year holding period using CAR (CP) ...................................... 259 
Table 61: ‘Model 2’ regression for a five-year holding period using CAR (CP) ....................................... 259 
Table 62: ‘Model 2’ regression for a six-year holding period using CAR (CP) ........................................ 260 
Table 63: Test of means for long-term performance .................................................................................. 261 
Table 64: Correlation for short- and long-term IPO performance calculated using the CAR .................... 263 
Table 65: Correlation for short- and long-term IPO performance calculated using the BHAR ................. 264 
Table 66: Correlation of IPO timing and long-term performance calculated using the CAR .................... 266 
Table 67: Correlation of ownership and long-term performance calculated using the CAR ..................... 268 
Table 68: Correlation of governance and long-term performance calculated by CAR .............................. 269 
Table 69: Correlation of ownership and long-term performance calculated using the BHAR .................. 270 
Table 70: Correlation of governance and long-term performance calculated using BHAR ...................... 271 
Table 71: Correlation of returns and long-term performance calculated using the CAR ........................... 272 
Table 72: Correlation of returns and long-term performance calculated using the BHAR ........................ 273 
Table 73: The Deflator Factors .................................................................................................................. 284 
Table 74: Cumulative benchmark-adjusted abnormal returns (1M) .......................................................... 285 
Table 75: Cumulative benchmark-adjusted abnormal returns (6M) .......................................................... 286 
Table 76: Cumulative benchmark-adjusted abnormal returns (12M) ........................................................ 287 
Table 77: Test of means of CAR (1M) ...................................................................................................... 288 
Table 78: Test of means of CAR (6M) ...................................................................................................... 288 
Table 79: Test of means of CAR (12M) .................................................................................................... 288 
Table 80: Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (1M) ........................................................................................ 289 
Table 81: Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (6M) ........................................................................................ 290 
Table 82: Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (12M) ...................................................................................... 291 
Table 83: Test of means of BHAR (1M) .................................................................................................... 292 
Table 84: Test of means of BHAR (6M) .................................................................................................... 292 
Table 85: Test of means of BHAR (12M) .................................................................................................. 292 
Table 86: Test of means of WR (1M) ........................................................................................................ 293 
Table 87: Test of means of WR (6M) ........................................................................................................ 293 
Table 88: Test of means of WR (12M) ...................................................................................................... 293 
 
  
vii 
 
TABLES OF FIGURES 
Page 
Figure 1: Distribution of all firms per industry. ........................................................................................... 80 
Figure 2: Distribution of family and nonfamily firms per industry.............................................................. 81 
Figure 3: Debt-to-equity ratio. ..................................................................................................................... 88 
Figure 4: Total assets in function of debt-to-equity. .................................................................................... 88 
Figure 5: Free cash flow in function of the debt-to-equity ratio. ................................................................. 89 
Figure 6: Total relative gross proceeds per industry. ................................................................................. 144 
Figure 7: The percentage of the number of IPOs and proceeds per industry. ............................................ 144 
Figure 8: The percentage of IPOs and proceeds per year. .......................................................................... 149 
Figure 9: Histogram of first-day underpricing. .......................................................................................... 152 
Figure 10: Ownership and control rights change. ...................................................................................... 157 
Figure 11: Histogram of French family firms’ board size. ......................................................................... 168 
Figure 12: Explanation 1 for IPO underpricing. ......................................................................................... 190 
Figure 13: Explanation 2 for IPO underpricing. ......................................................................................... 191 
Figure 14: Explanation 1 with long-term performance. ............................................................................. 192 
Figure 15: Explanation 2 with long-term performance (1). ....................................................................... 193 
Figure 16: Explanation 2 with long-term performance (2). ....................................................................... 193 
Figure 17: AR trend from the first to the seventy-second month. .............................................................. 238 
Figure 18: CAR trend from the first to the seventy-second month. ........................................................... 243 
Figure 19: BHAR trend for the five different entry dates. ......................................................................... 247 
Figure 20: Wealth relative ratio from the first to the seventy-second month. ............................................ 251 
8 
 
PRELIMINARY CHAPTER 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the last decade, the phenomenon of family business has received increasing attention from academics 
and consultants as it is a predominant structure around the world (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 
2002; and Faccio and Lang, 2002). In fact, the Father of Economics, Adam Smith, stated that the real 
engines of growth in a free-enterprise economy are family firms. Nowadays, family businesses are regarded 
more and more as economically significant and distinctive business entities because they make an essential 
contribution to the economy, bring long-term stability, show specific commitment to local communities, 
feel responsibility as owners and have values to stand for. 
For instance, a report published by Forbes in July 2013 states that family businesses generate over 50% of 
the US Gross National Product (GNP) and about 90% of all US businesses are family-owned or controlled 
by a family. However, the report mentions that the biggest issue with many family businesses is that they 
get stuck operating the same way they have for years, even when the business outgrows that structure. The 
founding generation holds on to the reins of leadership too long and will not pass control to their children. 
Therefore, less than one third of family businesses survive the transition from first to second generation 
ownership, and another 50% do not survive the transition from second to third generation. Family 
businesses only change when the pain is so great that they cannot stay where they are. However, it is not 
only tearing their company apart, but their personal lives as well. When this happens, the family has four 
choices: (1) sell the business, (2) merge the business, (3) shut the business down, and (4) stay the same. If 
they decide to stay the same, the key questions they then must answer are: (1) do they all stay in this business 
together or does someone exit? (2) is it time for the senior generation to pass the company on to the next 
one? and (3) do they bring in a professional manager? The report also mentions that for family businesses 
that are so rooted in tradition, the most difficult part of the decision is actually to implement a change that 
will bring a more profitable and happier business. 
Another recent report, published by Forbes in June 2014 entitled ‘The Biggest Myth About Family 
Businesses’, clearly mentions that family-owned businesses are the backbone of the American economy. 
Studies have shown that about 35% of Fortune 500 companies are family-controlled and represent the full 
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spectrum of American companies from small business to major corporations. In addition, family businesses 
account for 50% of US gross domestic product, generate 60% of the country’s employment, and account 
for 78% of all new job creation. Additionally, the greatest part of America’s wealth lies with family-owned 
businesses. Family firms comprise 80 to 90% of all business enterprises in North America (Astrachan and 
Shanker, 2003). Moreover, Anderson and Reeb (2003a) mention that in the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 
companies, return on investment (ROI) of family firms is 6.65% higher than in non-family firms. 
In addition, the Family Firm Institute Inc., states that family businesses show higher profitability in the long 
run, are less likely to lay people off, and more likely to hire despite the possibility of an economic downturn. 
This was also stated in the Forbes 2013 report. Moreover, family businesses are more likely to give 
charitably to their respective communities and engage in extensive philanthropic activities. In addition, 
family businesses have a more long-term strategic outlook due to their main motivation consisting of 
creating a legacy for generations to come, are less likely to raise debt, and are widely deemed to be 
financially prudent. For instance, the Mass Mutual American Family Business Survey in 2007 states that a 
majority of family businesses (around 60%) believed their ethical standards were more stringent than those 
of competing firms. They also report ethical standards being discussed often or always at meetings with 
employees, in discussions with customers and during board meetings. 
Similarly, the importance of family businesses to the European economy cannot be underestimated since 
they are essential to growth and employment creation throughout the world’s biggest economic area. In 
their 2014 Family Business Yearbook Report, Ernst & Young’s Europe Leader, M. Peter Englisch, states 
that ‘Family businesses are the lifeblood of the European economy’. For instance, 85% of the companies 
in Europe are family-owned, generating 70% of Europe’s GDP and employing 60% of Europe’s workforce. 
Additionally, the European Commission stated that family firms are distinguished by elementary factors 
that helped them survive the recent financial crisis of 2008, considered by many economists as the deepest 
financial and economic crisis since the Great Depression of 1929. Moreover, KPMG published in their 
report in 2013 that European family businesses represent €1 trillion in turnover and create over 5 million 
jobs in Europe.  
As an example, in France 83% of businesses are categorized as family businesses, contributing 60% of the 
country’s GDP and employing almost 50% of French workers (Family Business Monitor – FBN 
International and FBN France, 2008). Additionally, Faccio and Lang (2002) documented that more than 
60% of all listed French firms are family firms, and 62% of the family businesses controlled more than 20% 
by a family member. Additionally, data show that family firms listed on the stock exchange are much less 
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sensitive to industry shocks compared to non-family businesses (Sraer and Thesmar, 2007). Hence, through 
their extensive presence, strengths and specificities, family firms represent a vital engine for the economy’s 
growth and sustainability. As a result, French family firms are usually referred to as the backbone of the 
economy (Fohlin, 2007). 
In our inspection of the French family firms’ initial public offering (IPO) prospectuses, we found that after 
issuance, the family firms’ owners still held more than 62% of the firm’s cash flow rights and more than 
66% of the firm’s voting rights. Additionally, more than 80% of these family firms were managed by the 
firms’ founders on the IPO day and more than 76% also had their CEOs holding the position of the board’s 
Chair on the IPO date. Moreover, the board of directors of these firms that majorly, if not wholly, consist 
of the firms’ owners, their direct relatives and heirs, hold more than 64% of the firm’s cash flow rights after 
going public. Moreover, the average board size of the family firms was around 4.67 members which is a 
relatively small board size. Also, the percentage of independent directors was around 20% showing 
immaterial presence of independent directors over the firms’ boards. Last, but not least, on average, the 
percentage of public shareholders did not even reach 20% after going public. 
Therefore, all these facts affirm that the listed French family firms are characterized by rigorous control by 
the firms’ owners and their descendants over both the firm’s management and board of directors. They 
control the majority of the firms’ cash flow and voting rights even after going public. Moreover, the 
difference between cash flow rights and voting rights widened after the IPO as we will show in more detail 
in the subsequent chapter. This shows the extent of high ownership concentration in the listed French family 
firms by the family firms’ owners, descendants and direct relatives, indicating that they do not easily 
relinquish control and even show clear minority expropriation covered by an IPO event. As a result, such 
family firms are worth all the attention and efforts to observe, analyze, and understand their capital 
structure.  
As we will discuss in the subsequent section, agency theory is an important theory in corporate finance and 
was deeply observed by eminent researchers around the world due to its severe potential impact on a 
corporation’s value, prospects, and survival. In addition, the asymmetric information imposes its weight on 
investors, who seek highest transparency in times of abundant, sophisticated, and innovative types of frauds 
that, unfortunately, many managers and sometimes independent auditors get involved in (e.g. Enron, Arthur 
Andersen, WorldCom, Parmalat, Tyco Ltd., Adelphia Communications Corp., etc.). As a result, 
shareholders are becoming more aware about further scrutinizing and inspecting firms’ financial statements 
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and public reports due to recent corporate scandals resulting in huge losses that are linked mostly to either 
agency problems or information asymmetries. 
On the other hand, the IPO is considered one of the major fundamental changes a firm can experience 
during its lifetime, one that will definitely change its ownership structure, investment priorities, risk 
management, strategic plans, management style, taxation system, reporting standards, social image, 
reputation, and public communications. Therefore, due to their significance, IPOs have been the focus of 
management research since the 1960’s (Reilly and Hatfield, 1969). Yet, due to the importance of the IPO 
topic and the lack of empirical research on family firms’ IPOs (i.e. McConaughy, Matthews, and Fialko, 
2001), especially in the French market with its context of unique corporate governance mechanisms and 
ownership and control structure, we aim to investigate them thoroughly. 
However, it is important to mention that one of the main challenges that a privately-held firm faces when 
deciding to go public is the firm’s ownership structure change. Yet, how such challenges are perceived by 
the firms’ owners depend on the owners’ perception toward sharing control with new shareholders and the 
country’s economic system. For example, in market-based economies that depend on market financing, 
going public and, thus, losing control is almost always an option that principal owners think about, consider, 
and accept more easily whenever they need further finance to grow the business. On the other hand, in 
bank-based economies that depend on bank financing, going public and, thus, losing control is not one of 
the best options that the principal owners think about and desire whenever they need any additional 
financing.  
Accordingly, La Porta et al. (1999) were among the first to document that the Anglo-American model of 
corporation, though widely held, is far from being widespread. Thus, the different economic aspects 
mentioned above, will eventually affect firms’ ownership and control structures. Conversely, Faccio and 
Lang (2002) reported that in Continental Europe the ultimate shareholder controls, on average, more than 
43% of voting rights. Interestingly, in France, Italy, Germany, and Austria, such ultimate shareholders 
retain majority control. Concentrated ownership is also pervasive in East Asian Countries. For instance, 
Claessens et al. (2000) found that more than two thirds of listed companies were controlled by a single large 
shareholder. Even in the US, Holderness et al. (1999) showed that block holdings are not a rare phenomenon 
(Rigamonti, 2007), though not as predominant as in Continental Europe or East Asia. So, in different 
countries, different ownership and control structures will be observed.  
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Consequently, in many countries, especially in Europe and East Asia, from the principal owners’ 
perspective, the fear of losing control is ranked among the many disadvantages of going public and may 
influence the propensity to list (Roell, 1996). Similarly, Rigamonti (2007) argued that the original owners 
may be particularly concerned about the ownership structure. For such types of owners, losing control is 
definitely the last option to consider whenever they require additional financing for their firms. As a result, 
if such owners decide to go public anyway, they will do so by retaining ultimate control over their firms. 
However, from a comparative perspective, we believe that the difference among countries toward owners’ 
perception of going public and losing control, depends on many factors other than the country’s economic 
system (e.g. market-based or bank-based). For instance, such differences may also depend, among many 
others, on the overall country’s culture, legal system, shareholders rights protection, accounting system, 
market transparency, size, and volatility, as well as investors’ risk and returns objectives, culture, and 
experience. Thhis is why we believe that it would not be appropriate to compare IPO performance of 
European firms with American or Asian ones, without controlling for these different aspects. From here, 
we can understand how some research papers that treat similar topics related to IPO performance in varying 
countries obtain contradictory and sometimes mixed results, if no proper control variables were considered 
in the research. IPO short-term performance is usually measured by IPO underpricing which is common in 
the finance literature.  
Underpricing is generally calculated as the difference between the IPO offering price and the first-day 
market closing price. As we will see in subsequent sections, in the short term, scholars have generally 
documented the fact that IPOs are underpriced. However, underpricing may differ across countries and 
during different periods (Ibbotson, 1975; Welch, 1992; Ritter, 2002; Ritter and Welch, 2002; Loughran and 
Ritter, 2004; Gajewski and Gresse, 2006; Zouari et al., 2011). 
Therefore, in this preliminary chapter, we will discuss the main classifications and characteristics of family 
firms, agency theory, and the main expropriation strategies employed by family firms’ owners. Then we 
will discuss the main governance mechanisms to alleviate agency costs and last, discuss the IPO process, 
benefits, and timing.  
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2. CLASSIFICATIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILY 
FIRMS 
In this section, we will review the main classification and definition of family firms on which we will base 
our analysis and dataset. As shown below, the definition of family firm is very wide and differs from one 
country to another, sometimes even differing within the same country. Then we will describe the main 
characteristics of family firms’ owners who will affect most managerial, financial, and strategic decisions. 
For instance, as we will see, these decisions can be related to the firm’s capital structure decisions, going 
public, or any other decision.  
2.1. Classification of Family Firms 
There is a multitude of proposed definitions of family firms depending on the level of control, ownership 
structure, managerial position, generational transitions, and many other factors. For instance, Ampenberger 
et al. (2013), who worked on German family firms, proposed that in a family firm, either the minimum 
level of cumulative ownership stake of the founding family is 25%, or one of the founding family members 
occupies a managerial position, or is represented on the supervisory board.  
However, some studies such as Allouche and Amman (2000), ‘Association des moyennes entreprises 
patrimoniales’ (ASMEP), BM&S, PWC, and FBN France specifically targeted the definition of family 
firms in France. For instance, Allouche and Amman (2000) stated that a French family firm is one where 
significant control is exerted at the ownership and managerial level. Whereas, ASMEP characterized family 
firms with 50% ownership for enterprises with 250 to 4,999 employees and managing entrepreneurship, 
while PWC suggested that in a family firm, family members should own part or all of the shares and should 
occupy managerial positions. Hence, all these definitions of family firms are based on the ownership and 
managerial aspect of family members in the firm (European Commission, Enterprise and Industry 
Directorate-General, 2008).  
However, in this research, we define family firms similarly to Blondel et al. (2002) and Corstjens et al. 
(2005), who define a family firm as ‘a company where one or several individuals or families are ultimate 
owners and represent the largest block of shares. Moreover, the owning family is not required to be 
descendants of the firm’s founder(s) and is not required to be involved in the business. Non-family owned 
firms are those firms in which no individual, set of individuals, family or sets of families can be identified 
as the ultimate owner. Ultimate owner(s) are those shareholders who own at least 10% of the shares at each 
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step of the ownership chain’. This definition is found most appropriate because influence via ownership is 
well documented (Blondel et al., 2002) and highly representative of the levels of control in family firms, 
especially since control via ownership was highly remarkable in 13 western European economies (Faccio 
and Lang, 2002). In addition, this definition is the most widely known and used definition of family firms. 
2.2. Major Characteristics of Family Firms’ Owners 
After reviewing the main classification of family firms, it is crucial to review the major characteristics of 
family firms’ owners, their behaviors toward the firms they create, manage and control, and to describe the 
different positions researched by many eminent authors in the field of corporate governance. Basically, we 
will tackle: (1) the longer investment horizon of family firms’ owners compared to non-family shareholders, 
(2) the presence of family firms’ owners in the company’s management and decision-making process, and 
(3) the under-diversification effect of family firms’ owners and its consequence on the firm as a whole. 
2.2.1. Longer Investment Horizons 
Anderson and Reeb (2003a) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) demonstrated that family firms’ owners have 
longer investment horizons than other shareholders and view their ownership as an asset to pass on to their 
descendants, rather than wealth to consume during their lifetimes (e.g. Casson, 1999; and Anderson et al., 
2003). In this regard, it has been argued that typical shareholders have more emotional independence than 
family firms’ owners who have invested more than their private wealth in their firms. As a result, this will 
impact the investment horizon typical shareholders assume which is shorter than that of the family firms’ 
owners. Usually, shareholders’ main objective is to increase their wealth by investing in positive net present 
value (NPV) projects. When firms’ management do not achieve this ultimate objective, many shareholders 
liquidate their shares in these firms and invest elsewhere, somewhere they can find better opportunities and 
where their wealth grows at higher rates.  
Thus, we may observe the flow of funds of investors investing or divesting firms’ shares in different 
circumstances. Here we mention the risk averse investors who when faced with two investments with a 
similar expected return (but different risks), will prefer the one with the lower risk. However, this might 
not be always the case for all types of investors. For instance, family firms’ owners might be different in 
perceiving risk and in their level of risk aversion and, therefore, their investment behaviors might be 
different from other shareholders. This could be a valid reason for not observing family firms’ owners 
liquidating their shares upon every crisis their firms face as usual shareholders might do. Thus, we may 
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observe family firms’ owners holding shares for many years, sometimes for decades, and not ready to 
abandon easily their position in the firm they have built during financial and economic crisis. 
The possible reasons for such different behavior is that family firms’ owners usually invest more than their 
money in their firms. At the top, mostly they have invested all available resources from time, effort, 
knowledge, skills, expertise, and dedication in their own firms and most of them admire passing their firms 
to their descendants. Additionally, many family firms’ owners involve their families much in the firms’ 
business and distribute most managerial and supervisory roles among family members. Thus, their firms 
do not only represent the family’s wealth, but also the family’s culture, history, tradition, social image, 
pride, source of satisfaction, and identity. The last thing they want is to lose it to outside shareholders who 
do not necessarily share the same values as the family itself.  
However, sometimes their tactics and strategies to protect the family’s interests are legal, lawful, ethical, 
legitimate, rightful, and impartial, but sometimes unfortunately they are not, evoking severe agency costs 
among the majority of controlling shareholders (i.e. the family firms’ owners) and the minority non-
controlling shareholders (i.e. the outsider shareholders). It is understandable, therefore, why family firms’ 
owners have a longer investment horizon than other shareholders. 
2.2.2. Active Involvement in Firms’ Management 
Another important characteristic of family firms’ owners is their strong presence and direct involvement in 
the firms’ management and, hence, in its daily operation and decision-making process. Eventually, this will 
result in lower information asymmetry between the firms’ owners and managers. Thus, family firms’ 
owners will be more updated, involved, and responsible over the firms’ decisions compared to non-family 
and non-controlling shareholders, who mostly have less information about major management decisions 
and are mostly marginalized. Therefore, from their positions, family firms’ owners have much power to 
control management, and get involved in most or all important decisions which is not the case for most 
minority shareholders. 
Thus, direct monitoring by the families explains lower CEO compensation with respect to that of non-
family firms. Thus, family firms’ owners do not have to increase CEO incentives just to protect their own 
wealth or fear opportunistic behaviors of CEOs because they are almost always present in the firms’ 
management, and mostly on the firms’ board (Pichard-Stamford, 2002). Family firms’ owners can exert 
very close and adequate control over the firms’ CEOs and, therefore, they do not seek excessive 
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compensations for rewarding CEOs to better align interests. This, consequently, explains why family firms’ 
owners do not have to link CEO compensation to the firm’s performance due to their strong presence in the 
firm.  
On the other hand, Bertrand and Schoar (2006) stated that family ties could lead to the re-ordering of 
priorities assigned to the firm, so that the satisfaction of the family’s utility function could become the 
prevalent aim rather than serving the whole firm including minority shareholders. However, in some cases, 
the private benefits gained by the family do not hurt the value of the firm, but in other circumstances, they 
reduce the firm’s market value, then the consumption of private benefits of control takes place at the 
expense of minority shareholders. Similarly, Schulze et al. (2003) considered that family firms’ owners 
could favor family interests over the firm’s interests because of family loyalty.  
Concerning employment, it has been argued that family firms may encourage internal labor market schemes 
favoring family members (within-family promotion), rather than competent recruitment processes. Thus, 
reducing the quality of applicants for executive managerial positions may eventually cause significant 
monitoring cost (Berghe and Carchon, 2003). Then again, when it comes to family firms, many researchers 
argue that family firms’ owners who control and manage their firms for many years become highly 
entrenched (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003). Similarly, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2001) 
find that executives with family ties to the firm’s owners are more entrenched in their roles, with a weaker 
relationship between executive tenure and firm’s performance.  
However, Daily and Dalton (1992) indicate that paternalism contributes to the highly centralized decision-
making structure, concentrating power and control among people with family links to the owners of family 
firms. Hence, opponents of these theories argue that entrenchment is not found exclusively in family firms, 
while hundreds or thousands of examples, facts and realities exist where non-family firms’ executive 
directors have been involved in deep entrenchment activities and even in expropriating the firms’ wealth 
for their own interests. Also, many non-family managers have been decreasing shareholders’ wealth for 
years, and some have driven firms to bankruptcy while making huge fortunes out of them.  
On the other hand, many argue that by concentrating power and control among people, firms become more 
efficient in decision-making compared to sophisticated and long hierarchical structure where many 
directors are involved in every decision the firm has to take. Last, but not least, having a family firm owner 
who gets involved in the decision-making process and in the firm’s management and control might look 
normal and be highly acceptable depending on the culture and society. In the end, as mentioned earlier, an 
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owner invests a lot in the firm he/she has created, from wealth to health, which makes them so emotionally 
and psychologically attached to their firms. Therefore, it would be normal for them to stay in charge and in 
full control over the strategic decisions the board has to adopt and implement, or even over some small and 
less important daily decisions the management has to take. 
2.2.3. Concentrated and Under-diversified Equity Holdings 
Many authors argue that founding families’ concentrated and under-diversified equity holdings in their firm 
may translate into more conservative financial strategies. This often takes the form of less debt, more 
liquidity, and sounder balance sheets (Daily and Dollinger, 1992; Gallo and Vilaseca, 1996; and Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003a). Similarly, McMahon and Stanger (1995) and Mishra and McConaughy (1999) argue that 
family firms aim to lower the overall financial risk of the company and show a higher risk aversion 
compared to non-family firms. Thus, family firms shy away from high company growth to sustain their 
independence and therefore, they follow a conservative approach to company development with moderate 
company growth (Poutziouris, 2001). Correspondingly, family firms often follow the goal of lowering their 
financial risk exposure and consequently, they may follow a conservative approach of financing through 
the use of retained earnings rather than the use of external financing (McConaughy, Matthews, and Fialko, 
2001). 
Some authors argue that such policies will help the business survive until the new generation is ready to 
take over, and will leave successors with a healthier enterprise to run. As a result, financial positions are 
expected to be especially strong just before the handover to the next generation, especially in a world of 
high uncertainties, market volatility, fierce competition, and the constant need for funds to develop the firm 
and take it to the next level, while not relinquishing the control the family has established. 
On the other hand, Anderson et al. (2003) considered that because of their undiversified exposure, family 
firms may use their control of a firm to avoid risks that are usually acceptable to other more diversified 
shareholders. Accordingly, many family firms’ owners may decline positive NPV projects and eliminate 
the chance of increasing shareholders’ wealth just because of their conservative and over-protective policies 
regarding their under-diversified investments. In that case, family firms’ owners would be serving their 
own interests and preserving their own investments rather than those of the family as a whole, including 
minority shareholders. Last, we can argue that the under-diversified family firms owners’ wealth and the 
high concern and tremendous fear of conceivable financial distress or bankruptcy, naturally lead the family 
firms’ owners to expropriate minority shareholders, who are usually passive investors and, above all, much 
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more able to diversify their investments and spread their firm-specific risk across different companies, 
industries, and even across countries. 
As a result, these specificities of family firms’ owners related to longer investment horizon, deeper 
involvement in the firms’ management, and under-diversified equity holdings certainly affect the firm’s 
decisions differently. Thus, the firm’s managerial, strategic, and financial decisions will be different. For 
instance, as we will show in subsequent chapters, a different capital structure is observed for family firms 
than for non-family firms, and a different IPO performance in both the short-term and the long-term will 
also be observed. In addition, we will highlight the main corporate governance mechanisms set by family 
firms and the ownership and control rights pre- and post- issuance date. Now, after discussing the major 
characteristics of family firms’ owners, we will examine below the major conflicts in family firms and the 
major tactics and strategies some family firms’ owners follow in expropriating minority shareholders.  
3. AGENCY THEORY AND CONFLICTS 
It is indispensable to clearly understand the type of agency problems in family firms and to examine 
appropriate governance mechanisms suggested by many researchers and legal advisors and counselors to 
mitigate such problems. Research on family firms provides an avenue for developing agency theory in a 
new and fundamentally different context because incentives that motivate family shareholders are different 
from those of diversified shareholders. For instance, compared to non-family firms, family firms face less 
severe agency problems due to the separation of ownership and management (Type 1 problem), but more 
severe agency problems that arise between controlling and minority shareholders (Type 2 problem). We 
will discuss the major conflicts in family firms’ structure and list the most expropriation strategies used by 
family firms’ owners.  
3.1. Agency Theory Review 
Below we discuss the two main agency problems (Type 1 and Type 2) and will describe thereafter the 
different expropriation strategies followed by family firms’ owners.  
3.1.1. Principal-Agent Theory 
Principal-agent theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) constitutes the primary framework for corporate 
governance discussion. As defined, an agency, in general terms, is the relationship between two parties, 
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where one is a principal and the other is an agent who represents the principal in transactions with a third 
party. Agency relationships occur when the principals hire the agent to perform a service on the principals’ 
behalf. Principals commonly delegate decision-making authority to the agents. Agency problems can arise 
because of inefficiencies and incomplete information.  
Thus, according to this theory, people act with a short-term and opportunistic orientation while aspiring to 
maximize their personal financial utility. It is worth mentioning that the two problems that agency theory 
addresses are: problems that arise when the desires or goals of the principal and agent are in conflict, and 
the principal is unable to verify (because it difficult and/or expensive to do so) what the agent is actually 
doing; problems that arise when the principal and the agent have different attitudes towards risk. Because 
of different risk tolerances, the principal and agent may each be inclined to take different actions.  
Thus, to mitigate such problems, principals create incentives for the agent to act as the principal wants 
because the principal faces information asymmetry and risk with regard to whether the agent has effectively 
completed a contract. Thus, this theory is concerned with resolving problems that can exist in agency 
relationships; that is, between principals (shareholders) and agents of the principals (company executives). 
Accordingly, this classic agency theory, described by Jensen and Meckling (1976), looks at protecting 
investors from managerial entrenchment and expropriation. As discussed earlier, this type of agency 
problem is referred to as a Type 1 agency problem. 
However, Fama and Jensen (1983) stated that agency costs between owners and managerial agents can be 
advantageously low if there is a close alignment or even identity between the interests of owners and 
managers. No better example than the family firm can be given here in explaining the close alignment of 
interests between the family firms’ owners and managers. It is worth noting that in our discussion of the 
family firms’ characteristics in the previous section, we have mentioned that family firms’ owners often get 
deeply involved in the firms’ management and in the daily decision-making process (Daily and Dollinger, 
1992; and Melin and Nordqvist, 2000). Accordingly, family firms’ owners are assumed to be better 
monitors of managers than other types of large shareholders, suggesting that lack of alignment between 
managers and owners might be less prevalent in family than in non-family firms (e.g. Anderson and Reeb, 
2003a; and Ben-Amar and André, 2006).  
Similarly, La Porta et al. (1999) indicate that families are almost always involved in the management of the 
firm, which might result in greater alignment between the interests of shareholders and managers. Thus, in 
family businesses, the conflict of interests between the owners and the managers, and the risk that managers 
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do not act in the best interests of shareholders, are minimal. Consequently, Type 1 agency problems in 
family firms are minimal as well. A controlling family’s direct claim on its firm’s residual returns creates 
an incentive to minimize costs (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972), and to closely monitor its managerial agents, 
making it difficult for them to divert resources into value-destroying activities (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a). 
Similarly, family firms possess a strong incentive to ensure capital is deployed sparingly and used 
intensively and that indirect production costs are tightly managed (Brickley and Dark, 1987).  
Thus, controlling families reduce owner-manager conflicts either by directly appointing a family member 
as CEO or by effectively monitoring professional executives (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; and Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003a). As pointed out by Dyl (1988) with respect to closely-held firms, the large investment of 
controlling shareholder’s wealth within the firm creates the incentive to carefully scrutinize management 
actions. 
3.1.2. Principal-Principal Theory 
In corporate finance, the principal-principal agency problem is usually referred to as a Type 2 agency 
problem. It usually arises between the majority controlling shareholders and the minority non-controlling 
shareholders. In the family firm’s case, the majority controlling shareholders are the family firms’ owners, 
their close relatives, descendants or friends, who hold the majority of the firm’s cash flow rights and voting 
rights and usually also hold primary key positions over the firms’ management board and supervisory board. 
By contrast, minority shareholders are usually the dispersed, small, and outside investors who have no 
control and cannot closely monitor or exert any strategic changes over the firm’s actions. 
However, since the Type 1 agency problem, that is the principal-agent conflict, is not prevalent in the case 
of family firms where family firms’ owners are heavily involved in the firms’ management, we will focus 
in this chapter on the Type 2 agency problem. The Type 2 agency problem is not found exclusively in 
family firms but in any corporate structure where shareholders are divided into majority controlling 
shareholders and minority non-controlling shareholders. The Type 2 agency problem persists in most types 
of such corporations and in family firms as well. Consequently, more attention is being paid to different 
corporate governance mechanisms to mitigate such an important, if not inevitable, problem. Thus, here 
below we will concentrate on this type of agency problem by identifying the nature of conflicts between 
the controlling family shareholders and minority ones. We will also discuss different expropriation 
strategies followed by some family firms’ owners. 
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3.2. Nature of Conflicts between Shareholders 
As we have discussed, family firms do not really suffer from Type 1 agency problems (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) but from endogenous problems like altruism, owner opportunism, and self-control 
(Schulze et al., 2003). For instance, Claessens et al. (2002) explain that once a family has enough ownership 
for unchallenged control, it can begin to abuse its power by taking resources out of the business and here a 
Type 2 agency problem is created. Many authors argue that families have a powerful incentive to 
expropriate wealth from minority shareholders through various means (La Porta et al., 2000; and Bruton et 
al., 2003), what Young et al. (2001) call a ‘principal-principal’ or ‘horizontal’ agency relationship. 
Consequently, a growing body of literature has shifted attention toward this type of agency problem 
between minority investors and large controlling shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; and Morck and 
Yeung, 2003). Most firms around the world are controlled by a large shareholder, typically founders or 
their families (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; and Faccio and Lang, 2002). Villalonga and 
Amit (2006) suggest that controlling families have greater incentives for both monitoring and expropriation. 
For instance, La Porta et al. (1999) argued that the primary conflict in closely held firms is between majority 
and minority shareholders, with the former having the potential to expropriate wealth from the latter. 
Similarly, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that the fundamental agency problem is not the conflict 
between outside investors and managers, but rather the conflict between outside investors and controlling 
shareholders.  
Families tend to expropriate wealth when their control through their voting rights percentage is greater than 
their cash flow rights represented by their ownership percentage. A good example might be when family 
firms’ owners hold control over 53% of the firms’ voting shares (this percentage represents their voting 
rights) while holding only 47% of the firms’ shares (cash flow rights).  
Additionally, families may also expropriate in the presence of dual-class stock, pyramidal ownership, and 
cross-holdings (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; and Faccio and Lang, 2002). Such 
expropriation may also occur when family firms’ owners have the incentive, willingness, and ability to 
extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders (e.g. Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; and Bozec and Laurin, 2008). Additionally, separation of ownership from control via dual, 
pyramids or cross-holdings is widespread around the world. La Porta et al. (1999) and Faccio and Lang 
(2002) report that the use of devices separating cash flow from voting rights is common across European 
countries, though the discrepancy is particularly severe in some, including Italy. Claessens et al. (2000) also 
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find that in East Asian countries, voting rights frequently exceed cash flow rights via pyramids and cross-
holdings. In the US, control in excess of cash flow rights is achieved through dual-class shares and dual-
class firms represent a significant niche (Smart and Zutter, 2003). It is worth noting that through our 
observation of French family firms, we have seen almost all firms involved in one way or another in 
minority expropriation via different methods, primarily through dual-class stocks and pyramidal ownership. 
Relatedly, Anderson and Reeb (2004) consider that families may engage in reducing firm risk, enriching 
themselves at the expense of minority investors, engaging in non-profit maximizing objectives, misusing 
firm’s resources or generally representing their interests over those of the firm’s other stakeholders. 
Therefore, in this approach, it is suggested that family control creates agency costs. Similarly, if families in 
family firms are able to derive benefits through means that are not shared with other non-family 
shareholders, their actions may not be consistent with maximizing the value of the company. For instance, 
family firms’ owner-CEOs sometimes are given an inordinate amount of discretion at the job, especially 
where they personally have voting control of the company. Often, these CEOs cannot be controlled 
effectively by directors and are free to follow their instincts and impulses unchecked (Le Breton-Miller and 
Miller, 2006). Moreover, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) pointed out that poorly performing CEOs who resist 
being replaced might be the costliest manifestation of agency problems.  
However, the typical family firm provides family members with secure employment, as well as perquisites 
and privileges that they would not otherwise receive (Ward, 1987). An excellent example might be when a 
family firm’s founder appoints his son as head of the accounting and finance department, his daughter as 
head of human resources and recruitment, his son-in-law as head of production, and his wife as head of 
operations management, and above all, the founder takes the position of the firm’s CEO, and sometimes 
simultaneously the firm’s Chair. Interestingly, Kets De Vries (1996) reports that family firm founders have 
a tendency to lavish their children with gifts, perhaps to make up for their absence from the household when 
their children were young. For this reason, we can consider that parental altruism may exacerbate agency 
problems. On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that Villalonga and Amit (2006) provide evidence 
suggesting that family firms with a founder CEO have less severe agency problems than those with a 
descendent CEO. 
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4. EXPROPRIATION STRATEGIES 
Although expropriation strategies adopted by family firms’ owners are broad and differently viewed among 
investors and business researchers, below we discuss some widely used in most countries. 
4.1. Dual-Class Stock 
Usually, dual-class stock is a stock issued for a single company with varying classes indicating the different 
voting rights and dividend payments. For instance, we may see family firms’ owners issuing ‘stock A’ for 
family members that represents a normal stock with all rights and privileges given to a typical stock and 
sometimes with even superior conditions, and ‘stock B’ for the outside shareholders with far fewer rights 
and privileges in terms of voting control, representation on the board, and even the ownership proportion. 
For example, ‘stock A’ may represent 51% of the firm’s cash flow rights whereas ‘stock B’ may represent 
49% of the firms’ cash flow rights. Different voting rights percentages may also apply by giving double 
voting rights for ‘stock A’ and single voting rights for ‘stock B’. 
Rigamonti (2007) considered that in a dual-class structure, the controlling shareholder retains shares with 
voting rights and issues shares with restricted voting (or non-voting) rights to outside investors, thus 
deviating from the one share-one vote rule. For example, if a firm has 100 shares outstanding, of which 50 
are non-voting, the block-holder retains the majority of votes by holding 26 common shares. So, cash flow 
rights are 26% and voting rights 52% (26/50). Actually, this is what we have observed in almost all French 
family-controlled firms where the controlling shareholders are usually family firms’ owners who created 
the firms and decided to take it public while retaining control over it via issuing dual-class stocks. Many 
authors agree and explain that dual-class stock serves purely as a control-mechanism by family shareholders 
(e.g. DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985; Partch, 1987; Doidge, 2004; and Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2008).  
Dual-class stock studies measure voting rights as the ratio of the number of votes associated with the shares 
held by the shareholder to the total number of votes outstanding in the company. In companies with multiple 
classes of shares, different classes may entitle their holders to a different number of votes per share and 
hold relatively more shares of the superior voting class.  
Dual-class stock is in fact a manifestation of this agency problem between family shareholders and minority 
shareholders. Relatedly, La Porta et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2002), Barontini and Caprio (2006), and 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) found that when founders or their families use control-enhancing mechanisms 
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to create a wedge between their cash flow and control rights, firm value is reduced. On the other hand, 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2008) find that the single most important determinant of dual-class status is 
having a person’s name in the firm’s name (e.g. Wrigley, Renault, Picard, Ford, etc.), an obvious proxy for 
family control.  
4.2. Pyramidal Ownership 
The literature on pyramidal ownership of a corporation starts with La Porta et al. (1999) who define 
pyramidal ownership structure as an entity whose ownership structure displays a top-down chain of control. 
The authors also define a pyramid as an ownership structure where the firm has an ultimate owner (at either 
the 10% or 20% level) and there is at least one publicly traded company between the firm and the ultimate 
owner in the chain of voting rights. Rigamonti (2007) mentioned that in a pyramidal structure, a block-
holder controls, for example, 51% of shares of firm A, which owns 51% of firm B, which owns 51% of 
firm C, and so on. The block-holder at the top of the pyramid owns the majority of voting rights of all firms 
across the pyramid, with an increasingly small investment in each firm down the line. In firm B, the 
shareholder owns 26% of cash flow rights (the product of ownership stakes along the line), while in firm C 
he/she owns 13.27% of cash flow rights. For instance, Faccio and Lang (2002) posit that ‘firm Y is said to 
be controlled through pyramiding if it has an ultimate owner, who controls Y indirectly through another 
corporation that it does not wholly control’ and note that ‘pyramiding implies a discrepancy between the 
ultimate owner’s ownership and control rights’.  
On the other hand, Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) provide a rationale for the use of pyramids. In their 
model, pyramidal structures emerge as families use a firm they already control to set up a new firm, allowing 
them to access the entire stock of retained earnings of the firm they control and to share the security benefits 
of the new firm with others of the original firm’s existing shareholders – a valuable feature when internal 
funds are important and when the security benefits of the new firm are low, as is often the case in settings 
with poor investor protection. The direct result of the pyramidal ownership structure is a separation of actual 
ownership and control in firms located at the lower part of the pyramid structure (Claessens et al., 2000). 
The separation of actual ownership and control occurs because the pyramid structure enables the ultimate 
owners to establish control disproportionate to the amount of ownership they have in every one of the 
successive firms. It is worth mentioning that Claessens et al. (2002) highlighted that the impact of the 
pyramidal structure on firm valuation is negative.  
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Moreover, besides pyramidal ownership, other researchers discussed the presence of cross-holdings that 
are intended by a company to directly or indirectly control its own stocks (Rigamonti, 2007). Thus, it is 
clear that the use of holding companies for ‘pyramiding’ purposes is another way families can gain control 
and exploit minority shareholders with little ownership. In this case, there is too little alignment between 
the interests of the controlling owner and the other shareholders of the lower-tier firms. In this case, agency 
costs may increase between the family firms’ owners and the minority shareholders as the interests of 
different classes of owners diverge.  
The temptation among those in control may be to run the business for personal gain, to favor nepotism, 
sweetheart contacts, and lavish expenditures that benefit them at the cost of other shareholders, especially 
if they are able to keep a large percentage of their assets outside the business. Morck et al. (1998) argue 
that while the main agency problem in the widely-held firm involves managers not acting for shareholders’ 
interests, agency problems in family firms involve managers acting solely for only one shareholder, the 
ultimate owner, and neglecting minority shareholders.  
4.3. Ownership Structure with Multiple Large Shareholders 
Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) show that founders can optimally choose an ownership structure with 
multiple large shareholders to force them to form coalitions to obtain control. The authors believe that by 
grouping member cash flows, coalitions internalize to a larger extent the value consequences of their actions 
and, hence, take more efficient actions than would any of their individual members. Accordingly, coalitions 
serve as a commitment device. However, the formation of the controlling coalition within family firms is 
vital and can have a significant impact on the firm’s performance (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Bloch 
and Hege, 2001; and Claessens et al., 2002).  
On the other hand, Zwiebel (1995) and Maury and Pajuste (2005) suggest that family groups have a higher 
propensity to seek private benefits rather than serving the firm, enhancing performance and protecting 
minority shareholders. Therefore, the end results of ownership structure with multiple large shareholders 
remains mixed, as they may differ from one country to another based on the different socio-economic 
cultural and legal regimes. For instance, Faccio et al. (2001) found that the presence of multiple large 
shareholders dampens expropriation in Europe, but exacerbates it in Asia. 
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4.4. Excessive Compensation and Special Dividends 
Morck et al. (1998) identify the possibility that family firms might use their concentrated block-holding to 
expropriate wealth from other shareholders through excessive compensation, related party transactions, and 
special dividends. For instance, family CEOs with enough votes can abuse their power by extracting 
resources from the company or by hiring cronies or incompetent relatives (Faccio et al., 2001; Schulze et 
al., 2001; Morck and Yeung, 2003; and Schulze et al., 2003). Family CEOs may view their firms as personal 
fiefdoms. They have the discretion to act, or to resist acting, without board or top team intervention, and 
that can lead to risky decisions or, in the cases of lengthy tenures, strategic stagnation (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1996). However, Barontini and Bozzi (2010) demonstrated that family firms pay their CEOs 
more than non-family firms, as documented by previous papers (i.e. Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989). They 
showed that the incentives for the family to extract private benefits and share them with the CEO in the 
form of higher compensation are larger when the family owns a limited stake of cash flows. But also, 
according to Barontini and Bozzi (2010), the excess compensation and its impact on future firm 
performance shows that the higher compensation paid to the CEO is actually a form of rent extraction, 
ruling out the alternative hypothesis of a premium due to the CEO for the higher skills required to manage 
a family-owned firm.  
Yet the empirical evidence on this point is inconclusive. On a sample of German firms, Haid and Yurtoglu 
(2006) found positive impact of family ownership on CEO compensation. However, and to our knowledge, 
the lower pay of CEOs in family firms does not confirm either the absence or the existence of collusion 
between the family shareholders and the CEO in these firms. 
As for CEO compensation and the firm’s performance, Hall and Liebmann (1998) found that the link 
between the two has become much stronger. As a result, managers tend to focus too strongly on short-term 
profits at the expense of long-term opportunities and that they neglect to pay dividends to the firm’s 
shareholders (Lambert, Lanen, and Larcker, 1989). On the other hand, some other authors argue that family 
firms’ boards decide to pay high dividends at times when the firm has high need of funds to serve family 
members’ interests, instead of plowing back its earnings inside the firm and preventing costly external 
financing activities. In similar cases, these special dividends are considered an expropriation tool of 
minority shareholders and probably an accusation of threatening the firm’s financial position. According to 
Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002) clever executives always have the power and ability to manipulate the 
remuneration process to benefit them at the expense of the company.  
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4.5. Tunneling 
Tunneling is defined as the transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of their controlling 
shareholders (Johnson et al., 2000). The authors explain that tunneling occurs where a company that a 
shareholder controls sells below the market price products, assets, financial resources or investment 
opportunities to companies in which the same shareholder owns a larger share of cash flow rights. In these 
cases, the differential between the market price and the effective price of the transaction is not shared among 
all shareholders in proportion to the shares owned, but determines a wealth transfer to the party in control 
(Dyck and Zingales, 2004). Johnson et al. (2000) showed that countries whose legal systems restrict more 
effectively such looting of firms had milder financial crises in 1997–1998.  
However, it has been argued that tunneling is not always convicted by law, especially in civil law countries, 
and above all, it is not always easy to decide whether manager’s actions represent tunneling or not. Yet, 
family firms’ owners can still use tunneling in one way or another, pretending in servicing the firm, to 
benefit their own interests rather than the firm’s interests. Thus, in such case, it is obvious that majority and 
controlling shareholders, through their managers and board members, if intended, can involve some 
expropriating activities though tunneling.  
4.6. Earnings Management 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) stated that earnings management (i.e. earnings smoothing and accruals) occurs 
when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports, 
either to mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.  
Conversely, it is obvious that earnings management cannot be conducted by any minority, individual or 
outsider shareholder. Usually, in earnings management, there are some parties, individuals or coalition of 
managers or directors who sometimes get the help of some key internal positions, who together have the 
willingness, ability, control, interests, and power to manipulate accounting and financial records, data and 
reports to serve their own interests and those of their favored ones. 
Yet, empirical evidence regarding earnings management in family firms is mixed (Wang, 2006; Ali et al., 
2007; Tong, 2007; Prencipe et al., 2008 and 2011). While numerous studies in the US and UK suggest that 
family firms tend to have less earnings management compared to non-family firms (e.g. Wang, 2006; Ali 
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et al., 2007; Tong, 2007; and Cascino et al., 2010), other studies in Europe reveal opposite findings and 
indicate that family firms report a higher level of earnings management compared to non-family firms. 
However, Wang (2006) found that family firms, on average, have higher earnings quality than non-family 
firms. Similarly, Ali et al. (2007), also using S&P 500 companies, report higher earnings quality in family 
firms than non-family firms, but that family firms disclose less information than non-family firms (i.e. Chen 
et al., 2008; and Anderson et al., 2009). Using a sample of Italian listed firms, Prencipe et al. (2008) found 
less income-smoothing behavior but more earnings management related to debt contracts in family firms 
than in non-family firms (Prencipe et al., 2008 and 2011). In this regard, we may assume that in Europe, 
the family firms’ owners tend to expropriate minority shareholders’ wealth via earnings management and 
sometimes are involved in accounting and financial data manipulation.  
4.7. Collusion between Family Shareholders and CEO 
The family and the manager could find it profitable to collude in expropriating minority shareholders and 
sharing the benefits between them (Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer, 2002). As a result, the CEO could be 
granted extra compensation as the premium for loyalty to the family in control and as a stake in the private 
benefits extracted (Barontini and Bozzi, 2010). Thus, the CEO may be appointed by the family to serve its 
own interests and his compensation include a stake in the private benefits that the family obtains through 
control. The higher compensation granted to the executives could be a form of rent extraction by the 
ultimate owner (Barontini and Bozzi, 2010). 
Opponents of this viewpoint might argue that the higher pay of CEOs in family firms might be due simply 
to the specific high expertise, skills, and managerial know-how required by the CEO to run a family firm 
that might need special and higher attention, care, and resources than any non-family firm. On the other 
hand, some other opponents might argue that collusion between family shareholders and CEO is not always 
translated into or observed as a higher paid CEO, especially if the family firm CEO is a family member 
who may collude with the family shareholders to expropriate minority interests for the benefits of the family 
and by not simply seeking higher pay.  
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5. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS IN FAMILY 
FIRMS 
The potential for moral hazard conflict between the family and outside shareholders creates a new set of 
agency costs, including mutual monitoring and opportunity costs that may have an adverse effect on the 
firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Therefore, based on this literature, both parties, the family owners and 
the minority shareholders, have incentives to put in place an effective governance structure to mitigate such 
costs for the benefit of the firm as a whole and for the benefits of each party involved in the scene. 
On the one hand, studies conducted on the relationship between governance issues and firm performance 
have demonstrated mixed results (Dalton et al., 1998). For instance, under the agency theory framework, 
we may consider that a company with good corporate governance will perform better over a period of time 
and that good governance can reduce risk and attract further investment (Agrawal et al., 1996). On the other 
hand, many studies that have demonstrated positive relationships between variables of interest and firm 
performance, when reviewed meta-analytically show negative relationships and no statistically significant 
relationships at all (Dalton et al., 1998).  
Therefore, the diversity of results can be partly explained by differences in the theoretical perspectives 
applied, selected research methodologies, definitions of wide and ambiguous terminologies, measurement 
of performance, and conflicting views about board involvement in decision-making and, to some extent, 
the contextual nature of the individual firm and the family firm in particular. Thus, some important factors 
considered in measuring corporate governance have been identified and adopted differently by different 
researchers, with varying and sometimes contradictory results accordingly. 
However, many variables have commonly been used in the literature by numerous authors as the indicators 
of corporate governance, such as board size, board composition, multiple classes of shares, number of 
meetings attended by directors, number of meetings held in a year, the existence of various committees 
such as audit committee, remuneration committee and the like, founder-CEO or not, percentage of 
ownership held by the family firms’ owners, or percentage of voting rights held by the family firms’ owners 
and their descendants, and the presence of institutional shareholders, block-holders or simply individual 
shareholders. Somehow, these are considered standard variables that should have more or less the same 
definition anywhere. But, culture, preferences, traditions, goals, and even the definition for a family firm, 
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differ from one country to another, thus creating problems in comparing research results and findings across 
countries or even within the same country if different definitions were adopted.  
In this section we define and explain the importance of corporate governance mechanisms in family firms. 
Then we discuss the different types and techniques of governance mechanisms. We will also discuss family 
firms and performance, the determinants of performance, and governance mechanisms and performance.  
5.1. Definition and Importance 
In their recent paper, Ritter et al. (2012) mentioned that the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 
by US authorities served as a paradigm that influenced analogous regulatory changes in Europe. The authors 
added that in the same year, the “Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern 
Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe” issued by the European Commission, recommended 
corporate governance practices similar to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s provisions. A number of member states 
responded by either issuing national corporate governance codes or revising existing ones. Although the 
contents vary across countries, the codes are highly aligned with EU guidelines in recommending a balance 
of independent and non-independent directors, the separation of the CEO and chairman-of-the-board 
positions, formal and transparent procedures for the appointment of directors to the board, and effective 
internal control systems (Akyol et al., 2014). 
Therefore, we can see that there is a worldwide direction toward setting more stringent rules, regulations, 
and laws related to corporate governance mechanisms and protecting shareholders’ rights. This awareness 
is on the rise, not only among legislators and governmental agencies, but also among corporations, 
investors, and analysts. For instance, nowadays, a widespread awareness about corporations’ ratings in 
terms of governance mechanisms, social responsibility, and welfare is being observed. In the end, when 
shareholders’ rights are protected, investors’ confidence in the capital market and in corporations will 
increase. This, in turn, will increase the flow of capital into the markets allowing higher trade volume and 
sustainable growth. However, before discussing the different corporate governance mechanisms that can 
be applied to mitigate agency cost, it is important first to define corporate governance mechanisms and 
mention their rising importance in corporate structures and especially in family firms.  
The Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts issued by the European Commission in 
2002 stated that corporate governance is a system, having its foundations partly in company law and partly 
in wider laws and practices and market structures. Melin and Nordqvist (2000) define corporate governance 
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in family firms as ‘the processes, principles, structures, and relationships that help the owner of the firm 
realize his particular vision, goals and objectives’.  
The European Trade Union Institute illustrates that the concept of corporate governance is defined in a 
number of different ways. As a rule, however, it is understood to mean the system of company management 
and oversight. Governance is, consequently, to be understood as an integral organism in which different 
regulations and market forces interplay. This combination shapes the regulation of corporate governance. 
It was also argued that two main governance forms shall be distinguished, one internal, one external. 
External governance is closely linked to company financing through the capital markets. Alongside capital 
market regulations (for example, capital-market-law rules on disclosure, rendering of accounts, oversight 
of central decision-making bodies) which in turn influence the salability of shares (exit), a rich set of 
instruments for reacting and applying pressure is at the disposal of market actors. The regulations on 
external governance are already largely harmonized at European level. Internal governance refers to the 
possibility of influencing decisions within a company. In contrast to external governance, the rules on 
internal governance are harmonized on only a few points (for example, co-determination). In decision-
making, in the first instance managements have to consider the interests of the following: 
 Shareholder value approach: according to this, management actions are aimed solely at the interests of 
shareholders. The only thing that counts is maximizing their profits, for example, through dividends, 
share price gains or proceeds from sales. 
 Mixed shareholder–stakeholder approach: according to this, management actions do not have to be 
oriented solely towards the interests of the shareholders but may also take into account other interest 
groups that are likewise closely and permanently linked to the company (stakeholders). 
 Enlightened shareholder value approach: here again shareholders’ interests take precedence. However, 
ethical, charitable or environmental concerns also come into play; disregard for these could, in the long 
term, lead to losses for the shareholders. 
It depends on the national legal background how these approaches are observed and implemented. Anglo-
Saxon law is traditionally shaped by the shareholder value approach. Today, however, an ‘enlightened 
shareholder’ approach is probably the norm. German (continental European) law, in contrast, works on the 
principle that employees’ interests must be taken into account in company decision-making, or at least to a 
certain extent. There is a similar understanding in France and Italy. In British law there is some dispute 
concerning whether the board may at least consider the interests of other stakeholders.  
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Alternatively, in the US, the Chartered Financial Analyst Institute (CFA®) defines corporate governance as 
the system of principles, policies, procedures, and clearly defined responsibilities and accountabilities used 
by stakeholders to overcome the conflicts of interest inherent in the corporate form. Corporate governance 
affects operational risk and, hence, the sustainability of a corporation. Additionally, the quality of a 
corporation’s corporate governance affects the risks and value of the corporation. Thus, effective and strong 
corporate governance is essential for the efficient functioning of markets, according to the CFA®. 
In the US, corporate governance started to become important for market practitioners in the early 1990s. 
Today, it is a topic of discussion worldwide. International investors generally regard corporate governance 
as an important criterion in their investment decisions (Krafft et al., 2013). According to a Global Investor 
Opinion Survey, 15% of European institutional investors consider corporate governance to be more 
important than financial issues such as profit performance or growth potential (Krafft et al., 2013). Also, 
22% of European institutional investors are willing to pay a premium of 19%, on average, for a well-
governed company. The authors added that more and more countries are tightening the rules and regulation 
related to governance by adopting new standards inspired largely by US codes of best practice and 
establishing guidelines for publicly listed companies to try to improve firms’ overall governance. The 
OECD (2004) Principles of Corporate Governance acknowledge that an effective corporate governance 
system can lower the cost of capital and encourage firms to use resources more efficiently, thereby 
promoting growth. These factors implicitly and explicitly support the belief that better corporate 
governance will result in higher firm value and more profitable firm performance (Krafft et al., 2013). 
Governance structure is important in family firms because it helps reduce agency costs. For instance, 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Anderson and Reeb (2003a) considered that since family firms have 
concentrated shareholdings, they have an increased incentive to reduce agency costs because the more 
concentrated ownership is, the greater the degree to which the benefits and costs are borne by the same 
owner (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). More importantly, as the well-being of the family is tied directly to the 
welfare of the company, families have further incentives to reduce agency costs that might impede 
performance.  
Additionally, governance structure is important in family firms because it facilitates transmission to future 
generations. One of the main goals of family managers is to pass the firm on to the family’s next generation 
(Casson, 1999; and James, 1999). Also, family firms’ owners often have a deep emotional investment in 
their companies (Bubolz, 2001) as their family’s fortune, personal satisfaction, and even public reputation 
are tied to the business (Dyer and Whetten, 2006). Therefore, they view the firm as an asset to be passed 
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on to subsequent generations (Chami, 1999), leading to strict adherence to maximizing the value of the firm 
(James, 1999). Because of their undiversified shareholding, long-term interest, and concern for reputation, 
family shareholders are more likely to accept adopting strong corporate governance mechanisms to 
maximize the firm’s overall value.  
Research reveals that most family businesses have a very short life span beyond their founder’s stage. This 
is often the consequence of a lack of preparation by subsequent generations to handle the demands of a 
growing business and a much larger family. As a result, family businesses can improve their odds of 
survival by putting the right governance structures in place. 
Last, but not least, governance structure is important in family firms because it helps to gain competitive 
advantage. Family firms have to strive to prepare for the future and continued growth by establishing logical 
organizational and governance structures, taking proper advantage of every available resource and growing 
its potential to maximum.  
5.2. Types and Inter-relationships 
After we have defined corporate governance structure and discussed its importance in family firms, we will 
examine different types of governance mechanisms and the inter-relationships among different parties 
involved in the firm’s structure. As we have mentioned, the aim of such governance mechanisms is to solve 
the agency problems between majority controlling family shareholders and minority non-controlling 
outside shareholders. 
Here we will observe some corporate governance mechanisms being adopted by family firms to mitigate 
the agency problem, such as family presence, parental altruism, board structure, presence of independent 
directors, supervisory board, institutional investors, private equity, silent partners, CEO compensation, 
dividends, debt, and takeover. 
5.2.1. Family Presence 
Agency theorists argue that concentration reduces monitoring costs because large owners have the incentive 
and often the expertise to monitor their managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Given significant 
shareholdings, family firms’ owners too, will possess the incentive, power, and information to control their 
managers, thereby reducing free-rider agency costs and boosting returns (Morck et al., 1988; and Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003a). 
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One stream of literature suggests that family control is, potentially, an agency cost reducing mechanism in 
itself. Family firms are concentrated block-holders with a unique incentive to overcome the free-rider 
problem that prevents atomized shareholders and some other block-holders from effectively monitoring 
management (Tufano, 1996; and Anderson and Reeb, 2003a). As the wealth of the family is directly tied to 
the future of the company, and decision-making in family firms is predicated on much longer time horizons 
than in non-family firms, family firms more strictly adhere to wealth maximization than their counterparts 
(Chami, 1999; and James, 1999). A family’s special technical knowledge concerning a firm’s operations 
may put it in a better position to monitor the firm more effectively. 
Moreover, leaders who are ‘insiders’, whose names are on the business, and whose past, present, and future 
are tied to the reputation of their firm, may act as especially solicitous stewards (Bubolz, 2001; Le Breton-
Miller and Miller, 2006). Their stewardship can manifest in lifelong commitment to the firm, assiduous 
management of organizational resources, and a host of competency creating investments (Davis et al., 
1997). Relatedly, Ensley and Pearson (2005) show that management teams of family firms are more 
cohesive than those of non-family firms. Family ownership has the potential to generate a firm community 
with common goals, trust, and values compared to non-family ownership (Abdolmohammadi et al., 2009). 
The average CEO tenure at family-run businesses is said to range between 15 and 25 years, while that of 
the typical public, non-family firm leader has reduced to three to four years (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 
2006). Thus, family firms’ CEOs are usually quite secure in their jobs and operate with the expectation that 
they will be in office for a long time. This alone will cause some to be farsighted stewards of the business 
(Davis et al., 1997). Moreover, as noted, because the family name, fortune, and reputation are at stake, and 
because they are there for the long run, family CEOs may be more committed to the business and willing 
to do what is needed to make it strong (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). This may engender a number of 
strategic outcomes that bring superior return. Similarly, family firms seek to grow in the long term to be 
able to fulfill the demands of a growing family (Ward, 1997). Family firms pursue long-term oriented 
business strategies such as investing in R&D and keep good relations with the firm’s employees (Le Breton-
Miller and Miller, 2006) 
Family CEOs, who anticipate lengthy tenures, shun quick-fix solutions. They are less apt than their shorter-
term peers to make opportunistic, short-term decisions that may come back to haunt them later in their 
careers. They avoid potentially hazardous moves to boost revenues, such as acquisitions into areas beyond 
the firm’s expertise (Fox and Hamilton, 1994; and Amihud and Lev, 1999). They also resist downsizing 
expedients that may reduce costs but destroy morale and erode the firm’s human capital and knowledge 
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base (Laverty, 1996). Unlike many outsider CEOs, family leaders are usually secure enough in their 
positions to resist being goaded into risky short-term expedients to impress the board with quarterly 
numbers. 
Long family-CEO tenures may also be associated with long investment time horizons and a willingness to 
commit resources toward the ultimate health of the business, even if this means sacrifices in the short term 
(Laverty, 1996; and James, 1999). To increase returns over a prospectively lengthy career, family CEOs 
may make quintessentially farsighted investments such as those in research and development, training, and 
state-of the-art infrastructure. Indeed, some evidence reveals that family firms outspend non-family firms 
in R&D (Weber et al., 2003). 
Multiple family executives bring to bear multifaceted expertise and, therefore, broader knowledge, to 
monitor a variety of managerial and employee ‘agents’. These executives can have both the incentive and 
knowledge to oversee diligently their managers in each part of the business (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 
2006). When family members collectively have a diversity of experience, their monitoring contributions 
can be especially valuable (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). Moreover, family executives with common 
interests, mutual trust, and job security are in an ideal position to present frankly their points of view to the 
leader, thereby countering excesses or blind spots (Lansberg, 1999). Their family status lets them be honest 
without fear of adverse consequences to their careers (Bubolz, 2001). 
On the other hand, in family firms, the owner family is willing to support company development in the long 
term through investment of financial as well as human resources (Achleitner et al., 2010). The so-called 
patient capital of a family is an important source of competitive advantage for family firms (Sirmon and 
Hitt, 2003). Family firms have the goal of long-term orientation because they aim to hand down the 
company to the next generation (James, 1999). The company represents not only an investment or 
employment opportunity, but also family tradition and capability (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2006). 
Family firms often feel socially responsible to secure the long-term existence of their company and, thereby, 
to protect the jobs of their employees (Stavrou et al., 2007). For family firms’ owners, employee satisfaction 
in their daily work life is of high priority to increase employee retention, but also because their reputation 
in society is important, particularly if the company name entails the family name as mentioned earlier (Dyer 
and Whetten, 2006). 
Family firms trying to smooth the way for later generations have a strong incentive to build social capital 
in the form of enduring associations with external parties that can supply critical resources to successors 
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(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001; and Adler and Kwon, 2002). These associations can take the form of long-term 
alliances with partners, suppliers, and major customers (Palmer and Barber, 2001). Such concerned family 
firms are also more apt to make the unusually generous investments that make those relationships attractive 
(Naphiet and Ghoshal, 1998; and Bubolz, 2001), as well as to lure well-networked board members who can 
help later generations with their contacts (Anderson and Reeb, 2004).  
Because of the very long tenures and high trust environments existing in many family businesses, the older 
generation is often willing not only to share wisdom but to discuss their own mistakes (Bubolz, 2001). Such 
frankness would be quite rare in non-family businesses, where managers have careers to protect and are 
uncertain about their successors. Another way families help to pass the baton is by fostering a strong, value-
driven corporate culture (Barney and Hansen, 1994; and Habbershon and Williams, 1999). In fact, Allouche 
and Amann (1997) found that among major French companies, family firms invested significantly more in 
training, benefits, and salaries than non-family firms. Reid and Harris (2002) found the same for Irish family 
firms. 
Finally, family control tends to shield a firm from the disciplinary pressure of the market for corporate 
control, since concentrated share ownership reduces the probability of a hostile takeover (Gomez-Mejia et 
al., 2003). Moreover, it has been argued that family firms represent a special class of large shareholders 
that may have a unique incentive structure, a strong voice in the firm, and powerful motivation of managers 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). If monitoring requires knowledge and information about firms’ technology and 
processes, families potentially provide superior oversight because of their lengthy involvement with the 
firm (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a). 
Family ownership can lead to better monitoring of managerial discretion and reduce principal-agent costs 
associated with diffused share ownership structures. It can also facilitate access to resources. As a result, 
family presence in the firm may provide a competitive advantage and improve short- and long-term 
performance (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a). Social capital is often viewed as an especially efficient 
governance mechanism at intermediate levels of asset specificity, such as in facilitating medium-term, 
complex transactions that involve non simultaneous exchanges (Lovett et al., 1999).  
Owner-managers enjoy advantages in forming and sustaining personal business contacts and networks (Le 
Breton-Miller and Miller, 2006). In exercising their property rights, owner-managers generally have the 
authority necessary to commit the firm’s assets to transactions ‘on a handshake’, and because such 
commitments are personal, they may be more binding than arm’s length agreements (Blyler and Coff, 
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2003). Family firms might be an optimal governance structure in certain contexts or periods but inefficient 
in others. Morck and Yeung (2009) suggest that concentrated structures might be better (or even necessary) 
in periods of recovery (when stability is needed and risk-taking is not a good strategy), but not when major 
innovations (e.g. the IT revolution) have to be exploited. 
In general, family shareholders should have strong incentives to maximize the value of the firm, either 
because they want to preserve the family’s reputation, strictly related to the destiny of the firm that often 
bears the family’s name (Davis et al., 1997; and Dyer and Whetten, 2006), as well as because they want to 
pass the firm to the family’s next generation as mentioned earlier (Casson, 1999; and James, 1999). In 
addition, strong feelings of identity lead family managers to seek self-actualization in terms of achieving a 
firm’s goals rather than individual goals (Davis et al., 1997). 
5.2.2. Parental Altruism 
Although altruism has the potential to create agency costs, Schulze et al. (2001) believe that the altruistic 
benefits unique to family ownership may be beneficial for all other owners. However, Becker (1981) and 
Bergstrom (1995) consider altruism to be an economic phenomenon that occurs when an individual pursues 
his/her self-interest by promoting that of others. Simon (1993) and Eschel et al. (1998) develop this notion 
in the context of the family by arguing that it is in each family member’s interests to pursue their own 
interests by promoting the interests of the rest of the family. This, in turn, develops loyalty, facilitates 
communication, and increases time horizons for decision-making, ultimately reducing agency costs. 
Furthermore, parental altruism fosters loyalty, as well as commitment by the family firm’s leadership to the 
organization’s long-term prosperity (Ward, 1987).  
5.2.3. Board Structure 
Boards of directors can play a significant role in controlling agency problems, particularly in monitoring 
executive management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). However, literature suggests that a board can monitor its 
firm more closely and take appropriate governance actions if it is sufficiently small but with enough 
independent directors to ensure effective monitoring (Jensen, 1993). Relatedly, Westphal (1998) suggests 
that since governance mechanisms in family firms are limited, minority shareholders potentially rely on 
their boards to monitor and control the family’s opportunism. More recently, Anderson and Reeb (2004) 
found that interests of minority shareholders are best protected when independent directors have greater 
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power relative to family block-holders. Therefore, the importance is in having powerful independent 
directors to exert proper monitoring over the family firms’ behavior and protecting the minority’s interests.  
Previous research on family ownership and corporate governance in the US (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a, 
2003b, and 2004) found that board structure, in an environment of strong legal shareholder protection and 
low private benefits of control, is conducive to restricting opportunistic behaviors of controlling families. 
Furthermore, the board structure and its characteristics may influence strategic choices (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989). The resource dependence and strategic change perspectives have suggested that, in addition to 
control functions, the board may also play service/resource and strategic roles in the decision-making 
process (Pfeffer, 1972; and Daily et al., 1999). Effective monitoring and service roles are usually a function 
of structural factors, such as the proportion of independent directors on the board, CEO/Chairman roles 
held jointly or separately (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Daily et al., 1999; and Young et al., 2001). 
Family members often have an important role in the management or supervisory board of the firm 
(Astrachan and Shanker, 2003; and Zahra and Sharma, 2004). Family firms often decide against external 
managers because they believe that the objectives of external managers differ from family-specific goals 
(Daily and Dollinger, 1992). The presence of external managers leads to a need for control mechanisms as 
the goals of management may not be in line with family goals (Westhead and Howorth, 2006). Additionally, 
a management board dominated by external managers can create agency problems as the managers act as 
agents with different objectives to the family as principal (Westhead and Howorth, 2006). Thus, a family 
firm needs to have by its side an effective board, usually not big enough to control and monitor. In return, 
external managers may consider family firms to be a less attractive career option, as their career possibilities 
are limited due to the dominant role of the family (Sirmon and Hitt, 2003).  
o Presence of Independent Directors 
The Vienot Report (1995) defines an independent director as a person absolutely devoid of any link of 
interest, direct or indirect contact with the company or its affiliates. The report adds that, consequently, the 
independent director must not be:  
 An employee, the president or CEO of the company or its affiliates, otherwise, he/she must be stopped 
for at least three years.  
 A major shareholder of the company or of its affiliates, related in any manner to a significant partner 
or its affiliates. 
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Boards should include independent directors in line with the prevalent regulatory framework or codes of 
governance. The responsibilities of the independent directors include contributing to strategy and 
monitoring managerial performance, as well as staffing the key audit, remuneration and nomination 
committees, and influencing the board’s conduct (International Corporate Governance Network Principles). 
Several studies tell us that independent directors make decisions for the interests of the company, without 
being influenced by the purpose of family members, which is to keep full control of the company. Anderson 
and Reeb (2004) argue that costs of family ownership may be reduced by both independent directors and 
influential shareholders from outside the family. Such parties, if they are indeed independent, may 
contribute expertise and objectivity, provide alternative perspectives, and bring to bear critical information 
that a family might overlook. 
Independent directors can also serve as more objective monitors of family executives, help in locating and 
hiring better managers, improve resource-allocation decisions, and avoid expropriation of firms’ wealth by 
family members (Dalton et al., 1998; and Anderson and Reeb, 2004). Moreover, if these directors are 
significant shareholders, they have an added incentive to act as vigilant stewards over company resources 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi, 1997; Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer, 
2002; and Claessens et al., 2002). Board independence may be used as a signaling device by organizations 
that act to enhance or protect their legitimacy, especially in the investor community (North, 1990; and Peng, 
2004). Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) argue that family-related directors face higher exit costs because 
leaving the firm would mean foregoing certain rights, perquisites and privileges associated with being part 
of the controlling family. As a result, these high exit costs translate into a higher level of entrenchment.  
Non-family directors may provide additional external ties that can be used to access resources and 
knowledge that are more diverse than resources of the controlling family (Filatotchev and Bishop, 
2002). These resource and institutional arguments suggest that presence of non-family directors 
improves the firm’s competitive position. However, according to Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990), 
the board should be able to shift emphasis from financial control and evaluation of managerial 
decisions to strategic control more focused on longer-term organizational outcomes. Therefore, 
independent directors need to have strong incentives to perform monitoring, resource, and service 
functions effectively. Previous research links close involvement in strategy development and 
implementation with the personal financial risk approximated by ownership interests in the firm 
(Oswald and Jahera, 1991). Hambrick and Jackson (2000) indicate that share ownership not only 
creates financial incentives for independent directors, but also increases their identification with 
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the company, making them more vigilant in their oversight and more generous in their time and 
attention. 
However, family firms’ boards tend to be less independent, with substantial representation by family 
members (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a and 2004). Family firms’ owners prefer to have family members as 
directors because they tend to be proactive and have a collective desire to maintain unity and preserve their 
wealth (Business Week, 2003). Maintaining lack of transparency of corporate governance practices may 
facilitate getting family members on board without much interference from non-family shareholders. The 
resulting concern that non-controlling shareholders may have about the lack of transparency in corporate 
governance practices of family firms, would be reduced to the extent that these firms deliver superior 
performance (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a). Also, independent directors provide a line of defense for 
protecting the rights of non-controlling outside shareholders (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). Finally, 
independent board members can exercise constraint through participation in important committees such as 
the audit committee, compensation committee, or nominating committee, and may have the ability to 
prevent the nomination of an unqualified family member as CEO (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
o Supervisory Board 
However, the monitoring function of board members is sometimes questioned. Generally, the supervisory 
board or non-executive directors share the same main functions of monitoring and advising the management 
board or executive directors (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). In addition, the supervisory board may monitor 
the company closely and may offer the required non-financial support to management (Achleitner et al., 
2008). However, in a family firm, the supervisory board is represented by the family firms’ owner and the 
family manager who are either the same person or at least closely related. This makes it more difficult to 
monitor the family manager. Furthermore, family firms’ owners often decide to appoint to the supervisory 
board family members or external parties who are friends or on good business terms with the family 
(Schulze et al., 2003). The supervisory board is also expected to advise the management, by consulting its 
team in important management decisions or by giving access to external networks (Hillman and Dalziel, 
2003).  
5.2.4. Institutional Investors 
Anderson and Reeb (2003a and 2004) suggest that the presence of large external investors can mitigate the 
potential for moral hazard conflict between the family and outside shareholders. When control is dissipated 
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among several large investors, a decision to expropriate minority shareholders requires the consent of a 
coalition of investors, and this coalition might hold enough cash flow rights to choose to limit expropriation 
of the remaining shareholders and pay the profits as efficient dividends (La Porta et al., 2000).  
Interestingly, Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) suggest a theoretical model explaining an alignment effect 
of a coalition of large shareholders whereby there is a positive relationship between the cash flow stake of 
the controlling coalition and total company value. Consistent with this prediction, in a sample of Finnish 
listed firms, Maury and Pajuste (2005) found, especially in family controlled firms, that the presence of 
other strong block-holders limits the incentive to expropriation. 
The identity of such institutional investors has important organizational implications because different 
owners may have different objectives and decision-making horizons (Tihanyi et al., 2003). For example, 
banks and investment trusts may behave differently in terms of their strategic preferences (McConnell and 
Servaes, 1990; and Chang, 2003). It is worth mentioning that some authors (e.g. Brickley, Lease, and Smith, 
1988; and Kochar and David, 1996) differentiate between ‘pressure-resistant’ and ‘pressure-sensitive’ 
institutional investors.  
 Pressure-resistant institutions, such as investment funds, are unlikely to have strong business links with 
their investors and may have stronger influence on strategy choices and their performance outcomes 
(Hoskisson et al., 2002). Johnson and Greening (1999) also indicate that investment fund managers’ 
objective is a high relative performance of their portfolio firms because of their own reward system. 
 Pressure-sensitive investors, such as banks, are likely to have business relationships with the firms in 
which they invest (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001). Because they often have an obligation to support the 
management’s agenda, their governance role tends to be more passive compared to ‘activist’ investors 
(Tihanyi et al., 2003).  
Additionally, foreign investors based in developed market economies may provide local firms in their 
portfolio with access to a larger, global pool of financial resources compared to domestic institutions that 
mainly operate in the national capital markets (Taylor, 1990). This may make them better and more 
experienced monitors than domestically-oriented investors (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). Furthermore, 
different investment preferences held by foreign institutional investors, combined with their global 
investment experience, may provide their investor firms with access to strategic expertise and knowledge 
that help them to gain a competitive edge compared to companies funded by domestic investors, especially 
when expanding internationally (Tihanyi et al., 2003). 
42 
 
5.2.5. Private Equity 
When they become shareholders, private equity firms usually receive additional information, control, and 
liquidation rights. Particularly in majority investments, this implies a drastic reduction in the independence 
and control of the family (Easterwood, Seth, and Singer, 1989; and Berg and Gottschalg, 2005). Also, in 
minority investments, private equity firms often gain special control or veto rights and the family has to 
share control over the company (Achleitner et al., 2008).  
Interestingly, the presence of private equity firms exert an acceptable level of monitoring activities over the 
family firms’ owners, managers, and board decisions, and most of the time, private equity firms participate 
in firms’ basic and strategic decisions while preserving seats on the firms’ board. Therefore, the presence 
of private equity firms, with all their experienced personnel and directors, who should be well known for 
their credibility and professionalism, should bring a minimum level of assurance for minority and non-
controlling shareholders about the firms’ management, who otherwise have no true insight over the firm’s 
directions and monitoring activities. That is why the presence of private equity firms, especially the highly 
reputable ones, can be identified as corporate governance mechanisms that it would be really good to have 
in the firm. 
5.2.6. Silent Partners 
The silent partner provides the company with equity and participates in its profits, but he/she is not explicitly 
involved in management. However, the silent partner has the right to access the company’s annual reports 
(Achleitner et al., 2008). A silent partner is usually entitled to a fixed rate of return on his investments and, 
in addition, expects to receive a variable return based on the company’s earnings. Payments to the silent 
partner can be interpreted as a mechanism to discipline external managers because it reduces the free cash 
flow available for investments, thereby reducing the risk of over investments by management and 
decreasing agency costs (Achleitner et al., 2010).  
Therefore, silent partners do not play major roles in directly monitoring the firm’s management, or the 
board’s strategic decisions and their role is limited to disciplining firms owners’ spending behavior and 
reducing the free cash flow that can be used to expropriate minority shareholders. Consequently, compared 
to private equity, silent partners do not exert the required level of monitoring that minority shareholders 
usually desire or expect.  
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5.2.7. Debt Financing 
The literature on the monitoring role of debt is extensive and has taken several different perspectives. 
Grossman and Hart (1982) were the first to argue that managers could pre-commit to work hard by using 
debt rather than equity. Debt can serve as a disciplining mechanism to contain agency problems between 
managers and dispersed shareholders by imposing fixed obligations on firms’ cash flow or by reducing free 
cash flows (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; and Jensen, 1986). Harris and Raviv (1990) stress the importance 
of short-term debt in eliciting timely information from management. Issuing short-term debt, and therefore 
forcing management to continuously refinance or roll over the debt so frequently, provides more monitoring 
and imposes more discipline on management. This could work well in the presence of Type 1 agency 
problems where shareholders do not have true and deep insight or proper control over the agents’ work and 
performance. 
However, in family firms, the main owner (family) is usually involved in the key decision-making of the 
firm (Daily and Dollinger, 1992; and Melin and Nordqvist, 2000) which might result in greater alignment 
between the interests of shareholders and managers (La Porta et al., 1999) and, accordingly, the role of 
creditors in monitoring the managers’ actions is not of high importance. Nevertheless, since the primary 
conflict in family firms is between majority and minority shareholders, with the former having the potential 
to expropriate wealth from the latter (La Porter et al., 1999), the internal monitoring mechanisms, such as 
the board of directors, usually are at the disposal of the controlling shareholder who, in the family firm, is 
the family founder. In this context, external mechanisms, such as debt and takeover, are the only recourse 
for mitigating such activities. In Continental Europe, where active takeover markets are fewer than in the 
US and the UK, debt seems to represent the only external monitoring mechanism.  
Since April 2009, most countries’ central banks have tremendously increased their awareness by closely 
monitoring their banks with respect to their credit and liquidity risks and in enforcing them to adopt 
vigorous standards in assessing the creditworthiness of their clients, in scrutinizing any credit request and, 
more importantly, to continue monitoring their clients for the full credit term. All these requirements were 
reviewed, updated, and dramatically enhanced after the infamous credit crunch of 2009 where, 
unfortunately, most banks in the US and Europe were severely hit and many went bankrupt. As a result, 
banks and creditors have become more stringent than ever in dealing with their clients’ requests for credit 
or rolling over any old debt. Creditors’ levels of skepticism have also increased and their presence has 
improved close monitoring of firms. This will certainly put more pressure on firms seeking credit in terms 
of presenting more documents, such as updated financial statements, management reports, and policies. 
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More importantly, these creditors have turned out to be more effective in terms of management monitoring, 
since most creditors require more and more to have seats on the firm’s board and share the board’s 
decisions. In conclusion, this is what minority shareholders would like to see and have. 
Similarly, Shyu and Lee (2009) argue that in family firms, creditors are the only viable monitoring 
mechanism to protect minority shareholders. They considered that in countries where the protection of 
shareholders is weak, controlling shareholders usually use excess control rights to weaken the ability of 
internal control mechanisms to constrain their entrenching and expropriating activities. In such 
circumstances, external control mechanisms may be the only recourse available to remedy the problem. 
Unfortunately, the market for corporate control, one of the external mechanisms, that has worked very 
effectively in creating value for shareholders in many developed countries by throwing out incumbent 
executives, is very much needed in countries where shareholder protection is weak and excess control rights 
are prevalent.  
However, not all creditors wield the same influence (Jensen, 1986) and studies have shown that providers 
of short-term debt can exercise their monitoring power more effectively than their long-term counterparts. 
Not surprisingly, managers, out of self-interest, inherently prefer longer-term debt, and many studies (e.g. 
Datta et al., 2005) have provided evidence confirming such a managerial preference. 
5.2.8. CEO Compensation 
Agency theory suggests that owners who do not run their firms should tie managers’ pay to performance to 
incentivize them to work for the owners’ benefit and to lessen the possibility of high expropriation 
(McConaughy, Matthews, and Fialko, 2001). This can actually be true when Type 1 agency problems occur 
where shareholders (i.e. the firm’s principals) do not have direct monitoring over managers’ activities (i.e. 
the firm’s agents) and who are concerned about their wealth being expropriated. Accordingly, the board of 
directors, through the compensation committee, sets the CEO’s compensations plan to be aligned with the 
firm’s performance, trying to mitigate the agency problems.  
However, in the case of family firms, as previously discussed, firms’ owners or their families are usually 
always present in the firms’ management and board of directors. Thus, firms’ owners or their families are 
the most informed parties about the firms CEOs’ main decisions and have direct monitoring over their 
performance. So, according to agency theory, family firms’ CEOs should not be the highest paid and their 
compensations are not necessarily to be aligned with the firms’ performance. On the other hand, what 
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persists in family firms, is Type 2 agency problems which necessitate the CEO’s compensation to be aligned 
with the firm’s performance to mitigate such problems. It is worth mentioning that this type of governance 
mechanism, as many others, should be matched and adopted as a set of mechanisms to create a proper and 
effective governance structure. 
5.2.9. Dividends 
Dividends may serve to reduce free cash flows that might otherwise be expropriated (Jensen, 1986; La Porta 
et al., 2000; Faccio et al., 2001; and Farinha, 2003). Agency theory suggests that dividends help control 
agency problems between managers and shareholders by reducing free cash flows that force managers to 
raise capital market funding more frequently and, thus, subjects insiders to outside scrutiny (Rozeff, 1982; 
Easterbrook, 1984; and Jensen, 1986). Moreover, it was mentioned by DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2000) that 
family-dominated businesses are more apt to be characterized by extraordinary dividend payouts. However, 
in cases of low or no family members’ involvement in the management board, the family is likely to not 
identify themselves strongly with the company and, hence, their focus lies on gaining high dividends that 
decrease the share of earnings available to use as internal financing (Davis et al., 1997).  
In contrast, there is also some evidence that large family firms pay out lower dividends and reinvest a higher 
percentage of profits (Daily and Dollinger, 1992; Gallo and Vilaseca, 1996; and Anderson et al., 2003). La 
Porta et al. (2000), however, indicate that dividends can reduce agency problems between family 
shareholders and minority shareholders as they guarantee a pro-rata payout to all shareholders and remove 
corporate wealth from the controlling block-holders. Their dividend outcome model predicts that under a 
stronger legal protection system, minority shareholders will use their legal power to force controlling block-
holders to distribute more cash. The system also makes rent extraction, such as asset diversion, legally more 
risky and expensive for insiders, thus, dividends become relatively more attractive. As such, dividends can 
play a significant role in controlling the agency problem among family firms, particularly in environments 
of strong legal shareholder protection and low private benefits of control. Accordingly, the expropriation 
argument suggests families prefer lower dividend payouts so as to preserve cash flows that they can 
potentially expropriate. However, as families potentially reduce agency problems through their better 
monitoring of managers or direct involvement in management, they make less use of dividends to address 
agency costs. Faccio et al. (2001) focus on dividend policy in East Asian and European family firms and 
provide evidence of expropriation of other shareholders by the founding family. 
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5.2.10. Takeover 
Most governance mechanisms discussed so far are considered internal mechanisms that are usually 
generated, adopted, and implemented internally by the firm’s board. Thus, the firm’s board has substantial 
power to choose among those mechanisms that are usually considered opportunities for the firm’s owners, 
especially the minority shareholders. On the other hand, takeovers and the market for corporate control are 
external mechanisms, usually generated, adopted, and implemented by major and institutional investors 
wishing to have a substantial ownership in the firm and seeking a dramatic change in the firm’s board and 
management. Thus, the firm’s board and management have no power, control, and authority over such 
external factors that most often represent real threats to the firms’ managers.  
Takeover used to be considered an effective way to take control over a firm’s board and, thus, over the 
firm’s decision-making process, but this strategy might not be as effective in the case of family firms where 
usually firms’ owners hold the majority of shares making the real threat of takeover trivial. But still, 
takeover and the market for corporate control have some positive governance effects, in that they can 
change the ownership structure of a firm by having an enormous shares acquisition by a single or few 
investors. In such cases, minority shareholders with no proper representation on the firm’s board and no 
monitoring power over the firms’ major shareholders and CEO, are now replaced by a few solid and 
experienced investors who hold a major shareholding and who seek important changes over the firms’ 
governance and management. 
5.2.11. Inter-relationships among Various Governance Mechanisms 
Prior researchers (e.g. Gugler, 2003; Anderson and Reeb, 2003b and 2004) have examined relationships 
between family firms and corporate governance mechanisms, but they have done so separately without 
addressing any endogeneity issues among the variables. However, there are complex inter-relationships 
among different corporate governance mechanisms. Each governance mechanism has associated costs and 
benefits. For example, higher dividends may reduce agency problems but also increase transaction costs 
(Rozeff, 1982). Similarly, higher debt disciplines managers by reducing free cash flows but also leads to 
higher default risk or agency costs of debt (Jensen et al., 1992). Additionally, a higher proportion of 
independent directors on the board may enhance monitoring but it also increases their communication and 
co-ordination costs (Raheja, 2005). Smaller boards can be more effective monitors but will lack the 
expertise and advice provided by additional directors (Coles et al., 2008).  
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Likewise, Easterbrook (1984) suggests that as all agency problem controls are costly, substitution among 
them should be expected. However, some questions should be raised whenever examining any governance 
mechanism such as: (1) How are individual governance mechanisms combined to form a governance 
structure? (2) Are some governance mechanisms more effective when used in conjunction? (3) What blend 
of different mechanisms of corporate governance constitutes an optimal governance structure?  
Many authors worked to find answers to these questions. For instance, Fatma and Dufour (2005) showed 
there is a positive relationship between the presence of independent directors and company leverage. This 
means that independent directors, whose function is to secure the providers of resources, enable the 
company to increase its credibility and borrowing capacity. These same authors again showed there is a 
negative relationship between the presence of independent directors and the shareholders’ weight. This 
implies that the goal of family shareholders, namely to retain almost exclusive control by avoiding external 
finance, is shaken. Thus, the presence of independent directors on the board is a way to secure the funds 
provided by outside investors.  
In the end, we should not lose sight of the bigger picture and the ultimate objective managers seek all over 
the world, which is shareholders’ wealth maximization. Thus, managers seek to implement the most 
efficient set of governance mechanisms to increase the value of the firm whatever type of firm this is. Thus, 
we will concentrate in the following section on the reaction of family firms under the contexts of different 
corporate governance mechanisms and how these mechanisms would affect the firms’ performance. 
6. THE IPO PROCESS, BENEFITS, AND TIMING 
6.1. IPO Process 
The IPO is the process by which a private company can go public by sale of its stocks to the general public. 
It could be a new or an old company that decides to be listed on an exchange and, hence, goes public. 
Equivalently, companies can raise equity capital through an IPO by issuing new shares to the public, or 
existing shareholders can sell their shares to the public without raising any new capital. The company that 
offers its shares, known as an ‘issuer’, does so with the help of investment banks, usually referred to as 
‘underwriters’. These banks usually have a long and successful tracking history in making firms public and 
raising the required capital to the issuers in a prompt and cost efficient way. Additionally, these investment 
banks have generally strong international relationships with other investment banks, institutional investors, 
and high net worth individuals, that helps them sell the firms’ shares as quickly and easily as possible. It is 
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generally agreed that the main duties of the underwriters are: to assess the issuing shares’ value, determine 
the best offering price to launch the shares at, decide the type of securities to issue, and the time to bring it 
to market.  
Since most IPOs are companies going through a transitory growth period and subject to additional 
uncertainty regarding their future cash flows and values, IPOs are risky investments. This is why it is more 
likely to see institutional investors and high net worth individuals invest in IPOs than any other individual, 
small or inexperienced investor because they have both the financial ability to invest and bear the risk and 
the willingness to hold risky securities. Moreover, such types of investors have the capacity to pay for legal 
and financial consultants to assess, analyze, and follow up the IPO shares. 
However, since our research is focused on French family firms, it is imperative to review the very important 
IPO process in France, including the IPO regulations, prospectus, and procedures. Besides, more than any 
other country in the world, the French IPO market has been characterized by multiple mechanisms being 
used to sell IPOs without government interference in the choice (Ritter, 2003). Additionally, NYSE 
Euronext exceptionally hands over the initial negotiation mechanisms to the introducing firms unlike other 
European countries that hand it over to an investment bank (Boutron et al., 2007). Moreover, the auctioneer 
in France, which can be the stock market company, specifies the definitive flotation price on the basis of 
the order book. 
6.1.1. Regulation of IPOs in France 
The ‘Autorité des Marchés Financiers’ (AMF) was established by France’s legislature in 2003. It has a 
Board headed by the AMF Chairman and an Enforcement Committee empowered to impose disciplinary 
sanctions and fines. The AMF has a staff of around 450 and is financially independent thanks to the levies 
and contributions paid by the firms under its supervision. It co-ordinates its activities with other French 
regulators, especially in the banking and insurance sectors, and cooperates actively with its European and 
international counterparts. It also consults regularly with professionals, investors, and academics in an effort 
to take financial regulation forward.  
More precisely, the AMF regulates participants and products in France’s financial markets. It regulates, 
authorizes, monitors and, where necessary, conducts investigations and issues sanctions. In addition, it 
ensures that investors receive material information and provides a mediation service to assist them in 
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disputes. Thus, the AMF is an independent public body with a remit to safeguard investments in financial 
products, ensure that investors receive material information, and maintain orderly financial markets.  
To fulfill its remit, the AMF sets rules, authorizes participants, approves disclosures relating to corporate 
finance transactions, authorizes collective investment products, monitors the participants and savings 
products under its supervision, conducts investigations and inspections, has enforcement powers, informs 
investors, and offers a mediation service. Any firm wishing to go public and be listed on a stock exchange 
must prepare a prospectus that is highly regulated by the AMF and present it few months before the 
admission date. 
However, the firm wishing to go public needs the assistance and support of an experienced and professional 
intermediary whose main role is to value the offering, prepare all necessary and legal documents, such as 
the IPO prospectus, with the input of the firm, contact potential investors, individual and institutional, to 
advertise the offering and be the intermediary between the issuing firm and the official authorities for any 
query or information needed. This intermediary is, in most cases, an investment bank that plays the role of 
underwriter.  
Importantly, due diligence is required to compile the IPO prospectus where lawyers with the underwriting 
bank examine the company’s legal, financial, and commercial aspects. The due diligence has many legal, 
financial, and commercial facets and its importance is extremely high in gathering the information needed 
for an investment decision process. Actually, the requirements and quantity of information differ from 
country to country (cf. I.2). The next step of the flotation process is to obtain the approval of the admission 
authority (the AMF in the case of France). Last, the initial pricing and placement of shares are organized 
either by the underwriter or in co-ordination with the exchange, depending on the institutional setting (cf. 
I.3). The choice between listing market segments is mainly based upon size and in some cases may also 
depend on listing costs. Primary markets are portrayed by three normal necessities, particularly 
bookkeeping records history, capital size, and floating capital. Likewise, the IPO candidate should provide 
a full set of audited financial statements for the three business years prior to the IPO date. 
6.1.2. Procedures for Obtaining AMF Approval 
To start with, any company wishing to conduct an IPO on a regulated market or be admitted to an organized 
multilateral trading facility (OMTF) with a public offering must first prepare a prospectus for AMF 
approval. The prospectus is prepared under the responsibility of the company and must be made available 
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to the public before the offering begins. The draft prospectus must be filed with the AMF along with the 
legal and accounting documentation listed in Articles 1 and 3 of AMF Instruction DOC-2005-11. After the 
AMF has reviewed the draft prospectus, which it is required to do within 20 trading days of receipt of a 
complete document, the issuer must send the final version, along with: 
1. A statement by the responsible person or persons that the information contained in the prospectus is 
true and exact. 
2. A statement by the investment services provider or listing sponsor that conducted due diligence in 
accordance with the professional code established by the French Banking Federation (FBF) and the 
French Association of Investment Firms (‘Association Française des Entreprises d’Investissement’ – 
AFEI). 
3. A completion letter from the statutory auditors regarding the financial and accounting disclosures. 
As mentioned earlier, the prospectus is prepared by the issuer and incurs the liability of signatories. AMF 
approval indicates that the prospectus contains the information required for an investor to decide whether 
to take part in the offering. Thus, the prospectus must be complete, comprehensible, and consistent, and the 
information must be true, exact, and precise. Nevertheless, AMF approval does not constitute endorsement 
of the merits of the offering or the authenticity of the accounting and financial documents presented; above 
all, it does not give an opinion on the structure of IPOs. However, as part of its tasks in safeguarding 
investments, ensuring orderly markets and making sure that markets receive material information, the AMF 
sets down rules for providing material information to the market, including the price spread that forms the 
basis for investment decisions, and rules to avoid an obvious imbalance in the allocation of securities to the 
detriment of individual investors (Art. 315-35 of the AMF General Regulation). 
6.1.3. IPO Prospectus 
As mentioned above, before securities are publicly offered and admitted to a market, a prospectus must be 
prepared that is approved by the AMF and whose content requirements are determined by Regulation (EC) 
809/2004 of 29 April 2004. The prospectus contains all the information that investors require to make an 
informed assessment of the assets and liabilities, financial position, results, and future prospects of the 
issuer, and any guarantors of the financial instruments being offered to the public or admitted to trading, as 
well as the rights attaching to those securities and the way they are being issued. The type of information 
depends on the particular nature of the issuer and of the financial instruments it wants to offer to the public 
or have admitted to trading on a regulated market. ‘Offer of securities to the public’ means a communication 
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to persons in any form and by any means, presenting sufficient information on the terms of the offer and 
the securities to be offered, so as to enable an investor to decide to purchase or subscribe to these securities 
and placing of securities through financial intermediaries. A prospectus must always be prepared for an 
IPO on a regulated market. On Alternext, a prospectus must be prepared for a first admission to the 
Alternext Paris public offering compartment. As mentioned earlier, the prospectus is prepared by the issuer 
and incurs the liability of signatories. 
An issuer preparing to carry out an IPO and its advisers are often led to disseminate information about the 
company ahead of the approval and publication of the prospectus. To provide equal information to the 
market at the earliest possible stage before the offering, the IPO prospectus may be divided into two 
documents: 
1. A base document about the issuer recorded by the AMF and published ahead of the offer period to 
allow the market to get a better understanding of the issuer. 
2. A securities note together with a prospectus summary, approved by the AMF and published no later 
than the IPO opening day, giving details about the IPO and incorporating the base document by 
reference. 
Once the AMF has given its approval, the prospectus must be effectively disseminated (Art. 212-27 of the 
General Regulation), made publicly available free of charge at the issuer’s registered offices, posted on the 
issuer’s website, and published on the AMF’s website. However, it is important to note that promotional 
documentation relating to the offering, irrespective of form and distribution method (press inserts, leaflets, 
mail shots, internet banners), must be provided to the AMF before being disseminated (Art. 212-28 of the 
General Regulation). They must clearly state that a prospectus has been or will be published and indicate 
where and how investors can obtain it. If the prospectus has already been authorized, the company must 
give the issue date and the authorization number. All advertisements must contain a notice drawing attention 
to the section of the prospectus on risk factors. Basically, once a standalone or a base prospectus has been 
filed, the AMF sends the issuer a notice once the file is complete. It usually announces its approval within 
10 trading days and 20 days for an initial public offering. The deadline is reduced to five working days for 
issuers that have already provided comprehensive information by previously drafting a registration 
document and registering or filing it with the AMF. 
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6.2. IPO Benefits 
An equity sale through an IPO has two distinct features. First, by definition, it induces a change in the 
ownership structure of the firm. Second, given the presence of high initial returns, it leads to a transfer of 
wealth from the old owners to the new shareholders. Moreover, in their model, Benninga, Helmantel, and 
Sarig (2003) showed that the entrepreneur at each point in time chooses between remaining private or 
selling equity to well-dispersed outside investors. The trade-off is between the higher valuations diversified 
outside investors are willing to pay (from which the entrepreneur only benefits when the firm is public) and 
private benefits of control (which the owner only enjoys when the firm is private). When the entrepreneur’s 
private benefits exceed the cost of being under-diversified, he/she will choose to remain private. Outside 
investors’ valuations (and thus the cost of under-diversification) vary over time as market conditions and 
the firm’s cash flows and prospects change and, therefore, so does the case for going public. Below we list 
the main benefits and reasons that stimulate family firms to go public. 
6.2.1. Realizing Growth 
One of the main obstacles firms can face is the lack of adequate and sufficient financing to grow their 
business, invest in new technology, experienced and talented human resources, specialized training, capital 
expenditure, and working capital. Therefore, firms find in IPOs an excellent opportunity to raise additional 
funds for growth prospects and requirements, without which, firms find deficiencies in growing the business 
and facing new challenges. Therefore, many family firms’ owners have come to realize that going public 
is essential for long-term growth (McConaughy, Dhatt, and Kim, 1995; Deeds et al., 1997; Pagano, Panetta, 
and Zingales, 1998; and Welbourne and Cyr, 1999). Additionally, Bancel and Mittoo (2009) conducted a 
survey with 78 Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) from 12 European countries. Although the motivations for 
going public differed from one firm to another or from one country to another, most CFOs agreed that the 
main important benefit of IPO was to finance growth. Similarly, Mazzola and Marchisio (2003) confirm 
that IPO offers family-owned companies a possible way of financing future company growth. An IPO 
provides funding for the firm to undertake new projects as well. 
6.2.2. Solving Succession Problems 
The conventional wisdom about family business refers to the perceived lack of endurance of family 
businesses. The statistics that in only one out of three cases does the successive generation continue with 
the family business, and that the average lifespan of a family business is 24 years, have been repeated in 
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articles on family businesses since they were first published by Beckhard and Dyer (1983). By going public, 
this very important problem of survival will be solved and the family firms’ descendants or heirs can just 
hold shares in their parents’ or ancestors’ firms that have now been listed without being obliged to manage 
the whole company on their own. Thus, in addition to financing firms’ growth, finding a solution for 
succession problems is what family firms’ owners seek to achieve by going public (McConaughy, Dhatt, 
and Kim, 1995; Deeds et al., 1997; Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales, 1998; Welbourne and Cyr, 1999; and 
Mazzola and Marchisio, 2003). Additionally, Marchisio and Ravasi (2000) consider that IPO offers 
flexibility for family firms regarding management succession and the professionalization of management. 
6.2.3. Taking Advantage of Bullish Periods 
Ritter (1984 and 1991) proposes the ‘Hot Issue Markets’ explanation for a firm to go public. This theory 
reflects an opportunistic reason for going public, as a business tries to take advantage of bullish stock 
markets. Strong IPO activities are observed when markets have had bullish tendencies for some time and 
investors are consequently optimistic when paying higher share prices. During such periods, investors, 
analysts, and underwriters tend to overestimate future revenues, net earnings, and cash flows and, thus, 
investors tend to pay relatively higher prices to acquire firms going public. Accordingly, firms’ values tend 
to be overestimated and, thus, issuers tend to take advantage of such situations to maximize their proceeds 
from going public by selling the maximum number of shares at the maximum possible price. 
This approach establishes that companies know that investors are over optimistic about the potential 
earnings of firms that go public. As this behavior results in strong stock demand, a lot of ‘poor performing’ 
or immature companies take advantage of the situation and sell their shares by means of an IPO. Companies 
carrying out an IPO in hot issue markets often underperform other IPOs significantly in subsequent years. 
In particular, this occurs in the case of young growth firms (Ritter, 1991). 
6.2.4. Enhancing External Monitoring 
Bancel and Mittoo (2009) surveyed 78 Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) of firms that went public between 
1994 to 2004 from 12 European countries and demonstrated that large firms consider enhanced external 
monitoring as the most important benefit of an IPO. At an IPO, family firms’ owners send signals and 
invitations to the investment community to get to know more about the firm, its history, management style, 
board skills and strategies, production and line of business, current plans and future projects, financial 
records and performance and, most importantly, its current and projected cash flows that are the main 
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determinants of the shares’ values. As a result, numerous external financial analysts, investment banks, 
lending and commercial banks, investors’ agents and representatives, legislative and tax authorities will be 
much more interested in following and monitoring the firm in depth and take proper actions on time to 
either praise or punish the firm and, more importantly, to monitor its spending behavior and cash flow 
management. Therefore, some family firms’ owners would be interested in such a crucial monitoring 
channel being created upon IPO.  
From the governance perspective, especially in the case of family firms where the agency problem mainly 
arises between the controlling (majority) and the non-controlling (minority) shareholders, such monitoring 
means is mostly appreciated and valued by minority shareholders where their control and monitoring over 
the firms’ management is low and generally ineffective. Therefore, IPO can provide monitoring means for 
those shareholders, especially with the extensive requirements in distributing financial data and reports that 
are usually deeply reviewed and audited by external and qualified auditors and by disseminating other 
important disclosures related to performance, main operating activities, and strategic changes in the firms. 
6.2.5. Strengthening Bargaining Power with Creditors 
Bancel and Mittoo (2009) showed that family controlled firms view the IPO as a vehicle to strengthen their 
bargaining power with creditors without relinquishing control. Moreover, flotation can help access debt 
capital on more favorable terms (Rigamonti, 2007). By going public, the firm releases information to 
general investors, stimulates competition among potential lenders, ensures lower cost of debt or larger 
supply of funds, mitigating a potential credit crunch (Rajan, 1992). For instance, Pagano, Panetta, and 
Zingales (1998) document that Italian companies experienced a reduction in the cost of bank credit after an 
IPO. 
By choosing to raise funds by going public, firms diversify their source of financing and, thus, rely less on 
creditors’ funding and will have stronger bargaining power to discuss future financing conditions. This is a 
very important advantage for family firms, especially in bank-based economies like France where banks 
play major and ultimate roles in financing most privately-held companies, sometimes putting severe 
restrictions and regulations on firms and, above all, retain control during the financing period. We 
remember here Porter’s five forces (bargaining power of supplier). However, with an IPO, family firms 
find alternative financing and boost growth by targeting the market directly, benefiting from a vast source 
of financing from dispersed individuals and institutional investors, not necessarily from one source, usually 
the bank and, most importantly, without relinquishing control. 
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6.2.6. Increasing Share Liquidity 
Rigamonti (2007) explained that another reason for listing is liquidity provided by the enlargement of 
investors’ base. Listing on an organized exchange allows shares to trade at a value that reflects all available 
information. Hence, diffuse ownership has the effect of lowering the firm’s capital cost and increases the 
equilibrium price for the shares offered. Not only is secondary-market liquidity valuable to investors, but 
also to original shareholders, who may desire to dispose of additional shares after the IPO (Booth and Chua, 
1996). Additionally, through IPO, firms’ initial owners can find an exit for selling part or all their shares in 
the secondary market. Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) tested different IPO models in a sample of 69 
Italian firms that went public between 1982 and 1992. They concluded that Italian firms chose to go public 
primarily to rebalance their leverage and to allow the pre-IPO owners and managers to liquidate their 
positions.  
Bancel and Mittoo (2009) showed that English firms considered the increased share liquidity and ability to 
sell shares as the most important benefits of IPOs. This reason might be very important for some family 
firms’ owners who want to liquidate some or all their shares at a fair market price in the most efficient, 
prompt, and discreet manner and, more importantly, with the lowest possible bid-ask spread. This is usually 
what investors in privately-held firms suffer once they decide to sell their shares to a third party. That is 
why many investors and family firms’ owners appreciate liquidity so much and sometimes pay a certain 
price to obtain it, in some cases through an IPO and specifically through underpricing.  
6.2.7. Increasing Reputational and Social Capital 
Bancel and Mittoo (2009) also documented that most of the 78 questioned CFOs agreed that the main 
important benefits of IPO were to enhance visibility and create a prestigious outlook for the firm. Similarly, 
Marchisio and Ravasi (2001) surveyed 74 Italian IPOs and demonstrated that an increasing number of 
companies saw going public as a way to improve their reputational and social capital, with beneficial effects 
on their capacity to access external resources and opportunities for new entrepreneurial ventures. This study 
reveals that, besides the usual financial motives, the decision to go public is increasingly stimulated by a 
search for a higher visibility and is seen as an important step in the expansion and reinforcement of the 
network of relationships that sustains entrepreneurial activity.  
These results support Bancel and Mittoo (2009) with regard to enhanced visibility and firms’ prestigious 
outlook. For instance, some family firms that go public may take great advantage of the old age of their 
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firm, mostly using its heritage, in the firm’s sign and logo, to promote it and benefit from it. Others benefit 
from the IPO, considering it a sign of triumph for their hard work and efforts, and aim to build a successful 
track record out of it to benefit their reputational and social capital. Additionally, some firms choose to go 
public because it is a step forward for internationalization. Usually, family firms’ owners and principals are 
interested in their firms’ social image more than any other passive investor, because these images reflect 
their own culture, ideas, success, and behaviors. Thus, through IPOs, such firms’ owners can spread the 
image they have built for their firms over years and increase their reputational and social capital in the 
whole market. 
6.2.8. Sharing Investors’ Risk 
Rock (1986) states that one important motive behind going public for firms is the owners’ risk aversion as 
risk is shared but limited among owners and financial backers of publicly listed companies. Also, IPO offers 
existing shareholders the chance to diversify their wealth (Pagano, 1993). This can apply to family firms 
since the owners have intensively invested a big part of their capital in their own firms and, therefore, some 
means of risk management in terms of IPO would be beneficial to some of these owners. By going public, 
family firms’ owners can use the IPO proceeds to diversify their investments and, therefore, spread the 
overall investment risk. This is a tactic in risk management that some family firms’ owners intend to follow 
and prepare for it for years. As we have seen, this is attributed to the family firms’ owners’ characteristics 
that we covered earlier. We mentioned that the family firms’ owners have under-diversified equity holdings. 
Their investment is very focused in a single asset: the owners’ firm. As a result, IPO is a plausible solution 
for those owners who look to diversify their risks and, therefore, can sell part of their firms’ holdings to 
public shareholders at a desired price and desired time.  
6.3. IPO Timing 
IPO timing is crucial in an IPO decision as many players in IPO markets believe that timing affects IPO 
performance in one way or another. As a result, researchers in the field of corporate finance examined IPO 
timing through different scopes and angles focusing on the relationship between IPO timing and market 
conditions, IPO timing and changes in valuations, and IPO timing and IPO volume. However, to our 
knowledge, there is a lack of research about the IPO timing of family firms and, therefore, we cannot 
ascertain that family firms’ behaviors toward IPO timing differ from those of non-family firms. Therefore, 
we will review the main literature covering IPO timing in general and for a typical IPO. 
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6.3.1. IPO Timing Related to Market Conditions 
According to the timing hypothesis, managers choose a window of opportunity to launch an IPO. This 
window is identified as a function of the firm’s performance or market conditions, such as changes in 
valuations and investment opportunities. For instance, Baker and Wurgler (2002) argue that firms time their 
IPO to coincide with periods of excessive valuations. Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994) go further in 
claiming that issuers time their IPOs to coincide with periods of excessive optimism, consistent with the 
finding of Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) that more companies go public when investor sentiment is high. 
Such patterns can persist if rational investors are dissuaded by the cost of implementing arbitrage strategies 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
6.3.2. IPO Timing Related to Changes in Valuations 
Pastor and Veronesi (2003) also studied the timing of IPOs, but emphasize the importance of changes in 
valuations (as captured by returns), rather than valuation levels (high market-to book ratio in the industry). 
All else being equal, firms are more likely to go public following recent improvements in market conditions, 
regardless of the level of valuations in the market. They found recent returns matter more than the level of 
market-to-book ratios, which supports this emphasis on changes rather than levels. Pastor and Veronesi 
(2003) also predicted that more firms would go public when uncertainty about their future profitability was 
high. This intuition builds on Pastor and Veronesi’s (2003) insight that valuations increase in uncertainty 
about the growth rate in profits, due to the convex relationship between growth rates and terminal values.  
6.3.3. IPO Timing Related to IPO Volume 
Lowry (2003) studied the time-series of IPOs in the US, showing that the main determinants of fluctuations 
in IPO volume were changes in firms’ demand for outside capital and proxies for investor sentiment. 
However, Helwege and Liang (2004) argued that firms going public in periods of high IPO volume do not 
differ in any key characteristic from those going public in low volume periods. Differently, Cook et al. 
(2003) document that IPO volume increases during industry profitability and stock valuations, whereas 
Pastor and Veronesi (2005) found that ‘IPO waves’ coincided with peaks in stock market returns, increases 
in aggregate profitability, positive revisions to analysts’ long-term earnings growth forecasts, and higher 
volatility. According to Ritter (2003), the huge fluctuations in volume from period to period suggest that 
market timing considerations are relatively more important than the life-cycle considerations modeled by 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) in determining a firm’s IPO timing.  
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6.3.4. IPO Performance Time Intervals 
Concerning IPO performance time intervals, most researchers who studied and analyzed the performance 
of firms going public, differentiated their performance calculations based upon two main time intervals, 
either short-term or long-term. While the short-term time interval ranges mainly from one to five days after 
the IPO date (sometimes up to 10 or even 30 days), the long-term one can extend mainly from one to three 
years after the IPO date (and sometimes up to five years or longer). 
7. CONCLUSION 
As mentioned earlier, our research objective is to shed more light on the French family firms’ capital 
structure decisions compared to non-family firms, and their short-term and long-term performance after 
going public. Thus, in the first chapter we will focus on the many comparative analyses between the listed 
French family and non-family firms. We will thoroughly analyze the main differences in the French firms’ 
capital structure by focusing on their debt financing. Last, we present eight multiple linear regressions to 
attempt to explain firm’s debt financing in most aspects through different explanatory variables.  
In the second chapter we will focus on the IPO short-term performance of French family firms. We inspect 
the firms’ prospectuses with respect to different governance mechanisms set by the family firms pre-IPO 
date and the ownership and control rights at pre- and post-IPO date for the family firms’ owners, public 
shareholders, and other investors, such as non-family managers, employees, and investment banks. First, 
we present a thorough analysis of IPO firms and their distribution over the years in terms of IPO size, 
values, and industry affiliation. We also analyze the firm’s governance mechanisms and the ownership and 
control rights change due to the IPO. Last, we present two different models for attempting to explain IPO 
short-term performance, one via ownership and control rights change, the other by governance mechanisms. 
In the third chapter we focus on the IPO long-term performance of French family firms. We use different 
models and entry dates in the IPO portfolios to realize better and robust results. We calculate cumulative 
abnormal returns, buy-and-hold abnormal returns, wealth relatives, raw returns, and run the capital asset 
pricing model and the Fama and French multi-factor model, in addition to two models using multiple linear 
regressions. 
  
59 
 
CHAPTER 1: CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF FAMILY FIRMS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Many researchers urge that family firms are a group of particular interest to study because of the 
specificities and particularities in the level of professionalization and the degree of family ownership 
concentration that affects the governance system, strategy, organization and performance of firms. 
Accordingly, the last few decades have witnessed numerous research papers conducted on the specificities 
of family firms in their corporate finance behaviors, in their performance drivers and growth. One of the 
most important theories in corporate finance that many researchers have been interested in studying is the 
capital structure theory. In particular, the investigation of the determinants of the capital structure has been 
one of the most active inquiries in corporate finance. 
For instance, Ampenberger et al. (2013) explain that the “capital structure puzzle”1 (i.e. a firm’s choice of 
an optimal capital structure), remains one of the large unresolved issues in the financial economics 
literature. As a matter of fact, numerous research papers have been conducted trying to explain the capital 
structure theory from different perspectives starting in 1958. Modigliani and Miller (1958), considered the 
fathers of the capital structure theory, were the first to present a theorem explaining the firm’s decision to 
raise capital. This theorem states that, under a certain market price process, in the absence of taxes, 
bankruptcy costs, agency costs, and asymmetric information, and in an efficient market, the value of a firm 
is unaffected by how that firm is financed. This means that it does not matter if the firm’s capital is raised 
by issuing stock or selling debt, and it also does not matter what the firm’s dividend policy is. That’s why 
the Modigliani-Miller theorem (MM theorem) is also often called the capital structure irrelevance principle. 
In fact, two propositions were stated based upon this theorem, which are best known as Proposition 1 and 
                                                     
 
1
 The term “capital structure puzzle” refers to Myer’s (1984) presidential address at the 1984 AFA meeting, when he 
asked the question: How do firms choose their capital structures? … We don’t know. 
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2; however, we will focus more on Proposition 1, which was stated in two versions, without and with taxes 
assumption.  
Under the no taxes assumption, Proposition 1 focuses on the value of the firm that is the same regardless 
of its financing decision. Therefore, if we consider two firms that are identical except for their financial 
structures, the value of the levered firm (Firm L), which is financed partly by debt and partly by equity, will 
be the same as the value of the unlevered firm (Firm U), which is financed by equity only. To see why this 
should be true, suppose an investor is considering buying one of the two firms’ shares, U or L. Instead of 
purchasing the shares of the levered firm L, he/she could purchase the shares of Firm U and borrow the 
same amount of money that Firm L does. The eventual returns for either of these investments would be the 
same. So, the return of Firm L that pays its cost of debt to its debtholders, will be the same as the return of 
the Firm U minus the cost of borrowing to purchase additional shares of Firm U. Therefore, the price of L 
must be the same as the price of U minus the money borrowed, which is the value of L’s debt. This 
discussion clarifies the role of some of the theorem’s assumptions. However, Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
have implicitly assumed that the investor’s cost of borrowing money is the same as that of the firm, which 
need not be true in the presence of asymmetric information, in the absence of efficient markets, or if the 
investor has a different risk profile than the firm. Due to the unrealistic assumptions this theory relies on, it 
was considered too theoretical. 
Therefore, Modigliani and Miller (1963) expanded the theory by introducing taxes and costs of financial 
distress. Proposition 1, presented in their previous work in 1958, was modified to incorporate taxes, to state 
that the value of the levered firm is equal to the value of the unlevered firm plus the value of the debt tax 
shields (sometimes referred to as interest tax shield). This means that the firm that finances its assets through 
a mixture of debt and equity will be better off than an unlevered firm due to the presence of debt tax shield. 
This means that as long as debt increases, interest payment increases and taxable income decreases 
accordingly. Hence, when taxable income decreases, tax expense decreases as well. Here’s the benefit of 
leverage financing in the presence of taxes, because less taxes will be paid as leverage increases and that’s 
why this benefit is called the debt tax shields. Concisely, as debt tax shields increase, the firm’s free cash 
flow increases and its value, which is fundamentally defined as the present value of the future (free) cash 
flows discounted at the required rate of return, increases as well.  
Consequently, someone could hypothetically deduce that the value of a firm could be maximized if it 
finances 100% of its assets through debt to get the maximum benefits of the debt tax shields and generating 
the highest free cash flow. However, Modigliani and Miller (1963) clarified that as debt increases, the costs 
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of financial distress increase as well, which in turn decreases a firm’s value. The costs of financial distress 
include direct and indirect costs. Direct costs are related to the legal and administrative costs of liquidation 
or reorganization, including fees for lawyers, auditors, courts and money needed to file paperwork. In 
contrast, indirect costs are related to the costs associated with impaired ability to do business and the wasted 
time by management to concentrate on the financial distress instead of value creation.  
As a result, a major theory in corporate finance, which is the static “trade-off theory,” goes back to Kraus 
and Litzenberger (1973) and was later developed by Miller (1977). It assumes the existence of a target debt 
ratio where the marginal cost of an additional unit of debt, (i.e. the costs of financial distress), equals the 
marginal benefits of an additional unit of debt (i.e. the debt tax shield). In other words, the firm’s 
management has to find the appropriate balance between the two, the costs and the benefits of an additional 
unit of debt, rather than choosing the hypothesized 100% debt financing, because even though the addition 
of debt increases the firm’s value by decreasing the tax bill, it also increases the bankruptcy costs and thus 
decreases the firm’s value in return. Thus, the authors discussed an optimal leverage level for every firm to 
achieve in order to reap the maximum benefits of an additional unit of debt but without exceeding that level, 
but afterwards value destruction will begin due to the increasing financial distress costs. 
The second major capital structure theory is the “pecking-order theory” that was founded on a dynamic 
perspective of investment opportunities and information asymmetries. The theory was first suggested by 
Donaldson (1961) and then modified by Myers and Majluf (1984). It assumes that, first, firms prefer to 
finance growth opportunities with internal funds (available cash flow from the retained earnings piling) 
over issuing any debt or equity securities, then, second, prefer to issue debt securities over any equity 
securities, and, third, prefer to issue equity securities last.  
Behind the pecking-order theory is the rationale that information asymmetries between informed firm 
insiders and uninformed outside investors lead to a mispricing of equity issues. As a result, a firm’s 
management with the incentives of minimizing financing costs and raising additional funds in the smoothest 
and fastest way, will be first oriented towards the firm’s internally generated funds (i.e. retained earnings). 
Then if these funds were depleted, the firm will solicit the credit market by issuing debt securities, including 
both investment-grade bonds and junk bonds, as well as short-term commercial papers, bank drafts, line of 
credits, notes, and securitized obligations, etc. and, as a last resort, they will issue equity. Myers and Majluf 
(1984) argue that equity is the least preferred means to raise capital because when managers (who are 
assumed to know better about true the condition of a firm than investors) issue new equity, investors believe 
that managers think that the firm is overvalued and managers are taking advantage of this over-valuation to 
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get the maximum proceed of the issue. Moreover, the existing shareholders will not favor sharing a firm’s 
wealth and future cash flows with a larger number of shareholders when more shares are issued. As a result, 
investors will place a lower value on the new equity issuance and this will eventually lead to selling the 
firm’s shares and reducing the value of shares. In spite of the strength of those two most well known models 
in the determining the capital structure theory, which are the trade-off theory and the pecking-order theory, 
many other authors have attempted to analyze the capital structure theory through different perspectives.  
For example, Leland and Pyle (1977) focused on the signaling aspects behind the capital structure decision. 
Consequently, a firm’s management might be sending positive signals to the investment community if it 
raises additional funds through debt rather than equity, which might be interpreted as the firm being in a 
healthy financial position and that it is creditworthy to be able in raising funds through additional debt (i.e. 
the firm has sufficient financial capability to return the borrowed debt, and it also has the willingness and 
integrity to do so). Moreover, this also sends signals that the company has nothing to hide from or be afraid 
of in facing the debtholders’ scrutiny about the true financial positions of the firm and to examine its sources 
of funds and monitor its expenditures and cash flow activities. On the other hand, if a firm’s management 
intends to issue additional equity securities rather than debt, outsiders might believe that the firm’s share 
value is overpriced and that management intends to cash the maximum amount out of the issue and therefore 
they punish the firm by selling or short-selling its shares. Moreover, the existing shareholders would think 
that if the firm is in a better position or has stronger financial projections and solid cash flow activities, it 
would rather raise the additional needed funds through debt financing instead. Conversely, if the firm’s 
management intends to buy back its own shares, either from the accumulated cash or through debt financing, 
it would be strongly interpreted by outside investors that the firm’s management, which already has superior 
and internal private information, knows that the current share price is being traded below its intrinsic value 
or the firm intends to invest in the near future in positive net present value (NPV) projects, which will 
increase the share price above the current level.  
Alternatively, Fama (1980), Berger et al. (1997) and Masulis (1988) focused on the risk aversion 
perspectives in determining capital structure decisions, whereas Harris and Raviv (1988), Stulz (1988) and 
Ellul (2008) focused on the corporate control considerations, where they mainly discussed takeover risk 
and the capital structure decision behind such risk. In addition, Baker and Wurgler (2002) raised the theory 
of market timing issues mentioning that at different times, different opportunities may arise for finance 
growth through either debt or equity, depending on the cost of each alternative. Kayhan and Titman (2007) 
worked on the influence of firm history over the capital structure decisions where they agreed that each 
firm with its own specificities, and based on its business operation, culture, risk aversion policies, 
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experience and history, will adopt different capital structure decisions. This theory is more basically about 
the firm’s behavioral finance. 
Last, but not least, Jensen and Meckling (1976), Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) discussed agency 
cost as an effective determinant of capital structure theory. Agency cost has always been a focal point for 
numerous researchers in the corporate finance field, which many theories were established upon. Depending 
on many important aspects such as a country’s legal environments and investors’ protection rights, social 
behaviors and traditions, taxation and economic systems and many others, agency costs vary accordingly. 
Therefore, under different circumstances, managers reacted differently and adopted different policies to 
mitigate agency costs, which in turn had impacts on the capital structure decisions of their firms. 
Nonetheless, despite the widespread research conducted over the capital structure theory covered through 
several aspects and perspectives, researchers did not converge on finite determinants of the ultimate capital 
structure, which remains specifically puzzling in the context of family firms. As a result, in this chapter, we 
will attempt to analyze both the agency theory and the asymmetric information theory as determinants of 
the capital structure of the French family firms due to the following two reasons. 
First, and as Ampenberger et al. (2013) confirm, few research papers were prepared attempting to analyze 
the capital structure theory of family firms through the agency theory and the asymmetric information 
theory. For instance, Ampenberger et al. (2013) explain that few research papers examined the family 
ownership type, its agency costs and the capital structure theory, and they added that existing empirical 
evidence on this issue is inconclusive. Thus, the authors analyzed the capital structure theory of German 
family firms starting from the agency theory. Therefore, in this chapter we will examine the existence of 
differences in capital structure of the French family and nonfamily firms, and the drivers behind these 
differences by emphasizing two main theories, the agency theory and the asymmetric information theory. 
Second, to our knowledge, and as Ampenberger et al. (2013) affirm as well, most research papers conducted 
in this field were done in a market-based economy, mainly in the United States (e.g. Mishra and 
McConaughy, 1999; Fama and French, 2001; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; 
Jostarndt and Wagner, 2006; Kayhan and Titman, 2007; Ellul, 2008; and John and Litov, 2010), ignoring 
countries such as France, which could be a distinctive country to base our research on, for many reasons. 
France has a different legal and institutional setting in comparison to Anglo-Saxon countries (La Porta et 
al., 1998; 1999; and 2000) and according to Gleason et al. (2000), France has a distinctive legal 
environment, tax environment, economic system, and technological capabilities that influence firms’ capital 
structure choices. Importantly, France is a bank-based economy distinguished by a high level of blockholder 
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control (Mefteh and Oliver, 2010). Additionally, France still has concentrated ownership patterns with a 
large amount of family firms, even among listed companies (La Porta et al., 1999; and Faccio and Lang, 
2002). As a result, such family firms are worth giving all the attention and efforts in observing, analyzing 
and understanding their capital structure. Thus we attempt to understand whether the capital structure of 
such firms differ from the nonfamily firms and which factors contribute most in explaining their capital 
structure.  
Yet, it is worth considering that a country’s economic and financial system plays a major role in identifying 
and shaping a firm’s policy towards its capital structure, which not only depends on the owners’ preferences, 
risk aversion, agency relationship, legal systems, or others. Thus, it is indispensable mentioning that family 
firms’ owners are directly influenced by the country’s financial system where they have resided and 
developed their firms, which will certainly affect their capital structure decisions. For instance, in bank-
based financial systems, such as in Germany and Japan, banks play a leading role in mobilizing savings, 
allocating capital, overseeing the investment decisions of corporate managers and in providing risk 
management vehicles. Thus, in such systems, the financial markets are weaker than in the market-based 
systems, and the daily trade volume for the equity securities is much smaller in numbers and in value. Firms 
operating in such systems get naturally directed towards banks for raising funds for both, its working capital 
or for funding future projects and capital expenditures. Firms in such systems admire banks being principal 
in financing their growth and daily operations and as principal strategic partner for young firms.  
On the other hand, in market-based financial systems such as England and the United States, securities 
markets share center stage with banks in terms of getting society’s savings to firms, exerting corporate 
control, and easing risk management. In such systems, the financial markets for firms’ equity and debt 
securities are huge in numbers and in values. Additionally, firms are exposed to a variety of financing 
sources for their operating, investing and financing needs such as numerous private equity funds, venture 
capitals, and other financial instruments. As a result, the firms’ capital structure will be definitely influenced 
by the country’s financial systems, as well as by the country’s legal and economic system. However, as 
discussed earlier, in this chapter we will mainly focus on family firms’ capital structure decisions from the 
perspective of the agency problems and the information asymmetries.  
Nevertheless, despite the economic importance of family businesses in Europe and more particularly in 
France, we do not know of any work that directly attempts to understand the financing decisions of family-
controlled public firms. Since the seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976), the question of how agency 
costs impact financing policy has dominated the literature while little, if any, attention has been given to 
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the question of how family ownership structure affects financing policy. While these studies are insightful, 
they do not examine the effects of family ownership on a firm’s financing decisions. In this chapter, we 
will address this gap in the literature by investigating the financing behavior of family and nonfamily firms 
in France. Thus, during this chapter, we will focus our attention on the debt financing of French family 
firms to further investigate the motives for such financing types and the different characteristics of the debt 
being used. 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 illustrates the literature review and hypotheses. Section 3 
describes the sample, data and methodology. Section 4 illustrates the results and interpretations and Section 
5 concludes.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1. The Agency Theory and Debt Financing 
A better understanding of the relationship between family firms and debt financing is necessary to shed 
more light on this important issue especially as many contradictory theories and results exist. For instance, 
Ampenberger et al. (2013) affirm that the literature and the empirical results on the capital structure theory 
and financing choices of family firms are brief and largely inconclusive. The authors argue that little is 
known about the nature of family firms’ financing decisions and, in particular, whether their financing 
behavior differs from that of nonfamily firms. However, as previously mentioned, one of the major 
challenges family firms face is the management of the relationship between the majority, insiders, 
blockholders and controlling family shareholders from one part, and the minority, outsiders, dispersed and 
non-controlling shareholders from the other part. The problem that arises out of this relationship was 
referred to as the Type 2 agency problem. Yet, due to the numerous recent corporate scandals that were 
associated with this type of agency problem, firms have adopted a wide range of governance mechanisms 
to mitigate its impact, size, and financial costs. Debt financing through all its long process and monitoring 
requirements was found to be one of the major governance mechanisms and therefore had an impact on 
firms’ decisions. 
Below, we will discuss the main literature theories that suggest and describe the relation between the family 
firm and the level of debt, starting with the ones that describe the negative relationship between the two, 
then the ones that describe the positive relationship, and, last, the ones that describe the mixed and the no 
relationship at all. 
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2.1.1. Agency Theory and Lower Level of Debt in the Case of Family Firms 
Many researchers suggest that family firms will have a lower level of debt for the reasons mentioned below. 
 The risk aversion of family firms: Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980), and Grossman and 
Hart (1982) argue that family firms’ managers prefer lower financial leverage because it reduces the risk 
of bankruptcy and protects their under-diversified human capital. Family firms’ owners are well aware that 
by increasing leverage so high, the financial risk will be tremendously increased and thus increase the 
volatility of their firms’ earnings, especially in difficult times when business revenues unexpectedly drop. 
Founding families who are usually large and undiversified investors face a high risk exposure to one single 
asset, which is their own firm that they have been developing over years and sometimes over decades. 
However, any private benefit of the founding family, like high social reputation, might be lost in the event 
of the firm’s financial distress. Hence, family ownership might cause risk aversion and is thus expected to 
lead to lower leverage ratios (Ampenberger et al., 2013). Consequently, family firms’ founders strive to 
maintain financial distress costs as low as possible, and therefore maintain a low to moderate debt levels 
compared to nonfamily firms, because if they ever risk their family firm, they would be risking almost 
everything they have. Moreover, society usually highly appreciates family firms’ owners who are able to 
pass on their successful firms to their descendants, which is regarded as accomplishment act and it is well 
esteemed in many cultures. Therefore, family firms’ owners would be more hesitant in raising funds through 
debt, or exceeding the use of debt, in order to not jeopardize their firms, which are mostly the unique source 
of their wealth, pride, esteem, social image and mostly the fruit of all their efforts for numerous years. Thus, 
the above-mentioned authors explained that there is a negative relationship between the family firms and 
lower level of debt from the risk aversion perspective. 
 The loss of control of family firms: Mishra and McConaughy (1999) found that family firms have 
a significantly lower level of debt because they fear losing control over their firms as a result of a severe 
financial distress or in the case of bankruptcy filing, during which debtholders can take control of their 
firms. Gallo and Vilaseca (1996) showed that family businesses have low debt-to-equity, that is to say a 
low level of debt due to the fear of bankruptcy or loss of control of the company. For protecting their own 
interests and securing a well-balanced risk management on their investments, debtholders usually set 
restrictive covenants over a firm’s management actions and cash flow spending. For instance, in the case 
of bankruptcy, debtholders will have priority of claims over firms’ assets and cash flows above any equity 
holder or any other stakeholder. Thus, in such times, to secure their interests, debtholders will come to take 
control over a firm’s management which has failed in managing distress times and bankruptcy. As a result, 
family firms’ owners lose control over their own firms for the benefits of the debtholders. As a matter of 
67 
 
fact, in order to prevent such dramatic, unpleasant and terrible outcomes, family firms’ owners avoid as 
much as possible making debt the main source of their financing, fearing losing control over the firms they 
have built and preserved for years. As mentioned earlier, family firms’ owners seem to have a great concern 
about losing control even after going public. For instance, we have mentioned that listed family firms’ 
owners do still hold more than 62 percent of firms’ cash flow rights and more than 66 percent of firms’ 
voting rights. Thus, family firms’ owners hold control over their firms much more than their cash flow 
rights permit them to do so. Moreover, we have also seen that more than 76 percent of these firms had their 
CEOs holding the position of the board’s Chair on the IPO date as well. This shows to what extent family 
firms’ owners have dealt with control over their firms even after going public, which means that losing 
control over their firms for the benefit of the creditors is the last possibility they ever think about. Family 
firms’ founders who enjoy large private benefits of control (Faccio and Lang, 2002) and focus on 
maximizing their own benefits rather than that of all shareholders (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006), seem to be 
highly reluctant to use equity financing in order not to lose control (Stulz, 1988; and Amihud, Lev and 
Travlos, 1990). 
 The effective monitoring of family ownership: Friend and Lang (1988), Jensen et al. (1992) and 
Holderness and Sheehan (1988) find that the debt ratio is negatively related to managerial ownership. 
According to the agency theory, creditors monitoring benefits eventually increase when there is absence of 
real and effective shareholders’ representatives on the firm’s board, who cannot exert close monitoring 
tasks, and when agents behave for their own interests rather than shareholders’ interests. As a result, these 
shareholders would mostly appreciate and value the use of leverage because as mentioned earlier, 
debtholders have to secure their own interests and investments by closely and adequately scrutinizing, 
analyzing and monitoring firms’ management, profitability, financial reports, cash flow spending, and 
strategic decisions. Thus, by safeguarding their own interests, debtholders would also be securing the 
interests of shareholders who mostly have no access to management monitoring by any other means. For 
those reasons, debtholders are usually considered an effective and adequate monitoring vehicle in such 
situations. On the other hand, such a highly required role of monitoring a firm’s management by the 
creditors is of less importance in the case of family firms due to these reasons. First, family firms’ founders 
have a major stake in the firms’ cash flow rights and voting rights and therefore can exert closer monitoring 
of the firms’ management from inside than any other outside shareholder or even any creditor can do. 
Second, family firms’ founders usually maintain key positions in the firms’ management board and 
therefore exert a strong influence over daily managerial decisions. Third, family firms’ founders also hold 
a majority of seats of the supervisory board exerting great influence over a firm’s long-term strategic 
decisions. As a result, the family founders do not have problems in monitoring managers’ actions and 
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therefore they do not require monitoring actions from the creditors because owners have already full control 
and influence over the firms’ management. Consequently, the level of debt for these firms will be lower 
compared with nonfamily firms due to the little need for monitoring in the presence of family firms’ owners. 
Similarly, according to Ampenberger et al. (2013), in family firms, the effective monitoring reduces the 
agency costs, consequently reducing the level of leverage. Therefore, founding shareholders who have 
substantial internal presence on the firm’s board of directors and board of management can exert effective 
monitoring policies over the firms’ cash flow spending behavior. As a result, family firms’ owners seek 
less external monitoring mechanisms such as creditors, and therefore have lower levels of debt. However, 
as we will see in the subsequent section, for this explanation to be valid, it is assumed that the family firms’ 
owners will act in the best interest of the whole firm by aiming to increase shareholders’ wealth and by not 
engaging in any means for expropriating minority shareholders. Similarly speaking, for this to be valid, it 
is assumed here that either the Type 2 agency problem is not of great concern for minority shareholders or 
better governance mechanisms exist than counting on creditors to do so. Accordingly, family firms do not 
actually need creditors to monitor their own firms because they can perform that task on their own and in a 
more efficient way. Moreover, Anderson et al. (2003), using a sample of US family firms, study the effect 
of family ownership on the agency costs of debt and find that family ownership reduces the cost of debt as 
a result of fewer agency conflicts between equity holders and debtholders, suggesting that bondholders 
view family ownership as a safety device protecting their interests. 
2.1.2. Agency Theory and Higher Level of Debt in the Case of Family Firms 
However, many other researchers suggest that family firms will have higher levels of debt for other reasons, 
which are listed below. 
 Expropriation and entrenchment by family firms’ owners: Shyu and Lee (2009) argue that in 
family firms, the controlling shareholders usually use excess control rights to weaken the ability of internal 
control mechanisms that could arise via additional equity holders and the presence of outside 
representatives on the firms’ board of directors, constraining their entrenching and expropriating activities. 
Thus, when there is a significant separation between ownership and control among the family firms, and 
consequently the possibility of wealth extraction in mind, higher debt level could be an efficient mechanism 
to retain firm control and expropriating minority shareholders. Relatedly, Zwiebel (1996) provides a 
theoretical model showing that capital structure arises as an optimal response of managers to simultaneous 
concerns for expanding and retaining control of their empires, thus expropriating minority shareholders and 
increasing their entrenchment. Therefore, the authors assume that the high levels of debt financing of 
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family-controlled firms were behind expropriation and entrenchment behaviors. Consequently, the increase 
in debt financing is required to protect minority shareholders from expropriation, and for the numerous 
monitoring activities debtholders can exert over firms’ management and cash flow spending behaviors. 
Thus, this explanation for higher levels of debt comes as a solution of the Type 2 agency problem where 
majority shareholders have ultimate control over both firms’ cash flow and voting rights and who act in 
their own interests by expropriating minority shareholders’ rights. Therefore, minority shareholders highly 
appreciate the high use of debt for monitoring the role debtholders can exert over a firm’s management.  
 The risk of losing control over their firms: Stulz (1988) argues that firms with a controlling 
shareholder should exhibit higher financial leverage, as it increases their voting control for a given level of 
equity investment. Thus, the long-term commitment of family owners can explain a high debt level due to 
a high concern about diluting their voting rights and any loss of control over the firm. Additionally, Kim 
and Sorenson (1986) and Ugurlu (2000) show that a firm with high ownership concentration by insiders or 
families is associated with a higher debt level. Similarly, Ellul (2008), based on a sample of 3,608 firms 
from 36 different countries, demonstrated that family blockholders who are concerned about the loss of 
control associated with external equity financing, find debt is a solution to receiving external financing 
without diluting control power over the firm’s equity stake. As a result, family firms’ owners are unlikely 
to take risky financing decisions that will dilute their power or even put their control at risk by sharing their 
firms’ wealth, cash flows, business know-how, and strategic decision making-process with new 
shareholders instead of being the ultimate sole players and decision makers. Therefore, whenever family 
firms need additional funding for their future projects, they prefer raising funds through debt financing 
rather than issuing equity and losing control for new shareholders. As a result, a positive relationship exists 
between family firms and the level of debt. 
 Mitigating agency cost of equity by family firms’ owners: Kim and Sorenson (1986) considered 
that the positive relation between managerial ownership and leverage is explained by the agency costs of 
equity. Also, Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988) affirm that a higher debt level reduces the agency 
problems related with concentrated ownership and minority shareholders. As a result, these researchers 
argue that the higher the insider ownership, the higher should be the costs of external equity associated with 
incentive to consume perks. Thus, family firms’ owners will be directed to raise funds through debt, leaving 
a room for an effective external monitoring and thereby mitigating agency cost of equity. Equally speaking, 
for family firms where there is a high concentration of insiders, raising funds through additional equity 
financing will be too costly for a firm since outsiders have to assume the risk of being expropriated by the 
insiders and thus require a premium for accepting to finance the firm’s projects. As a result, raising funds 
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through equity financing becomes too costly, which will direct the firms’ owners to raise funds through 
debt financing instead.  
 Cash flow disciplinary mechanism for family firms’ owners: Jensen (1986) argues that 
shareholders prefer higher leverage as it reduces the overinvestment problem, particularly in firms with 
excess free cash flow. As a result, family firms’ owners may seek debt financing in an attempt to enhance 
their expenditures behavior and thus establish a steady cash flow management. In other words, debt 
financing plays an important role of cash flow disciplinary mechanism for family firms. According to 
Jensen, family firms shall then have a higher level of debt for achieving better management over their 
excess free cash flow. Although this disciplinary instrument does not solely apply to family firms since any 
type of firm can rely on debt financing to achieve more adequate cash flow management, it is discussed 
here to show that some behavior of increasing leverage by family firms can be explained though this motive. 
 The legal system and its effects on family firms’ owners: La Porta et al. (1999) show that countries 
with low investor protection levels are associated with ownership structures that are more concentrated. 
Additionally, Filatotchev and Mickiewicz (2001) show that, especially when shareholders protection is 
poor, dominant owner and creditors can collude at the expense of minority shareholders providing support 
to the role of debt as tool to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders. For instance, in Latin America, 
which is a region that ranks particularly low in terms of investor protection and high in terms of corruption, 
firms tend to prefer debt over equity (Céspedes, Gonzalez and Molina, 2010). Similarly, Driffield et al. 
(2007) by exploring a sample of Asian firms, covering countries with poor investor protection, show that 
firms with a separation between voting and cash flow rights bear a higher amount of debt. As a result, 
family firms’ owners find that the use of debt financing is a way out for expropriating minority shareholders 
especially in countries where investor protection is low. Thus, owners collude with the debtholders to move 
out the cash from the firms to their own account through organized conspiracies. Accordingly, family 
owners’ behavior toward their choice in capital structure is highly influenced by their country’s legal 
system.  
 The market for corporate control and the threat for family firms’ owners: Many studies (Harris 
and Raviv, 1988; Stulz, 1988; Israel, 1991; Zwiebel, 1996; Berger et al., 1997; Garvey and Hanka, 1999; 
Novaes, 2002; and John and Litov, 2010) find a strong relationship between corporate leverage and the 
activity in the market for corporate control. A recent study by John and Litov (2010) finds that managers 
insulated from takeover threats are likely to increase leverage as a result of better financing conditions and 
better access to debt. In order to safeguard their interests, managers could largely increase leverage to keep 
control pressures away such as takeovers. However, increasing debt as a defensive strategy has been more 
deployed in the past. By increasing debt significantly, companies hope to deter raiders concerned about 
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repayment after the acquisition. However, adding a large debt obligation to a company’s balance sheet can 
significantly erode stock prices and jeopardize a firm’s position and its ability in meeting the excessive debt 
obligations throughout the years. Yet, some firms’ owners still find increasing debt financing excessively 
a defense strategy against takeovers. Thus they intensify leverage and exacerbate all the debt-related ratios 
such as the debt-to-equity ratio, the total debt ratio, the interest coverage ratio and the overall firm’s credit 
rating. 
 Seeking immediate investment opportunities by family firms’ owners: Berger et al. (1997) and 
Mehran (1992) state that firms with higher insider ownership look for higher leverage ratios in order to 
increase a firm’s value as a result of an alignment framework. Usually, raising funds through debt is much 
easier and less costly than raising funds through equity, especially in the presence of numerous debt 
instruments and huge international debt markets. Also, in the presence of substantial investment 
opportunities and the immediate need for financing, family owners prefer raising funds through debt rather 
than going through the long process of issuing equity securities, especially when the founding families have 
already built a long-standing and firm relationship with its creditors, mainly banks in the case of France. 
Similarly, sometimes family firms find great investment opportunities or unexpected positive NPV projects 
that shall be promptly secured. As a result, such firms seek debt financing for its simplicity in raising funds 
rather than going into the complexity of equity financing. Such a reason could lead to higher debt financing 
for family firms than equity financing. Moreover, some firms may increase debt financing just to keep their 
cash balance high so they are able to promptly invest in some unexpected positive NPV projects. 
2.1.3. Agency Theory and Mixed Debt Results in the Case of Family Firms 
Brailsford et al. (2002) considered that at moderate levels of managerial ownership, the incentive effect 
takes place, making the disciplinary role of debt unnecessary. But, when managerial ownership increases, 
the control by managers over a firm increases as well, resulting in a higher managerial discretion, which 
could lead to a higher leverage ratio to mitigate the risk of wealth-destroying actions by managers. Yet 
again, when insider ownership reaches a certain high point, managerial discretion as well as economic 
involvement of managers in the firm become so high they lead to a decrease of leverage for reducing 
bankruptcy risk. Alternatively, one can argue that the alignment role played by managerial shareholding 
makes debt exploitation redundant at high levels of insider ownership. Therefore, according to Brailsford 
et al. (2002), there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the managerial ownership level, and the 
use of financial leverage that is generally considered an effective monitoring mechanism against 
expropriating minority rights.  
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Studying managerial ownership, Morck et al. (1988) also found an inverse U-shaped relationship between 
ownership stakes and valuation. Another theoretical model producing such a concave relationship was 
produced by Stulz (1988) who stated that there exists a curvy-linear relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm value. According to the author, the firm value increased in the initial period where 
ownership is more concentrated and the monitoring costs are decreased. However, as management becomes 
more insulated, the value of the firm decreases. 
Conversely, Croci et al. (2011) demonstrated over a sample of 777 large European firms during the period 
1998 to 2008 that the financing behavior of family- and nonfamily-controlled firms is sharply different. 
Specifically, they show that family-controlled firms rely more on debt and syndicated loans for their 
funding needs while they are averse to equity and convertible debt financing. On the other hand, Anderson 
and Reeb (2003b) find no evidence for the relationship between managerial ownership and capital structure 
choices. 
In this chapter, we will follow the review of literature presented by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama 
(1980), and Grossman and Hart (1982) who argued that family firms’ managers prefer lower financial 
leverage because it reduces the risk of bankruptcy. In addition, we will also follow Mishra and McConaughy 
(1999) who found that family firms use a significantly lower level of debt because they fear losing control 
over their firms as a result of a severe financial distress. In addition, we will also follow Friend and Lang 
(1988), Jensen et al. (1992) and Holderness and Sheehan (1988) who found that the debt ratio is negatively 
related to managerial ownership which is the case of most family firms. Accordingly, we will be testing the 
following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Debt and insider ownership are negatively related. 
Hypothesis 2: Debt and institutional ownership are negatively related. 
2.2. The Asymmetric Information Theory and Debt Financing 
As mentioned in the previous sections, a large body of literature finds that firms’ financing choices are 
affected by information asymmetry between the insiders who are mainly the family firms’ owners and 
outside investors who are creditors and investors. Thus, in this section, we will explore the relationship 
between asymmetric information and debt maturity, via analyzing different models conducted by 
researchers in the field. First, we will explain Flannery’s (1986) model in explaining the relationship 
between the asymmetric information theory and debt financing. In Flannery’s model, the following 
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assumptions were initiated: two types of firms that are initially observationally equivalent, both have 
positive NPV projects and private information, but one type is riskier than the other one. In Flannery’s 
model, firms with favorable private information are referred to as the ones having low-risk projects, while 
firms with unfavorable private information are referred to as the ones having high-risk projects. 
Additionally, it is assumed that both types of firms will require debt financing for their projects for which 
they will approach creditors. At the end of one period, creditors learn whether projects were upgraded or 
not. Basically, firms with favorable private information have a higher probability of upgrading their projects 
than those with unfavorable information. At that time, all firms that initially chose short-term debt must roll 
it over at a new interest rate and incur additional transactions costs. 
In this model, if transactions costs are sufficiently high, a separating equilibrium may exist in which firms 
with favorable private information issue short-term debt at a relatively low interest rate and roll it over. And 
those with unfavorable private information issue long-term debt at a relatively high rate. Thus, firms with 
unfavorable private information are willing to pay the high rate on long-term debt to avoid expected costs 
in rolling over short-term debt (i.e. the transactions costs plus a relatively high probability of paying a higher 
rate in the second period). Firms with favorable private information, in contrast, face a lower probability of 
a high rate in the second period, and so are willing to bear the transactions costs to obtain the lower rate on 
short-term debt in the first period. In equilibrium, creditors can infer some of what was initially a firm’s 
private information, and use it in assigning risk ratings. Thus creditors assign lower risk ratings to firms 
that choose short-term debt, and higher risk ratings to those that choose long-term debt. As a result, 
according to Flannery’s model, debt maturity of the required loan is predicted to be positively related to 
risk ratings. This means that low debt maturity financing denotes low risk ratings, while high debt maturity 
financing denotes high risk ratings. Similarly, some other researchers such as Titman and Wessels (1988) 
and Kale and Noe (1990) were consistent with Flannery’s model, but they didn’t include the transactions 
costs as Flannery’s did. 
Second, Diamond’s (1991) model also studied the relationship between asymmetric information and debt 
financing, although from a different perspective from Flannery. Diamond’s model differs from Flannery’s 
in that firms are not initially observationally equivalent and not all projects have positive NPVs. Firms have 
private information that their projects have either positive or negative NPV, which will not be revealed to 
creditors. Thus, creditors do not observe whether projects have positive or negative NPV, but are able to 
assign initial risk ratings based on other observational differences. Moreover, no additional transactions 
costs are required for financing via short-term debt. But similarly to Flannery’s model, creditors learn 
whether projects were upgraded at the end of one period. Because some of the projects have negative NPV, 
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creditors may refuse to roll over short-term debt at the end of one period, creating liquidity risk for firms 
with short-term debt, certainly for those that have negative NPV projects. It is assumed that firms with 
favorable private information are referred to the ones having positive NPV projects, while firms with 
unfavorable private information are referred to the ones having negative NPV projects. As a result, firms 
with favorable private information and with sufficiently low risk ratings may choose short-term debt at 
relatively low interest rates because of a high likelihood of being able to roll over their debt after one period. 
In contrast, those with favorable private information and intermediate risk ratings may choose long-term 
debt at a higher rate to reduce their greater liquidity risk of being unable to roll over short-term debt after 
one period. Finally, firms with unfavorable private information, and either low or intermediate risk ratings 
may mimic the actions of firms with favorable private information, otherwise, they may be identified by 
creditors as having negative NPV projects and be denied credit. As a result, firms with favorable and 
unfavorable private information with low or intermediate risk ratings will choose short-term debt, whereas 
firms with favorable private information with intermediate risk ratings may choose long-term debt. This 
therefore contrasts with Flannery’s model, in which it is argued that creditors can predict and assume the 
firms’ risk ratings through the maturities of the debt being in request, suggesting short-term debt financing 
for low-risk rating and long-term debt financing for high-risk rating, Diamond’s model assumes that risk 
rating has already been observed by creditors, and firms with low-risk rating will request short-term 
financing while firms with intermediate-risk rating will request long-term financing. 
Third, Rajan (1992) focuses on the bargaining power of a firm requesting debt financing. Therefore, when 
the bargaining power of a firm is low, the firm tends to prefer long-term loans, even if it has to pay higher 
interest because, under short-term bank financing, the bank has an explicit right to renegotiate contract 
terms. The author explains that under long-term bank financing, renegotiation takes place only if the bank 
gives up some of its rent control. Thus, according to Rajan, choosing long-term contracts allows the firm 
to limit the bargaining power of the bank and lessen its imminent control. Hence, when referring to firms 
with low bargaining power, on is usually referring to firms of a smaller size, generating lower revenues and 
cash flows, having average credit history, but also having moderate level of debt that allows the firms to 
raise additional leverage. Typically, such firms are more likely to maintain a very formal and strict 
relationship with their bank. Hence, they usually accept their bank’s financing conditions with very small 
room for negotiation because they are not in a strong position to do so. That’s why, according to Rajan, 
such firms prefer long-term financing to prevent rolling-over short-term debt, and thus going to their banks 
for financial aid as little as possible. The opposite applies for firms with high bargaining power, which 
usually are of a bigger size, generate higher revenues and cash flows, compile long successful credit history, 
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and also have a moderate level of debt that also allows the firms to increase leverage. Generally, such firms 
are more likely to maintain a very strong, excellent and lenient relationship with their bank. Hence, they 
are strong enough to negotiate their bank’s financing conditions and sometimes impose some customized 
terms. Thus, such firms usually prefer short-term debt financing, and rolling-over their debt as needed as 
much as possible without worrying about getting finance in the future. 
Fourth, Berger et al. (2005) commented on many models’ results and observed that most of the studies 
discussed, used both debt maturity structure and new debt issues. Hence, the authors include some measures 
of asymmetric information by focusing on bank loans to small businesses. The authors argue that small 
businesses tend to fit the profile of risky firms under conditions of asymmetric information for which the 
theories are written. The small business loans have a broad range of maturities from one day to thirty years. 
The authors focused on loans made by banks given that the relationship between debt maturity and firm 
risk ratings should be strongest when informational asymmetries are greatest.  
On the other hand, the authors argue that when a firm is associated with low informational asymmetries, 
the relationship between debt maturity and firm risk ratings weakens. This means such firms could approach 
creditors for either short-term debt or long-term debt regardless of their credit ratings. For instance, when 
there is a high transparency level in the relationship between the firm and its creditor and thus when the 
latter has full access on the firm’s real activities, forthcoming projects, financials and performance, the 
firm’s credit rating is not the factor that defines that debt maturity. According to Berger et al. (2005), in 
low information asymmetries, firms with average to low risk ratings could require long-debt debt while 
firms with high risk ratings could require short-term debt as well. Therefore, the request for different debt 
maturities in low information asymmetries is not related to a firm’s risk ratings, but to the firm’s 
requirements and preferences and the willingness of the creditor to finance the firm for whichever period it 
requires because of the presence of the low information asymmetries. Yet, in high information asymmetries, 
the relationship between the debt maturity and the risk ratings makes it more likely that firms with high risk 
ratings will require longer debt maturity than firms with low risk ratings; however, the creditor will further 
scrutinize the firm’s position and thus will be unwilling to grant such long-term debt financing. Therefore 
in such situations, the risk for creditors is much higher than in low information asymmetries, since the 
relationship with the firm is opaque and thus granting long-term debt financing is even riskier than granting 
them short-term debt financing, justifying the higher cost of debt for the longer term than shorter term loan. 
Many other empirical studies also specified measures of asymmetric information or informational opacity 
of firms, regardless of whether the private information is favorable or unfavorable. For example, Barclay 
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and Smith (1995) find that firms with lower valuations, higher research and development (R&D) spending, 
and more growth potential tend to issue more short-term debt, consistent with the notion that greater 
informational asymmetries are associated with shorter maturity. Equally, Stohs and Mauer (1996), Scherr 
and Hulbert (2001) and Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2008) find that smaller firms, which are likely to be 
relatively opaque, tend to make use of more short-term debt. Conversely, other theories of debt maturity 
stress the importance of matching maturities of firms’ assets and liabilities, and taxes (Kane et al., 1985; 
and Brick and Ravid, 1985).  
Nonetheless, evidence with regard to firm age is mixed and less clear. For instance, Scherr and Hulbert 
(2001) find that older firms issue less short-term debt, while Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2008) find that older 
firms issue more short-term debt. However, none of the studies to our knowledge distinguish the effects of 
asymmetric information on maturity by risk rating. Table 1 below summarizes empirical literature reviews 
on the relationship between debt maturity and asymmetric information. 
Table 1: Summary of debt financing and asymmetric information 
Authors Main literature conclusions Results 
Barclay and Smith 
(1995) 
They argue that among publicly traded industrial firms 
with bond ratings, those with higher bond ratings tend 
to use more short-term debt and those with lower bond 
ratings tend to have more long-term debt. Those 
without bond ratings generally have more short-term 
debt. 
If one interprets firms with high bond ratings as low 
risk, firms with low bond ratings as intermediate risk, 
and unrated firms as high risk, then their results as a 
whole may be considered to be consistent with 
Diamond’s predicted non-monotonic relationship.  
 
 
 
The non-monotonic relationship 
using bond ratings may be 
considered to be consistent with the 
predictions of Flannery’s model for 
low-risk firms, but not for high-risk 
firms. 
Stohs and Mauer 
(1996)  
They use bond ratings for publicly traded industrial 
firms and find evidence of a non-monotonic 
relationship between firm risk ratings and debt 
maturity 
Scherr and Hulbert 
(2001) 
They use an accounting measure for risk ratings 
(Altman Z-Score) for small businesses and also find 
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evidence of a non-monotonic relationship between 
firm risk ratings and debt maturity 
The relationship using accounting 
measures for risk ratings does not 
have implications for Flannery’s 
model. The risk rating in Flannery’s 
model is based at least in part on 
the revelation of private 
information by firm maturity 
choice. Although bond ratings may 
reflect such a revelation, accounting 
measures cannot.  
 
Johnson (2003) He studies nonfinancial traded firms and uses three 
different types of risk ratings, two based on 
accounting data (firm size and earnings volatility), and 
one based on whether the firm’s debt is investment 
grade. Johnson’s accounting indicators have the non-
monotonic relationship with the debt maturity 
structure, but the indicator for investment grade debt is 
negatively related to the proportion of short-term debt, 
which may be considered to be contrary to the 
predictions of Diamond’s model, under which low-
risk firms would have short-term debt. 
Mitchell (1993) 
 
He focuses on the maturity of new debt issues and 
uses data on publicly traded corporations and finds 
that those with higher bond ratings tend to have longer 
maturities rather than shorter ones.  
 
The relationships found in the 
bond-ratings studies of Mitchell 
(1993) and Guedes and Opler 
(1996) appear to conflict with the 
upward-sloping function predicted 
by Flannery’s model. 
 
Guedes and Opler 
(1996) 
 
Their study finds that firms with investment-grade 
ratings tend to issue shorter- and longer-term debt, 
while non-investment grade firms tend to issue debt 
with intermediate maturity, which would appear to 
conflict with some of the predictions of Diamond’s 
model. 
Ortiz-Molina and 
Penas (2008)  
 
They use data on small businesses and specify an 
accounting measure for the risk rating (prior 
delinquency). They find that firms rated as lower-risk 
tend have longer maturities than those rated as high-
risk. 
The relationship in Ortiz-Molina 
and Penas (2008) does not have 
implications for Flannery’s model 
because of the use of accounting 
data for risk rating. 
Starting from the assumption that family firms have a better alignment of interest between major 
shareholders and managers, and that family firms’ managers fear to lose their under-diversified investment 
for the benefit of creditors in case of financial distress (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; and 
Grossman and Hart, 1982), we presume that family firms have relatively lower risk than nonfamily firms. 
Then we will follow Diamond’s models by presuming that firms with low risk (i.e. family firms as we 
deduced), prefer to raise funds through short-term debt at a lower rate and roll it over. So for this section, 
we will be testing the following hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 3: Family firms’ debt maturity is lower than that of nonfamily firms. 
3. SAMPLE, DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Sample 
The sample consists of publicly held firms traded on the CAC All-Tradable Index excluding the companies 
in the financial sector since financial companies (SIC 6000–6999) are subject to legal regulations regarding 
capital structure (Mefteh and Oliver, 2010). The analysis is based on listed companies’ figures because all 
companies traded on exchanges are subject to external auditing and hence offer an acceptable level of 
transparency; in addition to that, publically held firms offer an acceptable level of disclosure, allowing me 
to obtain the data needed (Corstjens et al., 2005; and Gallo and Vilaseca, 1996).  
CAC All-Tradable Index is a new index replacing the SBF 250 in which the number of values is unlimited 
and it reflects the evolution of all companies listed on Euronext Paris. It also allows us to represent the 
evolution of the stock market over the long-term and serves as a benchmark to certain mutual funds (FCP) 
and Sicav. We choose to use post-crisis monthly data to avoid the problem of data heteroscedasticity and 
for data availability constraints. We do not replace firms that are delisted or firms that are newly listed. The 
Bloomberg platform was the source of the core of the data and in the case of missing information. Thus, 
we have used Bloomberg Terminal, which is a computer system provided by Bloomberg L.P. that enables 
professionals in finance and other industries to access the Bloomberg Professional service through which 
users can monitor and analyze real-time financial market data and place trades on the electronic trading 
platform. The system also provides news, price quotes, and messaging across its proprietary secure network. 
It is also worth noting that most large financial firms have subscriptions to the Bloomberg Professional 
service. We conduct an intensive research and collect information for each firm individually. However, if 
no information is found, we exclude the company from the research. Traditionally, the choice of the optimal 
capital structure of firms is the result of numerous determinants reflecting information asymmetry, 
performance, corporate governance structures and other factors (Mefteh and Oliver, 2010).  
Through this chapter, we aim to provide further evidence on capital structure theories and analyze the effect 
of a multitude of variables on the capital structure of French firms and we will also test for the difference 
in the capital structure between family and nonfamily firms in France. In addition to that, we will shed more 
light on one of the important subjects in literature, which is the question of preferable debt maturity in 
French family and nonfamily firms (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Stohs and Mauer, 1996; Datta et al., 2005; 
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and Ortiz-Moelina and Penas, 2008). We first prepared a comparative table in which we conduct a test of 
hypothesis to check if the mean of various variables reflecting level of debt and their corresponding 
maturities of the company is greater, smaller, or equal in family firms than nonfamily firms with 10%, 5% 
and 1% significance levels. The maturity of debt was reflected by the dependent variables: percentage of 
short-term debt in total debt and percentage of long-term debt in total debt. To assure high accuracy in all 
dependent variables all mild and extreme outliers were removed from the dataset. After testing if the means 
are different, superior or inferior to one another, the test presenting the most significant result is adopted. 
The hypothesis test is not conducted on time-series monthly data; rather we transformed the time-series 
data into cross-sectional data by averaging the values of each of the variables from 2008 to 2013 for each 
firm. Hence, the hypothesis test was conducted on the average value per month per variable per firm 
(Buferna et al., 2005). CAC All-Tradable Index included 330 firms at the date of selection, however, after 
excluding the financial sector, our study was conducted on 293 cross sections (out of which 90 are family 
firms and 203 are nonfamily firms). 
3.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Below is a descriptive table for the 293 firms distributed among the 9 different industries – basic materials, 
communications, consumer cyclical, consumer non-cyclical, diversified, energy, industrial, technology and 
utilities – and as mentioned above they are grouped between 203 nonfamily firms (NFF) and 90 family 
firms (FF). 
Table 2: Distribution of firms per industry 
Industry Total % NFF % FF % 
Basic materials 14 4.8% 11 5.4% 3 3.3% 
Communications 40 13.7% 25 12.3% 15 16.7% 
Consumer, cyclical 46 15.7% 27 13.3% 19 21.1% 
Consumer, non-cyclical 63 21.5% 46 22.7% 17 18.9% 
Diversified 3 1.0% 3 1.5% 0 0.0% 
Energy 8 2.7% 7 3.4% 1 1.1% 
Industrial 59 20.1% 44 21.7% 15 16.7% 
Technology 55 18.8% 35 17.2% 20 22.2% 
Utilities 5 1.7% 5 2.5% 0 0.0% 
Total 293 100.0% 203 100.0% 90 100.0% 
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We note that the three biggest industries for all firms are the consumer non-cyclical (first), industrial 
(second) and technology (third) making 60.4% of total firms. These three industries are also the dominant 
ones for the nonfamily firms with the exact ranking, making 61.6% of total nonfamily firms. However, we 
noticed that the three biggest industries for the family firms are technology (first), consumer cyclical 
(second) and consumer non-cyclical (third) with a total of 62.2% of total family firms. It is worth noting 
that the communications represent 16.7% of all family firms, whereas they just represent 12.3% of all 
nonfamily firms, showing that family firms are successful in this industry, as well as in the technology 
industry where they come first with 22.2% of total family firms belonging to the technology industry against 
17.2% of nonfamily firms that do belong to this industry. Furthermore, in family firms, the industrial ones 
had the same percentage of the communications with 16.7% of total family firms against 21.7% for the 
nonfamily firms. Also, the consumer cyclical firms represent 21.1% of total family firms against 13.3% of 
total nonfamily firms making the biggest difference between the two types of firms. 
Below, we present two figures for the distribution of firms among industries. Figure 1 plots the distribution 
of all firms among the 9 industries according to the number of firms per industry. Figure 2 plots separately 
the distribution of family and nonfamily firms among the 9 industries. 
Figure 1: Distribution of all firms per industry. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of family and nonfamily firms per industry. 
 
As mentioned earlier and as clearly shown in Figure 1, the family firms belonging to the three industries – 
technology, consumer cyclical and communications – are leaders compared with nonfamily firms with a 
total of 62.2% against 53.2%. Therefore, we notice that family firms are successful in technology-related 
and consumer cyclical industries, which exceeded in percentages that of the nonfamily firms. Yet, we also 
notice that industries that usually require a high level of investment, heavy capital expenditures, or some 
special legal approvals contain more nonfamily firms than family firms such as utilities, industrial, energy, 
consumer non-cyclical and basic materials. For instance, the utilities industry includes two firms related to 
water treatment, two firms related to electric-integrated, and one firm gas distribution.  
Usually big corporations and sometimes governmental wholly or partially owned corporations are involved 
in such types of industries and not family firms. Also, the energy firms dealing in energy production and 
treatment require special types of investment, governmental approval and skills, which usually nonfamily 
firms are in a competitive advantage to work with rather than family firms. Another example is the basic 
materials industry, which contains firms specialized in gold mining, steel producing, chemicals, industrial 
gases, etc. Below is a comparative table illustrating the means of percentage insider shares outstanding and 
the means of percentage institutional shares outstanding of family and nonfamily firms. 
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Table 3: Ownership structure comparison  
  
Family firms 
mean 
Nonfamily firms 
mean 
Result 
Ownership structure     
Percentage insider shares outstanding 27.73 2.86 >0*** 
Percentage institutional shares outstanding 14.70 32.04 <0*** 
As shown, the listed French family firms have a mean of percentage insider shares outstanding of 27.73%, 
which is statistically greater than the mean of the percentage of insider shares outstanding of the nonfamily 
firms of 2.86% at the 1% significance level. Moreover, the family firms’ mean of percentage institutional 
shares outstanding is 14.7% is statistically smaller than the mean of that of the nonfamily firms of 32.04% 
at the 1% significance level too.  
This shows to what extent ownership structure differs between family- and nonfamily firms in terms of 
insider and institutional ownership. Family firms have much greater concentration of insider ownership 
from the family firms’ owners, their descendants and relatives who have stakes in the firms’ cash flow 
rights and at the same time have top managerial positions in the firm such as CEO positions. Also, family 
firms have a much lower institutional ownership structure compared with nonfamily firms, which can be 
attributed to many reasons, most importantly to the fear of losing control by the family firms’ owners, and 
the fear of stricter monitoring mechanisms institutional shareholders usually employ whenever they are 
present on the firms’ boards. Conversely, nonfamily firms have much lower insider ownership due to the 
widely dispersed and diffused structure among much bigger number of shareholders, and due to the 
presence of higher institutional shareholders who usually get seats on the firms’ board of directors but do 
not directly involve into the firm’s management.  
However, these numbers about firms’ insider and institutional ownership, which are extracted from 2008 
to 2013 for the listed family firms, are quite different than the numbers presented in chapters, 2 and 3, for 
three main reasons. First, since in chapters 2 and 3, the IPO performance was the main research focus, 
covering both, the short- and the long-term performance respectively, all ownership data were extracted 
just pre- and post-IPO date for an attempt to observe their effects on performance. Moreover, as we will 
see in the subsequent chapters, we covered IPOs issued over 20 years, which is from 1994 to 2013, and we 
noticed that the majority of IPOs were issued before 2001. Yet, from the date of issuance until 2008, many 
firms were delisted for many reasons and/or their ownership structure had changed greatly during all these 
long years. Therefore, since their issuance, firms could have raised additional funds through the issuance 
of additional shares in what is called the seasonal equity offering (SEO), changing dramatically the 
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ownership structure from the IPO until the subsequent years. Second, the data about firms’ ownership 
structure used in chapters 2 and 3 were wholly hand-collected from each firm’s IPO prospectus on pre- and 
post-IPO date. Such prospectuses show the ownership composition pre-IPO date, and the number of shares 
intended to be issued on IPO date. On the other hand, the data used in this chapter about firms’ insider 
ownership were extracted from the Bloomberg platform from 2008 to 2013. Thus, the ownership data were 
extracted from two different sources and covering different time periods, which can create some 
discrepancies depending on the criteria the Bloomberg platform uses to disclose ownership data. Third and 
most importantly, the type of data is fundamentally different between the two chapters. In this chapter, we 
aim to disclose the insider ownership data within each type of firms, which are related to ownership held 
by top managers such as CEOs only and not the whole family ownership. However, in chapters 2 and 3 we 
aimed to show all family firms’ ownership structure regardless of the position of each owner or descendant 
holds in the firm.  
For instance, we might see a family owning 60% of the firm’s cash flow rights, but just one member of the 
family holding a top managerial position with 20% ownership rights, and the remaining family members 
are just owners without having managerial positions. This is why we have found a divergence of ownership 
data between this chapter and the remaining two chapters because there is a different in the time period, the 
data source, and the data type.  
Table 4: Distribution of debt variables in family firms per industry 
Industry 
Median 
total 
liab. 
Weight 
Median 
debt-to-
equity 
ratio 
Weight 
Median % 
ST 
borrowings 
of total 
liab. 
Median % 
LT 
borrowings 
of total 
liab. 
Short-term 
borrowings%- 
Long-term 
borrowings % 
Basic materials 161 12% 0.51 10% 15% 24% -9% 
Communications 81 6% 0.42 8% 8% 11% -3% 
Consumer, cyclical 119 9% 0.58 12% 17% 16% 1% 
Consumer, non-cyclical 298 23% 0.35 7% 9% 8% 1% 
Energy 484 37% 2.31 46% 20% 60% -40% 
Industrial 122 9% 0.67 13% 16% 18% -2% 
Technology 48 4% 0.20 4% 6% 7% -1% 
Weighted average 136 100% 0.46 100% 11% 13% -2% 
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Table 5: Distribution of debt variables in nonfamily firms per industry 
Industry 
Median 
total 
liab. 
Weight 
Median 
debt-to-
equity 
ratio 
Weight 
Median 
% ST 
borrowing
s of total 
liab. 
Median % 
LT 
borrowings 
of total 
liab. 
Short-term 
borrowings
%- 
Long-term 
borrowings 
% 
Basic materials 301 4% 0.38 10% 9% 18% -9% 
Communications 365 5% 0.35 9% 6% 4% 2% 
Consumer, cyclical 800 10% 0.84 21% 11% 23% -12% 
Consumer, non-cyclical 565 7% 0.63 16% 9% 27% -18% 
Energy 4,810 62% 0.51 13% 8% 23% -15% 
Industrial 761 10% 0.87 22% 10% 28% -18% 
Technology 95 1% 0.34 9% 7% 9% -2% 
Weighted average 648 100% 0.61 100% 9% 20% -11% 
Table 4 and Table 5 allow a comparison between family firms and nonfamily capital structure 
characteristics by industry. We decided to use the median instead of the mean to eliminate the outlier’s 
effect on our analysis. The median total liabilities in nonfamily firms is approximately 4 times the median 
total liabilities in family firms, which could be explained by the larger size of nonfamily firms and higher 
need for financing.  
It is worth highlighting that the median debt-to-equity ratio per firm in family firms is a lot lower than that 
in nonfamily firms, which indicates that nonfamily firms tend to rely on debt financing more than family 
firms. Particularly, it is notable that all firms tend to significantly rely on long-term borrowing more than 
short-term borrowing in almost all industries. However, compared with nonfamily firms, family firms use 
more short-term borrowing and less long-term borrowing. 
Comparing by industry, family firms belonging to the energy, industrial, consumer cyclical or basic material 
industries rely the most on short- and long-term borrowing similarly to nonfamily firms with the additional 
finding that the nonfamily firms belonging to the consumer non-cyclical rely most on long-term borrowing.  
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Table 6: Ownership and management characteristics of family firms per industry 
Industry 
Average 
tenure 
executives 
Average 
tenure 
BOD 
Majority 
shareholder 
Family 
management 
Median debt-
to-equity ratio 
Industrial 11.9 7.24 2.87 0.93 0.67 
Consumer, cyclical 8.99 9.25 3.26 0.72 0.58 
Basic materials 4.00 6.55 2.00 0.67 0.51 
Communications 8.75 7.11 2.60 0.93 0.42 
Consumer, non-cyclical 13.43 11.48 2.88 0.88 0.35 
Technology 11.38 8.80 3.10 0.95 0.20 
Average 9.74 8.41 2.79 0.85 0.46 
Knowing the strong influence of ownership structure particularly family ownership, the level of 
entrenchment and of control on capital structure, we aim to analyze the relation between the variables 
mentioned above and the debt-to-equity ratio by industry. The average tenure of executives and board of 
directors represent entrenchment, and insider ownership and family management represent agency cost. 
The industries in this table are stated in descending order of debt-to-equity ratio.  
It is noticeable that all industries present very close results regarding the number of majority shareholders 
that range between 2 and 3. In addition, the technology and consumer non-cyclical industries present 
relatively very high family ownership, tenure of BOD and executives and family management leading to 
the lowest two debt-to-equity ratios. The basic materials and communications industries with low 
managerial entrenchment and low agency cost have the third and fourth debt ratios.  
However, the consumer cyclical industry presenting high levels of board of directors tenure and majority 
shareholders and lower than average tenure of executives and family ownership has the second highest debt 
ratio. Finally, what is specific to the industrial industry is a positive relation between the debt and the family 
ownership, number of major shareholders, average tenure of the board of directors and executives. 
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Table 7: Debt-to-equity of family and nonfamily firms in percentiles 
Median Type Total 
assets 
Financial 
leverage 
% insider 
shares 
outstand. 
R&D 
expend./
net sales 
Free cash 
flow 
Debt-to-
equity 
Degree of 
financial 
leverage 
 Group 1  
FF  88.96 1.62 28.42 1.05 5.18 4.92 1.01 
NFF  97.12 1.65 0.09 11.06 2.49 3.74 1.01 
FF-NFF  -8.16 -0.03 28.33 -10.01 2.69 1.17 0.00 
 Group 2  
FF  43.76 2.15 19.28 15.79 0.61 24.69 1.06 
NFF  333.85 2.10 0.24 14.51 0.90 33.64 1.05 
FF-NFF  -290.08 0.05 19.04 1.28 -0.30 -8.95 0.01 
 Group 3  
FF  235.22 2.36 25.62 3.88 2.26 40.39 1.14 
NFF  1,733.72 2.40 0.19 2.68 21.71 58.37 1.18 
FF-NFF  -1,498.50 -0.04 25.43 1.2 -19.45 -17.98 -0.05 
 Group 4  
FF  371.12 2.70 26.38 1.09 2.49 66.34 1.19 
NFF  1,174.91 3.00 0.39 3.64 6.77 95.48 1.22 
FF-NFF  -803.79 -0.30 25.99 -2.55 -4.28 -29.14 -0.03 
 Group 5  
FF  237.39 3.82 18.94 2.32 1.11 149.98 1.42 
NFF  2,734.28 4.57 0.08 3.17 12.28 204.55 1.33 
FF-NFF  -2,496.89 -0.75 18.85 -0.86 -11.17 -54.57 0.09 
Average 
difference  FF-NFF  -1,019.49 -0.21 23.53 -2.19 -6.50 -21.89 0.01 
After demonstrating that family firms tend to rely on leverage less than nonfamily firms, we decided to 
deepen our analysis by studying the factors driving this divergence. Hence, for the purpose of comparing 
family and nonfamily firms that are relatively similar in capital structure, we divided family and nonfamily 
firms in 5 groups according to their financing techniques measured by the median of the debt-to-equity 
ratio. For each of the 2 subgroups, the family and the nonfamily firms, the 1st group’s upper bound is the 
20th percentile of the debt-to-equity ratio, the 2nd group’s upper bound is the 40th percentile, the 3rd group’s 
upper bound is the 60th percentile, the 4th group’s upper bound is the 80th percentile and the 5th group’s 
upper bound is the highest median of debt-to-equity ratio. Specifically, we computed the median of different 
factors affecting capital structure in each of the 2 subgroups and computed the difference aiming to explain 
the difference between the two firms’ types’ capital structures. The conclusions drawn from this table are 
the following: 
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1. Family firms have a lower size as measured by assets than nonfamily firms in the 5 bins. However, this 
difference is the largest in the 3rd and 5th group signaling that the more family and nonfamily firms use 
the debt, the bigger the gap between their sizes.  
2. In the previous table we demonstrated that family firms rely less on debt than nonfamily firms in their 
capital structure. Through this table, we show that for all firms represented by all five groups except 
for one, family firms represent a slightly lower level of financial leverage than nonfamily firms which 
proves that they rely less on debt for financing purposes. This is also highlighted by the negative 
difference between the levels of debt-to-equity in family and nonfamily in 4 out of 5 groups (i.e. from 
the 2nd till the 5th bin). 
3. It is highly remarkable and noteworthy that in every group family firms represent a much higher 
percentage of insider ownership. This could be highly informative regarding the reasons behind the 
lower level of debt of firms. For instance, insider ownership drives a firm’s leaders toward high levels 
of risk aversion, which diverges their plans from debt as they fear interest payments that negatively 
affect the bottom line, and risks of losing control in case of financial distress and bankruptcy. 
4. According to this table, both types of firms have almost the same degree of financial leverage. This 
result signifies that both subgroups’ earning per share is almost equally sensitive to interest payments. 
Hence, the difference between the two subgroups financing decisions is not based on the effect of 
interest payments on the bottom line.  
For all the graphs below we divided family and nonfamily firms in 5 groups according to their financing 
techniques measured by the debt-to-equity ratio. For each of the 2 subgroups, the 1st group’s upper bound 
is the 20th percentile of the debt-to-equity ratio, the 2nd group’s upper bound is the 40th percentile, the 3rd 
group’s upper bound if the 60th percentile, the 4th group’s upper bound is the 80th percentile and the 5th 
group’s upper bound is the maximum median of debt-to-equity ratio. The red graph represents nonfamily 
firms, whereas the blue graph represents family firms. 
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Figure 3: Debt-to-equity ratio. 
 
All family firms use lower levels of debt compared with equity than nonfamily firms. However, as the debt-
to-equity ratio increases in the 2 types of types of firms, the difference between the debt-to-equity ratios in 
family and nonfamily firms increases. 
Figure 4: Total assets in function of debt-to-equity. 
 
It is remarkable that as debt-to-equity ratio increases in both types of firms, family firms experience a 
significant increase in size whereas the size of family firms remains comparatively very low and 
approximately stable. This might signal the use of debt is proven to have a significant positive effect on 
nonfamily firms pulling that type of firm closer to using debt as the principal means of financing. 
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Figure 5: Free cash flow in function of the debt-to-equity ratio. 
 
In the first group, family firms tend to have greater free cash flow than nonfamily firms. However, as the 
debt-to-equity ratio increases (i.e. as we go from the first group to the second) we notice a big jump of free 
cash flow in nonfamily firms and stability in the level of free cash flow for nonfamily firms. From there on, 
for any level of debt, nonfamily firms present a significantly higher level of free cash flows than family 
firms which reflects their higher ability of raising debt and paying the interest payment explaining their 
higher reliance on debt for financing. 
3.3. Hypotheses Testing 
Hypothesis 1: Debt and insider ownership are negatively related. 
Almost two-thirds of family companies are managed by a member of the owning family (Family firm 
institute, Inc.), making insider ownership a preliminary variable in the model. However, this has two 
opposing effects. The larger the fraction of a company’s shares held by its managers, the more entrenched 
they are. Hence, insider ownership could be negatively related to debt due to its entrenchment effect. In 
contrast, it could have an alignment effect, which reduces agency cost. For instance, Berger et al. (1997) 
and Mehran (1992) state that firms with higher insider ownership look for higher leverage ratios in order 
to increase firm value as a result of alignment framework. However, Kim and Sorenson (1986) considered 
a positive relation between insider ownership and leverage driven by the agency costs of equity: the higher 
the managerial ownership, the higher should be the costs of external equity associated with incentive to 
consume perks. Hence, to keep control pressures away such as takeovers, managers can choose to increase 
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leverage largely. Moreover, from the management perspective, debt is a direct mechanism to control 
opportunistic behavior in the use of firm’s resources (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, according to 
Fama and Jensen (1983), when family is involved in management, the decision process tends to lose 
efficiency because of their risk aversion. In this respect, family firms managed by family members will tend 
to have less debt when compared with similar but nonfamily firms. From the direct ownership perspective, 
consistent with the idea that more supervision comes along higher debt levels (Stulz, 1988), families as 
dominant shareholders (which is the case of all the family firms in our sample), can increase debt inducing 
more creditor’s supervision and therefore reducing the potential management’s opportunistic behavior 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Thus, since contradictory theories are present, we decided to choose our first hypothesis as follows: (H1) 
debt and insider ownership are negatively related. Insider ownership is measured as the percentage 
outstanding shares currently held by insiders.  
Hypothesis 2: Debt and institutional ownership are negatively related. 
Berger et al. (1997) believe that firms with greater institutional shareholdings are more leveraged. Gugler 
et al. (2008) expect that managers’ discretion to pursue their own goals declines when the percentage of 
institutional shareholding increases, since institutional shareholders are mainly interested in share 
performance. Hence, the higher the percentage of institutional shareholding, the lower the agency cost and 
less significant is the disciplinary role of debt due to external monitoring. Besides, if families are performing 
monitoring in lieu of debt then the need for debt is not evident. Therefore, we expect a negative relation 
between the percentage institutional ownership and the level of debt. Percentage institutional shareholding 
is the percentage of shares outstanding held by institutions. We decided to choose our second hypothesis as 
follows: (H2) debt and institutional ownership are negatively related. 
Hypothesis 3: Family firms’ debt maturity is lower than that of nonfamily firms. 
If it assumed that less information asymmetry implies preference for equity relative to debt, then the higher 
the level of information asymmetry, the more significant the disciplinary role of debt becomes. Hence, we 
predict that debt and the level of information asymmetry are positively related in French family firms. 
Usually a good signal for the presence of information asymmetry is the relatively wide spread between the 
bid and the ask prices of shares. The percentage bid-ask spread is the average of all bid-ask spreads taken 
as a percentage of the mid-price. For a trading day to contribute to the calculation, there should be at least 
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ten valid bid-ask spread points on that day. The values used are subject to the condition that more than 50% 
of trading days in the period are eligible to contribute to the calculation. Our third hypothesis will be: (H3) 
Family firms’ debt maturity is lower than that of nonfamily firms.  
The tables below represent the most significant tests for the alternative hypothesis of difference, inferiority 
and superiority in means between family and nonfamily firms for various capital structure and control 
variables at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) significance levels. We observe in the tables the significant 
differences between the two groups of firms.  
Table 8 shows the size of the two types of firms. Using three separate definitions for size (current market 
capitalization, total assets and total capital), the t-test indicates that the French family firms are significantly 
smaller than the French nonfamily firms at the 1% level. The numbers of the firm size are in thousands of 
euros. For instance, the average total assets of family firms are almost equal to €1.924 million versus 
€10.397 for the nonfamily firms, and the average total capital of family firms are almost equal to €1.965 
million versus €7.091 for the nonfamily firm.  
It is worth recalling that total assets are equal to the summation of all, the interest-bearing and non-interest-
bearing short-term and long-term debt and the total stockholders’ equity whereas total capital are equal to 
the summation of all interest-bearing debt only and the stockholders’ equity, therefore excluding the non-
interest-bearing debt. Thus, as mentioned above, on average, the French family firms are much smaller in 
size than the nonfamily firms which will affect the firms’ capital structure as we will see subsequently.  
Table 8: Firm size comparison 
  
Family firms 
mean 
Nonfamily firms 
mean 
Result 
Firm size    
Current market capitalization 1,465 4,342 < 0*** 
Total assets 1,924 10,397 < 0*** 
Total capital 1,965 7,091 < 0*** 
Table 9 shows the capital structure of the two types of firms. For defining firms’ capital structure, we 
included total liabilities, debt-to-equity, dividend payout ratio, short-term borrowing, long-term 
borrowings, long-term debt to total capital, short-term borrowing to total liabilities, long-term borrowing 
to total liabilities, short-term to long-term liabilities, total debt ratio, cost of debt, and cost of equity. The t-
test indicates that the French family firms have significantly lower levels of debt than nonfamily firms at 
the 1% level. The numbers of the firm’s debt are in thousands of euros. 
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Table 9: Capital structure comparison 
  
Family firms 
mean 
Nonfamily firms 
mean 
Result 
Capital structure    
Total liability 1,233 6,989 <0*** 
Short-term borrowing 16 105 <0*** 
Long-term borrowing 234 1,973 <0*** 
Short-term borrowing to total liabilities 12 10 >0** 
Long-term borrowing to total liabilities 16 24 <0** 
Total debt ratio 33 29 <>0** 
Debt-to-equity ratio 40.34 61.10 <0*** 
Long-term debt to total capital 13.99 21.92 <0*** 
Short-term to long-term liabilities 1.61 2.25 =0*** 
Cost of debt 1.82 2.12 <0*** 
Cost of equity 9.69 10.97 <0*** 
For instance, through the comparison we find that the average total liabilities of family firms are 
significantly smaller than the average total liabilities of nonfamilies at the 1% level with €1.233 million for 
family firms versus €6.989 million for nonfamily firms. Total liabilities include all interest-bearing and 
non-interest bearing short-term and long-term debt. Additionally, both short-term and long-term 
borrowings in family firms are less than nonfamily firms since the mean in family firms are €0.016 million 
and €0.234 million and in nonfamily firms €0.105 million and €1.973 million respectively. Yet, this may 
be due to the fact that the size of family firms is smaller than that of nonfamily firms as previously 
mentioned; hence, much less debt is needed to finance family firm’s assets.  
It is worth recalling that whenever evaluating a firm’s total debt and the firm’s capacity to repay it to its 
creditors, analysts observe carefully the firm’s interest-bearing debt in addition to the whole debt levels 
because such type of debt imposes the firm not only to repay the debt principals but also the interests to its 
creditors. Thus, the level of scrutiny interest-bearing debt is subjected to is much higher than the non-
interest bearing debt and that’s why our observation was focused on the interest-bearing debt instead. 
Hence, we compare the percentage of short-term borrowing to total liabilities and the percentage of long-
term borrowing to total liabilities between the two types of firms. Interestingly, we find that family firms 
have higher percentage of short-term borrowings to total liabilities and lower percentage of long-term 
borrowings to total liabilities at 5% significance level. Specifically, short-term borrowing to total liabilities 
in family firms had an average of 12% versus 10% for the nonfamily firms. And long-term borrowing to 
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total liabilities in family firms had an average of 16% versus 24% for the nonfamily firms. These 
percentages show the proportion of the short-term and the long-term interest-bearing debt only to total 
liabilities respectively. Non-interest-bearing debt is not included in these percentages. Together, the 
interest-bearing short-term and long-term debt represent around 28% (=12%+16%) of total liabilities in 
French family firms whereas they represent around 34% (=10%+24%) of total liabilities in nonfamily firms. 
As a result, proportionately, family firms have lower percentage of interest-bearing debt compared with 
nonfamily firms, which will reflect the total cost of borrowing with respect to total liabilities of both types 
of firms. Separately, the percentages of borrowing to total liabilities imply that the French family firms 
attempt to borrow on short-term basis with respect to total liabilities more than the French nonfamily firms 
do, and they also imply the French family firms attempt to borrow on short-term basis with respect to total 
liabilities less than the French nonfamily firms do. Moreover, the proportion of short-term borrowing to 
long-term borrowing for family and nonfamily firms is equal to 0.75 (=12%/16%) and 0.42 (=10%/24%) 
respectively. Therefore, once again, it is clear that family firms prefer to raise more short-term borrowing 
rather than long-term borrowing compared with nonfamily firms.  
Thus, this goes in line with the findings of Bevan and Danbolt (2002) who report that size and short-term 
debt are negatively correlated while size and long-term debt are positively correlated. Additionally, this 
could be explained by the fact that “the use of short-term debt may mitigate the agency problems, as any 
attempt by shareholders to extract wealth from debtholders is likely to restrict the firms’ access to short-
term debt in the immediate future.”  
Moreover, when comparing the proportion of total funds raised by the debtholders to total funds raised by 
the equity holders captured by the debt-to-equity ratio, we notice that both types of firms had an average 
below 1.00, which means that the equity holders are the major source of financing rather than debtholders. 
Yet, family firms’ average debt-to-equity ratio of 40% is significantly less than that of nonfamily firms of 
61% at the 1% level. This also shows that family firms rely more on equity financing compared with 
nonfamily firms than on debt financing. For example, for every €40 raised by debt, the equity holders 
finances the family firm by €100 (i.e. 40%), whereas for every €61 raised by debt, the equity finances the 
nonfamily firm by €100 (i.e. 61%). So, proportionately, nonfamily firms rely more on debt financing 
compared with family firms. In fact, according to Ugurlu (2000), managerially controlled firms (similar to 
family firms) have lower debt ratio than the institutionally controlled firms (similar to nonfamily firms). 
Moreover, family firms have a low debt-to-equity level, which is consistent with Gallo and Vilaseca (1996). 
Additionally, we notice that the cost of debt of family firms is significantly lower than that of nonfamily 
firms at the 1% level, with 1.82% versus 2.12% respectively. The cost of equity for family firms is also 
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lower than that of nonfamily firms at the 1% level too, with 9.69% and 10.97% respectively. Consequently, 
the weighted average cost of capital of family firms is nearly lower than that of nonfamily firms since both, 
the cost of debt and equity is lower for family firms than nonfamily firms. As a result, from the risk point 
of view, it is assumed that family firms hold a lower level of risk than nonfamily firms, have lower 
percentage of debt, lower interest-bearing short-term and long-term debt to total liabilities, lower debt-to-
equity ratio and lower cost of debt and equity.  
Table 10 shows some information asymmetries measures and proxies for both types of firms. For instance, 
we will use the percentage of average bid-ask spread, the number of analysts covering the firm, and the 
average trade volume for implying to information asymmetries between the firm’s insiders and outsiders. 
Beside these three measures, we included the average managerial compensation to earnings before interests 
and taxes, average managerial compensation in absolute figure and the dividend payout ratio.  
Table 10: Asymmetric information comparison 
  
Family firms 
mean 
Nonfamily firms 
mean 
Result 
Asymmetric information    
% average bid ask spread 1.76 1.18 >0** 
Number of analysts covering the firm 6.04 11.58 <0*** 
Volume  2,059,416 14,003,171 <0*** 
Average managerial compensation/EBIT 48,470 3,721 >0* 
Average managerial compensation 410,340 1,444,850 <0** 
Dividend payout ratio 23.19 49.80 <0*** 
We notice that family firms seem to have a higher level of information asymmetries compared with 
nonfamily firms when looking at the three mentioned proxies. Thus, in family firms, we notice that the 
percentage bid-ask spread is significantly higher than that of nonfamily firms at the 5% level, with 1.76% 
versus 1.18%. This goes in line with Attig et al. (2006) who collect the ultimate ownership data for the 
1,167 Canadian traded corporations, for the 1994–1996 period, to examine the relationship between stock 
liquidity and ultimate ownership structure. The authors’ results suggest that the presence of family increases 
the bid-ask spread. In addition, the magnitude of the deviation between ultimate ownership and ultimate 
control at the presence of families is important in determining the bid-ask spread. Furthermore, they 
document that mechanisms of enhancing control, for example, a pyramid in the case of family firms, 
significantly affect bid-ask spreads. As mentioned earlier and as we will see in further detail in the 
subsequent two chapters, family firms’ owners have clearly used the IPO to increase their voting rights with 
respect to their cash flow rights. For instance, family firms’ owners cash flow rights pre- and post-IPO date 
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were equal to 74.9% and 62.29% respectively, whereas their voting rights pre- and post-IPO date were 
equal to 76.21% and 66.91% respectively. In absolute percentages, the cash flow rights have decreased by 
12.61% whereas the voting rights have decreased by only 9.3%. Moreover, the gap between the cash flow 
rights and voting rights at pre-IPO date was equal to 1.31% whereas with the post-IPO date it becomes 
equal to 4.62%. So on average, the cash flow rights of family firms’ owners have decreased after the IPO 
by 16.22% whereas their voting rights have decreased by only 11.02%.  
In addition, the share liquidity marked by the average trade volume is significantly lower for family firms 
than that of nonfamily firms at the 1% level with 2 million versus 14 million traded shares. It is generally 
known that the spread size from one asset to another will differ mainly because of the difference in liquidity 
of each asset. Thus, highly liquid assets that are heavily traded in the market have lower bid-ask spread 
compared to assets that are marginally traded.  
For instance, it is generally known that share market liquidity refers to the ‘ease’ by which shares can be 
traded, and there are two essential features in defining the word ease. The first feature should be the speed 
at which a stock is being traded in the market. So a liquid stock is one that can be sold quickly, which means 
when a market order is placed to buy or sell stock, investors will not wait for long before its order is 
executed. For this to happen there must always be willing buyers when sellers choose to sell. The second 
feature should be the price at which the stock is being traded in the market. Liquidity also implies that a 
stock can be sold without materially affecting the market price. In other words, there must be sufficient 
demand to support the price during the course of the transaction. Clearly, most things can be sold quickly 
if sellers are willing to accept a low price. But if a significant price adjustment is required to facilitate the 
sale, the market is not liquid. We can bring these two factors together and define liquidity as: “The ability 
to trade a substantial amount of a financial asset at close to current market prices.” 
Generally, the most useful measure of liquidity for any stock is its average daily trading volume. The daily 
trading volume varies from one day to another so it is best to use an average figure over a certain period, 
usually over 30 or 90 days. Yet, another liquidity measure that is commonly used is the share turnover ratio, 
which is calculated in two ways, thus giving two different but very close interpretations. The first one is by 
dividing the average daily trading volume by the float (1). The float represents the company’s total number 
of shares outstanding minus those owned by insiders and what the company is holding back as treasury 
stock. In other words, the float represents the shares available for public trade. The second way to calculate 
the share turnover is by dividing the total number of shares traded over a period by the average number of 
shares outstanding for the period (2). Using both calculations, the higher the share turnover, the more liquid 
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the shares of the company with respect to the float and the number of shares outstanding. Table 11 below 
represents a real-time example of the share turnover ratio of two corporations, IBM and HPQ: 
Table 11: Share turnover ratio 
  IBM HPQ 
Average daily volume (3 months) (in millions) = a 4.1 12.1 
Float (in millions) = b 983.1 1,810.0 
Share turnover ratio (1) = a/b 0.41% 0.67% 
Total shares traded in 3 months (in millions) = c 259.2 766.9 
Shares outstanding (in millions) = d 984.7 1,820.0 
Share turnover ratio (2) = c/d 26.33% 42.14% 
Average daily trade value (in millions of US$) $664 $395 
The share turnover ratio calculated using both ways (1) and (2) show that HPQ stock is relatively more 
liquid than IBM stock with respect to both, their float (1) and their shares outstanding (2). It is also known 
that large companies typically deliver high liquidity even when their turnover ratios are low. Therefore, 
instead of looking solely on the average trade volume and the float, we should also look at the average trade 
value to have an idea about the value traded and not only the volume or the quantity traded. So the average 
value traded is equal to the average of the product of the daily stock price and the daily trading volume over 
a certain period. Thus, by looking at the average trade value of IBM and HPQ, we find them equal to $664 
million and $395 million respectively, which means that IBM daily trade value is around 68% bigger than 
that of HPQ.  
Therefore, the bid-ask spread and volume of a particular stock are closely interlinked and play a significant 
role in the liquidity. As it is known, the bid price is the highest price investors are willing to pay for a stock 
while the ask price is the lowest price at which investors are willing to sell a stock. Because these two prices 
must meet in order for a transaction to occur, consistently large bid-ask spreads imply a low volume for the 
stock while consistently small bid-ask spreads imply high volume. Whenever the bid-ask spread is fairly 
large (i.e. a percentage spread of around 10%), it means that the buyer and the seller are far apart. In such 
situations, no transactions can take place until the buyer and the seller agree on price. Should this large bid-
ask spread continue, few transactions would occur and volume levels would be low, implying poor liquidity, 
either the bid or the ask price (or both) would have to move for a transaction to take place. On the other 
hand, a small bid-ask spread (i.e. a percentage spread of around 0.5%) would imply that the buyer and seller 
are very close to agreeing on a price. As a result, the transaction is likely to occur sooner and, if these prices 
continued, the liquidity for the stock would be high.  
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Moreover, Attig et al. (2006) studied the relation of ultimate control and ownership with the bid-ask spread. 
The authors explain that an important dimension of stock liquidity is the bid-ask spread. The authors find 
that stocks with greater deviations between ultimate control and ownership have a larger information 
asymmetry component of their bid–ask spread and wider bid–ask spread. The authors explain that their 
results are consistent with the notion that the ultimate owners of these stocks may have selfish agendas. 
And to increase the probability of the agendas being implemented, the firms may have poor information 
disclosure, resulting in poor stock liquidity.  
Yet, this directly applies to the French family firms. As we will see in the subsequent chapters, through the 
IPO, French family firms’ owners have increased the gap between the cash flow rights and voting rights, 
thus attempting to expropriate minority shareholders. In addition, we find that family firms have a 
significantly lower dividend payout ratio compared with nonfamily firms at 1% significance level with an 
average of 23.19% versus 49.8% respectively.  
In addition, family firms’ growth potential is lower. The lower level of growth in family firms is explained 
by the willingness of family members to pursue the stability of the business over rapid growth and risky 
investment strategies (Harris, Martinez and Ward, 1994; and Tagiuri and Davis, 1992). In addition, Booth 
et al. (2014) argue that a positive relationship is expected between debt and growth in most countries. 
Consequently, the lower amount of leverage may be explained by slow growth. Last, we find that 
performance and asset management are better in French family firms than nonfamily firms. This could also 
explain the lower level of leverage since, according to Bevan and Danbolt (2002), the more profitable firms 
are less indebted, because the higher the level of profits, the higher becomes the level of internal fund, 
which is the most desired type of financing according to the pecking-order theory. 
3.4. Regression Variables 
The unbalanced panel data is based on the time-series monthly data ranging from 2010 to 2013 (13,452 
observations per variable) excluding the years 2008 and 2009 because of the lack of sufficient data. Hence, 
we will investigate the factors behind the difference in capital structure and debt maturity between French 
family and nonfamily firms using a time-series data analysis from 2010 to 2013 (inclusive). But before 
analyzing the findings, we will explain in depth the variables used in the model. Thus, we will describe first 
the dependent variables related to debt maturity such as short-term borrowings, long-term borrowings, and 
percentages of both from total liabilities, and the dependent variables related to the debt value such as the 
total amount of debt to market value of assets, debt-to-equity and total debt. 
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o The Dependent Variables 
Similarly to Baker and Wurgler (2002), we will use a model reflecting several variables reflecting capital 
structure to a wide range of independent variables related to corporate governance mechanisms, firm size, 
risk level, performance, and information asymmetry. And similarly to Ampenberger et al. (2013), through 
the variety of leverage proxy variables we aim to test for the robustness of our results. The following are 
the various variables used to reflect a firm’s capital structure components and mainly leverage and their 
respective maturities. 
i. Short-term borrowings: Includes bank overdrafts, short-term debts and borrowings, repurchase 
agreements (repos) and reverse repos, short-term portion of long-term borrowings, current 
obligations under capital (finance) leases, current portion of hire purchase creditors, trust receipts, 
bills payable, bills of exchange, bankers acceptances, interest bearing loans, and short-term 
mandatory redeemable preferred stock. Net with unamortized premium or discount on debt and 
may include fair value adjustments of embedded derivatives. 
ii. Long-term borrowings: All interest-bearing financial obligations that are not due within a year. 
iii. Percentage of short-term borrowings in total Liabilities: Short-term debt divided by total 
liabilities. 
iv. Percentage of long-term borrowings in total Liabilities: Long-term debt divided by total 
liabilities. 
v. Long-term debt to total capital: Long-term debt divided by total capital. Total capital is the sum 
of market capitalization of equity, book value of short-term debt and long-term debt, and book 
value of preferred equity. Book value is used as a proxy for market value. 
These variables are used to indicate if French family firms are more oriented towards raising short-term or 
long-term debt than French nonfamily firms. The remaining variables stated above represent the level of 
debt. Since capital structure studies focusing on the total level of debt significantly neglect the differences 
between long-term and short-term debt, we will follow the steps of Michaelas et al. (1999) and Bevan and 
Danbolt (2002) when testing if the level of debt in family firms is different than that of nonfamily firms, 
we decompose debt into the variables stated above. According to Rajan and Zingales (1995), the most 
appropriate definition of leverage after having examined a variety of definitions is the total amount of debt 
to market value of assets of the firm in question. Hence, we will be using leverage as the most significant 
indicator of a firm’s capital structure. However, we will be using the book value of assets instead of market 
value due to the difficulty of obtaining such variable. In addition, we will remove all the outliers to 
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smoothen our data. We will also use the variable debt-to-equity and total debt to check for the robustness 
of our test. 
o The Independent Variables 
According to Harris and Raviv (1990) and Titman and Wessels (1988), the choice of suitable determinants 
of capital structure is potentially cause for disagreement. Rajan and Zingales (1995), Booth et al. (2014), 
Bevan and Danbolt (2002), Ampenberger et al. (2013), Mefteh and Oliver (2010) and many researchers 
have referred to some of these variables in their studies. Consequently, out of the seven main determinants 
of capital structure we will be using in our study market-to-book ratio as a proxy for the company’s growth, 
firm size as measured by total assets (Al-Sakran, 2001; and Cassar and Holmes, 2003), and dividend payout 
ratio.  
However, we go beyond existing research on French family firms by following a research approach with 
new explanatory variables and various proxies of capital structure that were not previously combined in the 
same statistical approach as mine. We will state through the paragraph our choice of variables. Since a 
firm’s governance structure highly affects decisions about a firm’s capital structure, we include corporate 
governance measures in our analysis. Therefore, we include as explanatory variables the percentage insider 
shareholding as a proxy for managerial entrenchment, the percentage institutional holding representing 
level of monitoring and control, the percentage average bid-ask spread reflecting information asymmetry, 
return on equity as an accounting-based measure of financial performance.  
Becker (1981) and Casson (1999) imply that family control will exert significant influence on its financing 
decisions. Thus, managerial entrenchment is expected to increase not only with the level of insider 
shareholdings, but also with the size of the firm (Gugler et al., 2008). Insider ownership represents 
managerial entrenchment since based on Morck et al. (1988) the higher the level of insider ownership, the 
more entrenched managers are. However, insider ownership could help control the problem of agency cost 
(Ugurlu, 2000). Therefore, insider ownership is a very significant variable in our model mainly since we 
observed that in most French family firms, as shown in Table 2, the blockholders are present in the board 
of directors and management team. By definition, blockholders are owners of more than 5% of the 
company’s outstanding shares (Villalonga and Amit, 2006; and Ampenberger et al., 2013). In addition, one 
mechanism to control agency cost and affect the level of debt positively is institutional holdings. Many 
studies have noted that usually institutional holdings have a positive effect on the level of monitoring in the 
firm and level of debt (Cable, 1985; Ugurlu, 2000; and Gugler et al., 2008). For instance, Harris and Raviv 
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(1988), Israel (1991) and Stulz (1988) suggest that control motives can shape a firm’s capital structure 
decisions. Another explanatory variable of the firm’s capital structure is asymmetric information.  
Recent work based on asymmetric information gives predictions roughly in line with the pecking-order 
theory also called information asymmetry theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984), which states that profitable 
firms rely heavily on internal equity and have a small need for external finance and thus debt (Mefteh and 
Oliver, 2010) and firms prefer to raise funds through debt rather than new equity (Buferna et al., 2005). We 
chose as a proxy for information asymmetry the percentage bid-ask spread for the stock prices because if 
the investor is bidding to pay an amount that is less than what the owner is willing to sell it for, that would 
be due to fact that the owner and the potential buyer have different information endowments (Maureen O’ 
Hara). Ampenberger et al. (2013) found a negative relationship between debt and performance.  
We will also analyze how a company’s performance affects a French family firm’s capital structure and we 
will use the return on equity to measure accounting performance (Graves and Waddock, 1994; and 
Tsoutsoura, 2004). According to Booth et al. (2014) and Buferna et al. (2005), growth is positively related 
to the level of debt.  
4. RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
After conducting the hypothesis testing and having an overview about the main capital structure 
components of the French family firms, we will attempt to explain via a multiple linear regression the 
capital structure of the French family firms. Conversely, to test for the relation between various 
determinants of the level of debt and capital structure, our analysis uses an unbalanced panel data. Our 
analysis uses an unbalanced panel dataset on 90 French family firms that are listed on the CAC All-Tradable 
Index. We present three types of regression estimates which are the pooled OLS, “between” estimates also 
called the random effects model, and “within” estimates also referred to the fixed effects model.  
From an econometric point of view, random effects model only employs cross-sectional variation and 
presents OLS estimates of firm means across time. “Within” estimates are based on the variation of the data 
within each firm. The fixed effects model includes firm-fixed effects and uses variation over time within 
each section and hence presents estimates of deviations from the firm means across time. The advantage 
presented by this model is the possibility of controlling for unobserved, time-invariant firm heterogeneity. 
According to Lemmon et al. (2009), in models resulting in adjusted R-squared higher than those obtained 
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in traditional leverage regressions, firm fixed effects seem to have a high explanatory power for capital 
structure decisions. In addition to that, the fixed effect model adjusts for the possibility that firm-specific 
factors influence the level of leverage in each company, the within estimates are equivalent to estimating 
OLS models and including indicator variables for each of the firms (Berger et al., 1997).  
The biggest advantage of the random model estimates is that it addresses the concerns that the observations 
drawn repeatedly from the same sample of firms may be independent. The pooled OLS estimator ignores 
the panel structure of the data but combines both aspects as it is a weighted average of both the fixed and 
random effect model estimates. In addition, we use the Hausman test to check if the random or fixed model 
estimates are more representative. Table 5 represents the p-value of the Hausman test corresponding to each 
of the dependent variables and, accordingly, which model is most appropriate.  
Furthermore, and similarly to Michaelas et al. (1999) and Bevan and Danbolt (2002), we will not only 
consider the overall level of debt, but we will also study the effect of the explanatory variables on long-
term and short-term debt. Through the use of three different models and various debt proxies, we aim to 
test for the robustness of our result against a variety of estimation techniques and a variety of debt 
definitions and benefit from the advantages of each of the three models. Table 9 represents the regression 
estimates of models of leverage levels. These results support the hypothesis and the arguments stated above 
explaining the relationship between size and debt (including short- and long-term debt).  
The first two hypotheses, H1 and H2, do not seem to be well verified and confirmed through our results 
since some of the significant estimates have a negative sign and the others have a positive sign. Insider 
ownership seems to have a positive weak relation with the level of debt and specifically short-term debt 
since almost all significant estimates are positive and have the same small magnitude. However, it does not 
seem to affect the percentage of long-term debt or the percentage of short-term debt since the estimates are 
close to 0. The positive relation between percentage insider shareholders could be explained by the fact that 
short-term debt may mitigate the agency problems, as any attempt by shareholders to extract wealth from 
debtholders is likely to restrict the firms’ access to short-term debt in the immediate future (Buferna et al., 
2005). This weak relationship may be due to the controversial effects of insider ownership, the negative 
entrenchment effect and the positive alignment effect. However, the results concerning the effect of 
institutional ownership on the firm’s performance are highly robust and clearly indicate the negative 
relation between the monitoring and level of debt. This relationship could be explained by the fact that the 
higher the percentage institutional shares outstanding is, the less needed becomes the monitoring and 
regulatory role of debt in family firms. This is especially the case since family firms do not suffer heavily 
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from agency cost due to the high levels of insider ownership that distinguishes family firms and hence do 
not require high level of debt to monitor the actions of the managers.  
In line with the trade-off theory and the pecking-order theory, which states that profitable firms have much 
retained earnings and therefore a smaller need for external finance and thus debt, and the market timing 
hypothesis, and according to our study, growing French family do not rely heavily on debt to finance their 
investments. Titman and Wessels (1988) argue this negative relationship by pointing out that the agency 
cost increases as growth increases. Consistent with these predictions, Titman and Wessels (1988), Chung 
(1993) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) prove the negative relationship between the level of debt and growth 
in developed countries such as France. Furthermore, firms with growth options have higher costs of 
financial distress (Rajan and Zingales, 1995) and consequently are expected to have lower debt. However, 
it is noticeable that the percentage of short-term borrowings is significantly positively related to growth and 
percentage of long-term borrowings is significantly negatively related to growth. This is consistent with the 
notion that greater informational asymmetries are associated with shorter maturity according to Myers 
(1977). Information asymmetry is positively significantly related to the level of debt with no remarkable 
effect on their maturity as predicted. According to Gugler et al. (2008), family firms under-invest due to 
asymmetric information problems and hence will have a low need for external financing.  
Through our analysis, the results concerning the effect of performance on the manager’s preference for debt 
are significant and highly robust. The better the performance, the lower the level of debt. The dividend 
payout ratio appears to have a significant negative effect on the level of debt. However, the coefficients 
were close to zero hence we do not consider this relationship to be strong. In addition to that, the effect of 
the dividend payout ratio on the maturity of debt was significant. This could be explained by the variety of 
well proven hypotheses on the negative and positive effect of dividends on leverage. The results clearly 
demonstrate a negative relation between dividend payout ratio and long-term debt and a positive one 
between dividend payout ratio and short-term debt. Below, we present the results of the multiple linear 
regression, attempting to explain the debt maturity and level through different independent variables. As 
mentioned, we tried to run different regression models for varying dependent variables related to debt 
maturity and levels, while keeping the independent variables constant with each different dependent 
variable.  
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Table 12: Regression estimates 
  
 Y1: Debt ratio Y2: log (debt to CE) 
  OLS Within Between OLS Within Between 
X1: Log of total assets 0.042364*** 0.03138** 0.025288*** 0.712886*** 0.845019*** 0.531558 
X2: Market capitalization to book value (0.005793)*** 0.007432*** 0.007157*** -0.03581 0.033067* 0.035755 
X3: Log of institutional percentage shares 
outstanding 
(0.003635)*** -0.000612 -0.000617 (0.102814)*** (0.018847)** -0.020238 
X4: Log of average bid ask spread 0.015139*** 0.004406** 0.004413* 0.722954*** 0.027848 0.031465 
X5: Return on common equity (0.003063)*** (0.000656)*** (0.000775)*** (0.023688)*** (0.009798)*** -0.010794 
X6: Percentage insider shares outstanding 0.000342* -0.000155 -0.000134 -0.004 (0.006641)** -0.006781 
X7: Dividend payout ratio -9.65E-05 (0.000372)*** (0.000392)*** (0.003719)** -0.001786 -0.002311 
Adjusted R squared 0.386433 0.954717 0.062496 0.229414 0.960559 0.058376 
F statistic 
  
357.1207 9.847089   412.3721 9.227634 
P value 
  
0 0   0 0 
Hausman’s test p value 0.0045 
  
  0.0101 
  
  
 
  
Y3: Total debt Y4: LT debt to tot cap 
  OLS Within Between OLS Within Between 
X1: Log of total assets 95.10057*** 305.836*** 307.2102*** 6.825919*** 303.8145*** 5.210607 
X2: Market capitalization to book value -7.002957 2.725806 2.942391 0.992254 -8.970074 0.095652 
X3: Log of institutional percentage shares 
outstanding 
(7.09382)* -0.358496 -0.508675 -1.306992 -1.140656 -1.085335 
X4: Log of average bid ask spread (331.6569)*** -0.703214 -0.961192 (18.60631)** -5.088317 (9.13119)* 
X5: Return on common equity (1.563494)** 0.012132 -0.017605 (3.458969)*** 0.269814 (3.270183)*** 
X6: Percentage insider shares outstanding -0.500473 0.824494* 0.81609* 0.572133* 0.233272 0.553783 
X7: Dividend payout ratio (3.510346)*** 0.069794 0.02922 -0.051208 0.138914 -0.085661 
Adjusted R squared 0.470465 0.993847 0.214663 0.151977 0.183026 0.107479 
F statistic   2729.16 37.27594   4.784046 16.98166 
P value   0 0   0 0 
Hausman’s test p value 0.1109 
  
  0.0004 
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Y5: Short-term borrowings Y6: Long-term borrowings 
  OLS Within Between OLS Within Between 
X1: Log of total assets 12.90166*** 38.24441*** 36.18352*** 33.76827*** 117.7412*** 115.268*** 
X2: Market capitalization to book value (4.446372)*** -0.196835 -0.071133 (19.23066)*** -0.40298 -0.301807 
X3: Log of institutional percentage shares 
outstanding 
(1.106266)** 0.146955 -0.00775 (4.750353)*** -0.23611 -0.363112 
X4: Log of average bid ask spread (35.54052)*** 0.515298 0.281943 (139.6813)*** -0.93249 -1.20555 
X5: Return on common equity -0.058175 0.108035 0.073292 (0.779175)** -0.0061 -0.042265 
X6: Percentage insider shares outstanding (0.365915)*** 0.385366** 0.305004* 0.484772 0.3124 0.318177 
X7: Dividend payout ratio (0.21383)*** 0.167118** 0.121416 (1.525593)*** -0.07875 -0.117158 
Adjusted R squared 0.384821 0.935 0.053253 0.336916 0.980052 0.0655 
F statistic   247.873 8.464984 
  
830.8771 10.30213 
P value   0 0 
  
0 0 
Hausman’s test p value 0.2581 
  
  0.3263 
  
  
 
  
Y7: Percentage short-term borrowings Y8: Percentage long-term borrowings 
  OLS Within Between OLS Within Between 
X1: Log of total assets 0.068845*** -0.00364 (0.034993)* 0.096662*** 0.619154 0.034993* 
X2: Market capitalization to book value 0.036364*** 0.023301*** 0.023563*** (0.012472)*** 0.00364*** (0.023563)*** 
X3: Log of institutional percentage shares 
outstanding 
(0.007529)*** 0.001372 0.001196 (0.007149)*** -0.023301 -0.001196 
X4: Log of average bid ask spread 0.097387*** -0.000894 -0.000883 0.039071*** -0.001372 0.000883 
X5: Return on common equity 0.000963*** -0.000831 -0.000576 (0.001759)*** 0.000894 0.000576 
X6: Percentage insider shares outstanding -9.76E-05 0.001502* 0.000661 0.00222*** 0.000831* -0.000661 
X7: Dividend payout ratio 0.001137*** 0.001435*** 0.001327*** (0.000666)*** (0.001502)*** (0.001327)*** 
Adjusted R squared (0.191689) 0.787697 0.033472 0.132048 0.787697 0.033472 
F statistic   63.66956 5.596087 
  
63.66956 5.596087 
P value   0 0.000002 
  
0 0.000002 
Hausman’s test p value 0.2909 
  
  0.2909 
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Table 13: Hausman test 
Dependent variable p-value Results 
      
Y1: Debt ratio 0.0045 H1 is true 
Y2: log (debt to CE) 0.0101 H1 is true 
Y3: Total debt 0.1109 H0 is true 
Y4: LT debt to total capital 0.0004 H1 is true 
Y5: Short-term borrowings 0.2581 H0 is true 
Y6: Long-term borrowings 0.3263 H0 is true 
Y7: Percentage short-term borrowings 0.2909 H0 is true 
Y8: Percentage long-term borrowings 0.2909 H0 is true 
H0: random effect model, and H1: fixed effect model 
Using the random effect estimator, when H0 is true, b1 is consistent and efficient and when H1 is true, 
b1 is inconsistent. Using the fixed effect estimator, when H0 is true, b0 is consistent and inefficient and 
when H0 is true, b0 is consistent.  
5. CONCLUSION 
The findings of this chapter are a contribution towards a deeper understanding of capital structure 
decisions in French family firms and in addition examine whether they differ from their counterparts. 
For that purpose, we present a correlation table to study the relation between all the variables and prepare 
a comparative table to show the difference between family and nonfamily firms with respect to a variety 
of variables reflecting the governance mechanisms, information asymmetry, level of debt, maturity, 
performance and others.  
Through these descriptive statistics, we were able to prove that family firms’ capital structure is 
characterized by a lower level of debt and specifically long-term debt than nonfamily firm, so, French 
family firms seem to rely heavily on short-term debt. However, if we consider Table 4, the low level of 
debt can be given various explanations. For instance, the lower agency costs due to the high involvement 
of family firms in the management as proven in this chapter makes the disciplinary role of debt less 
relevant (Jensen, 1986). Additionally, it could be also a result of the lower size and the lower level of 
free cash flows. Hence, managers are not left with high levels of free cash flow and thus do not need to 
increase debt financing for the purpose of having some cash flow disciplinary instrument. Another 
interpretation of a firm’s capital structure through performance is related to the pecking-order theory. 
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As our study and several different studies indicate (e.g. Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; and Villalonga and 
Amit, 2006), French family firms demonstrate a better performance than their nonfamily counterparts, 
which signals their better capabilities to generate internal funds and constant cash-flows. Hence, they 
depend less on external financing (both debt and equity). 
Then, we conducted a regression analysis on the panel data using three regression types (fixed effect, 
random effect and pooled OLS) and the Hausman test to check which of the within and between 
estimates is most appropriate. In addition, we conducted the three types of regression models on eight 
different variables out of which three variables reflect the overall level of debt and five reflect the 
maturity of debt. Through the variety of testing techniques and variables we aimed to test for the 
robustness of our results. Through this, we found that French family firms’ behavior goes in line with 
the broad capital structure theories (the market timing hypothesis, the trade-off theory and pecking-order 
theory). We also proved through Table 3 and Table 9 that almost all French family firms are 
characterized by insider ownership and that managers are entrenched. Through our research, it was 
noteworthy that in almost 90 percent of the family firms, the family is a major shareholder, part of the 
management board and board of directors, which signals the low agency cost. But through the average 
age of the managers in the board of directors and the management board, we notice that family firms 
might suffer from managerial entrenchment. Overall, our study suggests a strong, negative and causal 
relationship between family firm characteristics and the extent to which a company is leveraged. 
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CHAPTER 2: IPO SHORT-TERM PERFORMANCE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
An initial public offering (IPO) is a complex and lengthy process involving high uncertainty (Daily et 
al., 2003) that results in the transformation of a firm from a privately held into a publicly traded one, 
allowing entrepreneurs, employees, venture capitalists, and other investors to cash out (Yang et al., 
2011). As a result of the importance of the IPO in the life of a firm, IPOs have been the focus of 
management research since the 1960s (Reilly and Hatfield, 1969) and extensively covered by theoretical 
and empirical literature (Peterle, 2013). 
Yet, as we previously mentioned in the preliminary chapter, firms seek multiple benefits in going public, 
and these motivations are influenced by the firm’s ownership structure, size, and age, and by the home 
country’s institutional and regulatory environment (La Porta et al., 1998; Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 
2001; Ritter, 2002; Bancel and Mittoo, 2009; Bouzouita, Gajewski, and Gresse, 2015). For example, 
several studies highlight the fact that European firms tend to go public at a much later stage in life and 
are more likely to include secondary shares (shares owned by existing shareholders) in the IPO offering 
than their US peers (Bancel and Mittoo, 2009). In summary, as we have seen, the benefits of going 
public are numerous. They include, among many others, realizing growth, solving succession problems, 
seeking to take advantage of bullish time periods, enhancing external monitoring, strengthening the 
bargaining power with creditors, increasing share liquidity, increasing reputational and social capital, 
and sharing investors’ risk. 
However, regardless of the numerous motives for the firm to go public, and regardless of the firm’s size, 
age, type, industry, and county of origin, the top priority will mostly prevail for both the issuer and the 
underwriter, which is to maximize the gross proceeds and thus raise the largest amount of cash possible 
from the IPO. This is why an important success measure of any IPO is the amount of cash raised, which 
has become a major target of firms going public. Thus, given a constant number of shares, to maximize 
the gross proceeds, the offering price will be at the highest possible level in relation to the shares’ value, 
which is already challenging to assess. Accordingly, a problem is created for two main reasons. On the 
one hand, although higher offering prices will lead to higher proceeds, lower subscription and 
participation from both individuals and institutions will be recorded, which will lead to a higher risk of 
failure and result in IPO underperformance. This type of underperformance usually occurs when the 
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market closing price on the first day of trade after going public is lower than the offering price. Basically, 
in such scenarios, the principal shareholders will maintain the majority of the firm’s shares and the firm 
will not achieve its target by raising the required funds. On the other hand, if the issuer wants to ensure 
the success of the IPO and maintain a sufficient number of subscribers throughout the issuing period, it 
may purposefully underprice its shares by setting the offering price below, and sometimes way below, 
the shares’ intrinsic value, which is usually referred to as “IPO underpricing.” This will usually lead to 
suboptimal proceeds and more blockholders controlling the issuing firms due to the relatively cheaper 
share prices.  
In a nutshell, setting a firm’s offering price and assessing its shares’ value have never been an easy task 
and looks like shaping a two-edged sword. On the first edge, setting a higher offering price aiming for 
maximum proceeds and risking the success of the IPO and ending up with lower participation but 
retaining control. And on the second edge, setting a lower offering price to make the IPO succeed but 
leading to suboptimal proceeds and higher participation and losing control. Therefore, the real challenge 
is in finding an optimal offering price to make the IPO benefits outweigh their costs mainly for the 
family firm’s owners and main shareholders.  
As previously mentioned, IPO underpricing, which measures the IPO performance over the short term, 
is defined as the difference between the offer price and the market price representing the shares’ intrinsic 
value. Yet, it is worth noting that the financial literature regarding IPO performance has documented 
two anomalies that many researchers around the world have tried to observe and explain from different 
perspectives and theories. In the short term, underpricing is observed for most IPOs generating high 
initial returns after the first trading day (Ibbotson, 1975; Ritter, 1984; Kuklinski, 2003), while in the 
long term, usually three to five years later, underperformance is observed for most IPOs (Ritter, 1991). 
In fact, here lies the anomaly in observing two such contradictory performances from IPO firms in 
different time intervals. 
As we mentioned, several empirical studies documented the existence of the initial underpricing 
phenomenon for newly listed firms during the early days of trading across many countries and capital 
markets (Welch, 1992; Ritter, 2002; Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Zouari et al., 2011; Bouzouita, 
Gajewski, and Gresse, 2015). IPO underpricing is a common measure of IPO performance in the finance 
literature and is generally viewed as the difference between the offer price and the market closing price, 
usually on the first day of trading after going public. However, it is not uncommon to have research 
conducted on IPO underpricing by taking the market closing price of the second, third, fifth, tenth, or 
thirtieth day after the firm goes public. Ljungqvist (2005) documented that information asymmetry 
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between investors and issuers is a key factor contributing to such underpricing. Therefore, the extent of 
underpricing represents the level of uncertainty associated with the equity (Ritter, 1984; Beatty and 
Ritter, 1986).  
Early studies examined the short-term performance of IPOs on the US market. The first anomaly was 
initially documented in the late 1960s by Reilly and Hatfield (1969) where they found that from 53 
sample firms that went public from 1963 to 1965, the initial first-day return ranged from 18.3% to 20.2%. 
McDonald and Fisher (1972) investigated 142 IPOs during 1969 and found significantly large returns 
for the initial subscribers, adjusted for stock market effects, in the first week following the IPO. In 
addition, Ibbotson (1975) found an average abnormal return of 11.4%. Loughran and Ritter (1995), 
based on their survey of papers on IPO underpricing, reported average initial returns of 10%. More 
recently, Ljungqvist et al. (2001) documented an initial return of 56.6% on average in 2000 for US IPOs. 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) found returns ranging from 14% to 50% depending on the 
matching criteria used. 
Several other studies have investigated the underpricing phenomenon of IPOs on the main European 
stock exchanges. More particularly, McDonald and Jacquillat (1974) showed the existence of 
underpricing of 31 new French IPOs over the period 1968 to 1971 upon their official listing on the 
secondary market. The market-adjusted return was calculated according to the CAC40 index (by 
assuming an equal systematic risk) and was equal to 3% on the first day, 4.42% in the first week and 
5% in the first month after the IPO date. Additionally, in a study of 131 French IPOs between 1983 and 
1986, Husson and Jacquillat (1990) reported that the average (market-adjusted) initial return was 4%. 
Derrien and Womack (2003) documented a 9.5% underpricing in France from 1992 to 1998. Moreover, 
Derrien and Degeorges (2001), based on a sample of 243 IPOs over the period 1991–1998, found an 
average initial return of 17.5%. Similarly, Ginglinger and Faugeron-Crouzet (2001), in a sample of 292 
IPOs between 1983 and 1994, found an average return of 18.67%. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) 
investigated 516 IPOs during 1990 and May 2000 and found a fifth-day return of 16.5%. In addition, 
Derrien and Womack (2003) found a first-day return of 13.23% in a sample of 264 IPOs during 1992–
1998. Last, but not least, Chahine (2004), using a sample of 172 IPOs over the period 1996–2000, found 
a first-day return of 22.8%. Bouzouita, Gajewski, and Gresse (2015) found an IPO underpricing on the 
French market. On the German market, Ljungqvist (1997), using a sample of 189 firms over the period 
1970–1993, found an initial underpricing of 9.2%.  
But, despite the importance of the IPO event in the life of a firm and the countless studies that have been 
conducted to date on the performance of IPOs, it is somewhat surprising that the special case of family 
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firms in Europe has not been investigated in depth despite the fact that family firms are the most 
prevalent form of business throughout the world (McConaughy, Matthews, and Fialko, 2001). 
For instance, Ding and Pukthuanthong-Le (2009) stated in their papers that little information is being 
provided about the performance of family firms in relation to IPOs, although a wide range of research 
studies has been conducted on this specific topic. However, the authors added that interest in the 
performance of family firms in the capital market is on the rise due to the importance of family firms in 
the global economy. They continued by stating that there are numerous scientific research papers that 
deal with general firm performance in diverse contexts and in dissimilar markets; however, fewer studies 
have focused on the specificities of family firms in particular and their performance after an IPO date, 
either in the short term or in the long term. Similarly, Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) confirmed 
that due to their distinctive behavioral patterns, family firms should receive unique treatment from 
researchers and investors, especially now that family firm owners have come to realize that going public 
is essential for long-term growth and survival. Another reason that makes family firms in particular our 
subject of interest is the drastic change and trade-off that going public causes specifically in family 
firms. On the one hand, an IPO could benefit the firm by increasing its life beyond that of the family 
and boosting significantly its growth and increasing its capital tremendously, but on the other hand, the 
owning family might be reluctant to undertake the IPO process because of the need to disclose 
information that is private, and because of the management changes, submission to new regulations and 
procedures that going public requires, and the complexity that going public adds to the decision-making 
process. Furthermore, additional procedures in small businesses (which is the case for most French 
family firms) can sometimes be counterproductive and harmful as the firms become more rigid and lose 
flexibility (Tharawat magazine, Issue 17, 2013). 
Ding and Pukthuanthong-Le (2009) found evidence, by examining the Taiwan stock market, that lower 
underpricing occurs when an outsider such as a CEO manages a family firm. In addition, Anderson and 
Reeb (2003a) presented another advantage of having owners as managers and explained that family 
firms outperform nonfamily firms because the controlled family’s appointed CEO understands the firm 
and the business very well and this contributes to the firm’s success. They concluded that when the 
owner both controls and leads the firm, the agency cost will easily be reduced and the firm will perform 
equally as well as, or even better than, nonfamily-controlled firms.  
Likewise, Villalonga and Amit (2006) confirmed that value is added when the founding owner serves 
as the CEO or as the chairman of the board. They also claimed that in family firms, the agency costs 
created by the conflict between the family and minority shareholders are smaller than those of the 
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conflict between management and shareholders in a nonfamily-controlled firm. Therefore, it is clear that 
the ownership structure will have various impacts on the underpricing in different markets. 
Hence, numerous researchers have studied and analyzed the performance of firms in relation to their 
IPO process in different countries and capital markets in the short term and in the long term. As 
mentioned above, the results of IPO underpricing have been almost homogenous among many 
researchers in different countries and different markets since the 1960s until today. Thus, the very 
important question that we raise is not whether IPO underpricing exists or not, but under what 
circumstances does it exist? Another question that is mostly particular to our scope of study in this 
chapter is whether the short-term IPO performance differs between family and nonfamily firms as many 
researchers tried to explore, and what factors contribute mainly to such differences. It is worth noting 
that more than 60% of all listed French firms are family firms (Faccio and Lang, 2002). These family 
firms are usually regarded as exempt from agency conflict due to the separation of ownership and 
control, but subject to corporate control as argued by Zingales (1995). This is the focal point of our study 
that we aim to investigate given the lack of empirical research on family firms’ IPOs (McConaughy, 
Matthews, and Fialko, 2001), especially in the French market in the context of their unique corporate 
governance mechanisms.  
Therefore, this chapter is an attempt to remedy this deficiency. In a similar vein, we will investigate the 
particular corporate governance mechanisms of French family firms upon their first introduction into 
the capital markets and the effects on IPO short-term performance. As well as the governance 
mechanisms, we will attempt to spot the ownership and control rights on pre- and post-IPO dates and 
their effects on underpricing as well. As a result, analyzing family firms’ performance upon their first 
introduction into the stock market is of high interest, and more specifically, analyzing the corporate 
governance mechanisms applied by the French family firms that contribute most to this performance is 
our objective in this chapter.  
Additionally, IPOs have always been seen as the major change in the ownership structure of firms, 
attracting a limitless number of analysts, investors, and researchers to watch IPO performance closely 
and understand the drivers of this performance via different theoretical explanations. As discussed 
above, numerous researchers have measured IPO performance and found underpricing in most countries 
and through different times. However, our main interest is not simply in examining whether family firms 
are underpriced or not, but in explaining what factors contribute most to such underpricing, mainly 
corporate governance factors. 
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This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 illustrates the literature review and hypotheses. Section 
3 describes the sample, data and methodology. Section 4 illustrates the results and interpretations and 
Section 5 concludes.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1. Sources of IPO Underpricing 
As mentioned earlier, underpricing occurs when investors from the public market are willing to pay 
more, and sometimes much more, than the initial offer price to purchase the issuers’ stock after the stock 
has been listed and traded on a stock exchange. Underpricing has been considered a market anomaly to 
the principle of efficiency, because the size of underpricing is much higher than the premium offered 
for equivalent stocks in terms of risk. However, recent theories that consider IPO underpricing as an 
informational event or a tool for risk management have attempted to reconcile the IPO underpricing 
puzzle with market efficiency (see Gajewski and Gresse, 2006, for a review of sources of IPO 
underpricing). 
To illustrate, Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1988) found an average initial return of 16% for a sample 
of over 8,000 US IPOs. Loughran et al. (1994) provided a comprehensive survey of the IPO literature 
for 25 countries that found statistically and economically significant first-day IPO underpricing. As we 
have realized, there are extensive discussions about the sources of IPO underpricing in the finance 
literature. In the first part of this chapter we have illustrated many reviews and results presented by 
different researchers, in different markets and time horizons, concerning IPO underpricing, but here 
below we will elaborate some sources of underpricing. Thus, in this section we will examine the 
underpricing phenomenon under different theories in three wide contexts: the information asymmetries 
first, the capital structure second and the signaling effects third. Yet, since French family firms are the 
scope of our research, we will attempt to converge as much as possible and whenever applicable the 
main literature covered on all types of firms to specifically address the family firms. However, as we 
will see in the subsequent sections, most theories that have been established and expanded to explain 
the IPO underpricing over the last few decades did not differentiate between family and nonfamily firms 
in most times for two possible reasons. The first one could be linked to the smaller size of issues in terms 
of quantity and value of family firms compared to nonfamily firms as we will see below, which deviated 
the attention of most reputable researchers to focus mainly on family firms. And the second possible 
reason could be linked to the lack of sufficient evidence in finding substantial differences between the 
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two types of firms concerning the mentioned theories and IPO underpricing since many theories can 
apply to all types of firms, both family and nonfamily. Last, we subsequently present a section focusing 
on the uniqueness of family firms’ governance and IPO underpricing.  
2.1.1. Underpricing and Information Asymmetries 
Too many theories have surfaced in response to the underpricing phenomenon. The information 
asymmetry hypothesis explains that an information imbalance may occur between issuers and 
underwriters (Baron, 1982), between issuers and investors (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989), and among 
investors themselves (Rock, 1986). Imperfect information from either party will lead to underpricing of 
the new issue. As a result, it is indispensable to discuss and scrutinize each theory separately in different 
subsections, in an attempt to understand the family firm context of the underpricing phenomenon and 
the sources of the information asymmetries among the three main players: the issuers, the underwriters, 
and the investors.  
o Information Asymmetry between Issuers and Underwriters  
Baron (1982) noted that IPO underpricing may occur when there is a considerable level of information 
asymmetry between issuers and underwriters (investment bankers). Specifically, the author argues that 
if investment bankers take advantage of their superior knowledge of market conditions to underprice 
offerings, which enables them to expend less marketing effort and to favor themselves with buy-side 
clients, IPOs will then be underpriced. The author added that when the firm is less informed than its 
underwriter about investors’ intentions to buy the firm’s shares, managers have an incentive to allow 
the bank to fix the offering price. Also, when the firm cannot observe the bank’s selling efforts, it has a 
great incentive to offer the bank a contract that underprices the shares and thus induces the bank to make 
the best-selling effort. However, Baron’s hypothesis is not confirmed by Muscarella and Vetsuypens 
(1989), who documented underpricing even in the absence of agency costs between the underwriter and 
the issuing firm. 
The great discretion of underwriters in book-building has motivated many researchers to investigate 
why underwriters underprice their clients’ equities. In their papers, Rock (1986) and Beatty and Ritter 
(1986) explain that an issuing company may be too optimistic when presenting its own operation data 
and financial outlook to its underwriter. Of course, the underwriter will verify the accuracy of 
information provided by the issuing firm. The more transparent the latter’s operation is, the more the 
underwriter trusts the reports and assessments from the issuer and the less the underpricing might be. 
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Therefore, when information asymmetry is not a major concern, underwriters are likely to price the 
equity offering close to the expected market value.  
On the other hand, underwriters will not be able to fully trust the assessment and self-evaluation 
provided by their IPO clients if the business operation and financial reporting of the latter are less 
transparent. The underwriter can elect to ignore the problem in light of the quality of data provided by 
the issuing company and determine the offer price accordingly. However, doing so will increase the 
underwriter’s risk of overpricing an IPO. As a result, lowering the offer price allows underwriters to 
avoid potential overpricing. 
In addition, such information asymmetry motivates underwriters to price the equity below an optimal 
price to avoid undersubscription, which is a problem they definitely want to prevent. In other words, 
underwriters discount the offer price to offset risk derived from business (Certo et al., 2001a), and with 
greater underpricing, underwriters reduce the likelihood of undersubscription, which would force them 
to purchase the shares of the offering in a firm commitment deal. In addition, underwriters avoid the 
likelihood that they will need to provide price stabilization in the aftermarket (Logue et al., 2002). 
Underwriters can also enjoy a significant gain by exercising the overallotment option wherein they buy 
shares at the original offer price and sell them in the aftermarket at a higher price (Jenkinson and 
Ljungqvist, 2001). 
An IPO underwriter is also an agent to the issuing company. Agency problems occur when an 
underwriter obtains economic gains by not maximizing its issuing company’s gains from the IPO. It is 
important to note that these underwriters are normally investment banks and besides public offering 
deals, these banks usually offer different types of banking services. If selling a public offering equity at 
a low price to selected major clients helps to retain these clients for the investment banks, then the 
underwriters will have a strong incentive to introduce the IPO deal at a low offer price (Ritter and Welch, 
2002; Loughran and Ritter, 2002). 
The balance of bargaining power between underwriters and issuing companies also affects underpricing. 
Underwriters are prone to press the issuing companies to underprice the equity to attract investors 
(Beatty and Ritter, 1986). Moderately underpriced equities are found to generate more investor interest 
(Nanda and Yun, 1997). Because of large underwriters’ marketing power to reach investors, issuing 
companies may be willing to accept a low offer price for more investor interest and more aftermarket 
trading (Ljungqvist, 2005). 
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Given the underwriter’s web of relations in the IPO network, they have an incentive to please their 
institutional investors by providing a lower stock price in the offering (underpricing) so as to encourage 
future investment in other IPO deals (Pollock et al., 2004) and other investment opportunities. 
Institutional investors (as the ultimate agents of individual owner principles) pledge to purchase a certain 
number of shares of IPO stock from an underwriter at the established offer price on the date of the 
offering. For instance, by pleasing these institutional investors (for instance, by setting a lower offer 
price for the IPO stock the institutional investors purchase, thereby allowing them to benefit through the 
substantial price increase on the open market on the first day of trading), underwriters create loyalty and 
demand for future deals (Ritter, 1987; Tinic, 1988). As a result, given the potential for repeat business, 
underpricing helps underwriters to create groups of loyal institutional investors for future new issues 
(Hanley and Wilhelm, 1995; Pollock et al., 2004). 
Underwriters receive underwriting fees from equity offering firms for the service provided in 
researching, valuing the deal, and finding institutional investors to bid for the equity offering. An 
underwriter also receives a commission or remaining equity from the sales of the IPO equities. On the 
other hand, if underwriters are forced to charge a low underwriting fee for their services, they are likely 
to intentionally price the IPO deal low to attract more buyers to bid for the stocks. In addition, 
underwriters are required by law to buy unsold equities from an IPO deal. The hypercompetitive 
underwriting market allows issuing companies to bargain a low underwriting fee against underwriters. 
As a result, to recover from the cost of underwriting a deal, underwriters often use a low introduction 
price to attract bidders and to lower the liability in case there is a large quantity of equity remaining 
unsold (Chen et al., 2006). 
Lawsuits can have a negative impact on an investment banker’s reputation (Ljungqvist, 2005). In some 
countries, especially in the US, and particularly since the implosion of the Internet bubble, investors 
disappointed by their IPO investments sometimes sue issuers to recover financial losses resulting from 
incorrect, distorted, or omitted information (Gajewski and Gresse, 2006). As a result, intentionally 
setting the IPO offer price below the fair price is an insurance measure for underwriters to avoid 
litigation (Tinic, 1988). Lowry and Shu (2002) confirmed the litigation-risk hypothesis. They showed 
that firms with a higher risk of litigation underprice their IPOs by a greater amount as a form of insurance 
and that higher underpricing lowers lawsuit probability and expected costs. However, the threat of legal 
suits cannot be an important motivation for underpricing in European countries, where lawsuits 
associated with IPOs are extremely rare (Gajewski and Gresse, 2006). 
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Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist’s (1994) cross-country survey indicates that underpricing exists in both 
auction and book-building markets. To give a fair assessment of an IPO, auction bidders need firm-
specific information such as business operation, major clients, competition, and management. However, 
information production is not free. High information production would limit the number of potential 
bidders and cause IPO undersubscription. If the cost of information production is low, the number of 
potential bidders increases. Since the equity bidding is expected to be highly competitive, potential 
investors may decide to withdraw from the bidding, which thus increases the variance of auction 
participation (Sherman, 2005). The outcome of information production cost is that the auction 
mechanism can create even higher underpricing than book-building (Sherman, 2005). 
o Information Asymmetry between Issuers/Underwriters and Investors 
Pricing IPOs is a difficult task because the market is not certain about the quality of the IPO firm, while 
the issuing firm and its underwriter do not know the market demand for IPO shares. The disclosure of 
information is crucial in order to avoid mispricing. The problem facing an underwriter wanting to collect 
information useful for pricing an IPO is that investors have no reason to truthfully reveal their private 
information during the pre-market phase, unless they are rewarded in one way or another. 
Many studies revealed that institutional investors may know more than the issuer about the prospects of 
the company’s competitors and sector or the economy as a whole during the pre-offer period (Benveniste 
and Spindt, 1989; Benveniste and Wilhem, 1990; Spatt and Srivastava, 1991; Sherman and Titman, 
2002). Because these investors participate in the IPO market regularly, they may know more about its 
prospects. More importantly, they know something the issuer does not know: their demand for the 
company’s stocks. Thus, the task for the underwriter is to acquire as many pieces of information as 
possible from them, during the pre-selling period, before setting the issue price. This structure challenges 
the underwriter to choose a mechanism that encourages truthful information disclosure to benefit from 
selling shares at the full information price in the aftermarket. The roadshow or the book-building process 
can be seen as such a mechanism. Price discovery takes place in the premarket and is then followed by 
the distribution of securities to investors. 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) showed that, in order to induce investors to truthfully reveal their demand 
for IPO shares, they must be rewarded with more underpricing on deals for which there is strong demand. 
At the outset of the book-building process, the underwriter proposes a price range for the shares. 
Investors express their interest in IPO shares by placing nonbinding orders at different prices within the 
price range. When investors place their orders, they factor in their expectations about what the market 
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price of the stock will be on the first day of trading. From these indications of interest, the underwriter 
can therefore learn positive and negative information that can be used when setting the final offer price 
of the IPO. In order to compensate investors for revealing their private information, the final offer price 
only partially incorporates collected private information. On average, investors earn a high first-day 
return by paying a lower price for the stock than the full information price in the secondary trading 
market. The investment bank solicits nonbinding bids from institutional investors in the premarket. After 
evaluating investors’ demand in the premarket phase, the final offer price is determined. In order to 
reward investors for their information, underwriters only partially incorporate collected private 
information in the final offer price. The authors deduce that as investors pay a lower offer price than the 
full information price in the secondary market, they pocket high first-day returns. 
Consistent with the model of Benveniste and Spindt (1989), several US studies report a correlation 
between the percentage revision of the final offer price from the midpoint of the price range and first-
day returns. Hanley (1993), Lowry and Schwert (2001), and Loughran and Ritter (2004) reported that 
US IPOs where the final offer price is revised upwards display higher first-day returns than those IPOs 
where the final offer price is revised downwards. If the private information of investors is entirely 
incorporated into the final offer price, then no relation between the price revision and underpricing 
should be found. Loughran and Ritter (2004) show that first-day returns on IPOs are also predictable 
based upon market returns in the three weeks prior to the IPO date. The quantitative effect is large: Each 
1% increase in the market during the three weeks before the IPO results in a first-day return that is 1.3% 
higher. 
Lowry and Schwert (2001), on the other hand, showed that public information (proxied by market 
returns) is fully incorporated into the offer price, whereas private information is only partially 
incorporated. Their results suggest that negative information learned during the premarket phase is more 
fully incorporated into the offer price than positive information. The reason is that neither underwriters 
nor investors want to incur losses on overpriced issues (i.e. IPOs with negative first-day returns). In 
addition, Lowry and Schwert (2001) found that high-technology firms and riskier firms tend to have 
higher first-day returns. The higher first-day returns compensate investors for the greater valuation 
uncertainty associated with these deals. 
Another finding is that IPO deal flow has a negative effect on underpricing. A higher (expected) deal 
flow affords underwriters the opportunity to exclude investors from other, profitable deals in retaliation 
for distorting their private information. This increases the market power of underwriters and reduces the 
need to compensate investors for revealing their private information (Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm, 
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2002). The effect is large in terms of economic magnitude since a one standard deviation increase in 
IPO deal flow reduces underpricing from 22% to 17.2%. 
Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) gained access to the books of one European investment bank participating 
in 23 international IPOs. They found that the empirical pattern in the underwriter’s allocation and pricing 
decisions is very consistent with Benveniste and Spindt’s (1989) model. The underwriter favors both 
investors who submit limit orders and regular investors with a better probability of allocation. Sherman 
and Titman (2002) also supported the thesis of information disclosure. They observed that the youngest 
and riskiest firms are the most underpriced as the institutional investors need more private information 
to reduce uncertainty about the firm’s value. 
Hanley (1993), from a sample of 1,430 IPOs on the US market, between 1983 and 1987, provided 
empirical support for the phenomenon that considers that the underwriter adjusts the price upwards 
within the price range, but only partially in order to leave enough money on the table to compensate 
informed investors for their truthful disclosure. In this context, institutional investors are supposed to be 
informed about and subscribe to underpriced IPOs only. However, the empirical results demonstrate that 
institutional investors subscribe to underpriced and overpriced IPOs in identical or approximately 
identical proportions (Hanley and Wilhelm, 1995; Krigman et al., 1999; Aggarwal et al., 2002) and the 
level of underpricing does not appear to be the sole factor in deciding whether or not to participate in an 
IPO. Other factors such as size, length of the relationship with the candidate company, and the 
company’s reputation also play a role (Binay and Pirinsky, 2003). 
o Information Asymmetry among Informed and Uninformed Investors 
Saunders (1990) supported the belief that underpricing is a competitive outcome in the IPO market 
resulting from a small number of informed and large number of uninformed investors. For instance, few 
investors may have additional information about the market or may generate such information through 
analysis, which also carries a cost of information. Often large investors generate such information 
through the help of experts, which leads to information asymmetry. The increase in information 
asymmetry leads to the issue of rational decisions by informed investors and perceived less rational 
decisions by uninformed investors, which are more than the informed investors in real economy. 
Rock (1986) coined the term the “winner’s curse” in his study, which means that since informed 
investors have more information, they apply only for good issues with larger amounts and withdraw (not 
invest or even short-sell) all money from bad issues, while retail uninformed investors do not have access 
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to any such information, and they apply for both good and bad issues only on the basis of information 
available to the whole market. Hence the good issues are oversubscribed as both informed and 
uninformed investors apply for those, and due to the relatively small investment of uninformed investors, 
they carry greater risk of rationing (not receiving allotments) than informed investors, and at the same 
time uninformed investors receive all shares of bad issues (generating low return). Thus, uninformed 
investors are not able to take advantage of higher underpricing of good issues, but bear both the risk of 
rationing and uncertainty. As a result, to attract uninformed investors, firms have to compensate them 
by underpricing IPOs. Further, according to Welch (1992), the uninformed mimic the informed 
investors’ behavior. By underpricing its shares, the firm induces both the informed and the uninformed 
to submit buy orders in a domino effect.  
In fact, Rock’s (1986) model leads to several empirical predictions. IPO underpricing increases because 
IPOs attract the less informed. Moreover, IPO underpricing increases the more investing in a given firm 
is considered to be risky (Miller and Reilly, 1987). As a result, the more underpriced a firm is, the more 
costly the search for information (Booth and Chua, 1996). In the case of oversubscription and high 
underpricing, the rationing of shares favors the less informed, which has been observed in the case of 
Finland (Keloharju, 1993), the UK (Levis, 1990), and France (Sentis, 2001). 
Ellul and Pagano (2006) demonstrated that IPO underpricing is an increasing function of the expected 
post-listing illiquidity due to asymmetric information. They proposed a model in which investors worry 
about the aftermarket illiquidity that may result from asymmetric information after the IPO. The less 
liquid the aftermarket is expected to be, and the less predictable its liquidity, the larger the IPO 
underpricing, because IPO underpricing compensates uninformed investors who participate in the issue 
not only for adverse selection costs borne at the IPO stage but also for the expected trading costs that 
they will bear by liquidating their shares in the aftermarket. Ellul and Pagano (2006), for a sample of 
337 IPOs carried out between 1998 and 2000 at the London Stock Exchange (LSE), found a positive 
relationship between underpricing and post-IPO trading cost level and variability. 
2.1.2. Underpricing and Ownership Structure  
Having discussed in the previous section the sources of IPO underpricing in the context of information 
asymmetries among the different groups that are mainly involved in the IPO, below we will examine 
the IPO underpricing in some contexts of ownership structure. 
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o Underpricing Explained by Ownership Dispersion and Liquidity 
Usually, when a firm decides to carry out an IPO, it chooses between two alternatives. On the one hand, 
it can keep a concentrated ownership by attracting large shareholders possessing superior information 
about the company’s true value. Firms may seek higher institutional ownership because they anticipate 
benefits from monitoring institutions that are more likely to intervene because the consequence of their 
actions can be observed by the market (Kahn and Winton, 1998) and they can minimize the agency costs 
(McConnell and Servaes, 1990).  
On the other hand, they can target an ownership structure that consists mainly of small investors. Small 
and dispersed shareholders are less likely or less able to monitor managers’ actions. Additionally, a 
dispersed ownership structure allows the company to obtain more secondary-market liquidity for its 
shares and thereby helps increase the firm’s value and reduce its capital cost in several ways. For 
instance, post-IPO liquidity reduces transaction costs in future raising of equity and lowers the gross 
fees requested by investment banks in subsequent equity offerings (Ibbotson and Ritter, 1995). It also 
reduces the illiquidity premium and thus the returns required by investors to hold the firm’s shares, as 
shown in Amihud and Mendelson (1986). In addition, promoting trading liquidity through ownership 
dispersion may be an effective mechanism to impede future hostile takeovers (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986). Also, encouraging analysts to write and talk about the IPO improves the issuing firm’s future 
access to capital markets by attracting investors. These firms that seek secondary-market liquidity will 
underprice their shares because they need to attract a large number of small shareholders to create a 
broader ownership structure. Knowing that, small investors will not participate in an IPO unless they 
are compensated for the adverse selection costs they incur – in other words, unless the IPO is sufficiently 
underpriced.  
Similarly, Brennan and Franks (1997) showed that in order to preserve the private benefits of control, 
firms may choose to underprice their shares and ration the allocation of shares in favor of small, diffuse 
investors. Likewise, Michaely and Shaw (1994) found that there is higher underpricing for IPOs that 
have a more diverse shareholder base. Higher underpricing induces wider investor participation and 
creates a broader ownership structure. Miller and Reilly (1987), Hanley (1993), and Schultz and Zaman 
(1994) have all produced evidence showing that underpriced IPOs, on average, exhibit higher 
aftermarket trading turnover than overpriced IPOs, without clearly explaining why this is so. 
Booth and Chua (1996) illustrated in their model that an optimal level of underpricing is reached when 
the issuer maximizes proceeds. The ownership dispersion at equilibrium is partly determined by the 
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value of secondary-market liquidity. Maximizing proceeds means promoting secondary-market liquidity 
through initial ownership dispersion and oversubscription, to the point that the rate of increase in total 
market value equals the rate of increase in total information costs.  
Similarly, Hahn and Ligon (2006) found that liquidity and underpricing have a positive relation, i.e. 
higher underpricing leads to a decrement in the liquidity risk and increases the liquidity of the shares in 
the secondary market. Additionally, the number of analysts following the firm would also increase the 
post-IPO market liquidity of shares. Thus, there is a strong correlation between underpricing and higher 
trading volumes. Ellul and Pagano (2006) highlighted the literature with results obtained by a sample of 
companies that went public on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) between June 1998 and December 
2000. The paper finds that expected aftermarket liquidity and liquidity risk are important determinants 
of IPO underpricing. Bouzouita, Gajewski, and Gresse (2015) have conducted an empirical study on the 
liquidity benefits of IPO underpricing. They have shown that public information production can be 
another channel by which underpricing improves liquidity instead of ownership dispersion. 
o Underpricing Explained by Ownership Dispersion and Offer Price 
Chalk and Peavy (1987) showed that underpricing is inversely related to offer price. They divided their 
sample of 649 IPOs between 1975 and 1982 into five portfolios based on offer price. Their results 
indicate that low-priced IPOs exhibit larger underpricing. One explanation that they advance is that the 
underpricing represents a premium for above-average risk for stocks priced at $1.00 or less. In a similar 
vein, Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1988) showed that IPOs priced at less than $3.00 exhibit much 
larger underpricing, on average, than higher-priced IPOs. They hypothesized that more speculative 
issues tend to have offering prices below $3.00. Seguin and Smoller (1997) also showed that low-priced 
stocks are associated with higher risk and lower returns.  
Yet, as we previously mentioned, companies that decide to carry out an IPO may choose either to keep 
a concentrated ownership by targeting large shareholders or attract small and dispersed ownership. 
Interestingly, Falkenstein (1996) and Gompers and Metrick (1998) showed that institutional investors 
tend to avoid investing in low-priced stocks, a fact relevant for IPO placement. Similarly, a low offer 
price would discourage large investors due to the higher transaction costs associated with low-priced 
stocks. However, the resultant pooling equilibrium will lead to a winner’s curse problem and higher 
underpricing (Rock, 1986). Similarly, Booth and Chua (1996) argued that firms may choose a lower 
offer price to promote diffuse ownership. Here, it is argued that the firm benefits as long as the benefit 
of monitoring is greater than the cost of underpricing. 
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Stoughton and Zechner (1998) predicted in their model a positive relationship between underpricing and 
strategic rationing in favor of large investors. As mentioned earlier, firms may seek higher institutional 
ownership because they anticipate benefits from institutional monitoring (McConnell and Servaes, 
1990). Hence, Stoughton and Zechner (1998) explained that underpricing may represent compensation 
to institutional investors for their future monitoring services. In contrast, Benveniste and Spindt (1989) 
argued that institutional investors provide valuable information during the IPO marketing process and 
characterized underpricing as compensation to these investors for their information. Thus, IPOs that are 
marketed towards large, institutional investors are underpriced more. 
o Underpricing Explained by Ownership Dispersion and Economic Status 
Leland and Pyle (1977) mentioned that the post-IPO ownership structure serves as a signal for future 
prospects, while Loughran and Ritter (2004) argued that the prospect theory states that high underpricing 
of IPOs results in an increase in the wealth of the issuers due to their own shareholding. Interestingly, 
the authors mention that the corruption hypothesis states that management is not concerned about the 
“money left on the table” while they use it as a mechanism to increase their own wealth. Grinblat and 
Hwang (1989) also supported the view that underpricing and shareholding by the issuer after the IPO 
serves as a signal of the quality of the IPO, whereas Leland and Pyle (1977) supported the positive 
relationship between the original owners’ stake after the IPO and the quality of the firm. 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) investigated the relationship between the post-IPO decrease in 
shareholding of pre-IPO owners and the DotCom Bubble using the data of 2,178 IPOs between January 
1996 and December 2000. They found that extensive use of newly directed share programs, which 
provided the families, friends, and employees with the opportunity to purchase shares at IPO price, led 
to a motivation to deliberately underprice IPOs. These were the unique characteristics that were 
associated with a firm during the boom of the IT industry that led to the DotCom Bubble. The results 
found that DotCom firms accounted for 21.7% of the total variation in mean revenues and mean book 
value of assets, which means the specific characteristics of an industry. It was found that in 1999, 
Internet firms represented 57.4% of all IPOs. The average gross proceeds from IPO transactions 
increased three times from $57.4 million in 1996 to $164.9 million in 2000. As a repercussion of the 
event, the proportion of pre-IPO shares outstanding declined from 4.9% in 1996 to 0.7% in 2000. 
Moreover, there was a sharp decline in the pre-IPO insider ownership stakes from 63.9% in 1996 to 
51.8% in 2000. During the same period, CEO stakes also declined from 22.7% to 11.6%. The story was 
the same for venture capitalists and investment banks as well as other companies. The result was an 
increasingly fragmented ownership structure.  
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To complement these changes in ownership structure, the year 1999–-2000 also witnessed a rapid 
decline in both the frequency and magnitude of secondary sales of existing shares by all categories of 
pre-IPO owners. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) found that this unusual pricing behavior experienced 
during the DotCom Bubble may have partially accounted for the radical changes that took place in the 
pre‐IPO ownership structure and the insider selling behavior of the firms over the same period. Derrien 
(2005) investigated the reasons for the attachment of inside investors to their share in the IPO and the 
result in terms of behavior of not selling their share in the market and found that insiders prefer to keep 
their funds in the form of shares because they expect their shares to increase in value in the long term. 
The study found that the most important factors that influence an underwriter’s determination of an IPO 
price are the information about the intrinsic value of the issuer and noise trader sentiment. The results 
provided evidence that noise traders participate in the aftermarket only when they are bullish, otherwise 
the dominant players in aftermarket trading are the institutional investors. The study also provides 
evidence that IPO price, initial return, and aftermarket turnover are all positively related to the demands 
of individual investors. 
2.1.3. Underpricing and Underwriters’ Reputation and Analysts’ Coverage 
Below we will address two other probable explanations for IPO underpricing, which are related to the 
underwriter’s reputation and intention first, and the analyst’s coverage of the IPO firm second. 
Therefore, we will review the main literature concerning these two explanations for underpricing.  
o Underpricing Explained by Underwriter’s Reputation 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) suggested that issuers have more information about the future 
prospects of a firm than investment bankers. Hence the important role of the investment banker in 
producing more information to decrease information asymmetry. Yet they argued for the key issue of 
measuring the credibility of such information. The role of the investment banker is that of an information 
producer in the equity market, and the ordinary investors take the burden of fixing the market value of 
equities. As a common measure of the credibility of the recommendation given by the investment banks, 
investors look into the past performance of the investment banks and accordingly set the value of the 
equity. The consideration of building the reputation of investment banks plays an important role in 
shaping the way in which investment banks interact with investors. The empirical implications that can 
be derived from their model are that investment banks, having a better reputation, can be more effective 
in resolving the informational asymmetry in the equity market. The second implication that can be drawn 
is that the greater the reputation of the investment bank, the lower the variable of possible firm values 
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of the firms it markets. Baron (1982) suggested that investment bankers have more information about 
the IPO market than issuers. Due to the reputation of investment banks, the original value of the issue 
may get hyped more than usual. Hence it can be interpreted that the issuers incentivize the investment 
bankers by allowing them to underprice the issue rather than bearing high monetary cost (optimal 
delegation). Tinic (1988) found that underwriters deliberately underprice IPOs due to the risk to the 
reputation of the underwriter and institutional arrangements.  
Marchand and Roufagalas (1996) suggested in their study that underpricing is a better way for the 
underwriter to gain in any mechanism, such as in a firm commitment offer, the main loss of proceeds is 
afforded by the issuer while the underwriter gains due to full subscription at a lower price. Under the 
best effort contract the underwriter is incentivized on the number of shares sold, which can be increased 
by selling at a lower cost, thus again the issuer suffers from underpricing. But Ritter (1987) found a 
higher level of underpricing in best effort contracts than in firm commitment offerings. Marchand and 
Roufagalas (1996) found that underpricing will be minimized in three cases where underwriters are 
forced to price in line with owners’ expectation: a) if demand uncertainty is minimal, b) if full 
information about future prospects and profitability is available to the market, and c) if the optimal 
solution is the corner solution. Cliff and Denis (2004) found that underwriters with higher reputations 
will be compensated for analyst coverage with greater underpricing of IPOs. 
o Underpricing Explained by the Analyst’s Coverage 
Analyst’s coverage forms a critical factor in underpricing of the IPO process, since the issuers never 
directly pay for the coverage, and hence would indulge in indirect payment by underpricing the IPO 
(Loughran and Ritter, 2004). Analyst’s coverage is increased by the provision of underpricing (Cliff and 
Denis, 2004). Aggarwal et al. (2002) also detailed that the intention of managers is to increase analysts’ 
following, resulting in an increase in the number of investors due to positive recommendation by 
analysts. This increased analyst’s coverage of abnormal returns generated by IPO shares in the post-IPO 
market leads to higher wealth generation at the expiration of the lockup period. Increased analyst’s 
coverage of IPOs under the influence of the lead underwriter will lead to higher performance due to 
periodic boost by the same analysts (James and Karceski, 2006). For instance, Bouzouita, Gajewski, and 
Gresse (2015) stated that the vast majority of empirical studies examining the liquidity of recently listed 
stocks support the notion that IPO underpricing boosts secondary-market liquidity. Specifically, the 
authors investigate by which channels IPO underpricing impacts post-listing liquidity. Using a sample 
of IPOs undertaken on Euronext with diverse mechanisms, the authors show that when ownership 
structure is not influenced by initial underpricing, this underpricing still has a positive impact on 
125 
 
 
aftermarket liquidity through a virtuous cycle related to analyst coverage. The authors argue that analyst 
coverage reduces information asymmetry costs and illiquidity in the secondary market. Therefore, the 
higher the number of analysts and the more reputable the analysts covering the IPO, the higher the share 
liquidity that will be created and the lower the underpricing that will be observed due to more 
information disclosure and sharing among investors. Thus, according to Bouzouita, Gajewski, and 
Gresse (2015), analyst coverage further increases share liquidity and lowers information asymmetry, 
resulting in less underpricing. 
2.1.4. Underpricing and the Signaling Theory 
In this section, we will examine first the role of signaling in realizing larger proceeds from secondary 
operations, and second the role of signaling in reducing the IPO underpricing. 
o Role of Signaling in Realizing Larger Proceeds 
Grinblat and Hwang (1989), Allen and Faulhaber (1989), and Welch (1989) developed the signaling 
theory to explain the underpricing phenomenon. This theory hypothesizes that underpriced IPOs leave 
investors with a good taste, allowing the firms and insiders to sell shares in future offerings at a higher 
price than would otherwise be the case. For these authors, underpricing is considered to be a good signal 
about the firm value and therefore firms intentionally underprice their IPOs. Similarly, a study by 
Ibbotson (1975) supported the view that IPOs are deliberately underpriced by firms with the expectation 
of higher gain in future seasoned equity offerings. Relatedly, from a sample of 1,985 IPOs on the US 
stock market between 1980 and 1986, Jegadeesh et al. (1993b) reported a positive relationship between 
underpricing and the probability as well as the amount of seasoned equity offering or open-market 
insider sales. These results confirm Welch’s (1992) model. However, Jegadeesh et al. (1993a) offered 
another explanation. Initial positive returns may convey the information that investors are confident 
about the firm’s growth. As a result, upon receiving this market feedback, the firms may finance more 
investment opportunities through successive capital increases. 
In Chemmanur (1993), and more recently in Aggarwal et al. (2002), the issuer underprices shares to 
induce financial analysts to produce information about the firm. Underpricing the issue entails high 
initial returns, which attract the attention of potential analysts and media. For Chemmanur (1993), the 
information role played by financial analysts favors future reissuing operations. In this case, the owners 
hope to sell their remaining stake at a higher price than in the absence of underpricing. Moreover, 
Aggarwal et al. (2002) argued that initial underpricing followed by financial analysts’ activity is 
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favorable to the insiders when a lockup period is imposed, as it allows them to sell their shares at a 
higher price once the lockup period expires. Tests using a sample of 621 IPOs on the US stock market 
between 1993 and 1999 confirm these predictions. Hence, greater underpricing receives more attention 
from financial analysts, especially analysts unaffiliated with the underwriter, during the lockup period. 
Moreover, research coverage is found to be correlated with stock price performance during the lockup 
period and with the percentage of capital sold by the owner-manager at the end of the lockup period. 
Underpricing also has an effect on research by analysts affiliated to the underwriting bank (Cliff and 
Denis, 2004). This could be a compensation for the coverage efforts made by the analysts. 
In contrast to other studies, Michaely and Shaw’s (1994) evidence does not support the signaling models 
with a sample of 947 IPOs between 1984 and 1988 on the US market. They found that the less 
underpriced firms on the date of the IPO generate better earnings and dividends in the aftermarket and 
tend to reissue more frequently after the IPO. Two years after the IPO, the firm value is not directly 
linked to initial underpricing and capital retained by the owner. Additionally, Spiess and Pettway (1997), 
who worked on the US stock market, in a sample of 172 industrial firms introduced between 1987 and 
1991 that issued again within the three subsequent years, found that initial underpricing is significantly 
lower with the present value of initial and subsequent offerings and does not significantly determine the 
net profit from any of the issues for the existing shareholders. 
However, the signaling hypothesis has been more strongly validated on the French market than on other 
markets. Ginglinger and Faugeron-Crouzet (2001) found that firms going public on the secondary 
market have higher underpricing when reissuing shares within four years of the IPO. 
o Role of Signaling in Reducing IPO Underpricing 
It has been argued that the information asymmetry between the issuing firm and investors is large. Beatty 
and Ritter (1986) and Filatotchev and Bishop (2002) argued that as a result of such information 
asymmetry, pricing the shares of these firms becomes more difficult and investors require underpricing 
to compensate them for the higher valuation uncertainty. As underpricing transfers issuers’ wealth to 
premarket institutional and retail investors, issuers are motivated to reduce the cost of information 
gathering for investors by reducing the information asymmetry. Therefore signaling becomes an 
important measure to close the information gap between issuers and investors. Additionally, Leland and 
Pyle (1977) stated that signaling allows investors to learn more about their potential investment target 
and helps them to overcome asymmetric information and thus reduces the underpricing of IPOs. For 
instance, Marshall (1998) mentioned that the issuing firm has private information about the firm’s 
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quality, which is unavailable to the public, and first-day investors have relatively little access to 
information held by the IPO firm insiders. In other words, signaling provides a much needed means of 
communication to narrow the gap of information asymmetry between family firms and IPO investors. 
When investors learn more about an IPO, they can value them more accurately. 
Deeds et al. (1997) explained that investors’ evaluation of the issuing firm’s future value will affect the 
price they are ready to pay on the day of the IPO. To mitigate the risk of adverse selection, first-day 
investors use available indicators that are associated with the performance of an IPO. However, Carter 
and Manaster (1990) said that issuers may use the signaling mechanism by indicating that firm quality 
reduces ex ante uncertainty and the need to discount the shares in order to attract investors. The attributes 
of a firm include information that reduces uncertainty among investors about the firm’s intrinsic value. 
On the other hand, Sanders and Boivie (2004) argued that particular attributes and characteristics may 
replace other unavailable objective financial or operating data. For instance, Florin and Simsek (2007) 
explained that organizational and governance characteristics are proved to be useable as criteria for 
lowering valuation uncertainty when explicit indicators (e.g. historical accounting data) are deficient or 
unobservable. Cohen and Dean (2005) suggested that the composition of top management teams could 
be such an indicator. Investors’ ability to evaluate the quality of an IPO strongly influences the extent 
of IPO underpricing. 
Consequently, there are two criteria for signals to be valid. Deeds et al. (1997) argued that signals must 
be intended, known and observable in advance of the IPO and they must be costly or difficult to imitate. 
A primary mechanism for managers to send out signals about firm quality is through the prospectus, 
which provides information about the firm’s operations and management. According to Certo et al. 
(2001b), these send signals to the potential investors who will take them into consideration when 
determining the price they are willing to pay on the first day of trade and earlier studies have proved the 
effect of prospectus information on first-day underpricing. 
2.1.5. Underpricing and Behavioral Finance 
Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (2002) gave an alternative explanation for underpricing IPOs 
based on behavioral finance literature. The authors suggested that IPOs are not underpriced but that 
investors who enter the market on the first day after issuance drive the positive initial returns. The most 
puzzling aspect of the first-day return phenomenon is that, in many circumstances, issuers do not object 
to a severe first-day return. Loughran and Ritter (2002) explained this phenomenon by using the prospect 
128 
 
 
theory first developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), which argues that investors focus on changes 
in their wealth rather than on the level of their wealth.  
Another explanation in this context is the fact that investors may develop overconfidence in their 
knowledge of an investment target (Odean, 1998). In addition, self-attribution bias leads investors to 
believe that an unfavorable investment outcome is bad luck and to attribute a favorable outcome to their 
knowledge of the market (Daniel et al., 1998). Although underpricing caused by market sentiment 
inevitably upsets the original shareholders of issuing companies, these shareholders are able to regain 
their loss from selling their retained shares in the high-price aftermarket (Derrien, 2005). 
But sometimes, the equity owners may opt not to sell their shares to the aftermarket investors. This is 
particularly salient in family business IPOs when family owners intend to retain control of the firm long 
after the IPO. In addition, overpriced stocks in the early stage of an IPO are likely to underperform in 
the long term and thus increase the risk for shareholders (Ritter, 1991). Chemmanur (1993) showed that 
high first-day returns generate publicity for the firm. He argued that this publicity generates additional 
investor interest and brand awareness. Last but not least, Welch (1992) further illustrated that 
underpricing can occur when potential investors pay attention not only to their own information about a 
new issue but also to (1) whether other investors are purchasing, (2) bandwagon effects, and (3) 
informational cascades that may develop.  
2.2. The Uniqueness of Family Firms in an IPO Context 
What we have covered so far in the preceding sections is very important to our topic, which we divide 
into two main research elements. The first element is about the IPO underpricing and the second element 
is about the unique and different corporate governance mechanisms of family firms. So far, in the above 
sections we have examined a thorough literature about the IPO underpricing in different markets and 
contexts, and reviewed diverse theories explaining the sources of IPO underpricing. All these were 
strictly related to the first element of our research objective. Thus, what remains to cover is the second 
element of our topic, which follows below in this section. Moreover, after reviewing the different 
literature regarding corporate governance mechanisms in family firms, we will attempt to examine, test 
and explain the IPO underpricing in the presence of these unique mechanisms. This is why this section 
is of extreme importance and considered the most important element of our work in this chapter where 
we will choose six hypotheses to test. 
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2.2.1. Family Firms and IPO Pricing 
Astrachan and McConaughy (2001) argued that the uniqueness of family firms results in additional 
sources of uncertainties when investors evaluate the quality of family firms’ shares. However, despite 
the tendency to suppress the stock prices of family firms, investors also reward family firms when these 
organizations demonstrate attributes reinforcing the positive characteristics of such firms. For example, 
founders of successful family firms are usually highly competent entrepreneurs and managers. 
Consequently, Villalonga and Amit (2006) explained that it is not surprising that stock prices of first-
generation family firms tend to outperform second-generation family firms or nonfamily firms. Below 
we will explain in further detail family firms’ value in the context of an IPO and the effects of different 
governance mechanisms on IPO performance. 
As we noticed during our research and as previously mentioned in the earlier sections on the review of 
literature, there is no consensus that a single theory can fully explain the initial performance of newly 
listed firms during the first days of trading, and that was supported by Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) 
and Ritter and Welch (2002). That’s why we have seen numerous theories trying to fill gaps as much as 
possible to enable partial understanding of the effects of IPO underpricing in different contexts and 
environments. We will continue this section below in an attempt to understand the effects of some 
specific governance mechanisms of family firms on IPOs. 
o IPO Underpricing and Family Ownership 
Family businesses are assumed to be better monitored by family firm owners and thus by family-related 
managers than their counterparts, suggesting that a lack of alignment between owners (known as 
principals) and managers (known as agents), in reference to the agency problem, might be less prevalent 
in family than in nonfamily firms (e.g. Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Ben-Amar and André, 2006). 
Furthermore, a recent study suggests that the efficiency-enhancing practices in family firms such as 
commitment to long-term objectives and human capital development (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006) are 
stronger than those of nonfamily firms. Also, family ties provide a trust network when the business 
environment lacks a strong legal structure (Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer, 2002). As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the principal-agent conflicts and thus the agency costs might take different forms and 
levels that will affect the overall firm value. Consequently, it is believed that the absence of conflict of 
interest between the owners and managers in family firms would be highly appreciated by both the 
underwriter and the investors and therefore might lead to lower underpricing under the assumption that 
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underpricing is somehow the price that firms have to pay to succeed the IPO on the one hand, and on 
the other hand, is what investors receive by agreeing to take risks and investing in IPOs. 
Additionally, Leland and Pyle (1977) argued that insider ownership can be a signal of firm quality. In 
family firms, family members who own or control the firm are regarded as insiders and are supposed to 
know the true value of their company. Their willingness to hold more shares of their company indicates 
their confidence in the future prospects of the firm. Consequently, a higher percentage of insider or 
family ownership implies that the firm is of higher quality. Family owners will suffer substantial 
economic losses if the firm’s future performance is poor. Thus, in the belief that family owners with 
high ownership stakes must be confident about business prospects, investors will be prepared to 
subscribe to the new issue. The authors suggest that a high level of insider ownership will provide a 
signal of quality and mitigate information asymmetries. They develop a model that shows that outside 
investors are willing to invest more in a venture when insiders themselves own more. So, here also, we 
consider the existence of a high IPO pricing phenomenon for newly listed family firms during the early 
days of trading. By referring to these two theoretical frameworks, we can build this hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship between the level of family ownership and IPO 
underpricing. 
o A higher IPO Underpricing Due to Targeted Capital Structure 
We previously discussed the existence of a new type of agency problem between minority investors and 
large controlling shareholders. La Porta et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2000), and Faccio and Lang 
(2002) argued that most firms around the world are controlled by large shareholders, typically founders 
or their families. Villalonga and Amit (2006) suggested that controlling families have greater incentives 
for both monitoring and expropriation. Nevertheless, many other authors argue that families have a 
powerful incentive to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders in various ways (Bruton et al., 
2003; La Porta et al., 2000), which researchers call a “principal-principal” or “horizontal” agency 
relationship. 
In this context, family firms may be tempted to target an ownership structure that consists mainly of 
small investors because small and dispersed shareholders are less likely or less able to monitor 
managers’ actions. Moreover, small and dispersed investors may have fewer incentives and less ability 
to group, meet and vote for a unified decision with the aim of controlling or changing managers’ actions 
in their own interests and as a result they simply remain passive investors and subject to expropriation. 
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But, as discussed earlier, a dispersed ownership structure allows the company to obtain more secondary-
market liquidity for its shares and thereby helps increase the firm’s value and reduce its cost of capital 
in several ways. Brennan and Franks (1997) showed that in order to preserve private benefits of control, 
firms may choose to underprice their shares and ration the allocation of shares in favor of small and 
dispersed investors, rather than institutional and large blockholders. 
Zingales (1995) opined that a more diffuse ownership helps managers bargain for a higher price when 
they sell their controlling shares after the IPO. This indicates that underpricing is used by managers to 
attract excess demand and greater ownership dispersion with the objective of increasing share liquidity 
for future selling. Similarly, Booth and Chua (1996) documented that the issuer’s demand for ownership 
dispersion creates an incentive to underprice its shares. They argued that promoting oversubscription 
allows broad initial ownership, which in turn increases secondary-market liquidity. However, broad 
initial ownership requires an increase in investor-borne information costs, which are offset through 
initial underpricing. As a result, family firms may seek a diffuse ownership (e.g. Booth and Chua, 1996) 
and avoid the possible costs of institutional investor myopia (Bushee, 1998) by purposefully deeply 
underpricing their shares, thus seeking to create bigger demands and larger trade volumes, thereby 
attracting a wider range of investor types and increasing value. 
o Lower IPO Pricing for Family Firms Due to Family Founders’ Altruism 
We have previously examined how family firms may suffer from endogenous problems such as altruism, 
owner opportunism and self-control (Schulze et al., 2003). Additionally, family firms may be 
overcommitted to family value (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006). Families have a powerful incentive to 
expropriate wealth from minority shareholders when their control is greater than their cash flow rights 
(i.e. through dual-class stock and pyramidal ownership as explained in La Porta et al., 1999) and they 
may also have an incentive and the ability to extract private benefits at the expense of minority 
shareholders (e.g. Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Bozec and Laurin, 2008). 
Nonetheless, in the following sections, we will attempt to determine whether the French family firms’ 
owners who belong to our sample have different behaviors to other firms’ owners in terms of minority 
expropriation or not.  
2.2.2. Family IPO Underpricing and Governance Mechanisms 
Traditionally, studies of the relationship between corporate governance and firm value have considered 
existing listed firms and utilized accounting measures such as Tobin’s Q (Morck et al., 1988) and 
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market-to-book ratios (Chung and Pruitt, 1994). More studies (e.g. Goergen, 1998), however, have seen 
a shift to the examination of corporate governance in the context of IPOs. For instance, Filatotchev and 
Bishop (2002) found that premarket investors are likely to pay higher prices for family IPO equities 
when the issuers adopt good corporate governance practices. The concept of underpricing in the flotation 
of new stock represents a direct wealth transfer from the founders and initial shareholders to new 
external investors (Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002) but its extent can be reduced by a number of 
governance-related signals that may potentially enhance firm value (La Porta et al., 2000). We will 
mainly examine the impacts of three corporate governance mechanisms on the performances of family 
firm IPOs: the CEO characteristics, the appointment of outside directors and the dual class. These 
governance mechanisms concern the protection of outside investors from expropriation by corporate 
insiders (La Porta et al., 2000). Corporate governance practices are considered to be a signal of the 
quality of the investment in a given IPO. Hence, IPO firm owners are interested in effectively 
communicating the potential quality of their firm in order to extract full value at the time of the IPO.  
o CEO Characteristics in Family Firms 
Many researchers indicate that the quality and reputation of a firm’s management affects various aspects 
of its IPO (Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005) and that the management serves as a protective shield for the 
firm in a transformational event such as the IPO (Fischer and Pollock, 2004). In this section we will 
basically examine the relationship between the firm’s founder being the firm’s CEO at the time of the 
IPO and the IPO underpricing on the one hand, and the duality of roles of the firm’s CEO and its Chair 
at the time of the IPO on the other.  
 Founder – CEO at the Time of IPO 
Despite the great impact a founder may actually have on an IPO underpricing, the testing of the effect 
of founder status as CEO on underpricing is fairly unexplored and shows ambiguous results (e.g. Daily 
and Dalton, 1992; Willard et al., 1992; Begley, 1995; Certo et al., 2001a). To the best of our knowledge, 
there is no study for the French market that focuses on the founder’s effect on IPO underpricing. 
Therefore, we are interested in knowing how family firms with founder CEOs are perceived by the 
market at the time of an IPO. The CEO is considered to be a major determinant of a firm’s strategy 
(Calori, Johnson, and Sarnin, 1994). The personal perceptions of the firm’s founder influence the firm’s 
strategy and operations (Baron, Hannan, and Burton, 1999a). The founder’s ideas shape the culture of 
the organization, and his or her personality influences both the organization and its members (Schein, 
1983). Yet, Certo et al. (2001a) observed that US founder-managed IPO firms experienced higher 
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underpricing than the control group of professional managers. On the other hand, Arcand et al. (2004) 
tested the same linkage, also on US firms, but found no significant evidence for such a discount. 
Moreover, Villalonga and Amit (2006) provided evidence suggesting that family firms with a founder 
CEO have less severe agency problems than those with a descendent CEO. When a founder is the CEO 
(founder-CEO) at the time of the IPO, there are advantages for the firm. These advantages include a 
reduction in agency problems and in conflicts and political battles within the firm, and a continuation or 
extension of the firm’s existing strategy (Fischer and Pollock, 2004). Relatedly, Nelson (2003) argued 
that investors value the founder-CEO’s vision, experience, leadership, and stability. The author found 
that the presence of a founder-CEO at the time of an IPO is positively related to the valuation of the 
firm. A founder-CEO is believed to have greater personal identification with and commitment to the 
firm, as well as a higher level of trust from the firm’s employees than a nonfounder-CEO (Fischer and 
Pollock, 2004). However, despite the various advantages of a founder-CEO, founders may be considered 
as lacking experience and organizational skills, opportunistic (Schulze et al., 2003), and overcommitted 
to family value (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006) rather than firm value. Founders may also have an incentive 
and the ability to extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders (e.g. Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Bozec and Laurin, 2008). In this context, in the regression model we 
will examine how family firms with founder CEOs are perceived by the market at the time of an IPO by 
explaining the underpricing in the presence of such governance mechanisms in the presence of other 
variables.  
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative relationship between the presence of a founder-CEO and IPO 
underpricing. 
 The CEO/Chair Duality 
CEO/Chair duality refers to the concurrent holding of both the CEO and the board chair positions, and 
in this case, the power of the two positions is consolidated in a single person. Finkelstein and D’Aveni 
(1994) argued that CEO/Chair duality is a double-edged sword. The effectiveness of the CEO duality is 
still debated in the light of the agency theory and organizational/stewardship theory (Daily and Dalton, 
1992; Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Howton et al., 2001). The mixed findings of CEO duality in IPO 
firms may be due to the two perspectives of CEO duality: agency theory and organizational/stewardship 
theory (Daily et al., 2003). The results may also be due to a relatively small number of empirical studies 
on entrepreneurial firms (Daily et al., 2003). 
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On the one hand, the CEO/Chair may reduce the effectiveness of the board’s monitoring and so provide 
the CEO with the opportunity to benefit himself or herself more than the company (Salancik and Pfeffer, 
1977; Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994). If it is argued that firms with a CEO/Chair reduced firms’ risk-
taking propensity, some studies report that CEO duality may result in the misuse of power by a 
CEO/Chair (e.g. Daily and Dalton, 1993), and successful firms were not found to have a CEO/Chair 
position held by one person (Daily and Dalton, 1992; Rechner and Dalton, 1991). However, in a complex 
environment in which resources are scarce, CEO/Chair duality was found to be positively related to firm 
performance (Boyd, 1995).  
In the context of IPO, the findings have been mixed as well. For instance, Howton et al. (2001) argued 
that CEO duality concentrates power in the top management, which can exacerbate the potential 
conflicts of interests between shareholders and managers and limit the effectiveness of board 
monitoring; however, they found no significant relationship between CEO duality and IPO performance. 
However, Mak and Roush (2000) found more growth opportunities for IPO firms in which the CEO also 
chaired the board. Additionally, through our research on this topic, we did not find much material 
discussing the relation between the CEO/Chair duality and IPO performance of family firms specifically. 
However, as will see in the subsequent sections, it is very common for family firms’ CEO to be at the 
same time the board’s Chair for the strategic decision-making process and for controlling the board’s 
members vote. As a result, we will take the view in our study that the CEO/Chair will reduce the 
effectiveness of the board’s monitoring and so provide the CEO with the opportunity to benefit himself 
more than the company (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977; Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994).  
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relationship between the duality of the firm’s CEO/Chair position and 
IPO underpricing in family firms.  
o The Board Characteristics in Family Firms 
Here we will look at some of the important board characteristics: the board size, the presence of 
independent directors on the board, and the board member equity ownership. Then we will test the 
effects of each of these characteristics on the family firms’ IPO underpricing under three separate 
hypotheses. 
 The Board Size 
The board size as such has been suggested as an important factor related to corporate control and has 
been studied in many papers. However, the results of these studies were mixed. Zahra and Pearce (1989) 
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argued that large boards are more able to effectively monitor managers. The larger the board size, the 
more difficult it is for the CEO to dominate the board. But Mishra et al. (2001) argued that smaller 
boards help to make decisions more quickly. Yermack (1996), for a sample of 452 large US firms over 
the period 1984–1991, documented that firms with small board sizes have a higher stock market value. 
Similarly, Eisenberg et al. (1998) analyzed a sample of small Finnish firms and found a negative 
relationship between board size and firm value. Interestingly, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen 
(1993) suggested the existence of an optimal board size, and recommended limiting membership to 
seven or eight people. Both studies argued that as it is easier for a CEO to control large boards, such a 
board can become less effective. However, John and Senbet (1998) showed that the positive monitoring 
effect of a large board size may be offset by poorer communication and decision-making processes. Yet, 
Kathuria and Dash (1999) argued that a firm’s performance improves if the board size increases but the 
contribution of an additional board member decreases as the size of the board increases.  
However, in the case of family firms where the majority of a firm’s shares are held with the family, it is 
therefore very common to see board members who are strictly and directly related to the family owners, 
their descendants and direct relatives. As a result, the monitoring role over the firm’s management that 
any board of directors is required to play and firmly exert does not typically apply in family firms, 
regardless of the board’s size, because the board members tend to serve the family’s interests first and 
above any others’ interests, including the dispersed, outside, and other groups of investors, and because 
most board members in family firms tend to hold managerial positions in the family firm beside their 
directorship roles. Thus, a crucial question is raised on the effectiveness and the practicality of board 
monitoring over the firm’s management where most board members participate directly or indirectly in 
the firm’s decision-making and management, especially in the absence of large blockholders, investment 
banks, or independent directors on the board.  
 The Appointment of Independent Directors  
Jensen (1993) suggested that a board can monitor its firm more closely and take appropriate governance 
actions if it is sufficiently small but with enough independent directors to ensure effective monitoring. 
The arguments in support of the role of independent directors in corporate governance rely on three 
theoretical frameworks. First, if we refer to the agency theory, in family firms, minority shareholders 
potentially rely on their boards to monitor and control the family’s opportunism (Westphal, 1998). 
Similarly, Anderson and Reeb (2004) found that the interests of minority shareholders are best protected 
when independent directors have greater power relative to family blockholders. Effective monitoring 
and service roles are usually a function of independent directors on the board (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; 
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Daily et al., 1999; Young et al., 2001). Additionally, the presence of external managers leads to a need 
for control mechanisms as the goals of the management may not be in line with family goals (Westhead 
and Howorth, 2006). Second, if we refer to the resource dependence perspective (Hillman, Cannella, 
and Paetzold, 2000; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), we can understand the benefits of outside directors in 
terms of advice, social capital, and access to important external resources. And third, if we refer to the 
signaling theory (Certo et al., 2001b; Certo, 2003; Ndofor and Levitas, 2004; Sanders and Boivie, 2004), 
we can recognize the value of outside board members who can add prestige and legitimacy that enhance 
enterprise viability. However, despite all the arguments that support the role of independent directors, 
the benefits of outsiders have been questioned by many authors. According to Westhead and Howorth 
(2006), a management board dominated by external managers can create agency problems as the 
managers act as agents with different objectives to the family as principals. 
Arthurs et al. (2008) found greater representation of a firm’s top management team among its directors 
to be beneficial, rather than problematic. They found that insiders, rather than increasing agency costs, 
could actually reduce agency costs by providing monitoring services. Executive directors protect a firm 
from those with short-term orientations who may otherwise appropriate value from long-term principals. 
Kroll et al. (2007) also demonstrated that young, entrepreneurial firms have their post-IPO performance 
enhanced by boards comprised of a majority of top management team members rather than independent 
outside directors. Kroll et al. (2007) argued that tacit knowledge, entrepreneurial vision, and personal 
investment in their firms may put internal directors in a unique position by enabling them to provide 
oversight and carry out their strategies with fewer constraints. These insiders also tend to be committed 
to the success of their enterprises and are likely to continue pursuing the best interests of the organization 
because of their highly concentrated human capital investment (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Other studies consider that inside board control may thus improve strategy implementation, which is 
less encumbered by the control of outsiders (Van de Ven and Walker, 1984; Baker and Gompers, 2003). 
In addition, Astrachan and Shanker (2003) and Zahra and Sharma (2004) showed that family members 
often have an important role in the management or supervisory board of the firm.  
However, in the context of an IPO, firms going public are generally known to suffer from highly 
asymmetric information levels between owners and managers (Gompers, 1995). Therefore, we expect 
that investors will rely on their boards to monitor and control the family’s opportunism (Westphal, 1998) 
and we believe that outside directors offer the benefits of social capital, access to resources, expertise, 
and prestigious affiliates.  
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Hypothesis 4: There is a negative relationship between the proportion of independent directors and IPO 
underpricing in family firms. 
 Board Member Equity Ownership 
Beatty and Zajac (1994) found a negative relationship between board equity ownership and the level of 
firm monitoring, as represented by a larger percentage of outside directors or a dual leadership structure 
of the board. They concluded that an increase in board ownership will result in a lower proportion of 
outside directors and a unitary leadership structure. Both these effects may result from the high 
concentration of capital for widely held firms led by families managing their own firms and participating 
in the board of directors. Consequently, an increase in board ownership for firms wherein the main 
owner is also the manager and controls the board of directors leads to less effective monitoring and is 
negatively related to firm value. It is thus to be expected that a curvilinear relationship will occur where 
convergence of interests first increases firm value but is then offset by a board member ownership 
pattern that decreases firm value. The negative association that may be observed for high board 
ownership may either result from family interest protection or managerial entrenchment (Chahine, 
2004).  
However, in the case of a family firm’s IPO, when board equity ownership increases, especially when 
these board members are basically family members, positive signals will be sent to outsiders, and 
especially to investors, that the board has a strong confidence about the firm’s future prospects and thus 
about the current firm’s value, and as a result, this may lead to an IPO underpricing. 
Hypothesis 5: There is a negative relationship between board members’ ownership and IPO 
underpricing for family firms.  
Hypothesis 6: There is a strong relationship between IPO underpricing and the part of the capital 
retained by the founder. 
o The Dual Class in Family Firms’ Shares 
When founders or their families use control-enhancing mechanisms to create a wedge between their 
cash flow and control rights, firm value is reduced. For instance, Claessens et al. (2002) and Cronqvist 
and Nilsson (2003) found positive valuation effects associated with increases in cash flow rights, and 
negative ones with control rights in excess of cash flow rights. Similarly, Villalonga and Amit (2006) 
found that the valuation effect in family firms is opposite for two control mechanism categories: negative 
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for dual-class shares, and positive for pyramids and voting agreements. Additionally, Anderson and 
Reeb (2003a) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) found that freestanding family-owned firms with a single 
share class have similar market performance to other firms based on Tobin’s Q ratios, superior 
accounting performance based on ROA, and higher financial leverage based on debt-to-total assets. By 
contrast, family-owned firms with dual-class shares have valuations that are 17% lower on average than 
other firms, despite having similar ROA and financial leverage.  
o The Capital Retained by the Founder 
Many authors have highlighted the association between the level of the capital retained by insiders and 
firm value. From the agency theory point of view, due to the expropriation risks, high levels of retained 
capital may be associated with higher risks of cash flow minority rights expropriation, and in such 
circumstances, potential investors will buy shares only when they are severely underpriced. Yet, from 
the signal theory point of view, the more the owners/executives are confident about the future prospects 
of the IPO firm, the more they will retain a high proportion of capital. Thus, the level of capital retained 
by existing owners will send a signal to the potential investors about the true value of the firm. So, a 
higher percentage of insider ownership signals to the market that the firm is of high quality. As insiders 
are supposed to know the true value of the company, their willingness to retain a large amount of shares 
after the IPO indicates their confidence in the future prospects of the firm (Leland and Pyle, 1977; 
Downes and Heinkel, 1982; Clarkson et al., 1991).  
In short, insiders’ retained stock ex post is an indication of the original shareholders’ level of confidence 
in their own companies. Such confidence helps reduce aftermarket investors’ uncertainty (Certo et al., 
2001a). An extension of Leland and Pyle’s (1977) model is that family insiders may intentionally send 
a signal of their firm’s quality by retaining a high level of pre-IPO ownership. Allen and Faulhaber 
(1989), Grinblat and Hwang (1989), and Welch (1989) modeled a separating equilibrium where high-
quality firms have high underpricing and pre-IPO insider ownership. They explained that good-quality 
firms are willing to underprice their IPOs because they expect to raise more money after the IPO. 
Moreover, underpricing is positively related to the probability of issuing seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOs) and the size of SEOs. Based on a survey of insiders’ retained stock one year post-IPO, Habib 
and Ljungqvist (2001) explained that the underpricing of an IPO is higher for an IPO firm whose owners 
sell fewer shares at the time of IPO or retain their ownership after the IPO. However, the higher the pre-
IPO percentage of insider ownership, the higher the cost imposed on insiders from the decline of firm 
value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Additionally, entrepreneurs will suffer substantial economic losses 
if the firm’s future performance is poor. 
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3. SAMPLE, DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Sample 
We have extracted all firms from the CAC All-Tradable Index except the financial firms (SIC 6000–
6999) that are subject to special legal regulations. Our choice of the CAC All-Tradable Index was made 
to continue the work done in chapter 1, by using the same sample from the Bloomberg platform and 
because we needed a broad and representative benchmark to compare our results to such as the CAC 
All-Tradable Index. This index is a new index replacing the SBF 250 in which the number of values is 
unlimited and it reflects the evolution of all companies listed on Euronext Paris. It also allows the 
evolution of the stock market over the long term to be represented and serves as a benchmark for certain 
mutual funds (FCP) and Sicav as mentioned in chapter 1.  
In accordance with the definition of family firm used in chapter 1, we have separated the family firms 
from the nonfamily ones. Therefore necessary modifications of the selected data were carried out to 
match our definition criteria. In addition, some data were not found for some firms and therefore we 
were obliged to unselect or ignore a small number of family firms. In the end, we came up with full data 
for all needed variables for 86 French family firms out of 107 family firms listed from 1994 to 2013. So 
our sample consists of around 80% of all listed family firms in that period. 
Some variables were extracted directly from the Bloomberg platform such as all firms that were part of 
the CAC All-Tradable Index from 1994 to 2013. We have also extracted the daily prices of the index 
and of every firm in our sample by using Thomson Reuters DataStream, as well as the offering prices, 
dates, and number of shares issued. The rest of the data were hand-collected from the prospectus of each 
firm, including: the initial public offering date, the firm creation date, the number of shares before and 
after the IPO date, the percentage of ownership for the family founder before and after the IPO date, the 
percentage of ownership for other shareholders such as external investors, managers, and employees 
before and after the IPO date, the percentage of public shareholders before and after the IPO date, and 
the percentage of voting rights for the three mentioned parties (family founders, other shareholders, and 
the public) before and after the IPO date. Then we mentioned whether there exists a separation between 
the cash flow rights and the voting rights for all firms. We also extracted net revenues and net income 
for all firms in the year of the IPO date and the previous financial year. Total assets, total shareholders’ 
equity, and total debt were also extracted in the IPO year. In addition, the board size, the percentage of 
independent directors, and the percentage of board member equity ownership were extracted before and 
after the IPO date. We also identified whether the firm’s CEO is the same as the firm’s founder or not 
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and the presence of duality of roles between the firm’s CEO and the board chair. Yet, some other 
variables were not found for all firms and therefore were abandoned. The IPO underpricing that was 
calculated is actually the dependent variable that we will attempt to explain in our models below. 
As previously mentioned, in this chapter we aim to examine whether short-run IPO underpricing is 
higher in family firms than any typical firm due to the interest alignment theory and the signaling theory. 
To be specific, we would like to observe the effect of ownership and control rights change of family 
firms’ owners and public shareholders on the IPO underpricing. Moreover, we aim to examine main 
corporate governance mechanisms that can affect the underpricing level as mentioned by numerous 
researchers in the field.  
3.2. IPO Underpricing Measurement 
Measures of underpricing differ according to which price is taken as the post-IPO equilibrium price and 
which return is chosen as a benchmark. 
- Raw Initial Returns 
Initial performance can be measured by the difference between the post-listing equilibrium price (EP) 
and the final offering price (OP) divided by the offering price: 
U = EP − OPOP = EPOP − ͳ or U = ln (EPOP) 
However, a major problem is the choice of the equilibrium price, EP (i.e. the trading price matching the 
offer and the demand for the shares after the IPO). When the market is sufficiently liquid, EP generally 
corresponds to the first-day closing price. In other cases, the equilibrium may be obtained a couple of 
days after the IPO. For that reason, some authors measure initial returns over a five-day or one-week 
horizon. The raw initial return U can be considered a measure of underpricing, assuming that the normal 
return under efficiency would be 0 and that the equity risk is equivalent to the market risk. Other methods 
relax these assumptions and adjust raw returns. 
- The Initial Return Adjusted for a Market Index Return  
U � = EP − OPOP − Iͳ − IͲIͲ = EPOP − IͳIͲ  or U � = ln (EPOP) − ln (ܫͳܫͲ) 
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where I1 designates the market index closing price on the first trading day and I0 designates the market 
index closing price the day before. 
- The Initial Return Adjusted for Systematic Risk 
U � = EP − OPOP − β Iͳ − IͲIͲ   
where β is the systematic risk. 
- The Raw Initial Return Adjusted for the Return of a Control Portfolio  
U � = EP − OPOP − R � 
where Rp is the return of a reference portfolio. Some papers (Keloharju, 1993; Husson and Jacquillat, 
1990) calculate the return that would be obtained by an uninformed investor participating in all the IPOs. 
Given that the market movements are too small to affect the initial returns significantly, most studies 
measure IPO underpricing with raw returns and select the closing price at the end of the first day of 
quotation as the equilibrium price. 
The most widely utilized adjusted measure is Um, which implicitly standardizes systematic risk. As 
pointed out by Kooli (2000), the limitations of the second model (Us) lie in the difficult and biased 
estimation of beta and because of the lack of long data series to properly estimate betas because we are 
interested in calculating the underpricing a few days after issuance. Last, but not least, we will also not 
rely on a control portfolio due to the bias in choosing a representative portfolio that applies to all firms. 
Therefore, we will choose to calculate the initial return adjusted for a market index return, which is the 
CAC All-Tradable Index in our study, especially since all firms in the sample are all part of this index 
on the day of issuance.  
3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
The number of total offers for the family firms that belonged to the CAC All-Tradable Index from 1994 
to 2013 that meet our criteria set above are 86 firms and these are distributed among seven industries: 
(1) for Basic Materials; (2) for Communications; (3) for Consumer, Cyclical; (4) for Consumer, 
Noncyclical; (5) for Energy; (6) for Industrial; and (7) for Technology. These seven classifications were 
extracted from the Bloomberg platform. The gross proceeds calculations are based upon the number of 
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shares issued on the IPO date times the offering price, which are extracted from Thomson Reuters 
DataStream. However, the relative gross proceeds take into consideration the opportunity cost over the 
20-year period where the French risk-free rate is taken into account to compute the time value of the 
proceeds from 1994 to 2013, which is considered the base year, referred to below as the 2013 euro value. 
In the Appendices, we have included the deflator factor for each year that we used in multiplying the 
gross proceeds to get the relative gross proceeds or the 2013 euro value. Therefore €1 million raised in 
2013 as gross proceeds is equivalent to €1 million in a relative proceed measure (i.e. €1 million x 
1.0000). But €1 million raised in 2000 is equivalent to €1.3555 million in a relative proceed measure 
(i.e. €1 million x 1.3555). So in order to compare proceeds over the years, we used the relative gross 
proceeds as Ritter (1991) did and not the simple gross proceeds.  
In Table 14 we present the distribution of the 86 IPOs among the seven industries, the number of IPOs 
in each industry and their percentage of the total, the average firm age on the day of issuance in each 
industry, the gross proceeds, the relative gross proceeds and its weight in relation to the total, and the 
average relative proceeds per firm per industry. All numbers of gross proceeds, relative proceeds, and 
average relative proceeds are in millions of euros. 
Table 14: Distribution of IPOs per industry 
Industry No. of IPOs 
% of 
Total 
Average 
Age 
Gross 
Proceeds 
Relative 
Gross 
Proceeds 
Weight 
Average 
Relative 
Proceeds 
per Firm 
Basic Materials 1 1% 13.7 8.6 11.6 1% 11.6 
Communications 16 19% 9.9 698.4 813.6 35% 50.9 
Consumer, Cyclical 15 17% 23.4 169.6 239.0 10% 15.9 
Consumer, Noncyclical 17 20% 21.5 211.6 277.9 12% 16.3 
Energy 1 1% 3.0 6.8 6.9 0% 6.9 
Industrial 17 20% 21.3 224.8 293.1 13% 17.2 
Technology 19 22% 10.6 497.6 674.2 29% 35.5 
TOTAL 86 100% 16.9 1,817.4 2,316.3 100% 26.9 
As Table 14 shows, total relative gross proceeds were equal to €2,316.3 million for the 86 French family 
firms, which makes an average proceeds per firm of €26.9 million. As we will see below, this average 
proceeds per firm is considered extremely small compared to a typical French corporation, or to any 
other European corporations, which are averaged at €1,058.2 million and €580.8 million per firm 
(Torstila, 2001). We also notice that the total proceeds are not evenly distributed among the seven 
industries; even the average proceeds per firm per industry ranged from a low €6.9 million (energy) to 
a high €50.9 million (communications) per firm. For instance, we find the communications and the 
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technology industries raising the highest total proceeds among the remaining industries with €813.6 
million and €674.2 million, respectively, making a weight of 35% and 29%, respectively. So firms in 
these two industries, which count 35, representing 40.69% of all IPOs (35/86) have raised total proceeds 
of €1,487.8 representing 64.23% of total proceeds raised by all the 86 firms. Additionally, not only were 
the total proceeds related to communications and technology the highest among all the proceeds, but 
also on average each firm in these two industries raised €50.9 million and €35.5 million, respectively, 
which are much higher than the average proceeds of €26.9 million. Moreover, all firms in the remaining 
industries have generated average proceeds that are well below the overall average.  
It is also worth noting that on average, the 16 IPOs of the communications firms and the 19 IPOs of the 
technology firms have average lives of 9.9 years and 10.6 years, respectively, whereas the average life 
of all firms going public is 16.9 years. This shows that firms in these two industries tend to go public 
much faster and earlier than any firm belonging to other industries with the exception of the energy firm, 
which went public after just 3 years of being founded, but this has occurred only with one firm and with 
very small IPO proceeds that do not exceed €7 million. In another example, firms belonging to the 
consumer cyclical, the consumer noncyclical and the industrial industries have average firm lives of 
23.4 years, 21.5 years, and 21.3 years, respectively, which are almost twice the age of firms among the 
communications and technology firms. 
On the other hand, we also notice that only one IPO was launched for the basic materials and the energy 
industries each, representing around 2% of all IPOs and accounting for only 1% of the total proceeds of 
only €18.5 million versus the total of €2,316 million. The remaining three industries, the consumer 
(cyclical and noncyclical) and the industrial ones, had 49 IPOs, representing 57% of all IPOs and 
accounting for 35% of the total relative gross proceeds with €810 million versus the total of €2,316 
million. These data are also presented in the following two figures for better visualization and 
differentiation of the proceeds and percentage of proceeds in two separate figures. Therefore in Figure 
6  we present total relative proceeds per industry, and in Figure 7 we present the percentage of IPOs in 
each industry with respect to all 86 IPOs in all the seven industries and the percentage of relative 
proceeds per industry with respect to the total proceeds raised of €2,316.3 million. 
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Figure 6: Total relative gross proceeds per industry. 
 
Figure 6 shows that firms belonging to the communications and the technology industries recorded the 
highest relative proceeds among all the seven industries. We also note from this figure that the three 
industries related to industrial, consumer noncyclical and consumer cyclical have raised almost equal 
amounts, unlike the energy and basic materials that raised minimal proceeds. 
Figure 7: The percentage of the number of IPOs and proceeds per industry. 
 
From Figure 7 we notice that the communications and the technology industries are the only two that 
have percentages of the total proceeds that are greater than the percentage of the total IPOs. Therefore 
comparably speaking, fewer firms in these two industries were capable of raising higher proceeds than 
the remaining ones. The opposite is observed for the remaining firms where the percentages of total 
IPOs were larger than the percentages of total proceeds. Similarly we can say that a larger number of 
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firms belonging to these industries were capable of raising lower proceeds than the communications and 
the technology ones.  
With regard to the average gross proceeds per firm in France specifically, and in Europe in general, we 
present below Table 15, which is partially extracted from a paper produced by Torstila (2001) who 
worked on the determinants of IPO gross spreads in Europe covering 506 firms issued between 1986 
and 1999.  
Table 15: Average gross proceeds of main European countries 
Country 
Average Gross 
Proceeds in Q4 1999 
USD million 
Average Gross 
Proceeds in Q4 1999 
EUR million 
Average Gross 
Proceeds in Q4 2013 
EUR million 
Austria 156.5 150.8 209.8 
Belgium 320.9 309.2 430.2 
Denmark 303.1 292.0 406.3 
Finland 279.4 269.2 374.5 
France 789.4 760.5 1,058.2 
Germany 462.7 445.8 620.2 
Greece 307.6 296.3 412.3 
Hungary 121.4 117.0 162.7 
Ireland 858.1 826.7 1,150.3 
Italy 351.8 338.9 471.6 
Netherlands 316.8 305.2 424.7 
Norway 176.3 169.8 236.3 
Poland 189.5 182.6 254.0 
Portugal 407.2 392.3 545.8 
Spain 230 221.6 308.3 
Switzerland 1,022.6 985.2 1,370.8 
UK 1,094.1 1,054.0 1,466.6 
Others 368.5 355.0 494.0 
AVERAGE 433.3 417.4 580.8 
French Family Firms   26.9 
The author presented the amounts in millions of Q4 1999 USD value, which are presented in the second 
column next to the country. In the last two columns, we present the average gross proceeds in Q4 1999 
EUR value and in Q4 2013 EUR value, respectively, to be able to compare them with the relative gross 
proceeds calculated and observed in Table 14. It is worth noting that we referred to the average Q4 1999 
EUR/USD exchange rate found in the European Central Bank data history, which was equal to 
USD1.038 per EUR1.000 at that time. Moreover, in calculating the Q4 2013 EUR value, we referred to 
the deflator factors that were discussed above and are presented in the Appendices.  
146 
 
 
The deflator factor for converting the 1999 EUR value to the 2013 EUR value as mentioned in the 
Appendices is equal to 1.3914. As we have previously discussed, the average French family firm’s total 
proceeds in 2013 euro value is equal to €26.9 million, which is much smaller than typical corporations 
issued in France or even in Europe, which have average proceeds of €1,058.2 million and €580.8 million, 
respectively.  
Moreover, we note that the smallest average IPO proceeds are found in Hungary with €162.7 million, 
which is also much bigger than the average proceeds of the French family firms. It is also worth noting 
that by excluding small issues that are less than €5 million from our original sample, we get an average 
proceeds in 2013 euro value of €33.9 million and a median of €16.3 million, which are also much smaller 
than the average gross proceeds in either France or Europe as reported by Torstila (2001).  
Table 16 below presents the number of IPOs issued by year from 1994 until 2013 in addition to the 
percentage of issued IPOs per year with respect to total IPOs.  
Table 16: Distribution of IPOs per year 
YEAR No. of IPOs per year % of Total 
Average 
Age 
Gross 
Proceeds 
Relative 
Gross 
Proceeds 
Weight 
Average 
Relative 
Proceeds 
per Firm 
1994 1 1% 28.5 2.7 4.8 0% 4.8 
1995 - - - - - - - 
1996 4 5% 20.2 37.8 58.4 3% 14.6 
1997 8 9% 22.1 158.5 235.6 10% 29.5 
1998 10 12% 15.0 94.0 135.2 6% 13.5 
1999 8 9% 36.3 139.5 194.1 8% 24.3 
2000 21 24% 10.6 471.6 639.2 28% 30.4 
2001 7 8% 14.8 156.9 204.1 9% 29.2 
2002 1 1% 12.8 40.0 49.9 2% 49.9 
2003 1 1% 18.0 0.6 0.7 0% 0.7 
2004 3 3% 12.5 107.7 127.4 6% 42.5 
2005 3 3% 22.2 61.8 71.6 3% 23.9 
2006 7 8% 12.2 156.2 177.2 8% 25.3 
2007 6 7% 21.8 157.6 173.8 8% 29.0 
2008 2 2% 7.1 189.8 201.3 9% 100.7 
2009 - - - - - - - 
2010 1 1% 2.0 15.5 15.8 1% 15.8 
2011 2 2% 4.4 9.5 9.7 0% 4.8 
2012 - - - - - - - 
2013 1 1% 24.5 17.6 17.6 1% 17.6 
TOTAL 86 100% 16.9 1,817.4 2,316.3 100% 26.9 
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We have calculated the average age of firms issued in each year, the gross, the relative, and the weight 
of the relative gross proceeds, in addition to the average proceeds issued per firm per year. All numbers 
of gross proceeds, relative proceeds, and average relative proceeds are in millions of euros. 
Table 16 shows once again that the number and values of IPOs were not evenly distributed over the 20-
year period. Additionally, in 3 years (1995, 2009, and 2012) no IPOs for French family firms were 
issued. Also, the year 2000 was significant in terms of the number of IPOs launched and the relative 
gross proceeds, which were both the maximum for all years. For instance, 21 out of the 86 IPOs were 
launched in 2000, representing 24% of all IPOs observed from 1994 until 2013. The total relative gross 
proceeds recorded in that year were €639.2 million, representing around 28% of the total proceeds of 
€2,316.3 million. Therefore the proceeds raised in that single year were considered substantial with 
respect to the total proceeds raised during the 20-year period. Yet, the average proceeds per firm 
recorded in the year 2000 were €30.4 million, which is slightly higher than the overall average of €26.9 
million.  
However, it is worth recalling that in 2001, the DotCom Bubble burst affected the world IPO market 
and its negative impact can be easily seen in this table. Thus, we notice a significant drop in IPOs in 
terms of numbers and value after that year. For instance, only one IPO was launched in 2002 and another 
one in 2003, with relative proceeds of €49.9 million and €0.6 million, respectively. Afterwards, a smooth 
recovery started to take place where from 2004 until 2007 a total of 19 IPOs were issued with total 
relative proceeds of €550 million, representing around 23.7% of the total. 
However, in 2008 another crisis hit the world, which was referred to by many economists as the deepest 
financial crisis since the Great Depression of 1929. That’s why the 2008 financial crisis was usually 
referred to as the Great Recession, due to its worldwide expansion and its unforeseen depth and length 
of losses. Therefore it was normal to witness a cut in IPOs not only in family firms, or in French firms, 
but also worldwide. In their paper, Ritter et al. (2012) explained that the Panic of 2008 and the Eurozone 
crisis of 2011 temporarily depressed the volume of IPOs, consistent with the market conditions 
hypothesis. To get an idea of the drop in IPOs in Europe in the subsequent years, only 280 companies 
went public on the London, Euronext, Frankfurt, and Milan stock exchanges from 2008 to 2011, i.e. 
over four years, which is fewer than the 353 companies that went public in 2007 alone. 
Gao et al. (2012) documented that a similar shortage of IPOs also occurred in the US and they discussed 
three hypotheses to explain the low volume of IPOs during the period 2001–2011. First, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 put on corporations higher pressure, additional time constraints, and greater costs if 
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they chose to go or remain public, without avoiding the large number of compliance requirements and 
official reports that public corporations have to fill in, submit and disclose by carefully respecting all 
due dates. Moreover, the reduction in bid-ask spreads from 1994 to 2001 and Regulation FD in 2000 led 
to a reduction in analyst coverage for smaller firms that decreased the attractiveness of going public. 
The authors explained that supporters of the “regulatory overreach” hypothesis argue that the 
combination of these effects significantly lowered the market valuation of small publicly traded firms, 
discouraging other IPOs.  
Second, after the DotCom Bubble burst that started in March 2000 and extended until 2001, lower stock 
market valuations reduced the attractiveness of going public. Yet, supporters of the “market conditions” 
hypothesis argue that the drop in IPO activity is just temporary and expect that it will recover in the 
future.  
Third, and most importantly, and more related to behavioral and fundamental changes, is the “economies 
of scope” hypothesis. This states that due to an ongoing change in the economy, small firms are worth 
more as part of a larger organization that can realize economies of scope and scale. As a result, firms’ 
owners find it more convenient to sell out in a trade sale (merging) rather than going public and 
remaining independent. This hypothesis is based on the evidence that the major decline in IPOs has been 
most pronounced among small firms. However, this hypothesis takes the view that the main driver for 
this decline in IPOs is the attractiveness of being big rather than small, rather than the attractiveness of 
being private rather than public. Thus, small firms prefer having all the support and experience of big 
firms and accept being merged, rather than going public and having a higher risk of failure. This is 
clearly shown in  
Table 16, where only two IPOs launched in 2008, none in 2009, one in 2010, two in 2011, none in 2012, 
and only one in 2013. Thus, from 2008 to 2013, i.e. over 6 years, only six French family firms’ IPOs 
were launched with relative gross proceeds of €244 million compared to the grand total of €2,316 
million, with a weight of only around 11%. However, we note that in 2008, one IPO was launched that 
belongs to the communications industry for total relative gross proceeds of around €200 million, making 
almost 9% of the total proceeds. This IPO is considered the second largest issue. The largest one belongs 
to the technology industry with total relative proceeds of €294 million, representing around 13% of the 
total proceeds raised. 
Figure 8 shows the distribution of the number of IPOs per year in percent along with the percentage of 
relative proceeds. From this figure, we note that IPOs issued before the 2001 DotCom Bubble burst were 
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larger in terms of numbers and proceeds than the IPOs issued after it. Also we can see the significant 
increase in IPO numbers and values in 2000, which recorded the maximum percentages among all years. 
Additionally, from Figure 8 we can see the discontinuation and the very small sizes and values of IPOs 
issued after 2008. 
Figure 8: The percentage of IPOs and proceeds per year. 
 
As we see that IPO sizes and values peaked in 2000 and busted in 2001, we will refer in our model that 
year to the DotCom Bubble burst and will assign a dummy variable to it. Therefore this variable will be 
equal to 1.00 if the IPO occurred during or before the 2001 DotCom Bubble burst and 0.00 if it occurred 
after it. For this, we present in Table 17 below a summary of IPOs that occurred pre and post the DotCom 
Bubble burst. 
Table 17: Distribution of IPOs pre and post the DotCom bubble burst 
YEAR No. of Years 
No. of 
IPOs % of Total 
Average 
Age 
Gross 
Proceeds 
Relative 
Gross 
Proceeds 
Weight in 
Total 
Relative 
Proceeds 
1994–2001 8 59 69% 17.8 14.8 24.9 64% 
2002–2013 12 27 31% 14.8 27.8 31.3 36% 
TOTAL 20 86 100% 16.9 21.1 26.9 100% 
From Table 17 we spot the number of IPOs that were issued before and after the DotCom Bubble burst, 
which were equal to 59 and 27 IPOs, respectively, representing 69% and 31% of total IPOs issued. So 
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in just 8 years, from 1994 until 2001, 69% of all IPOs under study were issued, and in the 12 remaining 
years, 31% of all IPOs were issued. Moreover, total weight of the relative gross proceeds of the firms 
issued pre and post the DotCom Bubble burst was equal to 64% and 36%, respectively. On the other 
hand, the relative gross proceeds per firm pre- and post-DotCom Bubble were equal to €24.9 million 
and €31.3 million, respectively. This shows that although the number of IPOs was much larger before 
the DotCom Bubble than after it, the gross proceeds per firm were lower. Thus, as we mentioned, the 
purpose of presenting Table 17 is mainly to distinguish between IPOs issued before 2001 and IPOs 
issued after 2001. After discussing the main IPO factors related to issue size, firm age, proceeds, 
industry, and year of issuance of the 86 French family firms issued between 1994 and 2013, we present 
below IPO underpricing descriptive statistics from the first until the 30th day after issuance, along with 
the firm’s ownership and control variables and their governance mechanisms pre and post the IPO date.  
Table 18: Descriptive statistics of IPO underpricing  
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Lower 
Quartile 
Upper 
Quartile 
Range Std.  
Dev. 
Skew-
ness 
up_1d 1.92% 0.00% -12.56% 30.86% -0.61% 1.11% 43.42% 6.74% 2.59 
up_2d 7.30% 1.51% -16.39% 61.57% -0.46% 16.38% 77.97% 12.09% 1.43 
up_3d 15.00% 5.50% -17.61% 405.99% -0.19% 20.06% 423.61% 45.50% 7.65 
up_4d 17.94% 6.32% -16.08% 406.15% -0.14% 23.46% 422.23% 46.72% 6.96 
up_5d 18.96% 10.11% -18.96% 408.62% 0.51% 24.12% 427.58% 47.41% 6.76 
up_10d 26.58% 13.56% -16.20% 394.34% 1.12% 35.22% 410.54% 50.67% 4.86 
up_15d 29.63% 13.35% -26.27% 381.13% 2.95% 38.81% 407.40% 54.34% 3.68 
up_30d 35.16% 13.00% -28.98% 682.84% 0.00% 37.52% 711.82% 87.29% 5.38 
First, we notice that on average, the 86 French family firms were fairly priced since their first-day 
underpricing (up_1d) averaged only 1.92%, with a median of 0.00%, and a lower and upper quartile of 
-0.61% and 1.11%, respectively. Overall, these figures lead us to believe that family firms were almost 
fairly priced on the day of their issuance and therefore there should not be great concern on the part of 
these firms’ principal shareholders over the money left on the table since no great underpricing had 
occurred on their issuance. Here we can assume that the presence of the family firms’ owners on the 
firms’ supervisory and management boards, and being the main shareholders, prevented their firms from 
deep underpricing, which is usually committed by underwriters to favor their main clients, facilitate the 
IPO, and lower the risk of the issue, as previously seen. However, we notice that in the subsequent days, 
and up until the first month of issuance, a quick fads period was created increasing the average 
underpricing from 1.92% on the first day of issuance to 35.16% on the 30th day of issuance. This fast 
and sharp increase in IPO returns can be explained by over-optimistic investors and speculators 
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demanding to acquire IPO shares for seeking high short-term returns. Therefore, these continuous 
actions aimed at acquiring IPO shares have driven them up, reaching an average abnormal return of 
35.16% after one month of issuance, with a median of 13%, and a lower and upper quartile of 0% and 
37.52%, respectively. We also notice that the median of the underpricing from the first until the 30th 
day increased from 0% to 13%. However, on the fifth day, the median recorded 10.11%, and on the 
tenth day 13.56%, which is the highest median. By also looking at the underpricing averages and at the 
lowest and highest quartiles, we notice that the highest increases occurred in the first ten days of 
issuance. Afterward and until the 30th day, the increases in returns continued but at lower rates.  
This clarifies that a fads period occurred just a few days after issuance, driving abnormal returns high 
created by over-optimistic investors and speculators and not by issuers in purposefully underpricing 
their own shares. Therefore IPO returns increased sharply from the first until the 30th day, making 18 
times more returns on the 30th day than on the first day, strengthening our belief that this increase is not 
due to normal underpricing set by issuers but to over-optimistic investors and speculators. Moreover, as 
we will explain later, we have tried to explain underpricing of the first until the 30th day of issuance via 
the different models we present. But we did not find any significant result for the days subsequent to the 
second and up to the 30th day of issuance. For these reasons, we prefer in our models to focus solely on 
the first-day IPO underpricing rather than on any other subsequent day. 
However, we can still deduce that if investors choose to invest in all the 86 family IPOs by buying the 
firms’ shares at the offering price and holding them over the first 30 days of issuance, they can make an 
average holding periodical abnormal return of 35.16% or an annual abnormal return of around 420%. 
This clearly shows how attractive investing in IPOs is and why investors strongly believe that they can 
make high short-term returns, but mostly ignore the very high risks carried through investment in IPOs, 
and this is shown in the 30-day standard deviation of 87.29% compared to the average return of 35.16%, 
making a coefficient of variation of 2.48.  
In Figure 9 we plot the first-day underpricing of the 86 French family firms grouped in ten categories 
prepared via STATISTICA software.  
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Figure 9: Histogram of first-day underpricing. 
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From this table we also notice that almost 70 firms out of the 86 issues have an average first-day 
underpricing of between -3.9% and 4.8%, which made us believe that these family firms were almost 
fairly priced on the day of their IPOs, and the fads period started thereafter. Therefore we did not spot 
much extreme underpricing other than in a very few cases, and the majority were clustered around the 
mean. Yet, as we can see from the histogram and as we saw from Table 18, not all firms were 
underpriced and generated positive first-day returns since some firms were overpriced and generated 
negative first-day returns. Therefore, to spot the overpriced and underpriced issues separately, we 
present in Table 19 the first-day and the fifth-day average IPO performance. 
Table 19: Descriptive statistics of over- and under-valued IPOs  
Under/Over-
pricing 
N Mean Median Min Max Lower 
Quartile 
Upper 
Quartile 
Range Std.  
Dev. 
Skew-
ness 
1-D Overpricing 33 -1.58% -0.68% -12.56% -0.08% -1.34% -0.46% 12.48% 2.50% -3.28 
1-D Underpricing 42 5.18% 1.12% 0.01% 30.86% 0.42% 5.47% 30.86% 8.21% 1.96 
5-D Overpricing 17 -6.11% -4.38% -18.96% -0.09% -9.02% -1.99% 18.88% 5.54% -1.24 
5-D Underpricing 66 26.27% 12.86% 0.48% 408.62% 5.18% 28.36% 
408.14
% 5.19% 6.37 
From Table 19 we notice that after their first day of issuance, 33 IPOs were overpriced, generating 
negative average market-adjusted returns, while 42 IPOs were underpriced, generating positive average 
market-adjusted returns. So in total, 75 out of the 86 issues were mispriced (either underpriced or 
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overpriced), which makes 11 IPOs correctly priced, generating 0% market-adjusted returns after the first 
day of issuance. The overpriced issues reached a low of -12.56% and had an average of -1.58%. Their 
lower and upper quartiles were equal to -1.34% and -0.46%, respectively. On the other hand, the 
underpriced issues reached a high of 30.86% and had an average of 5.18%. Their lower and upper 
quartiles were equal to 0.42% and 5.47%, respectively. So in numbers and in averages, the underpriced 
securities were greater than the overpriced ones, making the overall average first-day market-adjusted 
return positive. However, by looking into the fifth-day market-indexed returns, we notice that although 
the number of overpriced issues dropped by half and reached 17 issues, the percentage of overpricing 
increased to reach an average of -6.11% and a minimum of -18.96%, which are greater than the first-
day adjusted returns. As a result, the number of underpriced securities increased to reach 66 issues, with 
an average of 26.27%, a maximum of 408.62%, and a median of 12.86%. Hence, this leaves the number 
of issues that are correctly priced five days after their issuance equal to three. 
Below, we present the average IPO underpricing from the first until the 30th day for six different 
categories or groups according to issue sizes, along with the number of issues in each category. This is 
a highly informative table since we can spot the highest and lowest underpricing in different size 
categories and after different days of issuance.  
Table 20: Gross proceeds in subgroups and underpricing 
Gross Proceeds N UP_1d UP_2d UP_3d UP_4d UP_5d UP_10d UP_15d UP_30d 
0–2,999,999 17 2.43% 10.20% 11.39% 14.86% 14.45% 32.78% 37.95% 66.81% 
3,000,000–4,999,999 7 0.15% 6.57% 66.92% 67.59% 68.07% 66.09% 75.48% 70.80% 
5,000,000–9,999,999 23 3.17% 7.55% 10.72% 16.75% 18.26% 21.63% 19.75% 21.79% 
10,000,000–14,999,999 13 2.56% 4.66% 9.68% 12.76% 14.72% 20.66% 21.03% 23.22% 
15,000,000–24,999,999 10 0.44% 8.75% 13.74% 12.52% 10.46% 23.19% 29.32% 25.53% 
25,000,000<………… 16 0.79% 5.43% 7.36% 8.82% 12.01% 16.77% 22.11% 20.86% 
From Table 20 we notice that firms in the largest two brackets, specifically those that raised gross 
proceeds of between €15 million and €25 million, and those that raised more than €25 million, witnessed 
on average very smooth underpricing of 0.44% and 0.79%, respectively. Conversely, categories with 
smaller gross proceeds have on average been further underpriced, reaching 3.17%. Exceptionally, one 
small-sized category, which includes firms with gross proceeds of between €3 million and €5 million, 
also witnessed very smooth underpricing of an average of 0.15%, which marked the smallest average 
among all remaining categories. However, and interestingly, firms belonging to this category generated 
the highest market-adjusted returns starting on the third day with 66.9% and until the 30th day, reaching 
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70.8%. Similarly, the smallest-category firms also reached a high of 66.8% thirty days after their 
issuance, but their increase witnessed a smoother upward trend than the previous category. For the 
remaining four categories that are greater than €5 million, all witnessed close market-adjusted returns, 
especially ten days after their issuance and until the 30th day, reaching an approximate 21%. Therefore, 
it is obvious from the size categorization that firms with the smallest gross proceeds witnessed the largest 
market-adjusted returns, which are threefold the returns generated in firms with greater proceeds. 
However, in this analysis we did not include the risk or variance factor to compare the returns that can 
be achieved with the appropriate risk in each category. Next, we present descriptive statistics on the 
main ownership and control rights change from pre- to post-IPO date for the three main types of 
shareholders: (1) family firms’ owners, their descendants and direct relatives, (2) others such as 
investment banks, nonfamily managers and directors and employees, and (3) public shareholders. 
Table 21: Descriptive statistics on ownership and control  
Variable 
Descriptive Statistics 
(Casewise Deletion of Missing Data) 
Mean Median Min Max Lower Quartile 
Upper 
Quartile Range 
Std.  
Dev. 
Skew 
ness 
%_CF_FF_Pre-IPO 74.9% 76.3% 12.7% 100.0% 58.4% 96.6% 87.3% 23.0% -65.3% 
%_CF_Others_Pre-IPO 25.1% 23.7% 0.0% 87.3% 3.4% 41.6% 87.3% 23.0% 65.4% 
%_CF_Public_Pre-IPO 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.1% 927.4% 
%_VO_FF_Pre-IPO 76.2% 79.2% 12.7% 100.0% 63.8% 97.4% 87.3% 22.7% -82.8% 
%_VO_Others_Pre-IPO 23.8% 20.8% 0.0% 87.3% 2.6% 36.2% 87.3% 22.7% 82.9% 
%_VO_Public_Pre-IPO 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.1% 927.4% 
%_CF_FF_Post-IPO 62.3% 63.9% 10.3% 98.3% 47.7% 79.1% 88.0% 20.8% -39.7% 
%_CF_Others_Post-IPO 18.2% 17.0% 0.0% 65.4% 3.0% 26.7% 65.4% 16.4% 76.5% 
%_CF_Public_Post-IPO 19.6% 18.2% 0.0% 50.6% 10.0% 26.0% 50.6% 11.8% 60.4% 
%_VO_FF_Post-IPO 66.9% 68.8% 10.3% 98.3% 50.9% 84.6% 88.0% 21.0% -61.6% 
%_VO_Others_Post-IPO 17.9% 16.5% 0.0% 65.4% 2.6% 26.3% 65.4% 16.8% 86.4% 
%_VO_Public_Post-IPO 15.3% 13.5% 0.0% 50.6% 6.7% 21.3% 50.6% 10.8% 110.2% 
Chge_Dif_CF_VO_FF 3.3% 2.1% -6.4% 17.1% 0.0% 5.5% 23.5% 4.1% 106.1% 
FF_%_CF_Chge -16.2% -16.9% -51.1% 94.6% -25.0% -9.5% 145.7% 17.4% 295.5% 
FF_%_VO_Chge -11.0% -10.7% -50.2% 149.1% -17.7% -5.1% 199.3% 20.9% 519.1% 
Dif_CF_VO_Public -4.3% -2.9% -15.5% 0.0% -8.5% 0.0% 15.5% 4.5% -68.1% 
CF_Board_Pre-IPO 78.5% 85.5% 0.1% 100.0% 66.8% 97.6% 99.9% 23.4% -137.9% 
CF_Board_Post-IPO 64.4% 66.3% 0.1% 98.3% 53.4% 79.3% 98.2% 21.9% -78.9% 
Board_CF_Change -18.3% -17.3% -47.7% 1.4% -25.0% -10.0% 49.1% 11.5% -56.6% 
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%_CF_FF_Pre-IPO and %_CF_FF_Post-IPO: Percentage of cash flow rights for the family firms’ owners on 
pre-IPO date and on post-IPO date. 
%_CF_Others_Pre-IPO and %_CF_Others_Post-IPO: Percentage of cash flow rights for the others such as 
investment banks, nonfamily directors and employees on pre-IPO date and on post-IPO date. 
%_CF_Public_Pre-IPO and %_CF_Public_Post-IPO: Percentage of cash flow rights for the public shareholders 
on pre-IPO date and on post-IPO date. 
%_VO_FF_Pre-IPO and %_VO_FF_Post-IPO: Percentage of voting rights for the family firms’ owners on pre-
IPO date and on post-IPO date. 
%_VO_Others_Pre-IPO and %_VO_Others_Post-IPO: Percentage of voting rights for the others such as 
investment banks, nonfamily directors and employees on pre-IPO date and on post-IPO date. 
%_VO_Public_Pre-IPO and %_VO_Public_Post-IPO: Percentage of voting rights for the public shareholders on 
pre-IPO date and on post-IPO date. 
Chge_Dif_CF_VO_FF: Change in the difference between cash flow rights and voting rights for the family firms’ 
owners. 
FF_%_CF_Chge: Family firms’ owners percentage cash flow right change. 
FF_%_VO_Chge: Family firms’ owners percentage voting right change. 
Dif_CF_VO_Public: Difference between cash flow right and voting right for the public shareholders. 
CF_Board_Pre-IPO and CF_Board_Post-IPO: Cash flow right ownership for the board members on pre-IPO 
date and on post-IPO date. 
Board_CF_Change: Cash flow right change for the board members from pre- to post-IPO date. 
Through our analysis, we have noticed a clear-cut differentiation between the cash flow rights given to 
holders of the firms’ shares and the voting rights. We recall that the cash flow rights are subject to the 
company’s residual claims including all types of dividends (regular dividends, special dividends, 
extraordinary dividends, and liquidating dividends), profit and losses according to the percentage of 
cash flow rights each investor holds with respect to the total cash flow rights granted for all shareholders. 
However, the voting rights granted for family firms’ insiders and for public shareholders depend on the 
firms’ internal bylaws decided by the board of directors. These voting rights may then be totally different 
between these two types of shareholders even in the presence of an equal number of cash flow rights 
granted for both types. For example, if family firms’ owners keep for themselves double voting rights 
whereas all other shareholders receive single voting rights, with ownership percentage of only one third 
of a firm’s cash flow rights, family firms’ owners can still control 50 percent of the firm’s voting rights 
and thus control the firms. As mentioned earlier in the literature review, such behavior spread in most 
family firms is not appreciated by the minority shareholders. Also, a separation between the cash flow 
right and voting right is said to occur when the twodo not equally meet. 
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We start first with the percentage of cash flow rights of the family firms’ owners before the IPO, which 
has an average of 74.9% and a median of 76.3%, a lower and an upper quartile of 58.4% and 96.61% 
and standard deviation of 22.97%. This clearly shows that the family firms’ owners and their 
descendants and direct relatives strictly control the firm by having relatively high cash flow rights. Yet, 
all these percentages drop after the IPO. For instance, the percentage of the average and the median cash 
flow rights of the family firms’ owners after the IPO recorded 62.3% and 63.9%. So the percentage of 
cash flow rights of the family firms’ owners dropped by an average of 12.6% for the benefit of others 
and public shareholders through the IPO. As a result, the percentage decreases of the cash flow rights 
for the family firms’ owners are 16.2% and 16.9% for the mean and the median, respectively. 
These numbers do not reveal much without comparing them to, and by looking at, the percentage change 
of the voting rights for the family firms’ owners, which drops by 11% and 10.7% for the mean and the 
median, respectively. So the average percentage decrease in cash flow rights recorded 16.2% while that 
of the voting rights recorded 11%. Therefore the percentage drop in voting rights was much less than 
the percentage drop in cash flow rights. Similarly, even though the percentage of cash flow rights 
dropped for the family firms’ owners due to the IPO by some percentage points, their percentage of 
voting rights did not follow by the same measure. This means that on average, family firms’ owners 
have benefited themselves through the IPO by allocating themselves more voting rights compared to 
their cash flow rights. As a result, the separation between the cash flow rights and the voting rights has 
worsened since the IPO.  
On the other hand, before going public and when only two types of shareholders existed, we notice that 
family firms’ owners had more voting rights than their cash flow rights by an average of 1.3% (=76.2%-
74.9%). Therefore the separation between the two rights already existed even before the presence of 
public shareholders. However, after going public, the separation between the two rights for the family 
firms’ owners increased by an average of 4.6% (=66.9%-62.3%). Therefore, the difference between the 
cash flow rights and voting rights increased after the firms went public in the interest of the family firms’ 
owners. This is considered as an expropriation attempt of minority shareholders’ rights employed by the 
IPO by enhancing family firms’ control rights relative to their ownership rights. Moreover, when the 
firms went public, not only did the family firms’ percentage of cash flow and voting rights drop to share 
them with the public, but also the other existing shareholders, such as other directors, employees, and 
investment banks, dropped their cash flow and voting rights as well. Thus, the percentage of cash flow 
of others before and after the IPO had an average of 25.1% and 18.2% and a median of 23.7% and 17%, 
respectively. Therefore, not only were all rights granted and allocated for the public shareholders 
extracted and taken from the rights of the family firms, but also from the initial other investors whose 
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cash flow and voting rights we see decreasing after the IPO in terms of numbers and percentages. 
However, the percentage decrease of family firms’ cash flow rights due to the IPO is equal to 16.2% 
whereas the percentage decrease of others’ cash flow rights due to the IPO is equal to 27.68%. So 
relatively speaking, others’ cash flow rights decreased by more than the owners’ cash flow rights. This 
means that on average, the new cash flow rights distributed to the public were mostly from the part of 
the others who diminished their cash flow rights and voting rights more than the family firms’ owners. 
This is also another clear sign of minority expropriation held by the family firms’ owners towards other 
investors and not only public shareholders. 
Another sign of such expropriation is shown throughout the difference between the cash flow rights and 
the voting rights for the public shareholders. As shown, their average and median cash flow rights are 
19.6% and 18.2%, respectively, and their average and median voting rights are 15.3% and 13.5%, 
respectively. Thus the average percentage of voting rights of the public shareholders is lower than the 
average percentage of cash flow rights by around 4.3% for the interest of the family firms’ owners. Last, 
but not least, the average ownership percentage of the board members drops from 78.5% to 64.4% 
whereas the median drops from 85.5% to 66.3%. This clearly shows that the board members who are 
mostly family members and close relatives held and still hold a significant percentage of the firms’ cash 
flow rights, and specifically voting rights. This is because, as we have previously mentioned, most 
family firms’ board members are direct relatives to the firms’ founders and owners and the independent 
directors represent a very small percentage. Also, these numbers show that the average board members’ 
ownership drops by 18.3% whereas the median board members’ ownership drops by 17.3%. Figure 10 
below sheds more light on the difference between cash flow and voting rights pre- and post-IPO date 
for the three types of investors. 
Figure 10: Ownership and control rights change. 
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As we can see, Figure 10 demonstrates clearly the differences in cash flow rights and voting rights for 
the three types of investors. We notice that after issuance, the difference between the two rights has 
expanded for the family firms’ owners, favoring themselves over others and public shareholders. We 
also notice that the difference between the two rights for the public shareholders is quite large. Moreover, 
another thing to notice here is that post-IPO date, the average cash flow rights for other investors is 
slightly lower than that of public shareholders. However, the voting rights of the others that are close to 
their cash flow rights are much higher than those of the public shareholders. Specifically, the average 
cash flow rights for others and public shareholders are equal to 18.2% and 19.6%, respectively, whereas 
the average voting rights for others and public shareholders are equal to 17.9% and 15.3%, respectively. 
So the separation between the two rights for others and public shareholders is equal to 0.3% and 4.3%, 
respectively. 
After presenting the main IPO underpricing results and after covering the main ownership and control 
rights change for the three types of investors, we present below a correlation table for the variables that 
will be employed in the regression analysis along with the control variables in the ownership and control 
rights model. 
Table 22: Pearson correlation table for the ownership and control rights model 
Variable 
Correlations  
Marked correlations are significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) level 
N=86 (Casewise deletion of missing data) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
up_1d (1) 1.000               
  p= ---               
Pre-DotCom (2) -0.193* 1.000             
  p=0.075 p= ---             
H_Tech (3) -0.141 0.360*** 1.000           
  p=0.196 p=0.001 p= ---           
LN(Proceed) (4) -0.067 -0.097 -0.015 1.000         
  p=0.538 p=0.376 p=0.895 p= ---         
LN(Age) (5) 0.091 0.061 -0.184* 0.091 1.000       
  p=0.404 p=0.578 p=0.091 p=0.403 p= ---       
Dif_CF_VO_Public (6) 0.047 -0.075 -0.084 -0.061 -0.259** 1.000     
  p=0.667 p=0.491 p=0.444 p=0.575 p=0.016 p= ---     
FF_%_CF_Chge (7) 0.073 -0.109 -0.112 -0.034 -0.011 0.340*** 1.000   
  p=0.507 p=0.320 p=0.306 p=0.759 p=0.923 p=0.001 p= ---   
%_CF_Public_After (8) -0.255** -0.073 0.054 0.258** -0.082 -0.392*** -0.706*** 1.000 
  p=0.018 p=0.505 p=0.621 p=0.017 p=0.455 p=0.000 p=0.000 p= --- 
We notice first that a negative correlation exists between the first-day underpricing and pre-DotCom 
Bubble burst. This correlation of -0.193 is significant at only the 10% level. Yet, we can still argue that 
family firms that were issued before the DotCom Bubble burst tend to be overpriced compared to firms 
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issued after it and thus they generate a negative first-day return. Moreover, there is a negative correlation 
between the first-day underpricing and the percentage of cash flow rights of the public shareholders 
post-IPO date of -0.255 and significant at the 5% level. It can be interpreted from this that the percentage 
of cash flow rights granted for the public shareholders and the first-day underpricing move in the 
opposite but weak direction. Therefore, the more public shareholders are granted shares on the IPO date, 
the lower the first-day underpricing will be, which may be due to the high supply of shares in the market 
for the public. We also notice that a positive correlation exists between the pre-DotCom Bubble burst 
and the high-tech industry of 0.360 and is statistically significant at the 1% level. Here we note that the 
19 high-tech firms were all issued before 2001, which made this correlation positive and statistically 
significant. Moreover, the correlation between the high-tech industry and age is negative and statistically 
significant at the 10% level only. Yet, we can say that firms belonging to the high-tech industries tend 
to be younger in age than firms in other industries. 
We also found a positive and statistically significant correlation at the 5% level between the proceeds 
and the percentage of cash flow allocated to the public of 0.258. This can be viewed as a normal 
relationship since the more shares that are allocated to the public, the higher the proceeds firms can 
generate through the IPO. This looks very rational since firms looking for higher gross proceeds have 
to sell a higher proportion of their shares to the public to raise the required funds, thus they increase the 
public shareholding. Another correlation to observe is the one between the age and the difference in 
cash flow and voting rights for the public shareholders. This correlation is negative of 0.259 and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. It can be interpreted that older firms are less likely to be involved 
in selling shares to the public with a high difference in cash flow and voting rights. Therefore, family 
firms that are more apt to breach the basic ownership rule and attempt to expropriate shareholders’ 
wealth are the younger rather than the older firms.  
We also found a positive correlation of 0.340 that is statistically significant at the 1% level between the 
difference in cash flow rights and voting rights and the percentage change of family firms’ cash flow 
rights. It can be interpreted from this that the higher the drop in family firms’ cash flow rights change, 
the smaller the gap between the two rights that will be observed. On the other hand, the more the family 
firms lose cash flow rights, the smaller the gap between cash flow rights and voting rights that will be 
observed. 
Another interesting correlation is found between the difference in cash flow rights and voting rights of 
the public shareholders and the percentage of the cash flow rights granted to the public shareholders. 
This correlation of -0.392 is significant at the 1% level. It can be interpreted that the higher the 
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percentage of cash flow rights granted to the public shareholders, the smaller the gap between the two 
rights that will be observed. This may be due to the negotiation power public shareholders can have 
when purchasing a high proportion of the firm’s shares which enables them to get voting rights that are 
close to their cash flow rights. And as the percentage of cash flow rights granted to the public gets 
smaller, the gap between the two rights widens.  
Last, but not least, there is a significant correlation at the 1% level of -0.706 between the percentage 
change of the family firms’ owners’ cash flow rights and the percentage of cash flow rights granted to 
the public shareholders. It can be interpreted from this relatively strong correlation that as the percentage 
of cash flow rights of the family firms’ owners decreases due to the IPO, the percentage of cash flow 
rights of the public shareholders increases. Yet, as we will see in the subsequent table, after carrying out 
the test of multicollinearity of the independent variables, we notice that the inclusion of the mentioned 
two independent variables does not pose any problem of multicollinearity and therefore we will include 
both of them in the regression analysis. After observing the ownership and control rights change 
variables, we review below the main corporate governance mechanisms set by the family firms on pre-
IPO date. Thus, we will present first the descriptive statistics of these variables and then the correlation 
matrix along with the control variables mentioned above.  
Table 23: Descriptive statistics on governance mechanisms  
Variable 
Descriptive Statistics – Valid N = 86 
Mean Median Min Max Lower Quartile 
Upper 
Quartile Range 
Std. 
Dev. Skewness 
Offering_Price 17.23 16.65 1.88 51.83 8.00 24.39 49.95 9.77 0.60 
Board_Size 4.67 4.00 3.00 11.00 3.00 6.00 8.00 1.82 1.20 
%_Independent 20.5% 16.7% 0.0% 66.7% 0.0% 37.5% 66.7% 22.8% 58.6% 
Separation_Shares 0.67 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.47 -0.76 
CEO/Chair Duality 0.77 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.42 -1.29 
CEO_Founder 0.80 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.40 -1.55 
High_Tech 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.42 1.37 
Age 16.9 12.5 0.9 187.0 5.8 20.7 186.1 22.1 5.7 
Table 23 shows that the average and median offering prices of the firms going public are €17.23 and 
€16.65, with a lower and upper quartile of €8 and €24.39, respectively. This shows that the most 
preferable share price for issuing new equity is between the modest range of €8 and €25 for liquidity 
preferences. With regard to the board size, we notice that the average and the median family firm’s 
board size is just 4.67 and 4.00, respectively, with a minimum and maximum board size of only three 
and 11 members, respectively. This tells us that on average, the French family firms in our sample have 
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a smaller board size than their typical French or European counterparts, as we will subsequently observe. 
This might be due to the refusal of family firms’ owners to increase the board size and include outside 
professional directors who can exert additional monitoring activities over the firms’ managers. This is 
also shown in the percentage of independent directors, who have an average of 20.5% and a median of 
16.7% with a lower and upper quartile of 0% and 37.5%, respectively. The percentage of independent 
directors of the French family firms is also lower than the average for a typical French firm. We will 
conduct in the subsequent section a comparative analysis of major European corporations’ board sizes 
and independent directors to get a clearer idea of the French family firms’ board characteristics. 
The separation in shares, the CEO/Chair duality, the CEO founder, and the high-tech industry are all 
dummy variables with 1.00 if the firm meets these characteristics and 0.00 if not. The separation in 
shares can be 1.00 if the firm has more than one class of shares such as voting and nonvoting shares, or 
the presence of some shares with double voting rights that are privileged to existing shareholders or to 
shareholders holding shares for more than two years, and 0.00 if this criterion does not exist. The 
CEO/Chair duality can also be equal to 1.00 if the CEO and the Chair positions are held by only one 
person and 0.00 if they are not. So on issuance day, for each family firm, we observe whether the CEO 
holds the position of the board’s Chair at the same time. Similarly, if the firm’s founder is the same as 
the firm’s CEO on the day of issuance, then the CEO founder will be equal to 1.00, otherwise it will be 
equal to 0.00. The last dummy variable used is the high-tech industry. Thus, if a firm going public 
belongs to the high-technology industry, then the variable will be equal to 1.00, and otherwise equal to 
0.00.  
As shown, 67% of French family firms have separation in shares, which is clearly considered an attempt 
to expropriate shareholders’ wealth. Family firms’ owners significantly favor their interests throughout 
the offering by allocating double voting rights to themselves, their descendants, and direct relatives. 
This will certainly exacerbate the separation between the cash flow rights and the voting rights and 
destroy the image of the firms’ integrity toward the public.  
Moreover, around 77% of the French family firms have their CEOs holding the position of the board’s 
Chair on the day of the IPO. This is also another method of control that family firms’ owners strongly 
exert over their firms where a firm’s CEO holds a Chair position at the same time. As previously 
elaborated, this can have both a negative and a positive side. On the one hand, the negative side of it is 
related to the expropriation of minority shareholders through the direct control and influence of the 
firm’s board decisions and of the firm’s management of the daily operation. On the other hand, the 
positive side of it is the better communication among both the management members and the board 
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members through one person, which may enhance the firm’s performance as many researchers agree. 
However, after the numerous scandals the financial markets have witnessed in recent decades, especially 
those related to corporate governance mechanisms, and according to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it was 
strongly recommended that firms differentiate clearly between the position of the firm’s CEO and that 
of Chair.  
We also found that around 80% of the French family firms were managed on their IPO date by the same 
person who founded the firm. Equally, founder CEOs were present in almost 80% of family firms. This 
reveals three important ideas to discuss. The first is that on average, firms are ready to go public even 
during the time when the CEO of the firm is the same as the firm founder and not his/her descendants, 
which requires courageous action. The second shows that family firms’ founders find that IPOs are 
means for future growth and possible solutions for passing the firms’ wealth and success to their 
descendants going beyond the founders’ lives. And the third shows the robustness and persistence of a 
firm’s founders in managing the firm they have created, and who remained at the top of the firm’s 
management until the issuance day. We recall here that the average life of a family firm going public is 
around 16.9 years.  
Moreover, we notice that around 22% of all family firms belong to the high-technology industry and the 
remaining 78% belong to the six other industries. For firms’ age, we state that the average and median 
of family firms going public are equal to 16.9 years and 12.5 years, respectively, and with a lower and 
upper quartile of 5.8 and 20.7 years, respectively. However, we notice here that the standard deviation 
of the firms’ age is equal to 22.1 years. This shows that firms going public are fairly young to mature 
firms. Below we present the correlation matrix of the variables that will be used in the governance 
mechanisms model. 
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Table 24: Pearson correlation table of the governance mechanisms 
Variable 
Correlations 
Marked correlations are significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) level 
N=86 (Casewise deletion of missing data) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
up_1d (1) 1.000          
  p= ---          
Pre-DotCom (2) -0.193* 1.000         
  p=0.075 p= ---         
H_Tech (3) -0.141 0.360*** 1.000        
  p=0.196 p=0.001 p= ---        
LN(Proceed) (4) -0.067 -0.097 -0.015 1.000       
  p=0.538 p=0.376 p=0.895 p= ---       
LN(Age) (5) 0.091 0.061 -0.184* 0.091 1.000      
  p=0.404 p=0.578 p=0.091 p=0.403 p= ---      
LN(Board_Size) (6) -0.193* 0.127 0.002 0.432*** 0.132 1.000     
  p=0.075 p=0.243 p=0.989 p=0.000 p=0.227 p= ---     
CEO_Founder (7) -0.059 0.230** -0.017 -0.192* -0.201* -0.096 1.000    
  p=0.590 p=0.033 p=0.875 p=0.076 p=0.064 p=0.381 p= ---    
CEO/Chair Duality (8) -0.104 0.161 -0.105 -0.148 -0.058 0.015 0.349*** 1.000   
  p=0.343 p=0.138 p=0.336 p=0.175 p=0.599 p=0.893 p=0.001 p= ---   
Separation_Shares (9) -0.011 0.118 0.071 -0.001 0.204* 0.008 -0.096 -0.089 1.000  
  p=0.919 p=0.279 p=0.516 p=0.993 p=0.059 p=0.943 p=0.381 p=0.416 p= ---  
%_Independent (10) 0.041 0.047 -0.011 0.259** -0.031 0.212* -0.027 -0.383*** 0.063 1.000 
  p=0.710 p=0.670 p=0.924 p=0.016 p=0.777 p=0.050 p=0.803 p=0.000 p=0.564 p= --- 
From Table 24 we notice a negative, weak, and statistically significant correlation of 0.193 at the 10% 
level only between the first-day underpricing and the board size measured by its natural logarithm. It 
can be interpreted from this that the bigger the board size, the lower the underpricing that will take place. 
This might be due to the higher degree of control exercised by the board members to generate the highest 
proceeds out of the IPO and sell the firm’s share at, or close to, its intrinsic value and prevent deep 
underpricing taking place.  
We also notice a positive and weak correlation of 0.230 at the 5% level between the DotCom Bubble 
burst and the presence of a founder CEO. It can be interpreted from this that firms that went public 
before the bubble burst have more founder CEOs than firms issued after the bubble. This may be 
explained by the fads period created before the 2001 bubble burst during which the majority of the 
family firms went public (around 69% of our sample). Thus, founder CEOs were keen to take their firms 
public during a period of investor overoptimism.  
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Another relationship to observe is the positive and highly significant correlation between the gross 
proceeds and the board size of 0.432. It can be interpreted from this that firms with bigger proceeds tend 
to have bigger board sizes. Bigger proceeds might mean bigger firm value and therefore a bigger board 
size is required to keep monitoring the firm’s operations.  
We found a positive and statistically significant correlation between the proceeds and the independent 
directors of 0.259. This can be partially explained by the positive correlation that exists between the 
proceeds and board size, and between the board size and independent directors. Thus, firms that are able 
to raise more funds or bigger-sized firms are not only more able to increase their board’s size by 
increasing the number of directors, but also they tend to increase the percentage of independent directors 
as well. A negative and statistically significant correlation of 0.201 at the 10% level was found between 
the firm’s age and the presence of a founder CEO. This relationship is normally to be observed since the 
older the firm, the higher the chance of having the founder’s descendants heading the firm rather than 
the founder himself or herself. 
Additionally, we found a positive and statistically significant correlation at the 10% level of 0.204 
between the age and the separation in shares. It can be interpreted from this that older firms are more 
likely to get involved in issuing double voting shares, or multiple share classes for entrenching the firm’s 
insiders over the benefit of the public and minority shareholders. Therefore, if the presence of multiple 
share classes such as issuing voting and nonvoting shares or double and single voting shares is a form 
of opacity and information asymmetry employed by family firms’ owners, then older firms are more 
likely to be involved in such behaviors than younger firms. Another point to discuss is the positive and 
statistically significant correlation at the 1% level between the founder CEO and the CEO/Chair duality 
of 0.349. This is obvious since on the day of their issuance, the majority of family firms had their CEOs 
the same persons as the firms’ founders, and at the same time, the firms’ CEOs hold the same position 
as the boards’ Chairs. Finally, a very interesting correlation found in this table is the one between the 
CEO/Chair duality and the percentage of independent directors, which is negative by 0.383, and 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  
Therefore, the presence of the CEO/Chair duality in family firms reduces the presence of independent 
directors. It can be interpreted from this that whenever the CEO controls the board of directors through 
his/her position as the board’s Chair to control all strategic decisions prevents as much as possible the 
presence of independent directors to monitor the board’s and management’s actions and behaviors. This 
is a clear attempt at expropriation employed by the family firm’s CEO/Chair to control all the firm’s 
board and deny the presence of independent directors and not allow any external monitoring over their 
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actions. However, a very important point to mention here is that the correlation between the first-day 
underpricing and each of the main governance mechanisms such as the founder CEO, the CEO/Chair 
duality, the separation in shares, and the percentage of independent directors is very weak and 
statistically insignificant. This means that no significant association is found between IPO underpricing 
and governance mechanisms.  
Accordingly, underpricing is to be least affected by the presence or the absence of a founder CEO, the 
CEO/Chair duality, the separation in shares, and independent directors. Since we are describing the main 
governance mechanisms in French family firms, we will refer to a research study conducted by Ferreira 
and Kirchmaier (2013), who worked on European board composition. Below we present a summary of 
the authors’ findings. We also present a comparison of the board composition of French family firms 
with European and typical French ones. 
Table 25: Comparative study of board size in Europe 
Country Mean SD Min Max Range N 
Austria 14.34 4.99 6 24 18 41 
Belgium 9.46 3.57 5 23 18 65 
Denmark 11.41 3.43 6 20 14 34 
Finland 7.87 1.26 6 12 6 31 
France 10.76 4.25 3 27 24 247 
Germany 13.99 6.83 3 30 27 183 
Greece 9.63 3.52 5 19 14 52 
Ireland 8.51 3.37 3 21 18 73 
Italy 12.72 5.39 4 34 30 97 
Netherlands 8.88 2.96 3 16 13 90 
Switzerland 9.12 4.1 4 28 24 101 
United Kingdom 6.5 2.56 2 25 23 1,326 
French Family Firms  4.67   1.81   3  11  8 86 
Table 25 summarizes part of the authors’ work by mentioning basic descriptive statistics on major 
European countries’ board size. We have added in the last row the French family firms’ board size and 
other variables found during our analysis in this chapter through our inspection of the firms’ IPO 
prospectuses. As noted earlier, French family firms have an average board size of 4.67, with a standard 
deviation of 1.81, and a minimum and maximum of three and 11 board members, respectively. On the 
other hand, the board size on average in French firms is 10.76, with a standard deviation of 4.25, and a 
minimum and a maximum of three and 27 board members, respectively. So French family firms have 
on average a much smaller board size than the typical French firm. Moreover, the remaining countries 
also have bigger board sizes than the French family firms, which ranged from a low of 6.5 board 
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members in the UK to 14.34 board members in Austria. Moreover, Germany, Italy, and Denmark have 
average board sizes of 13.99, 12.72, and 11.41, respectively. Therefore, the small board sizes proposed 
by the French family firms’ owners can be interpreted as better retaining control over board members. 
It may also be for better communication among the board members. However, through our inspection 
of the composition of firms’ boards, we noticed that most French family firms’ boards are composed 
solely of family members, with a very low percentage of independent or outside directors, as we will 
see in the following table. Also, we have noticed that the board’s Chair is mostly the same as the firm’s 
CEO, which demonstrates a threat with respect to a proper corporate governance mechanism and 
management quality control and assurance. 
Table 26: Comparative study of independent directors in Europe 
Country Mean SD Min Max Range N 
Austria 39% 26% 0% 83% 83% 41 
Belgium 43% 16% 0% 83% 83% 65 
Denmark 29% 23% 0% 89% 89% 34 
Finland 78% 19% 38% 100% 62% 31 
France 35% 22% 0% 100% 100% 247 
Germany 5% 16% 0% 86% 86% 183 
Greece 38% 19% 0% 80% 80% 52 
Ireland 46% 28% 0% 91% 91% 73 
Italy 43% 17% 0% 84% 84% 97 
Netherlands 52% 22% 0% 88% 88% 90 
Switzerland 42% 38% 0% 100% 100% 101 
United Kingdom 34% 25% 0% 100% 100% 1,326 
French Family Firms 20% 23% 0% 67% 67% 86 
While Table 25 shows the board size, Table 26 shows the percentage of independent directors in most 
European countries. This is also a part of the work of Ferreira and Kirchmaier (2013). Here we have 
also added in the last row the French family firms’ percentage of independent boards that we found 
during our analysis of the firms’ prospectuses. We note that French family firms have an average 
independent directors’ percentage of 20%, with a standard deviation of 23%, and a minimum and 
maximum of 0% and 67%, respectively. By comparing the family firms’ average percentage of 
independent directors of 20% with the typical French corporation percentage of 35%, we certainly notice 
that the difference between the two is substantial. Moreover, as we notice in the correlation analysis 
below, we find a positive relationship, yet somehow weak and statistically significant at only the 10% 
level, between the board’s size and independent directors. It can be interpreted from this that bigger 
board sizes attract more independent and outside directors. 
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Interestingly, the average percentage of independent directors in Germany is only 5% while the average 
board size in Germany is 13.99, as we have seen above. However, if we remove Germany’s percentage, 
which is considered an outlier compared to others, and also by excluding our sample of the French 
family firms, we notice that the average percentage of independent directors is 43.55% in Europe. This 
is much higher than the average percentage of independent directors of the French family firms of only 
20%. Moreover, we notice that Finland, the Netherlands, and Ireland have the highest percentages of 
independent directors of 78%, 52%, and 46%, respectively. Also, Italy’s average percentage of 
independent directors is 43%, which is very close to that of Switzerland of 42%, but higher than that of 
the UK of 34%, Austria of 39%, and its neighbor, France, of 35%. 
Therefore, generally speaking, it is obvious that French family firms’ owners intended to keep their 
board size small compared to their French and European counterparts, to better monitor and control the 
boards’ members. Moreover, family firms’ owners recruit independent directors insufficiently compared 
to their counterparts, which might be due to the expropriation intention assumed by firms’ owners, in 
particular that most board members are family affiliated. These two compositions of the board of 
directors (size and independence) of French family firms can be explained from an agency perspective 
that family firms’ owners intend to expropriate outside, dispersed, and minority shareholders. This is so 
because we have also seen that the founder is mostly the firm’s CEO and also holds the position of the 
board’s Chair.  
Therefore, a Type 2 agency problem arises here, which is between insider family firms’ owners, who 
are the majority, and outsider dispersed shareholders, who are the minority. Yet, this is still one possible 
explanation that we found during our analysis of the main governance mechanisms applied by French 
family firms. However, we noticed from the correlation matrix that a relatively strong, positive, and 
statistically significant correlation at the 1% level exists between the gross proceeds and firms’ board 
size. Equally, bigger proceeds go along with bigger board sizes. So, since we have previously seen that 
European firms have raised much bigger gross proceeds than French family firms, this could explain 
their bigger board sizes and higher percentage of independent directors. From this point of view, we can 
deduce that the small board size of the French family firms is not strictly intended for expropriation 
purposes as we suggested earlier, but simply because their firms are much smaller in size than a typical 
French or European firm, which does not require bigger board sizes and a higher percentage of 
independent directors. Accordingly, family firms, which are on average very small in size, not only do 
not require bigger board sizes to manage and control the firm’s management but also they probably do 
not have sufficient funds to increase their board size and remunerate their board members.  
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In Figure 11 here below, we present in a histogram French family firms’ board sizes. 
Figure 11: Histogram of French family firms’ board size. 
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We notice that although the average board size of French family firms is only 4.67, as we previously 
discussed, there are a good number of firms that have even smaller board sizes. For instance, we find 
that almost 30 out of the 86 firms have board sizes of between 3 and 3.8. Moreover, board sizes bigger 
than seven are very few and far between and considered exceptions and outliers. 
3.4. Hypothesis Testing and Results 
As mentioned, we will test six hypotheses related to IPO underpricing from one part and the ownership 
and control rights and governance mechanisms from the other part. Therefore, we will test and observe 
the effects of ownership and governance mechanisms set by the French family firms on IPO 
underpricing, going from the first to the thirtieth day. In the review of literature, we have explained the 
choice of these hypotheses along with the significance of the relationship between IPO underpricing and 
ownership and governance mechanisms. Thus, here we will just recall the six hypotheses that we will 
test: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship between the level of family ownership and IPO 
underpricing. 
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Hypothesis 2: There is a negative relationship between the presence of a founder CEO and IPO 
underpricing in family firms. 
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relationship between the duality of the firm’s CEO/Chair position and 
IPO underpricing in family firms. 
Hypothesis 4: There is a negative relationship between the proportion of independent directors and IPO 
underpricing in family firms. 
Hypothesis 5: There is a negative relationship between board member ownership and IPO underpricing 
for family firms.  
Hypothesis 6: There is a positive relationship between the IPO underpricing and the part of the capital 
retained by the founder. 
Therefore, we will test these hypotheses by using the correlation matrix between the mentioned 
ownership and governance mechanisms from one part, and the IPO underpricing from the first to the 
thirtieth day from the other part. The correlation results are presented in Table 27 at the 5% statistical 
significance level and with the 86 total observations. 
Table 27: Pearson correlation table 
Variable 
Pearson Correlations 
Marked correlations are significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level 
N=86 (Casewise deletion of missing data) 
% CF FF 
Pre-IPO 
CEO 
Founder 
CEO/Chair 
Duality 
% Indep. 
Directors 
CF Board 
Pre-IPO 
% CF FF 
Post-IPO 
up_1d 0.091 -0.059 -0.104 0.041 0.087 0.155 
up_2d 0.176 0.139 0.067 -0.040 0.069 0.261** 
up_3d 0.093 0.089 0.091 -0.090 -0.131 0.173 
up_4d 0.093 0.109 0.081 -0.059 -0.170 0.137 
up_5d 0.060 0.106 0.063 -0.021 -0.209 0.093 
up_10d 0.072 0.090 0.079 -0.067 -0.143 0.092 
up_15d 0.068 0.139 0.111 -0.044 -0.133 0.097 
up_30d 0.098 0.136 0.140 -0.090* 0.001 0.113 
Before listing our results, it is worth noting that we have conducted another correlation test between the 
mentioned above variables by using the Spearman’s correlation, aiming to spot any nonparametric 
measure of statistical dependence between any two variables. Interestingly, we got very close results to 
those of the Pearson correlation with the same level of statistical significance; therefore we will solely 
employ the latter. 
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The first hypothesis mentions that the relationship between the level of family ownership pre-IPO date 
and the underpricing level is negative. However, from the Pearson correlation table, surprisingly, we 
notice that a positive, very weak and statistically insignificant correlation exists between these two 
variables. This reveals that IPO underpricing of French family firms is insensitive toward the cash flow 
rights pre-IPO date held by the family firms’ owners. Therefore, the family presence does not play a 
significant role either in underpricing or in overpricing the issue. This leads to the conclusion to reject 
the hypothesis that the presence of family firms’ owners has a negative impact on underpricing.  
The second hypothesis mentions that the relationship between the presence of a founder CEO and 
underpricing level is negative. From the Pearson correlation table, we also notice that for most 
underpricing, a positive, very weak and statistically insignificant correlation exists between these two 
variables, but slightly stronger than that between the two variables mentioned in the first hypothesis. 
Here, we can also reject the hypothesis stating that the founder CEO has negative effects on underpricing 
family firms’ shares. 
The third hypothesis mentions that the relationship between the duality of position of the CEO and the 
Chair and IPO underpricing in family firms is negative. From the Pearson correlation table, we also 
notice that for most underpricing, a positive, very weak and statistically insignificant correlation exists 
between these two variables which resembles the correlation between the family firm ownership and 
underpricing stated in the first hypothesis. Therefore we reject the hypothesis that suggests a negative 
relationship exists between the duality of the CEO/Chair position and IPO underpricing.  
The fourth hypothesis mentions that the relationship between the presence of independent directors and 
IPO underpricing in family firms is negative. From the Pearson correlation table, we notice that mostly 
a negative relationship exists between the two variables but it is still very weak and insignificant. 
Accordingly, we reject the fourth hypothesis. 
The fifth hypothesis mentions that the relationship between board member ownership pre-IPO and IPO 
underpricing for family firms is negative. From the Pearson correlation table, we notice that mostly a 
negative relationship exists between the two variables but it is still very weak and insignificant. 
Therefore, we reject the fifth hypothesis. 
The sixth hypothesis mentions that the relationship between IPO underpricing and the part of the capital 
retained by the founder after the IPO is positive. From the Pearson correlation table, we notice that a 
positive relationship exists between the two variables but somehow it is weak and insignificant except 
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for the second-day underpricing, which is equal to 0.261. This can be interpreted as meaning that when 
firms go public and the family firms’ owners still hold a significant part of the firms’ cash flow rights, 
shares are further underpriced during the second day. Thus, we cannot reject the sixth hypothesis.  
3.5. Regression Analysis 
To explain the French family firms’ IPO underpricing given different ownership and control rights and 
some governance mechanism variables, we will employ here below two different multiple linear 
regression models by changing the predictors that match these variables. Thus, in the first model we will 
address the ownership and control rights for the family firms’ owners and the change between the two 
rights after issuance; in the second model we will address some specific governance mechanisms set by 
the family firms on issuance day. 
3.5.1. Regression Variables 
Before running the regressions, we present a descriptive statistics table for the dependent, independent 
and control variables in each model. We have prepared the Pearson correlation table to check the 
correlation sign, strength and significance level between all variables, and another table that includes 
the tolerance and the variance inflation factor (VIF) to check whether any multicollinearity problem 
exists between the independent variables. We then present the regression analysis and finally the 
summary regression results. It is worth noting that all analyses were conducted by including four control 
variables at the same time which are related to IPO timing, issue size, average firm age, and firm 
industry, as subsequently mentioned.  
The Dependent Variable 
As previously discussed, the dependent variable that we are interested to explain is the French family 
firms’ underpricing. As mentioned above, we calculated the underpricing by using the market index 
return, being the first method of adjusted underpricing. More specifically, the IPO underpricing that we 
attempt to explain is the first day underpricing to differentiate between the direct IPO effect set by the 
issuers and the speculative periods created after issuance by the overoptimism of investors who, as 
previously discussed, drove the share price at very high levels. 
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The Independent Variables 
Below is a brief summary of the independent variables that will be used in both models. 
Ownership and Control Rights Model 
i. The Dif_CF_VO_Public stands for the difference between cash flow rights and voting rights 
for the public shareholders. As mentioned above, upon issuance, public shareholders were given 
some control rights that were lower than their cash flow rights. We calculated the difference 
between the two public shareholders’ rights for each issue and included it in our regression 
analysis to measure its effect on underpricing. 
ii. FF_%_CF_Chge stands for family firms’ owners’ percentage cash flow rights change from pre- 
to post-IPO date to measure the degree of ownership disposal and its effect on underpricing.  
iii. %_CF_Public_Post-IPO stands for the percentage of cash flow rights for the public shareholders 
post-IPO date. The purpose of including this variable is to watch the effect of the public 
shareholding levels on underpricing.  
Governance Mechanisms Model 
i. Ln(Board_Size) is the natural logarithm of a firm’s board size due to the importance of the board 
members and the board size in the firm’s governance. 
ii. CEO_Founder defines if the family firm’s founder is the same person as the firm’s CEO on the 
day of issuance. This is a dummy variable that will be equal to 1.00 if the firm’s founder is the 
firm’s CEO on the day of issuance and 0.00 if not.  
iii. Duality defines if the firm’s CEO is the same person as the firm’s board’s Chair on the day of 
issuance. This is a dummy variable that will be equal to 1.00 if the firm’s CEO is the same 
person as the firm’s board’s Chair on the day of issuance and 0.00 if not. 
iv. Separation_Shares denotes if the firm has already or intends to issue shares with double voting 
rights or different classes of share to favor the existing shareholders. It also shows if there is a 
separation between the cash flow rights and the voting rights. This is a dummy variable that will 
be equal to 1.00 if the separation in shares exists and 0.00 if not. 
v. %_Independent means the percentage of independent directors present on the firm’s board with 
respect to the total number of directors.  
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The Control Variables 
We aim to include control variables related to IPO timing, issue size, average firm’s age, and firm’s 
industry. As for the firm’s age, Reside et al. (1994) found evidence for a negative correlation between 
firm’s age and level of underpricing, which is attributed to the availability of information in the older 
firm. Thus, according to the authors, older firms shall have less underpricing than young firms. As for 
the firm’s industry, the phenomenon of IPO underpricing is studied across the industries by many 
researchers to examine the implications of industry classification. The most important difference is 
considered to be the difference in financial industry versus non-financial industry by researchers (Cagle 
and Porter, 1996; Tinic, 1988). Since financial institutions are controlled by regulatory bodies, there is 
less initial uncertainty about the firm value compared to non-regulated industrial firms when they try to 
launch their IPOs. Even with higher restriction, there is less information asymmetry in the market. Cagle 
and Porter (1996) support the lower underpricing (4.8% less) of financial institutions (thrifts, 
commercial banks, utilities, and insurance companies as financial institutions) compared to other 
industrial institutions, but no significant difference is found between the underpricing of commercial 
banks and other financial institutions. They also examine the difference between the underpricing levels 
of these financial institutions individually and other industrial firms, and found the differences to be 
thrifts (4.2%), commercial banks (5.8%), insurance companies (8.4%), and utilities (2.7%).  
In contrast to this, Tinic (1988) found that the underpricing of regulated financial institutions is greater 
than that of non‐regulated firms because underwriters and issuers would tend to underprice the IPOs to 
avoid future legal liabilities for misrepresenting the firms’ true value. Additionally, Ritter (1984) found 
a significant difference in the US between underpricing levels of the offerings of natural resource firms 
and non-natural resource firms using data from 1977‒1982. The control variables that we will use in our 
two models are described below. 
i. Pre-DotCom is a proxy for the IPO timing which is a dummy variable equal to 1.00 if the IPO 
occurs before the 2001 IPO bubble burst and 0.00 if after it. We have included this variable 
because we have seen in the previous analysis the relatively large number of IPOs that occurred 
just before the 2001 IPO bubble burst and which could have an effect over the IPO underpricing.  
ii. H_Tech is a proxy for the firm industry which is a dummy variable equal to 1.00 if the issuing 
firm belongs to the high-technology industry and 0.00 if it does not. 
iii. Ln(Proceed) is the natural logarithm of the firm’s gross proceeds measuring the issue size of 
each firm and can also be a size measurement of equity raised. 
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iv. Ln(Age) is the natural logarithm of the firm’s age at the date of its issuance which counts the 
years from the date of firm creation to the date of issuance.  
Again, our justification for choosing these control variables at pre-IPO date is to observe whether the 
IPO underpricing for family firms is sensitive in the presence of these variables and to differentiate both 
firms with similar and dissimilar issue size and age, and those that do or do not belong to the high-tech 
industry. In addition, the IPO timing was included due to its importance in IPO pricing and returns, as 
seen in the review of literature. As described above, these control variables will be chosen in two phases. 
In the first, we will include only the IPO timing, while the second will include all four control variables 
to observe if collectively they present or offer some enhancement to the model’s results and can better 
explain the return variance than by including these control variables along with the independent 
variables which are related first to ownership and control rights and second to governance mechanisms. 
It is worth noting that it has been observed by many researchers that firm size and risk move in opposite 
directions, meaning that smaller firms are riskier than bigger firms.  
Thus, since IPO underpricing implicitly holds numerous risk factors, we assume that small firms have 
greater underpricing than big firms. As mentioned above, we will mainly focus on the issue size for size 
proxy. The issue size is equal to IPO share price times the number of shares outstanding. This therefore 
includes the market capitalization of the firm being subject to IPO and so we would like to observe the 
effect of issue size on underpricing, which could be more interrelated than the firm’s total assets pre-
IPO date. Therefore we will calculate the natural logarithm of the gross issue size for each firm and 
include it in the model. Additionally, as mentioned above, firm age can be considered an important 
factor of information asymmetry.  
As a result, we will assume that younger firms will be more opaque and thus more subject to 
underpricing. Also, young firms are more susceptible to business risk and their risk of failure is higher: 
therefore investors underprice these firms more than the older ones. We will also calculate the natural 
logarithm of firm’s age in our model. Last but not least, the firm industry is included to differentiate 
between different industries and to remove any uncertainty about IPO underpricing due to the industry 
to which the firm belongs. As we have seen, in firms in high technology and servicing industries or firms 
in industries where intensive research and development is required, higher underpricing is perceived due 
to the high risk and uncertainty such firms have, and due to the high volatility to which their future cash 
flows are subject. For practicality in the regression models, we have included a dummy variable for the 
industry. We grouped the seven industries into two main groups and observed whether the firm belongs 
to the high-tech industry or not. 
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4. REGRESSION RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
As mentioned above, we will run two main regression analyses in an attempt to explain first day IPO 
underpricing via ownership and control variables first, and governance mechanisms second. 
4.1.1. Ownership and Control Rights  
Table 28: Regression of the ownership and control rights 
N=86 
Regression Summary for Dependent Variable: up_1d  
R=0.4019 R²=0.1615 Adjusted R²=0.0862 
F(7.78)=2.1461 p<0.04827 Std.Error of estimate: 0.06439 
VIF b* Std.Err. b Std.Err. t(78) p-value 
Intercept      0.056 0.088 0.640 0.524 
Pre-DotCom 1.232** -0.246** 0.115 -0.035** 0.017 -2.138 0.036 
H_Tech 1.232 -0.057 0.115 -0.009 0.019 -0.495 0.622 
LN(Proceed) 1.157 0.022 0.112 0.001 0.006 0.195 0.846 
LN(Age) 1.225 0.032 0.115 0.002 0.009 0.281 0.779 
Dif_CF_VO_Public 1.353 -0.065 0.121 -0.098 0.182 -0.537 0.592 
FF_%_CF_Chge 2.232* -0.295* 0.155 -0.114* 0.060 -1.905 0.060 
%_CF_Public_After 2.611*** -0.506*** 0.167 -0.289*** 0.096 -3.024 0.003 
As explained, we will include in this model four control variables which are the DotCom bubble burst, 
the high-technology industry, the natural logarithm of gross proceeds, natural logarithm of age and the 
remaining three independent variables related to ownership and control rights for an attempt to explain 
the first day underpricing.  
We note that all employed variables in the model have highly acceptable variance inflation factor (VIF) 
levels since they are all less than the threshold value of 4 used and argued by Pan and Jackson (2008). 
Therefore we can assume that we do not have a multicollinearity problem and we can include all the 
variables in the multiple linear regression. We note that the model’s R-squared is equal to 0.1615, which 
means that 16.15% of the first day underpricing variance can be explained by this model’s variables, 
which are related to ownership and control rights change. The adjusted R-squared recorded 8.62%. 
Moreover, the model’s p-value is less than 5%. Concerning the control variables, we mention that only 
the pre-DotCom variable is statistically significant at the 5% level with a coefficient beta of -0.246, 
while the high-tech, gross proceeds and age variables are all statistically insignificant and their 
standardized coefficient betas are statistically not different than zero. Concerning the independent 
variables, we note that the family firms’ cash flow rights change and the public shareholders’ cash flow 
rights are both statistically significant at 10% and 1% respectively. Their standardized coefficient betas 
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are equal to -0.295 and -0.506 respectively. However, the difference between the cash flow rights and 
the voting rights for the public shareholders variable is statistically insignificant. We attribute this result 
to the possibility of dominance of the short-term envisioned and opportunistic investors who care less 
about voting rights than about realizing high and prompt returns. 
4.1.2. Governance Mechanisms 
Table 29: Regression results of the governance mechanisms 
N=86 
Regression Summary for Dependent Variable: up_1d 
R=0.3122 R²=0.0975 Adjusted R²=----- 
F(9.76)=.91208 p<0.51943 Std.Error of estimate: 0.06767 
VIF b* Std.Err. b Std.Err. t(76) p-value 
Intercept    0.107 0.100 1.073 0.287 
Pre-DotCom 1.392 -0.145 0.129 -0.021 0.019 -1.129 0.262 
H_Tech 1.299 -0.070 0.124 -0.011 0.020 -0.565 0.573 
LN(Proceed) 1.346 -0.043 0.126 -0.002 0.006 -0.338 0.736 
LN(Age) 1.195 0.118 0.119 0.009 0.009 0.988 0.326 
LN(Board_Size) 1.331 -0.189 0.126 -0.036 0.024 -1.505 0.137 
CEO_Founder 1.301 -0.012 0.124 -0.002 0.021 -0.095 0.924 
Duality 1.455 -0.050 0.131 -0.008 0.021 -0.381 0.704 
Separation_Shares 1.078 -0.022 0.113 -0.003 0.016 -0.197 0.844 
%_Independent 1.344 0.083 0.126 0.025 0.037 0.660 0.511 
We noticed first that there is no collinearity problem among the variables since all VIFs are much less 
than the threshold of 4. However, although the R-squared recorded 9.75%, the adjusted R-squared 
dropped to zero and the p-value is greater than 51%. Moreover, and surprisingly, none of the control 
and independent variables seems to be statistically significantly different than zero or to present any 
enhancement in explaining the first day underpricing. As a result, none of the control variables 
contributes to an explanation of the first day underpricing combined with governance mechanisms. We 
attribute this result to the possibility that investors in IPOs care more about the ownership and control 
rights change, as we observe in the first model, than about governance mechanisms. This might occur 
because investors in family firms’ IPOs already know that they are investing in family firms and the set 
of governance mechanisms favor the family firms’ owners; therefore the government mechanisms do 
not constitute a major variable in explaining the IPO first day abnormal returns.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we have attempted to explain the IPO underpricing of French family firms departing 
from firms’ ownership and control structure pre- and post-IPO date, and from the corporate governance 
mechanisms set by the family firms’ owners pre-IPO date. Initially, we have reviewed the main motives 
for family firms in going public, such as to solve succession problems, to finance future company 
growth, to increase share liquidity, and to diversify family owners’ portfolios. Additionally, we have 
reviewed the main research, theories and literature explaining IPOs’ performance in the short term, 
which is usually referred to as IPO underpricing. We discussed the IPO underpricing from an 
information asymmetry perspective among the major players in IPOs, who are the issuers, the 
underwriters and the public investors. Most researchers have found that whenever information 
asymmetries increase, IPO underpricing increases to compensate investors for the risk they take by 
investing in IPOs. Thus, information asymmetry from different dimensions was considered by many 
authors as the main source of IPO underpricing in many markets and countries. Another main source of 
underpricing is related to ownership structure. Therefore targeted ownership and control structure affect 
IPO underpricing and investors’ perceptions toward firms’ value. We have seen that, when going public, 
the percentage of cash flow rights and voting rights allocated for the public shareholders affects IPO 
underpricing. Last but not least, signaling also has its part in explaining IPO underpricing. Sometimes, 
issuers and underwriters have information to share among public shareholders and, through signaling, 
they circulate such information which will cause underpricing. 
During our observation and analysis of the French family firms’ IPO underpricing, we have spotted an 
average of 1.92%, a median of 0.00%, and a lower and upper quartile of -0.61% and 1.11% respectively, 
compared to higher (and sometimes much higher) underpricing found by many researchers for French 
IPOs or even for typical IPOs. We attributed this lower average first day underpricing to the alignment 
of interest between the family firms’ principals and agents, leading to lower type 1 agency problems. 
However, a type 2 agency problem, discussed by Zingales (1995), is clearly present between the majority 
and the minority shareholders in these family firms. We noticed that, on average, family firms’ owners 
made a clear attempt to increase their control over their firms by assuring higher levels of control rights 
with respect to their levels of cash flow rights. Thus, the gap between the two rights has been widened 
via the IPO, which is considered a clear attempt of minority shareholders’ expropriation, as described 
by La Porta et al. (2000). For instance, before the IPO date, the average percentage of cash flow rights 
of family firms was 74.9% versus an average voting rights percentage of 76.2%, having a gap between 
the two of 1.3%. After the IPO, the average percentage of cash flow rights of family firms became 62.3% 
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versus an average voting rights percentage of 66.9%, expanding the gap to 4.6%. Thus, after the IPO, 
the percentage of cash flow rights of family firms dropped by more than the percentage of voting rights. 
Also, the average cash flow rights of other shareholders and of the public shareholders post-IPO date 
were equal to 18.2% and 19.6%, whereas their respective average voting rights at post-IPO date were 
equal to 17.9% and 15.3%. Thus, expropriation of minority shareholders is clearly conducted by the 
family firms’ owners who used the IPO to attain their financing objectives in raising funds and at the 
same time enhance their control rights over their firms with respect to their cash flow rights.  
We also noticed that 67% of French family firms have a separation in shares, which is considered a clear 
attempt to expropriate shareholders’ wealth. Firms’ owners significantly favor their interests throughout 
the offering by allocating double voting rights for themselves, their descendants and direct relatives. 
Moreover, around 77% of the French family firms have their CEOs holding the position of the boards’ 
Chair on the day of the IPO. We have discussed that where the firm’s CEO holds a Chair position at the 
same time, this represents another way in which family firms strongly exert control over their firms. We 
also found that around 80% of the French family firms were managed on their IPO date by the same 
person who founded the firm. Equally, founder CEOs were present in almost 80% of family firms. This 
reveals three important ideas to discuss. As mentioned, it shows the robustness and persistence of the 
firms’ founders who remained on the top of the firm’s management until the issuance day in managing 
the firms they created. Also, the average life of a family firm before going public is 16.9 years, which 
is quite long. In this respect, we can deduce that the French family firms’ owners do not much differ 
from other family firms’ owners in other countries in their behavior towards minority shareholders and 
their different attempts in expropriating them via dual-class stocks and pyramidal ownership, as 
discussed by La Porta et al. (1999). 
Also, we noticed that most board members are strictly and directly affiliated to the firms’ owners and 
they mostly hold key managerial positions in addition to their directorship positions, making their 
ultimate monitoring role over the firms’ management less important, less efficient and, of course, less 
real. For instance, we have seen that the average family firm boards’ size is 4.67 versus 10.76 for a 
typical French board size, 14.34 for an Austrian, 13.99 for a German, 12.72 for an Italian, and 11.41 for 
a Danish and 6.5 for an English board. The average percentage of independent directors in French family 
firms is only 20%, while in Europe as a whole it is 43.6%. Finland, the Netherlands, Ireland and France 
recorded 78%, 52%, 46%, and 35% respectively. Thus, in family firms, this would make control and 
influence over the board’s decisions by the family firm’s Chair easier, faster and stronger. Also, from 
these facts and figures, we note that family firms’ owners do their best to retain control over their firms 
by granting themselves the majority in control and cash flow rights, the majority on boards’ seats, the 
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minimum of independent directors, and effectively present in both, the firm’s supervisory and 
management board. Therefore, for the family firms’ owners, relinquishing control via the IPO over the 
firms they have created is out of the question. 
We also note that the 86 French family firms were able to raise total gross proceeds of €2,316 million 
as per 2013 euro value, making an average of €27 million raised by every firm. These average proceeds 
of French family firms are well below the average proceeds raised by a typical French or European firm 
that on average raises €1,058 million and €581 million respectively. This fact helps to explain the high 
degree of control exercised by the majority of the firms’ owners. Therefore, even though their firms are 
listed on exchanges and public shareholders can subscribe and trade the firms’ shares, these firms are 
still of very small size and are treated by the firms’ owners as privately held firms with respect to control 
and governance.  
In an attempt to explain IPO underpricing, we have presented two models. The first includes family firm 
owners’ ownership and control rights change and the percentages allocated for the public shareholders. 
With a high degree of statistical significance, we can explain around 16.2% of the IPO underpricing 
variance through ownership and control rights change. The second model includes governance 
mechanisms applied by the family firms upon their issuance. However, surprisingly, and at a very high 
statistically insignificant level, we found that around 9.8% of the IPO underpricing can be explained by 
governance mechanisms. We attribute this result to the possibility of having short-term sighted investors 
and speculators who are more sensitive toward change in cash flow rights allocated via the IPO rather 
than toward governance mechanisms set by the family firms. This might also be explained by the very 
small percentage allocated for the public, which on average did not exceed 20%. Thus, investors with 
such a small percentage of cash flow and even less in voting rights are less sensitive about firms’ 
governance since they are aware that they cannot exert significant control over the family firms. This 
can also be shown in the first day and first month abnormal returns that were around 2% and 30% 
respectively. Therefore, speculative and over-optimistic investors are those who drive the share price 
upward quickly. 
We recall that the sample size we worked on covers only 86 listed family firms. Although other 
researchers have worked on similar or even smaller sample sizes as we have elaborated, yet, from a 
statistics viewpoint, it would be desirable to increase the sample size for more reliable and robust results. 
In the future, we aim to increase the firm sample size by including both types of firms, family and non-
family, and making a thorough comparative analysis. Moreover, we aim to conduct another research on 
family firms in other European countries to spot the main ownership and governance mechanisms and 
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observe their impact on IPO underpricing. We aim to do so because we have thoroughly explained the 
importance of such mechanisms set by family firms and therefore we would like to test the market 
perception and response regarding such mechanisms on IPO date using cross-country analysis. 
Additionally, our purpose was to explain the IPO underpricing via these two ownership and governance 
mechanisms and not to explain family firms’ underpricing in general, because, as we have seen in the 
literature, there are limitless variables that can affect underpricing but which were not taken into 
consideration due to our specific scope of work. In future research, we aim to include other variables, 
such as independent external auditors, underwriters’ reputation, size, historical records and performance, 
the presence of venture capital and private equity funds among the firms’ boards, the main firms’ target 
shareholders, and firm-related risk factors such as business risk and financial risk, country risk, general 
economic conditions, and general’s market trends and conditions pre-IPO date. For instance, Certo et 
al. (2001a) argue that many factors other than the governance mechanisms may affect the extent of 
underpricing. However, future research should also attempt to examine the impact of contextual factors 
on the interaction between corporate governance and performance of the IPO ﬁrm by controlling for 
inter-industry differences, and other extra-organizational factors (Zahra and Pearce, 1989).  
Moreover, we have extracted the percentage of cash flow rights allocated to the public shareholders at 
post-IPO date, but we have not observed the types of public investor. For instance, we have not checked 
whether they are large institutional shareholders, investment banks or just individual investors. 
However, as previously mentioned, all these types of investor could affect IPO underpricing differently. 
Thus, in the future, we will go into further detail about the public shareholders and divide them into 
institutional and non-institutional shareholders to observe the effect of each on IPO underpricing.  
In addition, an extremely important variable that many researchers have observed in IPO underpricing 
is the time effect. This means that IPO performance is highly influenced by the time during which issuers 
decide to go public. More specifically, during different times, economic, financial and market conditions 
change and therefore IPO valuation does too. For instance, as mentioned earlier, the “hot issue markets” 
theory has been proposed by Ritter (1984 and 1991) to explain firms going public, which states that 
issuers attempt to benefit from bullish stock markets and investors’ over-optimistic behavior to launch 
their firms. It is so because during such periods, investors, analysts and underwriters tend to overestimate 
overall economic conditions, firms’ future revenues, net earnings, cash flows, and thus firms’ intrinsic 
value. During such bullish periods, investors’ appetite to assimilate further risks by investing in IPOs 
escalates, and therefore creating greater demand for IPO firms. This would therefore justify the higher 
prices investors are willing to bid to acquire IPO shares, and issuers carefully take advantage of this to 
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maximize their proceeds when going public. So, to return to our delicate variable in better explaining 
IPO underpricing, the timing effect, we would say that in both our models, this variable has not been 
precisely considered in all its aspects by differentiating the “hot” from the “cold” issue markets as 
proposed by Ritter, mainly due to the small sample size we have worked on, compared to Ritter’s sample 
size of over 1,500 IPOs. Rather, we have taken all the 86 family firms that were issued during 20 years 
and segregated the ones that were issued pre- and post- the DotCom bubble burst of 2001, using a 
dummy variable of 1.00 or 0.00 to measure this variable. As a result, although we attempted to measure 
the time effect on the IPO underpricing and got some results for it, we could not measure the precise 
effect of time and the precise market pulse, conditions and trends other than using the market-adjusted 
return. Therefore, to solve this issue in our future research and to better explain IPO underpricing via 
the time effect, we would aim to increase the sample size by either including more than one country 
with similar characteristics to the French markets, as previously noted, or by closely observing two 
different periods that are believed to be “hot” and “cold” issue markets. By this means, we would be 
creating two sub-samples and better comparisons could be made accordingly. 
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CHAPTER 3: IPO LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the initial public offering (IPO) is a very important and 
fundamental step in a firm’s life and a central issue in corporate finance, as it transforms the firm from 
privately held to a publicly held firm, changing dramatically its ownership structure, capital structure, 
growth potential, legislative requirements, reporting standards, public communication, strategic 
objectives, analysts’ inspections and followings, peer competition levels, firm image, human capital, 
and the overall rules of the business. As a result, IPOs have received widespread attention in literature: 
limitless research papers, professional articles and analyses have been conducted worldwide attempting 
to explain IPO behavior, trends, and performance in the short and the long term. However, most 
researchers in the field have identified conflicting and sometimes unexplained results in IPO 
performance, which they refer to as ‘IPO anomalies’. These are summarized by positive first day returns 
(so-called underpricing) and negative long-term performance (so-called underperformance). Those two 
anomalies have been the central points of numerous researches worldwide, attempting to explain their 
source, magnitude, and effect. 
In the previous chapter, we have seen that underpricing is the positive return that a shareholder can 
achieve when a newly public share is bought at the offering price and sold at the first closing day price. 
Additionally, there are numerous research papers that document the existence of the initial underpricing 
phenomenon for newly listed firms during the early days of trading across many countries and capital 
markets (Ibbotson, 1975; Welch, 1992; Ritter, 2002; Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Zouari et al., 2011), in 
various periods (Ritter and Welch, 2002), and over various levels over time (Loughran and Ritter, 2002). 
For example, in the 1980s, the average IPO underpricing hovered around 7%. It increased to 15% during 
the period 1990‒1998, and jumped to 65% during the short period of the DotCom 1999‒2000 bubble 
(Gajewski and Gresse, 2006).  
However, although the true reason for underpricing in IPOs is still a mystery (Ritter, 1991), many 
researchers have tried to explain it via different theories and models. One of the main reasons for such 
underpricing which has been observed by many authors is the ex-ante uncertainty shareholders face in 
assessing the quality of the IPO firms (Rock, 1986). Another important reason for underpricing is the 
information asymmetry problem among participants in the IPO, which adds difficulty in assessing the 
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real value of the shares at introduction. Thus, the issuing firm has to incentivize investors to buy its 
offering shares by discounting the share price and generating a positive return in the first days after its 
initial offering. However, many other theories presented by prominent researchers attempting to explain 
IPO underpricing were observed in the previous chapter. We have focused on the main corporate 
governance mechanisms applied by owners of French family firms, pre- and post-IPO dates, and tested 
their effect and significance on IPO underpricing, with the inclusion of some other variables, notably 
ownership and control related variables, offering price and period, and firm’s age.  
In a nutshell, we have found that the French family firms are underpriced starting the first day, and the 
mentioned governance mechanisms with the remaining variables contribute to explain around 25% of 
the variance of such underpricing. The result is statistically significant. 
Conversely, the long-run underperformance describes the observation that IPO firms, over the one to 
five year period subsequent to the IPO, tend to underperform relative to the market and relative to public 
firms with similar characteristics, such as size, industry, capital structure, etc. (e.g., Loughran and Ritter, 
1995; Ritter, 1991). For instance, numerous studies in different countries have confirmed 
underperformance one (Aggarwal and Rivoli, 1990), two (Hanley, 1993), three (Loughran et al., 1994; 
Ritter, 1991), and five years (Loughran and Ritter, 1995) after issuance. Interestingly, the long-term 
share price performance of IPOs has become the focus of attention more than any time before (Espenlaub 
et al., 2000) and therefore the field is attracting more research to explain IPO performance from different 
aspects. 
Nonetheless, Chen (2001) argues that it is very confusing as to why IPO initial returns are significantly 
positive while long-run returns are negative. The author adds that, typically, if all the investors expect 
that the long-run returns of IPO shares will be negative, through backward induction, no one will invest 
in IPOs in the initial markets. Therefore the author states that since long-run underperformance of IPOs 
is an anomaly, it needs further examination and analysis. 
In their pan-European study, Gajewski and Gresse (2006) used a sample of 2,026 IPOs when they 
measured the one-year performance and a sample of 1,846 IPOs when they measured the three-year 
performance of European firms. The authors document that the long-term abnormal returns are 
frequently negative, but vary over time and across countries. However, evidence of underperformance 
at the one-year term is unclear (the average first year CAR equals -21.59%, but the average first year 
BHAR of -1.52% is not significantly different from zero). The authors also found a significant three-
year underperformance with both measures, the CAR (-87.19%) and the BHAR (-32.61%). Below, we 
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will review a summary of the most pertinent IPO long-term performance research conducted in Europe 
and other countries.  
In France, Leleux (1993) studied the long-term performance of 69 IPOs launched between 1985 and 
1991 and found a market-adjusted abnormal return of -11.2%. More recently, Boissin and Sentis (2014) 
examined 207 French IPOs occurring between 1991 and 2005, reporting a three-year excess return of -
28.85% against the size-adjusted benchmark portfolio and -68.1% against its book-to-market adjusted 
version. However, remarkably, by summarizing existent studies, Loughran et al. (1994) showed that the 
long-term underperformance is only 4.8% for France. Loughran et al. (1994) comment that the French 
market is reliable for the long-term oriented investors, as they will not lose the invested money during 
the offer price period, as was documented by Gounopoulos et al. (2007). Additionally, Chahine (2008) 
also examined IPO long-term performance for French stocks for the period 1996‒1998 and found 
negative cumulative abnormal returns of -9.94%.  
Ljungqvist (1997) combined results for the German market and reported long-term returns of -12.1%. 
Stehle et al. (2000) conducted research based on 187 German IPOs listed from 1960 to 1992 and 
observed, at the 5% significance level, a negative average buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) of 
around -6% after three years of listing. Likewise, in the United Kingdom (UK), Levis (1993) examined 
the long-term performance of 712 firms issued throughout 1980‒1988, and found over a three-year 
period that British IPOs’ underperformance is between 8% and 23%, depending on the market 
benchmark. The three benchmarks used by Levis were the Financial Times Actuaries (FTA) All Share 
Index, the Hoare Govett Smaller Companies (HGSC) Index and a specially constructed all-share 
equally-weighted index. Similarly, Espenlaub et al. (2000) re-examined evidence on long-term returns 
in the UK over the period 1985‒1995 and also found significant negative returns of 8.12% with the same 
index. In Italy, Arosio et al. (2000) conducted IPO research over 108 Italian IPOs from 1985 to 1997 
and found that these firms significantly underperform their benchmarks by 11.53%. In Spain, Alvarez 
and Gonzalez (2001) found that Spanish IPOs underperformed their benchmark by 37% after five years 
of listing. In Finland, a study was conducted by Keloharju (1993) over 79 Finnish firms that went public 
between 1984 and 1989 which documented negative long-term market-adjusted cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) of 26.4%. In addition, Jakobsen and Sorensen (2001) studied 76 Danish IPOs from 1984 
to 1992 and concluded that the IPO stocks underperformed the Danish Total Stock Index after five years 
by almost 30%. In Australia, Lee et al. (1996) observed and calculated the 36-month market-adjusted 
CAR for Australian IPOs for the period 1976‒1989 and recorded a negative CAR of 51%. In Japan, Cai 
and Wei (1997) reported in a study which covers a 19 year period that three years after the IPO is 
launched, firms generate an average return of -27%. 
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IPO long-term performance in the United States (US) has been intensively researched and analyzed by 
Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990), Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), and many others. Starting with 
Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990), the authors report that the NASDAQ index adjusted return reached -
13.73% at the 250th post listing day for a sample of 1,598 US IPOs during 1977‒1987. However, the 
return calculated by Aggarwal and Rivoli stands for only one year after the issuance date, which is 
actually not so common: when researchers calculate long-term performance, the focus is usually on three 
to five year periods. For instance, Ritter (1991) used a sample of 1,526 IPOs that went public in the US 
in the 1975‒84 period and found that in the three years after going public, these firms significantly 
underperformed a set of comparable firms matched by size and industry. Ritter explained that every 
dollar invested in a portfolio of IPOs purchased at the closing market price on the first day of trading 
results in a terminal wealth of $1.3447, while every dollar in the matching firms results in $1.6186, a 
ratio of only 0.831. Moreover, Loughran and Ritter (1995) found the three-year holding period return 
on a sample of 4,735 IPOs to be -20%. Subsequently, this aftermarket underperformance was confirmed 
by Ritter and Welch (2002), who indicated in their study that the long-term returns were negative for an 
investor buying new titles in the offer price period, and that over three years, the average IPO 
underperforms the CRSP value-weighted index by 23.4%.  
However, Lyn and Zychowicz (2003) conducted research on IPOs in Hungary and Poland and found 
that they overperform in the long term by about 19.59% and 57.17% respectively, whereas Thomadakis 
et al. (2007) conducted research on IPOs in Greece and found that they overperform by about 92.93%. 
On the other hand, Loughran et al. (1994) observed Turkish IPOs and found that they underperform by 
about 84.5%. Thomadakis et al. (2007) documented that most evidence appears to indicate negative 
long-run IPO performance in developed markets, but with notable exceptions―Greece and Portugal 
exhibit overperformance. Also, Brounen and Eichholz (2002) conducted research on IPOs issued in 
Sweden that are related to the property sector and found an overperformance over a period of three years 
of 18.89%. According to the authors, this was due to the fact that the Swedish property share market 
had been in a different phase than other more stable and mature markets.  
Moreover, Drobetz et al. (2005) conducted research on Swiss IPOs from 1983 to 2000. To examine the 
long-term performance of Swiss IPOs, Drobetz et al. computed buy-and-hold abnormal returns, 
skewness-adjusted wealth ratios, and cumulative abnormal returns using 120 months of secondary 
market returns. In contrast to previous findings, the authors did not find strong evidence for a distinct 
IPO effect; rather, they attribute long-term underperformance to the fact that IPO firms tend to be small 
firms. However, it is worth noting that this is not the first result that has documented that IPO firms tend 
to be small in size and attribute underperformance to this factor (e.g. Brav and Gompers, 1997; Brav et 
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al., 2000; Gompers and Lerner, 2003). Drobetz et al. explain that this underperformance virtually 
vanishes when they use a small capitalization index as a benchmark. The authors also found that firms 
underperform their benchmarks only after a long period, which is after 48 months of trading. 
Furthermore, in spite of distinct economic implications and statistical properties, their basic results are 
similar for all performance measures applied.  
As a result, though there is a virtual consensus by numerous researchers around the world on the 
presence of IPO underperformance; however, more recently, other research findings have contradicted 
the IPO underperformance phenomenon (Hoechle and Schmid, 2009). For example, Brav and Gompers 
(1997), Brav et al. (2000), Gompers and Lerner (2001 and 2003), and Drobetz et al. (2005) show that 
IPO firms are strongly tilted towards small and high growth companies, which has been the worst 
performing investment style over the last several decades. Hence, the latter studies conclude that by 
controlling for size and the book-to-market ratio, IPO firms do not perform worse than similar non-
issuing companies. In addition, they mostly explain that the long-term performance of firms is not 
attributed to the IPO effect, but rather to the performance calculation and the benchmark used. For 
instance, Alvarez and Gonzalez (2001) contend that the results of their study show that the existence of 
long-run underperformance for the Spanish IPOs depends on the methodology used. There exists long-
run underperformance when buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) are used and not when mean 
calendar-time returns (monthly) are employed. They argue that this result is in line with the evidence 
presented by Brav et al. (2000) in reference to the fact that the use of BHAR tends to magnify the long-
run underperformance of IPOs. A similar conclusion was presented by Chen (2001), who measured IPO 
long-term performance by using both the capital assets pricing model (CAPM) and the Fama and French 
(1993) three-factor model. Chen concluded that the underperformance of IPOs is attributed to the 
misspecification of the measurement model, since each model generates different results. 
When calculating and analyzing IPO long-term performance, most researchers exclude first day returns, 
and their choice for the starting price is almost always the closing price of the first trading day. However, 
Santos (2010) criticizes this methodology in measuring IPO long-term performance and argues that 
returns might be biased if we exclude first day returns. The author adds that observing long-term 
underperformance excluding the first day returns is not enough to claim that firms take advantage of 
excessive optimism. Santos argues that his paper presents an important contribution because he 
calculated long-term performance by looking at the buy-and-hold returns including and excluding first 
day returns. The author clarifies that including the first day return means that the long-term performance 
is measured from the IPO offering price, while excluding the first day return means that performance is 
measured from the first day closing price. In our calculation of the long-term performance, we will 
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follow Santos’ method by both including and excluding first day returns. Santos argues that the long-
term underperformance including the first day return implies that IPO prices are above the fundamental 
value, which would be consistent with the claim that IPO prices include a sentiment premium. However, 
according to the author, it is still unclear how abnormally poor post-IPO performance is.  
Furthermore, many research papers rooted in different countries consider long-term returns up to three 
years after the IPO (Aggarwal and Rivoli, 1990; Levis, 1993; Loughran et al., 1994; Ritter, 1991), 
whereas, in our study, we will examine long-term performance over a substantially longer period, as did 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Espenlaub et al. (2000). Specifically, we will measure IPO performance 
for the first six months, the first year, and the second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth years.  
Fascinatingly, most IPO performance research papers that consider the short-term and the long-term 
performance are conducted over all types of firm without differentiating between family and non-family 
ones (Gounopoulos et al., 2007). Accordingly, related theories and empirical results all over the world 
about family firms’ IPO performance are rare, despite the substantial importance such firms bring to the 
economy as a whole. Last but not least, the effect of firms’ ownership structure and the governance 
mechanisms in forging IPO performance is also not well documented and thus needs more evidence.  
Therefore, we will examine the IPO long-term performance of the 86 French family firms that were 
chosen in the previous chapter in the context of corporate governance mechanisms and ownership 
structure pre- and post-IPO date, along with other variables. We will also observe the relationship 
between the IPO underpricing levels of these firms and their long-term performance. This relationship 
has been observed and discussed by many authors, who found a negative association between the two 
performance dimensions (Krigman et al., 1999; Ritter, 1991; Santos, 2010). As a result, our research 
objective in this chapter is to shed more light on French family firms’ IPO long-term performance, 
considering their proper governance mechanisms and ownership structure pre- and post-IPO date, by 
applying different models and tests, going from six month to five year periods, taking into account all 
firms launched between 1994 and 2013 (that is, over a 20 year period), and using different calculation 
methods. Firstly, we will measure long-term performance; secondly, we will explain the sources and 
reasons for such performances via different mechanisms and variables, aiming to predict and enhance 
subsequent performance.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1. Sources of IPO Underperformance 
First of all, it is crucial to note that whichever methodology is adopted and whatever the length of time 
during which IPO long-term performance is observed and analyzed, we cannot ignore, isolate or separate 
the reasons behind and the sources of IPO underpricing from IPO underperformance, especially when 
reviewing the different theories that lie behind underpricing and their magnitude. It is so because IPO 
underpricing and underperformance are interrelated: they derive from one and only one event, the initial 
public offering. Therefore, any theory that tries to explain IPO underpricing has necessarily to connect 
to IPO long-term performance, in one way or another, as we will observe subsequently. Different authors 
have elaborated different theories and applied varying models, benchmarks, return calculations, sample 
sizes and time horizons; however, observing varying and sometimes contradictory explanations for IPO 
long-term performance is uncommon. 
Ritter (1991) contends that possible explanations for the observed underperformance of the 1,526 IPOs 
that went public in the US during the 1975‒84 period include (1) risk mismeasurement, (2) bad luck, or 
(3) fads and overoptimism. Ritter explains that he used alternative benchmark portfolios to ascertain 
whether risk mismeasurement could account for the poor long-run performance. Also, to distinguish 
between the bad luck explanation and the fads and overoptimism explanation, various cross-sectional 
and time-series patterns are documented. The author adds that the pattern that emerges is that 
underperformance is concentrated among relatively young growth companies, especially those going 
public in the high volume years of the 1980s. While this pattern does not rule out bad luck being the 
cause of the underperformance, it is consistent with a scenario of firms going public when investors are 
irrationally over-optimistic about the future potential of certain industries which, following Shiller 
(1990), Ritter refers to as the ‘fads’ explanation. Subsequently, we will discuss these possible reasons, 
along with others, to better explain IPO long-term performance. 
2.1.1. The Relationship between IPO Underpricing and Underperformance 
Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) worked on a sample of 1,598 common stock IPOs during 1977‒1987. The 
returns to investors who purchased the IPO share at the closing price on day 1 in the aftermarket and 
held it until day 250 are found to be significantly negative (-13.73%) after adjusting for market 
movements. The authors argue that the poor long-term IPO performance may be due to fads or 
speculative bubbles in the early aftermarket. However, they do not present performance measurements 
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over an extended period as did Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995), who worked on three-year 
and five-year periods respectively. However, Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) indicate that, in general, there 
are two possible explanations for IPO short-term abnormal returns which we found extremely beneficial 
and constructive to review because, as previously mentioned, they will have effects on the long-term 
performance. 
The first explanation and the most common view on IPO short-term abnormal returns is that IPOs are 
actually underpriced at the initial offering, meaning that firms’ shares are sold below, and sometimes 
way below their intrinsic and true fundamental value upon issuance. However, this could happen either 
when the issuers and the underwriters purposefully and intentionally underprice the firms’ shares, or 
when they unknowingly commit huge valuation and assessment mistakes during the due diligence phase 
or are misled by the investors, and such underpricing represents an unpleasant surprise for both. Thus, 
initial first day abnormal returns will take place, exemplified by a very high end-of-day closing price 
compared to the offering price.  
However, this will actually occur in efficient markets where investors react quickly by driving the 
stock’s price upward to its intrinsic value. As a result and according to this explanation, Aggarwal and 
Rivoli (1990) believe that IPO short-term abnormal returns are fundamentally economically and 
financially justifiable and normal occurrences. We will see the effects of this underpricing explanation 
on the subsequent IPO underperformance. For simplicity, we will refer to this explanation as explanation 
1. 
The second possibility for the first day abnormal returns as stated by Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) is that 
IPOs are not priced at their intrinsic value in the early aftermarket trading, which means that IPOs are 
subject to overvaluation or ‘fads’ in early aftermarket trading. The fads explanation was also mentioned 
by Shiller (1990) when explaining IPO long-term underperformance, who claimed that firms go public 
when investors are irrationally over-optimistic about the future potential of certain industries. Hence, 
according to Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990), IPOs were originally correctly valued and shares were issued 
at or very close to their intrinsic value, and here no underpricing actually occurs. However, due to market 
inefficiency, and because empirically most IPOs have generated high first day abnormal returns, 
investors will speculate on the IPO, creating huge demand for it, driving the share price above its offering 
price―that is, over its intrinsic value―backed by strong but false belief that the share is underpriced, 
and thus generating high first day abnormal returns.  
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In a similar vein, Ritter (1991) presented evidence in his paper that in most IPOs, the offering price is 
not too low but the first aftermarket price is too high. This conclusion affirms the second explanation 
for the high first day abnormal returns. However, Ritter adds that if issuers and their investment bankers 
set the offering price in a manner that reflects the firm’s underlying fundamental value, it is still a 
mystery as to why the first day closing price reaches extremely high levels to generate such high initial 
returns and such low long-term returns. In this case, IPO short-term abnormal returns are unjustifiable 
in all aspects and are fundamentally and economically rejected. We will later refer to this explanation 
as explanation 2.  
We will plot explanations 1 and 2 in Figure 12 and in Figure 13 to visualize them and we will compare 
them to the subsequent figures when including long-term performance. 
Figure 12: Explanation 1 for IPO underpricing. 
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Figure 13: Explanation 2 for IPO underpricing. 
 
Thus, according to Aggarwal and Rivoli’s explanations, whether the price is offered at discount 
(explanation 1) or at intrinsic value (explanation 2), the end-of-day closing price is expected to be higher 
than the offering price, creating this short-term abnormal return which is known as IPO underpricing for 
explanation 1 or IPO short-term abnormal return for explanation 2. Accordingly, whenever IPO long-
term performance is calculated based upon this ‘very high’ end-of-day closing price (i.e. very high as 
compared to the offering price), and compared to the market price after a certain number of days or 
months, then weaker long-term performance will undoubtedly appear, alternatively known as IPO 
underperformance.  
According to explanation 1, the closing price on the first day of issuance is equal to or very close to the 
share’s intrinsic value because markets are believed to be efficient and the IPO share was believed to be 
issued below its intrinsic value (i.e. underpriced). However, if the share price after n days becomes lower 
than the first day closing price, which is usually the reference price for most IPO long-term performance 
calculations, it means that the share price is also lower than the original intrinsic value. This means that, 
with time, the shares lose value and we can deduce that shareholders’ value is being deteriorated and a 
real underperformance occurs, as is shown in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14: Explanation 1 with long-term performance. 
 
According to explanation 2, the closing price on the first day of issuance is much higher than the shares’ 
intrinsic value due to speculation and investors’ overoptimism. However, if the share price after n days 
becomes lower than the first day closing price, but still higher than the offering price, that is the original 
intrinsic value; this means that the share gains value throughout time and no underperformance occurs, 
as shown in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15: Explanation 2 with long-term performance (1). 
 
However, if the share price after n days becomes lower than the first day closing price and the offering 
price, which is the intrinsic value, then the share truly loses value over time, and a real, yet unjustifiable 
underperformance occurs, as shown in Figure 16. 
Figure 16: Explanation 2 with long-term performance (2). 
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However, Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) assert that returns to investors who purchase the share at the 
initial offering price (and not at the closing price) and hold it for 250 days are also negative, as in 
explanation 2. However, they mention neither to what extent they are negative, nor the statistical 
significance levels of their results. Thus, by referring to Figure 16, we can conclude that such 
underperformance is real and unjustifiable in the same time. 
Lastly, Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) conclude that their results have important implications for most 
finance professionals and decision makers. As for investment bankers, the results provide a defense 
against the charge of systematic underpricing. This means that underwriters should not be liable toward 
issuers whenever very high returns are generated on the first day of IPOs, because according to the 
second explanation, underwriters could have done their work perfectly and shares could be correctly 
priced, but due to market speculations, rumors, overoptimism and investors’ greed, and due to market 
inefficiencies and others, abnormal returns simply occur. As for financial managers and issuers, the 
results suggest that the abnormal returns accruing to initial investors should not always be interpreted 
as ‘money left on the table’ and as an indirect or opportunity cost because differentiation should be made 
between a true underpricing and an over-optimist market that overprices the issue after launching. 
Therefore, issuers cannot sue the underwriters and make them liable for what they believe is money left 
on the table, which is their opportunity cost of not raising extra proceeds by setting a higher offering 
price. Thus, IPO short-term abnormal returns are quite different from IPO underpricing, even though 
the terms are used interchangeably by professionals in the field. As for investors, the results show that 
if they have the chance to subscribe and get some allocations in IPO shares at an offering price that is 
actually below the intrinsic value, they can make money out of the IPO by selling the shares at the first 
closing day or just a few days later. However, if investors subscribe and get some allocations in IPO 
shares at an offering price that is equal to the intrinsic value, this presents a higher risk of achieving first 
day abnormal returns and, even if they do, it would not be fundamental but speculative, and probably 
the same losses will occur in the long term if no dramatic change occurs in the share price by driving 
value upward. 
IPOs may, however, present profitable short-selling opportunities in the long term, too. This is a very 
interesting conclusion for many forthcoming investors who are drawn towards very high returns by 
investing in IPOs, but, of course, they have to consider carefully the inherited risks which are most of 
the time substantial and highly unanticipated. 
However, Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) found IPOs to be overvalued at the offering price. 
Correspondingly, they argue that the poor long-term performance of IPOs is mainly due to the fact that 
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on average the high growth expectations implicit in the initial valuation fail to materialize. Accordingly, 
two important notes are worth observing here.  
Firstly, authors document that the offer price is already overvalued, meaning that firms issue their shares 
above their fundamental value and not below it, which is commonly believed by many researchers and 
is elaborated in the explanations of Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990). Thus, no underpricing occurs according 
to Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004), but the opposite. Yet if at the time of issuance the offering 
price is already above the intrinsic value, then what drives IPO initial abnormal returns is absolutely 
unjustifiable. The possible reasons for such a phenomenon could be, among others, the investors’ 
overoptimism, speculative rumors and inflated demands by blockholders, the negative influence of 
underwriters, value manipulation, false and unrealistic promises about the future free cash flows, 
revenues and earnings the firm expects to generate over the coming periods, or simply the very positive 
and enthusiastic sentiment in the overall market, without relying on strong fundamentals and sustainable 
sound economic indicators. As a result, IPO long-term performance (that is calculated based upon the 
first closing day, which is way above the fundamental value) would be negative since, with time, the 
share price will move close to its intrinsic value―that is originally too low―compared to the first day 
closing price.  
The second note to observe is that firms usually fail to realize the expected high growth figures, free 
cash flows, revenues and all the earnings they have promised during the IPO phase. This usually occurs 
when expectations are set so high that they are almost impossible to achieve or to sustain for a long 
period. Additionally, many factors could lead to such underperformance, such as rivals’ fierce and 
unforeseen competition, market turndown, industry challenges, political pressure, severe legal and 
environmental regulations, fast technological changes, worldwide economy slowdown, human resource 
issues, supply chain and raw materials deficiencies, management financial and strategic mistakes, etc. 
Maybe one or more of these factors was not properly taken into consideration upon valuing the firm’s 
share before issuance, or maybe the newly listed firm’s management is not yet ready to go public, or it 
lacks the experience and maturity to confront the newer and tougher challenges that public firms usually 
face. All these factors would definitely make materialization of high and sustainable long-term 
performance relative to firms’ benchmarks difficult, especially given that newly listed firms are under 
much more pressure from investors, analysts, and regulators than an older firm. 
The seminal article by Ibbotson (1975) reported a negative relationship between initial returns on the 
IPO and long-term share price performance. That was an important finding in IPO research at that time 
which opened the path for subsequent researchers to study the relationship between IPO underpricing 
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and underperformance. However, they were not so numerous in studying this relationship as Ritter 
(1991) and Santos (2010) documented. Yet, importantly, Ibbotson found that although initial returns 
were not erased in the aftermarket, average returns for one month holding periods were positive in the 
first year after the IPO, negative during the following three years, and again positive in the fifth year 
(Espenlaub et al., 2000). 
As a result, Santos (2010) clearly asserts that although extensive research has been done to try to explain 
either IPO underpricing or underperformance, the two issues are usually not jointly analyzed, as most 
papers address one issue without taking the existence of the other into account. Notable exceptions are 
Ritter (1991), Krigman et al. (1999), and Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2006). Santos (2010) observed 
US IPOs from 1973 to 2008 with the aim of examining the connection between the two performances. 
Thus, the author analyzed whether firm-specific underpricing or average underpricing in the market, 
defined as the average underpricing for all recent offerings, determines the degree of subsequent long-
term underperformance. The author’s main finding was the existence of a close relationship between 
periods of high/low first day returns in the market and subsequent long-term performance. Accordingly, 
investors can have some insights into the firm’s expected long-term performance by observing the 
average IPO underpricing of the market which indicates the average investors’ perception and sentiment 
towards IPOs at the time of issuance of the firm. The author explains that in low-underpricing periods 
or at the beginning of high-underpricing periods, comparing firms going public with public firms 
matched on book value, market value, industry and operating performance, the five-year wealth relatives 
are not significantly different from one another. Here it is worth remembering that a wealth relative ratio 
above one means that the firm outperformed its benchmark, which is usually the market return, and a 
ratio below one means that the firm underperformed its benchmark. Therefore these firms perform 
equally to their benchmarks.  
Conversely, wealth relatives for firms going public in the late stages of high-underpricing periods are 
well below one, which means that these firms underperformed their benchmarks. Additionally, Santos 
explains that this implies that the long-run underperformance of IPO firms documented by Ritter (1991) 
and Loughran and Ritter (1995), among others, is caused by firms going public in the late stages of high-
underpricing periods. Moreover, assuming that the long-run price proxies the fundamental value, the 
author finds that firms going public in the late stages of high-underpricing periods underperform even 
relative to their offer price. This means that the long-term market price becomes lower than the offering 
price. This result is difficult to reconcile with the view that IPO underpricing is a discount to fundamental 
value. Instead, it suggests that IPO prices, in these late stages of high-underpricing periods, include a 
premium over fundamental value.  
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The author also states that two earlier studies have observed and analyzed the association between firm-
particular underpricing and long-term underperformance. Ritter (1991) documented that firm-specific 
underpricing and long-term performance are negatively correlated. Using a sample of IPOs for the 
period 1975‒1984, Ritter compared aftermarket returns for quintiles of industry adjusted initial returns. 
The author shows that firms with high underpricing have the worst aftermarket performance. Krigman 
et al. (1999) also look at the relationship between firm-specific underpricing and long-term 
underperformance. They partition a sample of IPOs for the period 1988‒1995 according to first day 
returns and show that only the most extreme first day returns predict future performance. They find that 
IPOs with underpricing above 70% and IPOs with negative first day return both underperform in the 
long term. 
Santos (2010) asserts that the empirical results presented in his paper are in line with the theoretical 
work of Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2006) who developed a model of IPO pricing that connects 
underpricing and long-term underperformance, which is different from most of the IPO literature that 
usually addresses each issue separately. Santos contends that a major assumption of their model is that, 
on occasion, some investors are ‘irrationally exuberant’ about IPOs. In a setting where shorting IPO 
shares is difficult or too costly, the presence of sentiment investors implies that some periods should 
display long-term underperformance excluding the first day return. Moreover, at times where these 
sentiment investors are likely to show up, firms raise IPO prices in order to exploit them, according to 
Santos. This is consistent with the author’s finding that in certain periods we observe long-term 
underperformance even relative to the IPO price. Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh’s (2006) model also tries 
to explain why, although firms raise IPO prices above their fundamental value, they do not fully exploit 
sentiment investors. In their model, high underpricing is compensation given by firms to intermediaries 
for bearing the risk of carrying overvalued IPO shares in inventory. 
It is crucial to recall that in the second chapter, we observed and calculated the IPO underpricing of 86 
French family firms. Interestingly, the average underpricing was only 1.92%, which was much lower 
than almost all underpricing calculated for French and European firms. Moreover, the median of 
underpricing of these French family firms was 0.00%, and the lower and upper quartiles were equal to 
-0.61% and 1.11% respectively. We attempted to relate such performance to the presence of family 
firms’ owners who, after issuance, still play a substantial part in their firms, and therefore will not agree 
to deeply discount their shares in the market for the benefit of the public shareholders. Yet on average, 
family firms still witnessed positive first day abnormal returns which is not dissimilar to most firms’ 
performance. As a result, we will assume that family firms will not behave much differently than other 
firms in the long term, and the association that Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) discussed between the 
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underpricing and underperformance will also be tested. Therefore, the hypotheses that will be tested 
concerning the IPO long-term performance, the relationship between underpricing and 
underperformance, and the robustness of underperformance measurement will be the following: 
Hypothesis 1: French family IPO firms will underperform in the long term. 
Hypothesis 2: French family firms’ IPO long-term underperformance will vanish when using the issuing 
price instead of the first day closing price in the return calculation. 
Hypothesis 3: For the French family firms, there is a negative relationship between IPO underpricing 
and underperformance. 
2.1.2. The Relationship between the Hot Issue Market Phenomenon and Underperformance 
One of the most important explanatory variables for the IPO long-term performance that has been widely 
argued, tested and ascertained by many researchers over many decades is the ‘hot issue’ market 
phenomenon. Its importance lies in the fact that it deeply affects not only firms’ short-term but also their 
long-term performance. However, we will not discuss it in isolation as Yi (2003) did, but we will observe 
its effect on long-term performance as we did in the second chapter when we observed its effects on 
underpricing due to the relatively small sample size and the large time period we are working on, which 
comprises only 86 French family IPOs spread over 20 years. 
Yi (2003) argues that over the past 30 to 40 years, numerous researchers have observed the recurring 
pattern of cycles in both the volume and the average initial returns of IPOs, which is usually referred to 
as the hot issue market phenomenon. Hot issue markets, which are periods with unusually high initial 
returns, are found to be associated with increased volume of IPOs. On the other hand, ‘cold issue’ 
markets, with relatively low initial returns, tend to occur toward the end of high IPO volume periods. 
Ritter (1991) observed and analyzed the IPO long-term performance of 1,526 firms issued during 1975‒
1984 in the US market and argues that many firms go public near the peak of industry specific fads; 
however, he argues that alternative interpretations cannot be discounted since the sample involves IPOs 
going public in only a ten year period. Ritter confirmed the persistence of the pattern for the 1960‒1982 
period. He found an unusually high 48.4% average initial return during the hot issue market in 1980‒
1981, while he reported a relatively low figure of 16.3% for the cold issue market in the remaining 
1977‒1982 period. In summary, Ritter argues that the negative long-term performance of IPOs can be 
attributed to fads in the IPO market. 
199 
 
 
Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1988) extended the sample period to 1960‒1987 and reconfirmed the 
phenomenon. According to this theory, firms intend to time their IPOs to benefit from the presence of a 
bullish stock market, and an overoptimism of investors’ sentiment and expectations about the firm’s 
future performance. During such periods, investors will be willing to pay higher share prices more than 
any other time, and by this means firms can maximize their proceeds. However, as this behavior results 
in strong stock demand, a lot of poorly performing or immature companies take advantage of the 
situation and decide to go public by selling their shares through IPOs. Accordingly, both the well and 
the badly performing firms will gain the advantage of the prevailing market conditions along with the 
high investors’ expectations and optimistic sentiment to launch their stocks to the public via IPOs. Thus, 
interestingly, companies carrying out an IPO in hot issue markets often underperform other IPOs 
significantly in subsequent years. In particular, this occurs in the case of young growth firms (Ritter, 
1991). 
Similarly, Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) argue that the poor IPO long-term performance may be due to 
fads or speculative bubbles in the early aftermarket. The fads or speculative bubbles can be explained 
in that, when firms are overvalued upon their listing and after a while this overoptimism vanishes, share 
prices tend to decrease, resulting in noticeable losses. This is also referred to the fads theory. 
Ritter (1991) has further advanced the fads theory and shown that IPO firms with a high risk profile (i.e. 
younger, smaller, and active in certain sectors) are sooner subject to shareholder sentiment―the so-
called fads of the stock market. Over time, investors will be better able to assess the firms’ value and 
risk, and therefore will require a higher rate of return on their investments; this results in discounting 
the firm’s shares, leading to underperformance. 
Equally, Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Rajan and Servaes (1997) found evidence that 
underperformance is the result of the utilization of ‘windows of opportunity’ by the issuer and the lead 
manager. Companies go public at the moment of relative overvaluation and when investors’ sentiment 
about the future is highly optimistic and positive (i.e. a high market-to-book ratio and high price-to-
earnings ratio), and when investors and security analysts tend to be systematically over-optimistic about 
earnings potential and long-term growth predictions of IPOs. Conversely, the authors have documented 
that IPOs have better future performance when analysts forecast lower growth prospects. This was 
documented in Thomadakis et al. (2007), who analyzed long-term Greek IPO performance. Therefore, 
when there is a ‘cold issue’ market phenomenon, underwriters are not pressured to launch a big number 
of firms in a small period of time to compete with the market, are better able to conduct deeper analysis 
over the firm’s future profitability, can perform better judgment over risk factors, and will precisely 
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select their investors. So, during such times, investors are not driven by optimism sentiment, but rather 
by fundamentals and economic indicators. Therefore when expected cash flows and risks are assumed 
during ‘cold issue’ markets, valuations will not be as inflated as during ‘hot issue’ markets simply 
because expectations are more rational. This can explain why IPO firms issued in ‘cold issue’ markets 
on average outperform IPO firms issued in ‘hot issue’ markets. 
Ritter (1991) also added that, for issuers, it appears that the concentrations in volume in certain years 
are associated with taking advantage of a ‘window of opportunity’. Kim and Stulz (1988) present 
evidence that issuers take advantage of differences in borrowing costs that periodically arise between 
the domestic and Eurobond markets. Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) present evidence that closed-end 
funds are issued more frequently in periods when discounts are unusually small. Thus, evidence exists 
in several markets that issuers successfully time their offers to lower their cost of capital and/or to 
maximize proceeds. 
Thus, according to this theory, if we assume that firms decisively time their offering to coincide with a 
fads period and benefit from the available ‘window of opportunity’, they can overvalue their own shares, 
raise the needed funds, and benefit themselves, their underwriters and some investors in a very short 
period of time. However, afterward, firms will be challenged to keep their operations at maximum 
efficiency, driving revenues to optimal levels, keeping costs to minimum, and generating the highest 
earnings possible. But the true challenge is to sustain such operating conditions along with an efficient 
cash flow and debt management over a long period. In brief, they should keep investors’ expectations 
as high as they were upon issuance, therefore leading share value to new, higher levels. However, if this 
can be internally managed, there is a need also to consider the external factors that affect the firm’s 
operation, profitability and survival―the overall economic fluctuations, the capital market trends and 
performance, the competitor’s pressure and prompt intervention, the ever changing customer’s 
preferences and behaviors, the government monetary and fiscal policies, the technological evolutions, 
the environmental campaigns and employees’ unions, and many others that have a deep and powerful 
effect on the firm’s operation and profitability. That is why the reality of sustaining the very high 
performance of firms pre-IPO date is much more difficult than this theoretical progression and is why 
only a few firms can sustain the good performance: otherwise, we would never have witnessed failing 
companies and investors’ losses in billions. Thus, even though all types of firms with different risks, 
sizes and performances can launch their shares to the public through IPOs and can benefit from the 
‘windows of opportunity’ and benefit from the very high investors’ sentiment and positive expectations 
about future cash flows and performance, very few will actually succeed in keeping their good shape, 
always beating their benchmarks and satisfying their investors over a long period.  
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For instance, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) show that many ‘value’ strategies also seem to 
exhibit abnormally high returns. The authors formed portfolios based on earnings-to-price ratios, sales 
growth, earnings growth, or cash flow-to-price, and found that ‘value’ stocks outperform ‘glamor’ stocks 
without appreciably affecting risk. In this regard, Warren Buffett, who is known as the most successful 
investor in the twentieth century, an investment guru and one of the richest and most respected 
businessmen in the world, said: ‘It’s far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair 
company at a wonderful price.’ Similarly, La Porta et al. (1998) show that selling stocks with high 
forecasted earnings growth and buying low projected earnings growth stocks produces excess returns. 
This implies that investors are too optimistic about stocks that have had good performance in the recent 
past, and are too pessimistic about stocks that have performed poorly, leading to surprising performance, 
which is bad performance for the first category and good performance for the second.  
Buffett also said: ‘Only when the tide goes out do you discover who’s been swimming naked’. This 
clearly describes what firms and investors examine while investing in general and in IPOs in particular 
during a fad period and during high IPO volume in the market. Therefore, during the IPO bubble, the 
rallying among underwriters who are pressured by the market, issuers and shareholders to launch the 
maximum possible number of IPOs and generate higher revenues, also exacerbated the valuations. 
Investors are enthusiastic: they want to capture an opportunity to secure the maximum allocations and 
conquer the market by very high returns. Issuers too are keen to benefit from the IPO wave, trying to 
get maximum benefit from it. Therefore, during such times, it is likely to be more difficult to know 
which firm is really worth paying for, to have proper value assessments, accurate estimations of future 
profitability and risks, and also much more difficult to think critically, above all emotional behaviors 
driven by the market. However, with time, everything will go back to normal when the IPO wave ends. 
Investors’ overoptimism will calm down and they will be better able to assess and differentiate the 
‘good’ from the ‘bad’ in terms of firms’ performance. As a result, long-term underperformance will 
appear if more poorly performing firms have taken advantage of the hot issue phenomenon when they 
issued their shares than those performing well. However, we will almost always find some well 
performing firms that sustain their performance over a long period. 
Similarly, Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) add that investors are only periodically over-optimistic 
about the prospects of firms entering the market. Thus, IPOs would benefit if issuers could time their 
flotation to coincide with periods of high expectation among investors, which do not last forever. 
Conversely, firms can still time their IPOs to coincide with such periods, but never abuse the 
overoptimism sentiment because, with time, investors will be better able to differentiate the ‘good’ from 
the ‘bad’ in firms’ performance, and therefore, they will remunerate or penalize such firms. As a result, 
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firms can issue their shares through IPOs and also benefit from the positive and over-optimistic 
sentiment in the market, without violating the simple valuation techniques, relying on fair, justifiable, 
rational, acceptable, prudent, disciplined and clear assumptions. Such behavior will not only be 
compensated in the short term, but also in the long term. This is because if firms succeed in applying 
this logic, they will be better able to re-issue additional shares in the future through seasoned equity 
offerings (SEO) than other firms.  
Kooli and Suret (2001) observed and analyzed 445 Canadian IPOs from 1991 to 1998 and found that 
investors buying IPOs immediately after listing and holding them for five years would make a loss of 
24.66% which, according to the authors, is attributed to the hot issue phenomenon. It is clear that the 
hot issue market phenomenon is not limited to certain markets or countries, but its effects can apply to 
any IPO markets and timing. 
Over again, Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) claim that firms time their IPOs to coincide with 
periods of excessive optimism, consistent with the findings in Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) that more 
companies go public when investor sentiment is high. Therefore, firms seek to issue their shares during 
such moments to ultimately benefit from the offering and to generate the highest possible proceeds; also, 
investors and underwriters tend to forecast higher revenues for these firms since the overall market is 
doing well, leading to higher expected cash flows and thus higher valuations. So, when markets are 
bullish, more IPOs tend to be observed, according to the authors. However, after going public, firms 
will be pressured to maintain high performance levels and meet investors’ expectations as closely as 
possible, otherwise, they will be considered guilty of window dressing and show more 
underperformance in the aftermarket (Teoh et al., 1998). Similarly, if the company is not able to fulfill 
expectations after going public, investors will reevaluate their positions and punish the firm, which will 
cause the stock price to fall. 
Santos (2010) argues that the most common explanations for long-run underperformance rely on some 
type of overconfidence (Bernardo and Welch, 2001; Daniel et al., 1998; Teoh et al., 1998). The author 
summarizes that prior literature on underpricing and long-term underperformance suggests that firms go 
public at a discount to the fundamental value, which leads to positive first day returns. Thus, investors 
overshoot fundamental value on the first day of trading, and in the long term, prices revert to their 
original fundamental value or to what Santos describes as the correct level. Santos provides evidence 
that investor sentiment is stronger in high underpricing periods than in low underpricing periods.  
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First, Santos found that firms going public in high underpricing periods experience a higher number of 
stock trades and higher turnover in their first day of trading. This is consistent with the idea that over-
optimistic retail investors are driving the stock price above fundamental value on the first day of trading. 
Accordingly, during periods of high underpricing, investors get much more enthusiastic about a firm’s 
future performance, and will be apt to pay a premium to acquire the firm’s shares.  
Second, Santos found that three widely-used measures of sentiment―the dividend premium, the 
percentage of equity issues in total issues, and the University of Michigan Consumer Confidence 
Index―indicate that investor sentiment is stronger in high underpricing periods. Hence, this may explain 
the inflated and sometimes over-optimistic expectations about the firm’s future cash flows and thus 
about its shares’ value. Also, when investor sentiment is stronger, it would be harder to employ proper 
critical thinking, or to be rational and use fundamental and analytical judgment in valuing the 
investments.  
Third, Santos showed that investors react more positively to news in periods of high underpricing. 
Estimating investors’ response to earnings announcements, the author found that cumulative abnormal 
returns on the day of the announcement and the next day are on average fifty basis points higher in 
periods of high underpricing in the IPO market. This effect is more pronounced for extreme positive 
news. Here we can also observe the response time and promptness to react upon news announcements, 
which is also higher during high underpricing. 
Santos adds that these results are consistent with a story where some firms go public to take advantage 
of overvalued equity due to the presence of overly-optimistic investors. In periods of high underpricing 
in the market, when IPO prices seem to include a premium over fundamental value, firms with and 
without investment opportunities have an incentive to go public. In low underpricing periods, when IPO 
prices do not include a premium over fundamental value, only firms that need financing for positive net 
present value (NPV) projects have an incentive to go public. Hence, post-IPO performance is different 
for firms going public in high and low underpricing periods. Accordingly, for investors wishing to invest 
in IPOs, it is suggested that they do not do so during periods of high underpricing in the market, for fear 
of getting trapped by the over-valuation and the greed of some firms deciding to go public to expropriate 
shareholders’ wealth and not to finance positive NPV projects and grow the firm’s value. 
Similarly, Miller (1977) attributes IPO underperformance to the divergence of investor opinions and 
short sale constraints. Miller implies that in early stock-offering periods, stock prices are generally 
higher, with a greater differentiation of opinions for expected future returns. However, in the long-term, 
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prices decrease as the most optimistic investors lower their appraisals. An investigation into Finnish 
IPOs conducted by Keloharju (1993) recorded -26.4% long-term cumulated market-adjusted returns for 
79 issues that went public between 1984 and 1989. Likewise, Keloharju affirmed the validity of the 
winner’s curse that was developed by Rock (1986). The author claimed the presence of overoptimism 
by IPO investors, who later on grew disappointed when they discovered the IPO firm’s prospects and 
lower expectations, generating negative return over the long-term. 
Schultz (2003) offers a rational explanation for the clustering of IPOs at market peaks and subsequent 
underperformance, which he calls pseudo market timing. It arises if firms’ propensity to go public 
increases with market price levels. Trauten et al. (2007) found that the IPO activity in Germany can 
largely be explained by price levels. They apply simulations in order to test the extent to which pseudo 
market timing can account for the economically significant underperformance of IPOs in Germany. 
Trauten et al. (2007) found that pseudo market timing can partly explain the performance of IPO 
investment strategies between 1985 and 2002. Their results indicate that investing in a portfolio of recent 
IPOs is preferable to investing separately in each firm going public. According to what we have 
discussed so far, we will attempt to test the following hypothesis related to IPO timing and long-term 
performance. 
Hypothesis 4: French family firms’ IPO long-term performance is positively associated with the timing 
of IPOs during fad periods. 
2.1.3. The Relationship between IPO Prospectus Data and Underperformance 
Alvarez and Gonzalez (2001) observed 56 Spanish IPOs listed during 1987‒1997 and analyzed the 
influence of the prospectus information on IPO long-term performance. The authors assert that less 
evidence exists regarding the analysis of characteristics that enable the identification of good or bad 
long-term performance of IPOs. Consequently, further research should be done into such characteristics 
to better explain and identify which ones lead to good or bad performance. Bhabra and Pettway (2003) 
document that underperformance is most severe for the smaller and younger firms. They also contend 
that prospectus information is more useful to predict survival/failure compared to subsequent equity 
offerings or acquisitions. However, they mention that despite the widely accepted view that information 
contained in a prospectus is valuable in assessing the risk of the offering, very little attention has been 
devoted in finance literature to studying the usefulness of the information contained in the prospectus 
vis-à-vis the subsequent performance of the issuer. 
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Concerning the survival and failure of IPO firms, Hensler, Rutherford and Springer (1997) and Jain and 
Kini (2000) examine the survival of IPOs in the aftermarket using information from the offering 
prospectus. However, the studies do not track the firms for the same length of time after the IPO. In the 
Hensler, Rutherford and Springer study, IPOs from 1975 through 1984 are used and survival is 
determined only as of the end of 1992. In our opinion, some firms may have survived till 1992 and failed 
thereafter, or some other firms may have been created in 1975 and survived till 1992, having a total life 
of 18 years; still other firms may have been created in 1984 and survived till 1992, having a total life of 
only nine years. Likewise, in the Jain and Kini study, IPOs from 1977 through 1990 are used and survival 
is determined only as of the end of 1996. The same inference applies to Jain and Kini regarding the life 
of survival and the possibility of failure after the mentioned period. However, Platt (1995) also uses 
prospectus data to predict the survival of an IPO firm beyond the first three years of its public life and 
finds that predicting bankruptcies is difficult at best. But several researchers in accounting literature 
have examined the value of prospectus information in pricing IPOs in relation to the long-term 
performance of the firm, such as Clarkson et al. (1992), Firth and Smith (1992), Keasey and McGuinness 
(1991), Kim et al. (1994), and Mak (1994). Additionally, Hensler, Rutherford and Springer (1997) find 
that the issuer’s size, age at the time of the IPO, level of underpricing, insider ownership, industry 
membership, and the level of IPO activity in the market are significantly positively related to the 
probability of survival, whereas the number of risk factors listed in the offering prospectus is 
significantly negatively related to the likelihood of survival.  
Nevertheless, Bhabra and Pettway (2003) attempted to determine the usefulness of the IPO prospectus 
data to a potential investor, not only to predict post-IPO bankruptcy or the IPO value on the offering 
date, but to predict the IPO long-term performance of the firm by applying different models and over 
different horizons, to determine how the value of the available information in the prospectus changes 
over time. The authors found that pre-IPO operating earnings, the relative size of the offering, and the 
level of underpricing are significantly related to the one year abnormal returns; but they add that there 
is no evidence to suggest that prospectus information is related to long-term performance over three 
years. Moreover, the authors add that their results suggest that prospectus information could prove useful 
to a potential investor at least in the short term, one year after the IPO, in designing investment strategies 
with IPOs. But firm performance prior to the IPO offers little or no indication of subsequent long-run 
performance, suggesting that investors should be cautious when using past results in their investment 
decisions, especially the ones indicated in the IPO prospectus. 
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2.1.4. The Relationship between Venture Capital-backed IPO and Underperformance 
Jain and Kini (2000) show that venture capital backed IPOs are more likely to survive compared to 
others because they attract prestigious investment bankers, influence managers in strategic resource 
allocation decisions, influence institutional investors, and attract more analysts in following the firm.  
Usually, before investing in any firm, venture capitalists analyze in depth the macro-economic 
environment and the industry, assessing the firm’s growth potential, the risk factors, and all possible 
pitfalls. Also, venture capitalists invest mostly in fields in which they are specialized and experienced. 
Such experience is extremely valuable in all aspects: it is fundamentally required in order to have better 
monitoring and assessment of any potential opportunities, for discovering and growing the firm’s 
competitive advantages and for conducting industry-related risk analysis and management. They also 
get seats on the firms’ boards and they share in building and implementing a firm’s strategic decisions, 
closely monitoring the firm’s operating, investing and financing decisions and activities, and thus the 
firm’s cash flows, which are the firm’s source of value. Thus, venture capitalists employ critical 
disciplinary behaviors over the firm’s CEO and management actions and performance. Finally, a very 
important note to consider about venture capitalists is that they mostly have a longer investment horizon, 
much more rigid and less sensitive to short-term downturns and fluctuations than any other investor who 
might have shorter insight and less patience.  
As a result, when IPOs are backed by venture capitalists, investors feel their investments are safer and 
adequately monitored from inside the firm by high profile investors who have high interest in growing 
the firm’s value. Similarly, Brav and Gompers (1997) show that underperformance is concentrated in 
small non-venture capital backed IPOs. They investigate the long-run underperformance of IPO firms 
in a sample of 934 venture backed IPOs from 1972‒1992 and 3,407 non-venture backed IPOs from 
1975‒1992. Their findings show that venture backed IPOs outperform non-venture backed IPOs using 
equal weighted returns. Value weighting significantly reduces performance differences and substantially 
reduces underperformance for non-venture backed IPOs. In tests using several comparable benchmarks 
and the Fama-French (1993) three factor asset pricing model, venture backed companies do not 
significantly underperform, while the smallest non-venture backed firms do.  
Underperformance, however, is not an IPO effect. Similar sized book-to-market firms that have not 
issued equity perform as poorly as IPOs. It is worth noting that small sized firms, according to Brav and 
Gompers (1997), are firms with market capitalization of less than $50 million, whereas Ritter et al. 
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(2012) define small firms in their European study as firms that generate less than €30 million in pre-IPO 
annual sales, using 2011 purchasing power.  
Van Frederikslust and Van der Geest (2001) investigated both the initial returns and long-run 
performance of IPOs on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange using a sample of 38 private equity backed 
IPOs and 68 non-private equity backed IPOs in the period 1985‒1998. They found that private equity 
backed firms outperform non-private equity backed firms. The evidence suggests that private equity 
backed IPOs do not significantly underperform over a three year period, while non-private equity backed 
IPOs do. The authors mention that almost all explanations of the influence of private equity funds on 
the performance of the IPO firm in the short term are derived from the certification hypothesis, which 
states that the involvement of a private equity fund at a stock introduction has a certification effect 
concerning the quality of the introduction fund, leading to less underpricing. It is argued, however, that 
this certification has economic value only if there is a discrepancy between the perceptions of insiders 
and outsiders of the value of the company. However, as most researchers agree, this discrepancy strongly 
exists in family firms between the controlling majority―family firms’ owners―and the non-controlling 
minority―dispersed shareholders. Here we see the benefits of successful and reputable private equity 
funds, which have access to a large investor market and are at the same time attractive to investors in 
companies that aspire to go public in the future. Thus, it is strongly believed that private equity funds 
are unlikely to be willing to jeopardize their relationships for a one-time monetary benefit of a false 
certification. Van Frederikslust and Van der Geest (2001) argue that the presence of private equity and 
venture capital in the firm will, up to a certain level, assure that all material information needed for 
decision making is disclosed to the public.  
Consequently, this certifying function will reduce the information asymmetry between the insiders and 
outsiders of the firm, leading to less underpricing. So, since private equity funds have longer investment 
horizon objectives, in addition to their ultimate goal of increasing shareholders’ wealth, their impact 
does not depend solely on the short-term performance but also on the long-term. This is especially true 
given that the private equity funds’ services may include not only providing the invested amount of 
money, but also the necessary management and technical expertise, strategic board consulting, 
international network administration and publicity, improved access to capital markets and a certifying 
role when going public. 
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2.1.5. The Relationship between the Underwriters’ Reputation and Underperformance  
Numerous researchers have been interested in measuring and assessing the sensitivity of IPO short- and 
long-term performance and their magnitude according to and based upon the underwriters’ name, 
reputation, experience, profile, past records, and professionalism. So, in their models, researchers have 
included these variables as a way to test the effects of underwriters on IPO performance. Underwriters 
play an extremely important role and assume huge responsibilities in administering the due diligence 
over the firm before undertaking the deal and launching a firm’s shares to the public.  
Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) document that the underperformance of IPO stocks relative to the market 
over a three year holding period is less severe for IPOs underwritten by more prestigious underwriters. 
This is in line with what we have explained earlier about the role of underwriters in properly valuing the 
firm’s shares by using the most prevalent, justifiable, rational, and realistic valuation assumptions, and 
then selling them to the public via a very delicate and long process. Additionally, we can infer that 
prestigious underwriters are usually attracted by high net worth individuals (HNWI) who have quite a 
long history in investments, private banking, venture capitals, and also in IPOs. Prestigious underwriters 
are attracted by the HNWI, known for having both the willingness and ability to invest and take risk, 
especially when it comes to IPO investment. Investors must have the willingness, which is related to the 
person’s behavior, attitude, experience and readiness to invest and take risks. In addition, they must have 
the ability, which is related to the financial status, capabilities and sufficiency of resources to invest and 
take risks. Overall, such investors are extremely successful and wealthy and they will invest with 
successful, prestigious, experienced, reputable and professional underwriters. Underwriters therefore 
have a major interest in preserving the reputation that they have built over years and decades and will 
not easily jeopardize it for the benefit of a single deal or transaction. Thus, reputable underwriters are 
not as pressured as small and unknown underwriters to please small investors through manipulating 
fundamental and ethical rules in the due diligence process or misleading the investment community and 
the issuers. 
Using Rock’s (1986) framework, Carter and Manaster (1990) model the role of the investment banker’s 
reputation. They show that more prestigious investment bankers are associated with less risky IPOs. To 
preserve their reputation, the prestigious underwriter screens the firms that go public and selects the less 
risky ones, using information unavailable to the general public. This, in turn, reduces the uncertainty 
and information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors. Now, since investors know 
that by subscribing to the issues of reputable investment banks they face less risk, consequently, the 
initial first day return is lower for these issues.  
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Using investment bankers’ capital as a proxy for their reputation (investment bankers with greater capital 
have more to lose from a loss of reputation), Michaely and Shaw (1994) find that reputation plays an 
important role in explaining the initial day return. Although the authors’ findings indicate that the 
investment banker’s reputation and the issue size are highly correlated (the correlation coefficient is 
0.75), controlling for reputation, they find that larger issues experience greater underpricing. They also 
show that IPOs issued by more reputable investment banks perform significantly better in the long term.  
This is in alignment with our earlier discussion concerning the main roles of underwriters and how 
underwriters’ tasks may differ according to a range of factors such as experience, reputation and capital. 
So, since reputable underwriters carefully select their investors, they do the same for the firms that intend 
to go public. Those firms have to be deeply analyzed by the reputable underwriters, where most aspects 
of valuation are taken into consideration and rigorous due diligence is conducted by professional teams. 
Therefore, such firms as are attracted by reputable underwriters shall have minimum requirements in 
terms of size, professionalism, profitability and management. As a result, it would be normal to see these 
firms perform better than their counterparts working with small and unknown underwriters whose 
standards are usually softer than the reputable ones. Thus, the difference between the two types of firm 
will appear in the long term through their IPO long-term performance.  
In our model, we will not account for the underwriter’s name, reputation, history or performance, 
because this is not the scope of our research in this chapter. Due to the importance of the subject, 
however, we intend to include them in subsequent research papers.  
2.1.6. The Relationship between Pre-IPO Factors and Underperformance 
Khurshed, Mudambi and Goergen (1999) suggest that long-term performance of a firm depends on pre-
IPO factors, such as management and the firm’s performance prior to going public. They found that 
long-term performance of an IPO stock is inversely related to its profitability before the issue as well as 
to the degree of change in ownership in the process of IPO. Yet, it was found to be positively related to 
the size of the firm. On the other hand, Mikkelson et al. (1997) tested the hypothesis of the dependence 
of long-term stock performance on post-IPO ownership structure of the firm, but found no evidence of 
the ownership effect.  
However, before going public, no information about the firm’s share value is available for investors. 
Therefore, investors have to carefully use, assess and evaluate carefully all available data presented in 
the prospectus, read and analyze the firms’ financial statements, pro-forma statements, major 
210 
 
 
achievements prior to IPO and all available future plans the firm intends to achieve with the raised funds, 
gather as much information as possible from the investment banker about the firm’s valuation, and 
appraise the overall market and economic conditions to decide whether to invest and by how much. 
Additionally, investors assess the industry to which the IPO firm belongs, its historical performance and 
prospects, its major foreseeable threats and opportunities. Again, investors shall assess their investing 
strategies based upon all these factors and based upon their perception of the overall risk and return they 
expect to bear during their investment horizon.  
Nevertheless, besides all these fundamental and critical aspects that most investors consider before 
investing in IPOs, they usually also review the details of the firm’s pre-IPO ownership structure. This 
includes reviewing pre-IPO major shareholders, investments by private equity firms, venture capitalists, 
investment banks, major corporations, and professional blockholders. The review should include the 
firm’s board structure and composition, including size, average age and experience of board members, 
election style, frequency of meetings, and the presence of major investors, blockholders and independent 
directors on the board. All these are considered the pre-IPO data which every investor shall assess 
thoroughly before investing in IPOs. 
Alternatively, Thomadakis et al. (2007) mention that others hypothesize that firms manipulate their 
accounting numbers and financial statements so as to make their offerings much more appealing to the 
public to entice investors to pay a price higher than the fair one. However, this ‘window dressing’ 
technique is not effective in the long term since, with the passage of time, investors eventually learn the 
true value of the firm and its price will fall to its fundamental value, according to Teoh et al. (1998).  
All of this explains why, during IPOs, the roles of underwriters in performing outstanding due diligence 
about the firm have to be complemented by the roles of the independent external auditors whose 
responsibility it is to plan and perform an audit to obtain reasonable assurance that the financial 
statements are free of material misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud. Thus, the independent 
auditors have to express an opinion on the fairness with which financial statements present, in all 
material respects, financial position, results of operations, and cash flows, in conformity with the 
applicable accounting principles and standards. The auditor’s report is the medium through which he/she 
expresses his/her opinion or, if circumstances require, disclaims an opinion. In either case, he/she states 
whether his/her audit has been made in accordance with applicable auditing rules and standards. 
Additionally, auditors’ responsibilities include assessing firms’ reserves and provisions. Thus, in the 
normal sense, the investment community expects that auditors do their best to catch any inappropriate 
reporting or to reconcile any major window dressing activity conducted by the firm’s management.  
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However, even though it appears that all auditors perform similar tasks and present similar reports at the 
end of the auditing process, the auditing procedures differ from one firm to another. These procedures 
can differ according to the auditors’ fees, sampling methodologies, time dedicated for each firm, the 
industry the firm belongs to, the experience of auditors, the number of visits per year, the reputation, the 
internationalization and others. Accordingly, many researchers have included in their models variables 
related to the auditors to test their effects on IPO performance in an attempt to examine the market’s 
reaction toward specific auditors who have audited the financial statement of firms that were about to 
go public. Therefore, underwriters and auditors together constitute vital cornerstones and the very 
decisive foundations for every investor considering investing in an IPO, since there is no other 
information presented in the market to rely on other than the firm’s prospectus presented by the 
underwriter, including the full set of financial statements audited by the external auditor. 
Another explanation for IPO underperformance is presented by Eckbo and Norli (2005), who argue that 
IPO underperformance is mainly due to IPO firms’ high stock turnover and low leverage ratios, which 
is a capital structure related variable. However, once they account for these two factors in their 
estimations, IPO underperformance disappears (Hoechle and Schmid, 2009).  
Interestingly, Santos (2010) found no evidence that IPOs in periods of high underpricing are safer than 
IPOs in low underpricing periods. In addition, the author did not find that firm risk decreases within 
high underpricing periods, which would be needed to explain why long-term underperformance is 
caused by firms going public at the end of high underpricing periods. According to the author, long-
term underperformance is not related to the risk inherited by the IPO, since this factor is taken into 
consideration and no cause-effect was found. 
Furthermore, and in contrast to the risk-based theory, Santos found that significant underpricing is 
correlated with significantly weaker (not stronger) firms. The author showed that firms going public in 
high underpricing environments exhibit striking differences in terms of operating performance 
subsequent to the IPO. Specifically, these firms exhibit worse ROA and profitability, invest less, display 
lower asset growth, and hold more cash than firms that undertake their IPOs in low underpricing periods. 
We will attempt to observe if pre-IPO ownership and performance measures have some effects on IPO 
long-term performance as Santos and others did, by testing the following two hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 5: There is a positive relationship between owners’ cash flow rights after the IPO date and 
the IPO long-term performance of French family firms. 
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Hypothesis 6: There is a negative relationship between the IPO long-term performance and return on 
asset and net profit margin. 
2.2. Varying Results on IPO Long-Term Performance 
It is worth noting that despite all the results mentioned above and the numerous research papers 
conducted all over the world that document IPO underperformance, some authors suggest that when 
properly measuring excess returns, the evidence for long-run underperformance following offerings 
disappears (Schultz, 2003). For instance, Brav et al. (2000) find that post-issue IPO returns are similar 
to those of firms with similar size and book-to-market characteristics, and that SEO returns co-vary with 
similar non-issuing firms.  
Additionally, Eckbo et al. (2000) show that leverage and its attendant risk are significantly reduced 
following equity offerings while liquidity is increased. They claim that as a result of these changes in 
leverage and liquidity, firms that have recently issued equity are less risky than benchmark firms. Those 
who favor behavioral explanations for underperformance point out that IPOs have significantly 
underperformed market indices, however, and few would claim that IPOs are less risky than an average 
stock, according to Schultz (2003). 
Espenlaub et al. (2000) found different results by using different models and time horizons. For instance, 
they found that, using the event-time approach, there is significant underperformance in the first 18 
months after the issue for all benchmarks except the CAPM. However, over the next 24 months, there 
is even more severe underperformance across all benchmarks. Thus, the authors identify 
underperformance as a robust feature of these event-time returns over the first 42 months.  
However, they argue that over the next 18 months the extent of the underperformance depends on the 
benchmark portfolio adopted. They found that 60 month long-run excess returns measured relative to 
the CAPM and Fama-French benchmarks continue to display significant underperformance. Yet, while 
one of the size-adjusted benchmarks found significant underperformance and demonstrates that the rate 
of underperformance declines over time, an alternative size-adjustment model reveals abnormal returns 
which are not statistically significantly different from zero. 
Moreover, Hoechle and Schmid (2009) presented mixed results while measuring IPO long-term 
performance. The authors conducted their research over a sample of 7,378 firms going public in the US 
from 1975 to 2005 by varying the time horizon in analysis, and have documented a significant 
underperformance of IPO firms over the first year after going public, but virtually no underperformance 
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thereafter. Hoechle and Schmid argue that this finding regarding IPO underperformance is important as 
it strongly contradicts prior research exclusively considering longer time horizons of, usually, five years 
(e.g. Brav et al., 2000; Brav and Gompers, 1997). The authors add that, to their knowledge, there is no 
other paper investigating the time horizon over which IPO underperformance prevails. It is worth noting 
that this mixed result is not the sole one observed, since many other researchers have found different 
results by varying the factors used in their measurement technique, such as the performance 
measurement, the time horizon of their study, the country or the market, the economic conditions, the 
benchmark and other factors. 
For instance, Hoechle and Schmid (2009) also mention that by decomposing the Carhart-alpha, they 
found that IPO underperformance is due to fundamental differences in firm characteristics (e.g. market-
to-book ratio, leverage, and R&D expenditures scaled by sales) between IPO companies and more 
seasoned, non-issuing firms. Hoechle and Schmid argue that their results indicate that IPO firms perform 
neither materially better nor worse than mature companies with similar firm characteristics. This has 
been observed by some other researchers, who argue that IPO firms perform similarly to their 
benchmarks. Finally, the authors show that IPO underperformance is partially predictable. IPOs are 
associated with overly optimistic growth prospects (and correspondingly high valuation levels) and IPOs 
going public during hot issue periods perform substantially worse than other IPOs. This has also been 
observed earlier, that whenever share valuations, firms’ future prospects and cash flows are based on 
very optimistic assumptions, expecting very high and sustainable growth rates in sales and totally 
ignoring any downturns in the economy or slowdowns in the industry, then IPO long-term 
underperformance will be seen. Additionally, we have elaborated upon the hot issue phenomenon 
proposed by Ritter (1991) and discussed by many other researchers.  
Gompers and Lerner (2001) discuss numerous and different results regarding IPO long-term 
performance found by prominent researchers around the world and argue that these results are not 
uncontroversial. The authors also contend that the debate about the underperformance of IPOs may not 
easily be answered without out-of-sample tests. Additionally, data from non-US markets is not 
conclusive because of the shorter time periods employed and the cross-sectional correlation between 
returns of IPOs in the US and the returns of IPOs in other markets. Common economic shocks or 
common movements in fads and sentiment potentially drive these correlations. However, the authors 
undertook a large, out-of-sample investigation of IPO underperformance. They gathered information on 
the universe of firm-commitment IPOs in the United States from 1935 to 1972 and measured their 
returns for up to five years after listing. Interestingly, and as many authors argued and explained, the 
results demonstrate that the performance of IPOs from 1935 to 1972 depends upon the method of return 
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measurement used. While the sample shows underperformance when performance is measured using 
value-weighted event-time buy-and-hold abnormal returns, this underperformance disappears when 
either equal-weighted buy-and-hold abnormal returns or cumulative abnormal returns are utilized. The 
calendar-time analysis shows that over the entire sample period, IPOs return as much as the rest of the 
market. Finally, in simple Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Fama-French three-factor 
regressions, the intercepts are insignificantly different from zero or even significantly positive. The 
difference between the event-time and calendar-time results stems from the clustering of IPOs in periods 
immediately preceding poor IPO performance: IPOs and similar size and book-to-market stocks have 
lower returns after periods with heavy IPO issue volume, though the effects are not statistically 
significant. Gompers and Lerner (2001) mention that the long-run performance of pre-NASDAQ IPOs 
depends considerably on the method for calculating returns and performance. While the results do not 
rule out the possibility of more board-based sentiment-driven mispricing, they provide little support for 
distinct IPO effect. Therefore, as many prominent authors have argued and demonstrated through their 
research, IPO long-term performance depends mainly on the benchmark type, size and period, and the 
measurement models applied, since each model will result in different performance analysis and thus 
different interpretation.  
3. SAMPLE, DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Sample 
Since in this chapter we will highlight French family firms’ IPO long-term performance, and since as 
we have observed the IPO underpricing and underperformance are interrelated in many aspects, we will 
refer to the same sample of French family firms that we have worked with in the second chapter. 
However, it is important to recall what our sample consists of and how it has been chosen. We have 
extracted all firms from the CAC-All Tradable Index except the financial firms (SIC 6000–6999) that 
are subject to special legal regulations. Our choice of the CAC-All Tradable Index is intended to 
continue the work done in Chapters 1 and 2, because in this thesis we are interested in studying the 
French family firms, and because we needed a broad and representative benchmark to which to compare 
our results, such as the CAC-All Tradable Index. This index is a new index replacing the SBF 250 in 
which the number of values is unlimited and which reflects the evolution of all companies listed on 
Euronext Paris. It also allows representation of the evolution of the stock market over the long-term and 
serves as a benchmark to certain mutual funds (FCP) and Sicav, as mentioned in chapter 1. 
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According to the definition of family firm used in chapter 1, we have precisely separated family firms 
from non-family firms. Therefore necessary modifications to the selected data were done to match our 
definition criteria. In addition, some data were not found for some firms and therefore we were obliged 
to deselect and ignore a small number of family firms. In the end, we were able to produce full data for 
all the necessary variables for 86 family firms out of the 107 family firms listed from 1994 to 2013, so 
our sample consists of around 80% of all family firms listed during that period. 
Some variables were extracted directly from the Bloomberg platform such as all firms that are part of 
the CAC-All Tradable Index from 1994 to 2013 and their IPO dates. We have also extracted the daily 
prices of the index and of every firm in our sample by using Thomson Reuters Datastream, as well as 
the offering prices and dates, and number of shares issued. The rest of the data were hand-collected from 
the prospectus of each firm, such as the initial public offering date, the firm creation date, the number 
of shares before and after the IPO date, the percentage of cash flow and voting rights for the family 
founder, other shareholders such as private equity funds, venture capitalists, other partners and the 
remaining public shareholders, before and after the IPO date.  
In addition, the board of directors’ data has been extracted, such as board size, the board members equity 
holding before and after the IPO, and the percentage of independent directors. We also identified 
whether the firm’s CEO is the same as the firm’s founder or not, the presence of duality of roles between 
the firm’s CEO and the board chair, and other governance data. We extracted net revenues and net 
income for all firms in the year of the IPO and the previous financial year. Total assets, total 
shareholders’ equity and total debt were also extracted for the IPO year. However, some other variables 
were not found for all firms and therefore were abandoned, such as research and development 
expenditures and direct total issuance costs. 
As previously mentioned, we also aim in this chapter to examine whether short-term IPO underpricing 
is related to long-term IPO underperformance, and whether underperformance persists when different 
calculations are applied, especially when the IPO offering price is used in the calculation instead of the 
first day closing price, as Santos (2010) did. Additionally, as discussed in the previous chapter, we aim 
to observe and measure the effects of some major pre- and post-IPO corporate governance mechanisms 
on the IPO long-term performance. 
It is important to mention that initially we wanted to follow Ritter’s (1991) method in selecting the firms 
that meet certain criteria in terms of size, offering price, and proceeds. However, since our sample 
consists of only 86 firms―not as big as Ritter’s sample of over 1,500 firms―we will not apply such 
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conditions and therefore we will work on the same sample we worked with in the previous chapter 
without imposing restrictions on size, especially given that most firms are of small and medium sizes.  
Additionally, numerous researchers who have studied IPO performance all over the world have used 
bigger sample sizes, but a sample that is comprised of 86 observations can still be statistically acceptable. 
Also, as we have previously mentioned, by choosing to work specifically on the listed French family 
firms that form part of the CAC-All Tradable Index, this has automatically narrowed the selection to 
this relatively small sample size. However, this will leave us with some drawbacks in the conclusion 
and inference part, and also in checking the robustness of our results.  
For instance, we will not be able to conduct some tests to isolate the effects of size, industry, leverage, 
market-to-book ratios or others because the sub-samples will become much smaller and this will affect 
the results’ significance and reliability. However, different researchers around the world have also 
explored IPO long-term performance by using small and medium sample sizes, as shown below. 
Table 30: Small IPO sample sizes treating long-term performance 
Country Authors and years of research Period Sample Size Long-Term Returns 
Austria Ausenegg (2000) 1965‒2002 83/57 -46.50% 
Brazil Aggarwal et al. (1993) 1979‒1990 62 -47.00% 
Chile Aggarwal et al. (1993) 1982‒1990 55/28 -23.70% 
Finland Keloharju (1993) 1984‒1989 99/79 -21.10% 
France Loughran et al. (1994) 1983‒2000 571/87 -4.80% 
Hong Kong McGuinness (1993) 1980‒1990 72 -18.30% 
Hungary Lyn and Zychowicz (2003) 1991‒1998 33 19.59% 
Singapore Hin and Mahmood (1993) 1976‒1984 45 -9.20% 
Spain Alvarez and Gonzalez (2001) 1987‒1997 41 -24.19% 
Switzerland Loughran et al. (1994) 1983‒2000 120/34 -6.10% 
Concerning the benchmark in IPO long-term performance, Espenlaub et al. (2000) claim that an obvious 
difficulty with an event study research model is the choice of an appropriate benchmark. As we have 
previously mentioned, there is considerable evidence that benchmark selection can have an important 
impact on the scale of abnormal returns from event studies (e.g. Dimson and Marsh, 1986; Fama and 
French, 1996a; Gregory, Matatko, Tonks and Purkis, 1994).  
In this chapter, we have used the CAC-All Tradable Index as our sole benchmark in all our models. 
However, for the robustness of our results, we were unable to include other benchmarks as we wanted 
to do, especially given that many prominent authors argue that underperformance vanishes when 
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different benchmarks and calculation methods are used and many attribute the poor long-term 
performance to small firm size and young age. It is worth recalling that Drobetz et al. (2005) attribute 
long-term underperformance to the fact that IPO firms tend to be small firms. In addition, Brav and 
Gompers (1997), Brav et al. (2000) and Gompers and Lerner (2001, 2003) document that IPO firms tend 
to be small in size and they attribute underperformance to this factor. Also, they document that 
underperformance vanishes when they use a small capitalization index as a benchmark. We wanted to 
include, in addition to the CAC-All Tradable Index, the France CAC Mid, the France CAC Mid and 
Small, and the France CAC Small indices, one at a time. However, all three French indices were 
introduced and put in function in January 2005 according to Thomson Reuters Datastream. We noticed 
that only 22 French family firms were issued after January 2005 and the remaining 64 firms were issued 
prior to this date, so we will, of course, not observe the returns of the 22 firms and compare them to the 
three market benchmarks to calculate their abnormal returns, since the sample size will become very 
small and statistically unfavorable. As a result, we are left with no option but to employ only one 
benchmark which is the CAC-All Tradable Index that started in January 1990 and to work with the 
whole sample of 86 firms. Unfortunately, we will be unable to refer to any of the three indices to capture 
the returns of the small, small and mid, and mid firms. 
3.2. Models of Long-Term Performance 
Alvarez and Gonzalez (2001) mention in their paper that there is considerable variation in the measures 
of abnormal returns and the statistical tests that empirical researchers used to detect long-run abnormal 
stock returns. Alvarez and Gonzalez mention that several works, such as those by Barber and Lyon 
(1997) and Lyon et al. (1999), have revealed that the method for calculating returns influences both the 
magnitude of the measured abnormal return as well as the size and power of the statistical tests. Thus, 
we will follow prominent authors in calculating long-term performance by using different methods in 
order to examine the robustness of the performance of the IPOs regarding various specifications of the 
model. Therefore, we will use the following four measures, inspired by Ritter (1991): (1) average 
holding period returns of the portfolio that contains all the family firms in the sample from month 1 to 
month 72 and the same holding period returns as calculated for the CAC-All Tradable Index; (2) 
cumulative average adjusted returns calculated with monthly portfolio rebalancing, where the adjusted 
returns are computed using the CAC-All Tradable Index as the market benchmark; (3) buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (BHAR); (4) Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM); (5) the Fama and French (1993) 
three-factor model; and (6) two multiple linear regression models. 
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Therefore, based on the hypothesis testing and all the literature covered in the review, we will try to 
explain IPO long-term performance via two multiple linear regression models. In Model 1, we will 
attempt to explain IPO long-term performance taking ownership and control rights change from pre- to 
post-IPO date as our starting point. In Model 2, we will instead consider governance mechanisms set by 
the family firms on the day of their issuance. In both models, we will employ the fifth day underpricing 
as a control variable for considering IPO short-term performance for all firms, besides their ownership 
and governance mechanisms.  
We followed Ritter’s (1991) method in calculating the IPO performance, with two intervals: the initial 
return period (normally one day), defined as the offering date to the first closing price listed on the CAC-
All Tradable Index daily return tapes; and the aftermarket period, defined as six months, one year, two, 
three, four, five, and six years after the IPO, exclusive of the initial return period. Therefore, the first 
day closing price will be taken as the benchmark in calculating IPO long-term performance, as per Ritter 
(1991). Also, the initial return period is defined as being month 0, and the aftermarket period includes 
the following respective months where months are defined as successive 21-trading day periods relative 
to the IPO date. Thus month 1 consists of event days 2‒22, month 2 consists of event days 23‒43, etc. 
Additionally, as previously mentioned, we will follow Santos’ (2010) method in including the first day 
return by taking the offering price as the benchmark in the long-term performance calculation; by doing 
this, we will be attempting to observe whether the shares were initially issued above or below their 
intrinsic value and so explain long-term performance as Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) did. Additionally, 
monthly benchmark-adjusted returns are calculated as monthly raw return on a stock minus the monthly 
benchmark return for the corresponding 21-trading day period.  
It is worth recalling that all prices were extracted from Thomson Reuters Datastream, with total returns 
criteria taking into consideration all price appreciation/depreciation through the years, and all dividends 
paid by the firm to each share. The same applies to the index return calculation when observing total 
returns, not only the gross returns, which takes into account all reinvested dividends in all the shares 
composing the index.  
All data extracted from Thomson Reuters Datastream for the IPO shares have a starting price of 100 at 
the time of issuance and are calculated on daily basis according to the value appreciation and 
depreciation of the share price (capital gains or losses) that are considered a main source of return for 
shareholders, in addition to all dividends (current income) paid that are considered the second source of 
returns. Thus, on day 1, the portfolio that contains the 86 family firms has a value of 86*100 = 8,600. 
This is not a euro or any other currency price, but is a form of performance indicator for each and every 
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firm from the day of issuance to the end of the holding period. It is treated like an index regardless of 
the individual share price on day 1. For instance, according to Datastream total returns, a share that is 
actually offered at €5 is given the same value as a share that is offered at €200, which is 100. However, 
this posed a very serious problem in calculating the portfolio value-weighted returns, since this method 
assumes the same market value of all shares of 100 on day 1, regardless of their actual market price. 
Therefore the value-weight is absolutely biased and irrelevant in this specific case: although all 
calculations using the value-weighted method were done for all return methods, the data were irrelevant 
and so totally ignored. However, this issue does not pose any problem in the equally-weighted method 
because it is simply an arithmetic average taking into account the number of shares in a certain month 
regardless of the shares’ value. Thus, all the return methods that will be discussed below are calculated 
using the equally-weighted or the arithmetic average.  
Additionally, we assumed three different entry strategies in building the IPO portfolio, in that all shares 
are assumed to be purchased and included in the portfolio one, six and twelve months after issuance 
instead of on the first day. Thus, we would be able to separate the returns that are generated in the short 
period from the long period, as Santos (2010) did for the first day by both including and excluding the 
first day returns, though we went a step further in our performance measurement by excluding not only 
the first day, but also the first month, and then the first six and twelve months. However, according to 
the results we have obtained which we will discuss subsequently, we believe it was crucial to exclude 
those months to check the persistence and the robustness of the long-term returns. Additionally, when 
assuming that the shares were purchased a while after issuance as discussed above, we would be trying 
to get as far as possible from the issuance shock effect, that period of overoptimism of investors―the 
fads period which is believed to coincide with the issuance period and that is usually clustered around 
the IPO date. So, observing long-term performance starting a few days to a few months after issuance 
is necessary in such situations to reveal more information about the shares’ performance which is due 
more to firms’ long-term performance and not to temporary IPO effects. As a result, we will measure 
portfolios’ long-term return differently and show our results in the subsequent section.  
3.2.1. The Benchmark-Adjusted Abnormal Return 
The benchmark-adjusted abnormal return (ar) for stock i in event month t is calculated as the difference 
between the monthly return on stock i and the monthly return on a selected benchmark. However, due 
to the constraints we faced in selecting different benchmarks as mentioned earlier, we will use the CAC-
All Tradable Index when referring to the benchmark, especially the market benchmark. Then the 
benchmark-adjusted abnormal returns will be calculated as follows: 
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�ݎ�,௧ =  ݎ�,௧ − ݎ�,௧ 
3.2.2. The Average Benchmark-Adjusted Return 
The average benchmark-adjusted return (AR) on a portfolio of n stocks for event month t is the simple 
average of all benchmark-adjusted abnormal returns and is calculated as follows:  
ܣܴ௧ =  ͳn ∑ �ݎ� ni=ͳ  
3.2.3. The Cumulative Benchmark-Adjusted Abnormal Return 
The cumulative benchmark-adjusted abnormal return (CAR) from event month q to event month s is the 
summation of the average benchmark-adjusted abnormal returns and is calculated as follows: 
ܥܣܴ�,௦ =  ∑ ܣܴ௧ st=q  
3.2.4. The Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return 
Following Drobetz et al. (2005), we will calculate and use the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) 
as follows: 
ܤܪܣܴ�,� = ∏(ͳ + ܴ�,௧)�௧=1 −  ∏(ͳ + ܴ�,௧)�௧=1  
where Ri,t denotes the rate of return (including dividends and all other financial benefits stockholders 
receive) on stock i in month t after its IPO, and Rm,t is the corresponding benchmark return.  
We interpret a positive buy-and-hold abnormal return as a better performance of the respective IPO 
compared to the benchmark, which is in this case the market return proxied by the CAC-All Tradable 
Index. The mean buy-and-hold abnormal return is computed as the arithmetic average of abnormal 
returns on all IPOs in the sample of size N: 
ܤܪܣܴ�௉ை,� = ͳܰ ∑ ܤܪܣܴே�=1  
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In recent years, following the works of Ikenberry et al. (1995), Barber and Lyon (1997), and Lyon et al. 
(1999), the characteristics-based matching approach (also known as BHAR, the buy-and-hold abnormal 
return) has been widely used. Mitchell and Stafford (2000) describe BHAR as ‘the average multiyear 
return from a strategy of investing in all firms that complete an event and selling at the end of a pre-
specified holding period versus a comparable strategy using otherwise similar nonevent firms’. An 
appealing feature of using BHAR is that buy-and-hold returns better resemble investors’ actual 
investment experience than the periodic (monthly) rebalancing entailed in other approaches to 
measuring risk-adjusted performance. The joint-test problem remains in that any inference on the basis 
of BHAR hinges on the validity of the assumption that event firms differ from the ‘otherwise similar 
non-event firms’ only in that they experience the event. The researcher implicitly assumes an expected 
return model in which the matched characteristics (e.g., size and book-to-market) perfectly proxy for 
the expected return on a security. Since corporate events themselves are unlikely to be random 
occurrences, i.e., they are unlikely to be exogenous with respect to past performance and expected 
returns, there is a danger that the event and non-event samples differ systematically in their expected 
returns notwithstanding the matching on certain firm characteristics. As a result, from a comparison 
standpoint, we cannot compare one method with the other because each has a different methodology of 
calculation and will certainly yield different and sometimes contradicting results and this will be seen 
when comparing the CAR with the BHAR methods.  
Moreover, Barber and Lyon (1997), Kothari and Warner (1997), and Lyon et al. (1999) provide thorough 
evidence about various methods of measuring abnormal performance. However, these papers do not 
find that one method is always preferred. Brav et al. (2000) point out that the choice of CAR or BHAR 
largely depends upon the implicit trading strategy that is being assumed. It has also been discussed by 
many authors that BHAR can magnify underperformance, even if it occurs in only a single period, as a 
consequence of compounding single-period returns. Additionally, distributional properties and test 
statistics for CAR are better understood.  
Yet, from a practical side, we would like to mention that someone would still be able to generate a return 
that is somehow close to the BHAR while ignoring to some extent the trading transaction costs. It is 
assumed that if investors purchase shares and hold them over a long period, the trading costs effects will 
not be deep on the portfolio performance in the long term because we expect that total returns will beat 
the transaction costs. For that reason, the trading transaction costs can be, up to a certain point, ignored 
since they will not have a great effect on the overall portfolio performance and they have to be incurred 
only twice―that is, once at the purchase of each stock and once at the sale of each stock in the portfolio. 
For instance, if we assume a portfolio that consists of 100 stocks and intend to hold it over 72 months, 
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then the transaction costs are incurred 200 times (100 stocks times 1 purchase transaction + 100 stocks 
times 1 selling transaction).  
On the other hand, since the CAR is assumed to be rebalanced every month, it means that at the end of 
each month the whole portfolio is being sold and then repurchased at the market closing price. Therefore, 
from a practical side, this would be extremely costly, because the trading transaction costs have to recur 
at the end of each month at the sale and purchase of each stock in the portfolio. For instance, if we 
assume a portfolio that consists of 100 stocks and intend to hold it over 72 months with monthly 
rebalancing, then the transaction costs are incurred 14,400 times (100 shares times 72 months times 1 
purchase transaction + 100 shares times 72 months times 1 selling transaction), which is 72 times more 
than the transaction costs incurred in the BHAR methodology.  
Therefore, from an economic and practical side, it would be almost impossible to purchase that big 
number of shares and resell them at the end of each month and keep rebalancing the portfolio for a long 
period as in the CAR methodology without considering that their transaction costs can reach huge 
amounts. This means that even though many researchers argued that the BHAR methodology is 
negatively weighted and thus not highly desired, the CAR is absolutely not the perfect methodology to 
adopt, since it is very far from how a portfolio would in reality perform.  
Last but not least, as mentioned above, returns were calculated by using Santos’ (2010) method, but 
both including and excluding the first day return. We also decided to do the same with the first month, 
and the first six and twelve months, attempting to measure IPO long-term performance beyond the direct 
and immediate effect of IPO shock when the stocks are newly introduced to the market. The same was 
applied in all returns calculations which are basically the AR, CAR, BHAR, HPR, and WR. Thus, in 
these returns, a cross-sectional data analysis will be adopted, regardless of differences in time of issuance 
and time when the portfolio was constructed. Thus, the abnormal returns take into consideration the 
difference in returns between the stock and the benchmark, and then all abnormal returns are treated 
collectively as if they occur during the same period. However, in the CAPM and the Fama and French 
three-factor model, a time-series data analysis will be adopted and will be discussed in more detail 
below. 
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3.2.5. The Holding Period Return 
As an alternative to the use of cumulative average benchmark-adjusted returns which implicitly assumes 
monthly portfolio rebalancing, we computed the holding period returns (HPR) from month 1 to month 
72, defined as: 
ܴ� = ∏ሺͳ + ݎ௧ሻ�௧=1 − ͳ 
where r it is the raw return on firm i in event month t. This measures the total return from a buy-and-
hold strategy where a stock is purchased at the first closing market price after going public and held 
until the earlier of its 72nd month or its delisting. Additionally, we have calculated the holding period 
return of the market benchmark in order to compare both returns from month 1 to month 72. 
3.2.6. The Wealth Relative Ratio 
To interpret these returns, we computed wealth relatives (WR) as a performance measure as Drobetz et 
al. (2005) did, defined as: 
�ܴ = ∏ (ͳ + ܴ�,௧)�௧=1 ∏ (ͳ + ܴ�,௧)�௧=1  
A wealth relative of greater than 1.00 can be interpreted as IPOs outperforming a portfolio of matching 
firms, whereas a wealth relative of less than 1.00 indicates that IPOs underperformed.  
3.2.7. The Capital Asset Pricing Model 
When we employ the market return as the benchmark, we assume that the systematic risks of IPOs are 
similar to those of the market as a whole. However, Ibbotson (1975) and Cotter (1996) argue that the 
IPO firms tend to be risky at issuance and to be less risky long after issuance. Therefore, it is not 
reasonable to assume that the beta risks of IPOs are always close to one. Thus, based on the CAPM, we 
would like to estimate the systematic risks of IPOs and then measure the expected returns of IPOs with 
the estimated beta risks. Typically, the beta risks of assets are estimated by the market model with returns 
prior to a certain event time.  
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However, for IPO firms, the returns data prior to the issuance are not available. Hence, the conventional 
market model will not be able to measure the expected return of IPO firms in the early aftermarket. To 
deal with the beta risk problem in the early aftermarket for IPO firms, we employ Jensen’s alpha to 
measure the performance of IPOs in the aftermarket. The market model is defined as follows: ܴሺ�,௦ሻ − �ܴ =  ߙሺ�,௦ሻ + ߚሺ�,௦ሻ [ܴ�ሺ�,௦ሻ − �ܴ] +  �ሺ�,௦ሻ 
where α is the intercept term of the regression, also known as Jensen’s alpha, for IPOs over the time 
period from q to s. It is the measurement of the average performance of IPOs from time q to time s based 
on the market model.  
3.2.8. The Fama and French Three-Factor Model 
The CAPM model proposed by both Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) argues that the market is the only 
common factor for asset returns. Nevertheless, Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996a, 1996b, 1997) show 
that the market factor, the size related factor and the book-to-market related factor are the common 
factors underlying the stock returns. We argue that the expected returns or the abnormal returns of IPOs 
measured by the Fama and French three-factor model should be more appropriate than those measured 
by the market model. With the Fama and French three-factor model, we investigate the performance of 
IPOs in the aftermarket considering the contributions of market factor, size-related factor and the book-
to-market factor. The performance of IPOs is measured on the Jensen’s alpha of the following 
regression: ܴሺ�,௦ሻ − �ܴ = ߙሺ�,௦ሻ + ߚሺ�,௦ሻ[ܴ�,ሺ�,௦ሻ − �ܴ] + �ሺ�,௦ሻܵܯܤሺ�,௦ሻ + ℎሺ�,௦ሻܪܯܮሺ�,௦ሻ + �ሺ�,௦ሻ 
where alpha is the intercept term of the regression, which is also known as the Jensen’s alpha under 
Fama and French’s three-factor model; SMB (q,s) is the size-related risk premium over the period from 
q to s; and HML (q,s) is the book-to-market related risk premium from q to s. Basically, the measurement 
of the Fama and French three-factor model is similar to that of the market model. Both apply Jensen’s 
alpha as the performance measure for IPOs. Further, the designs of the regression models measure the 
Jensen’s alpha as the average performance of all the IPOs and allow the coefficients of b (q,s), s (q,s), 
and h (q,s) to change over time from q to s. Therefore, besides measuring the performance of IPOs, we 
can still observe the patterns of factor loadings of b, s and h of IPO firms.  
It is important to mention that the Fama and French three-factor model data were found, obtained and 
used from the data library of a prominent researcher,, Professor Stefano Marmi, in collaboration with 
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Flavia Poma Database and the computational platform FactSet. Professor Marmi constructed the 
database for the Fama and French model via many developed countries such as Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, as well as in some emerging countries such as Brazil, China, India and South Korea. Data 
were calculated on a monthly basis starting in 1988 and ending in 2013. Therefore, we totally recognize 
the work done by Professor Marmi in providing such valuable data to all researchers and all interested 
people in the field on a public website, and we thank him for all his efforts and his contribution to the 
research field. 
As previously mentioned, in the calculation of the monthly portfolio return, we have used only the 
equally-weighted method, where at the end of each month, a portfolio rebalancing was done according 
to the remaining number of surviving firms in the portfolio. Therefore the CAPM and the Fama and 
French three-factor regressions were also constructed for each of the three, four, five, and six year 
periods by using the equally-weighted returns. However, we could not construct any of the two models 
for the six month, the one year or the two year periods due to the spread of some shares that exists in the 
IPOs. For instance, the first IPO took place in October 20, 1994, whereas the second one occurred in 
May 21, 1996, which is more than 19 months later. Therefore, if any of the two models is used for a 
portfolio over a six month or one year period, its return would start with the first stock then cut for a few 
months to continue with the second stock, because there is a spread or a lag between the two stocks that 
is more than 19 months. As a result, we had no option but to construct the CAPM and the Fama and 
French three-factor regressions exclusively for the three, four, five, and six year periods by using the 
equally-weighted returns method. Thus, in total, eight time-series regressions were constructed, four for 
the CAPM and four for the Fama and French three-factor model.  
We also note that the market returns were calculated according to the total return of the CAC-All 
Tradable Index, meaning that all reinvestments of dividends were taken into account in the prices and 
returns of the portfolio. Then, the market return was used to calculate the market risk premium (Rm-Rf) 
by using the French 90-day risk free rate of return taken from the data library of Professor Marmi. So 
by using the CAC-All Tradable Index and the risk free rate of return, the monthly market risk premium 
was calculated. Then, a comparison was made between the calculated market risk premium and the one 
extracted from the data library of Professor Marmi to check the consistency of the two returns. We 
noticed that the two risk premiums are almost equal with very few and small differences. We believe 
that these differences exist because Professor Marmi may have used another or a much wider market 
benchmark than the CAC-All Tradable Index, or because of a very few, small and acceptable calculation 
differences between the two premiums. 
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It is worth noting that in the CAPM and the Fama and French three-factor model regressions, the 
portfolios were assumed to start with the first IPO that occurred in 1994 and continue by including each 
subsequent IPO to the portfolio going from 1994 till 2013 to include all firms. It is therefore assumed 
that investors start investing in each and every IPO, going from the first one in 1994 to the last one in 
2013, by holding each share in the portfolio over different periods. These periods were discussed as 
being equal to three, four, five, and six years. So every share in the portfolio will be purchased upon its 
IPO for three, four, five and six consecutive years corresponding to 36, 48, 60 and 72 months after 
issuance and inclusion in the portfolio. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, in the CAPM and the Fama and 
French models, a time-series data analysis was necessary to perform the regression analysis: we wanted 
to match the portfolio built by all the mentioned IPOs from day one to the end of our analysis, by 
observing the portfolio return with respect to the market in the CAPM regression, and with respect to 
the market and two other factors in the Fama and French model, using time-series data analysis. 
Therefore, the time effect is important here since the portfolio raw return is calculated at the end of each 
month and compared to some market related, size related and book-to-market related factors from the 
first till the 221st month, which is from the first some time during 1994 till the last IPO some time during 
2013.  
3.2.9. Multiple Linear Regressions 
As stated, we attempt to explain IPO long-term performance via two models. Model 1 includes 
ownership and control rights, while Model 2 includes governance mechanisms. Both models will include 
the fifth day underpricing as a control variable. Nonetheless, we will measure long-term performance 
using the CAR and the BHAR for four different holding periods of three, four, five, and six years after 
issuance.  
3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
In the tables shown below, T stands for the observed month from the IPO date for all the firms in the 
portfolio, from month 1 to month 72, using cross-sectional data analysis. N stands for the number of 
remaining family firms in the sample, starting with 86 family firms in the first month and decreasing 
with time, since some firms were delisted, merged with other firms, privatized, or bankrupted.  
OP stands for the offering price, meaning that all the returns were calculated on the assumption that all 
the shares in the IPO portfolio were purchased at the offering price on the day of issuance, as argued by 
Santos (2010) and as previously discussed. With the OP we intend to observe the long-term performance 
with the inclusion of the first-day return. CP stands for the share first-day closing price, which most 
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researchers use when calculating IPO long-term performance and assuming that the IPO shares were 
purchased at the first-day closing price, excluding IPO first-day underpricing.  
1M, 6M, and 12M refer to the purchase and inclusion of all the IPO shares in the portfolio after 1, 6, 
and 12 months of their issuance. The 1M, 6M, and 12M results are all presented in the Appendices. 
Here, it is assumed that no shares were purchased on the first day, as the OP and CP assume, but that 
the portfolio was built after a while of issuance, after 1, 6, and 12 months. Later on, we will refer to OP, 
CP, 1M, 6M, and 12M as the five different entry dates, since they refer to the prices and performance 
on the five different entry dates. It is also worth noting that the statistics software used in all our 
regression analyses and hypothesis testing is STATISTICA. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Bloomberg Platform identified seven industries to which the 86 
French family firms belong. These industries are (1) basic materials; (2) communications; (3) consumer, 
cyclical; (4) consumer, non-cyclical; (5) energy; (6) industrial; and (7) technology. These seven 
classifications were extracted from the Bloomberg platform. The gross proceeds calculations are based 
on the number of shares issued on the IPO date times the offering price, which are extracted from 
Thomson Reuters DataStream and ascertained from the firms’ prospectuses.  
The relative gross proceeds take into consideration the opportunity cost over the 20-year period; the 
French risk-free rate is taken into account to compute the time value of money of the proceeds from 
1994 to 2013, which is considered the base year. We followed Ritter’s (1991) method to calculate the 
relative gross proceeds to be able to compare the numbers through time by calculating the deflator 
factors of each year with 2013 as the starting point.  
In the Appendices, we include the deflator factor of each year that we used in multiplying the gross 
proceeds to obtain the relative gross proceeds. Therefore, €1 million raised in 2013 as gross proceeds is 
equivalent to €1 million in a relative proceeds measure because the deflator factor in 2013 is equal to 
1.0000 (i.e. €1 million × 1.0000). However, €1 million raised in 2000 is equivalent to €1.3555 million 
in a relative proceeds measure (i.e. €1 million × 1.3555). Thus, to compare proceeds throughout the 
years, we used the relative gross proceeds, like Ritter (1991), and not the simple gross proceeds. In Table 
31 below, we present the distribution of all the IPOs per year and per industry.  
 
 
228 
 
 
Table 31: Distribution of IPOs per year and per industry 
 INDUSTRY  
Year of IPO Basic Materials 
Communi-
cations 
Consumer, 
Cyclical 
Consumer, 
Non-
cyclical 
Energy Industrial Technology TOTAL 
1994 
 
  1    1 
1995 
 
      - 
1996 
 
 1   1 2 4 
1997 
 1 1   4 2 8 
1998 
 1 5 1  2 1 10 
1999 
 
  4  1 3 8 
2000 1 4 4 3  1 8 21 
2001 
 2  1  1 3 7 
2002 
 
  1    1 
2003 
 
  1    1 
2004 
 1  2    3 
2005 
 
 1   2  3 
2006 
 3 2   2  7 
2007 
 3 1 1  1  6 
2008 
 1    1  2 
2009 
 
      - 
2010 
 
  1    1 
2011 
 
  1 1   2 
2012 
 
      - 
2013 
 
    1  1 
TOTAL 1 16 15 17 1 17 19 86 
First, we notice that in 1994, only 1 IPO was issued, which belongs to the consumer non-cyclical 
industry, and in 1995, none were issued. Then, an IPO rally started in 1996, with 4 IPOs issued during 
the year, and accelerated until 2001, the year of the DotCom bubble burst. Specifically, from 1996 to 
2001, that is, during only 6 years, a total of 58 family IPOs were issued, which is approximately 
equivalent to 67% of all the family IPOs issued from 1994 to 2013. Here it is obvious that IPOs were 
clustering around the DotCom bubble, which peaked in 2000 with 21 family IPOs and busted in 2001 
with only 7 IPOs. Only 1 IPO was issued in each of the years 2002 and 2003, and a very shy and slow 
recovery was witnessed in 2004 with 3 IPOs. Moreover, 3 IPOs were issued in 2005, 7 IPOs in 2006, 6 
IPOs in 2007, and only 2 IPOs in 2008. We note that the 2 IPOs issued in 2008 occurred in the first half 
of the year, just prior to the big financial crisis that hit the whole world.  
The first IPO occurred at the end of April 2008 for an industrial firm with gross proceeds of around €2.5 
million (€2.63 million as the 2013 euro value), which is considered a very small offering compared with 
other offerings, and the second IPO occurred at the end of June 2008 for a communications firms with 
gross proceeds of around €187 million (€198.7 million as the 2013 euro value), which are considered 
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the second-largest proceeds, just behind €217 million issued for a technology firm in the year 2000. 
Then, no IPO was observed in the second half of 2008 or in 2009. Only 1 IPO was issued in 2010, 2 
IPOs in 2011, again none in 2012, and only 1 IPO in 2013. Thus, it is obvious that the number of IPOs 
has dropped dramatically in the last 6 years, with only 6 family firm IPOs issued, or around 7% of all 
the IPOs issued in the last 6 years.  
We also note that the highest number of issues belongs to the technology industry, which accounts for 
19 IPOs, all of which went public from 1996 to 2001, that is, during the rally of the DotCom bubble, 
with a peak in the year 2000 with 8 IPOs. Unfortunately, after 2001, no IPOs were issued related to the 
technology industry. The second-highest number of IPOs belongs to both the consumer non-cyclical 
industry and the industrial industry, with a total of 17 IPOs for each industry, which is very close to the 
technology industry with 19 IPOs. The highest third and fourth numbers relate to the communications 
and consumer cyclical industries, with a total number of 16 and 15 IPOs, respectively. The basic 
materials and energy industries had the lowest number of IPOs, that is, only 1 IPO each.  
However, what is important to consider about the consumer non-cyclical and the industrial industries is 
that their IPOs were issued over a spread of 11 years, which is the longest among all the IPOs. The 
communications industry had its IPOs spread over 8 years, the consumer cyclical had its IPOs spread 
over 7 years, and, last, technology, as mentioned above, had its IPOs spread over 6 years. This is 
important for risk measurement and for gaining insights into the clustering of certain IPOs related to 
different industries. Specifically, we notice that there was a fad period, during which technology IPOs 
were issued, which lasted for 6 years.  
Additionally, such an industry is known for its relatively high business risk and market volatility. 
However, the consumer non-cyclical industry and the industrial industry are usually less affected by 
market risk and are also known to have relatively lower business risk compared with the technology 
industry. That is why the IPOs related to these two industries were spread over a longer period than the 
technology industry, showing that firms belonging to these two industries were much less susceptible to 
market downturns, such as technology, and more apt to go public at different times and not only during 
fad periods, such as the DotCom bubble. 
Table 32 below shows the distribution of IPOs per year and per industry according to their relative gross 
proceeds, meaning that the amounts are in millions of 2013 euros.  
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Table 32: Distribution of IPO proceeds per year and per industry  
 INDUSTRY  
Year of 
IPO 
Basic 
Materials 
Communi-
cations 
Consumer, 
Cyclical 
Consumer, 
Non-
cyclical 
Energy Industrial Technology TOTAL 
1994 
 
  4.77   4.77 
1995 
 
      - 
1996 
 
 20.67  19.77 17.95 58.39 
1997 
 9.03 93.94  98.13 34.53 235.62 
1998 
 14.06 83.97 7.24 26.52 3.44 135.23 
1999 
 
  153.39 9.57 31.12 194.07 
2000 11.62 161.23 6.08 19.80 10.84 429.63 639.21 
2001 
 24.21 7.29 15.10 157.52 204.11 
2002 
 
  49.94   49.94 
2003 
 
  0.73   0.73 
2004 
 123.35 4.04   127.39 
2005 
 
 16.29  55.30 71.59 
2006 
 134.13 10.33  32.73 177.20 
2007 
 148.89 7.72 12.25 4.91 173.77 
2008 
 198.70   2.63 201.33 
2009 
 
      - 
2010 
 
  15.76   15.76 
2011 
 
  2.73 6.93  9.67 
2012 
 
      - 
2013 
 
    17.57 17.57 
TOTAL 11.62 813.61 239.00 277.93 6.93 293.05 674.18 2,316.32 
First, we note that the total relative gross proceeds were equal to €2,316.32 million raised from 1994 to 
2013 and obviously were not evenly distributed among the 7 industries. Since these proceeds were 
derived from the issuance of 86 family firms, this makes the average proceeds per family firm around 
€26.93 million, which is relatively small compared with IPOs in other markets, such as the Anglo-
American ones. From 1996 to 2001, the 58 IPOs launched had total relative proceeds of €1,466.63 
million, which is equal to 63.32% of the total proceeds raised in the whole period. The peak was in the 
year 2000, with total proceeds of €639.21 million, which alone is equal to 27.6% of the total proceeds, 
followed in 2001 with only 7 IPOs with proceeds equal to €204.11 million, which come third in terms 
of value because the proceeds in 1997 are second, with €235.62 million raised from 8 IPOs. Furthermore, 
from 2009 to 2013, only 4 IPOs were issued, with total gross proceeds of €43 million, which is equal to 
1.86% of the total proceeds, that is, on average €10.75 million of proceeds per firm, which is far below 
the overall average of each firm of €26.93 million. We also note that the communications and technology 
industries together had the biggest number of IPOs and total relative proceeds. They totaled 35 IPOs, 
which is 40.70% of all the IPOs, and €1,487.80, which is 64.23% of the total relative proceeds. This 
shows that family firms were successful in these 2 industries, which require very high levels of know-
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how and expertise. Additionally, the consumer cyclical and non-cyclical industries accounted for a total 
of 32 IPOs, which is 37.21% of all the IPOs, and total relative proceeds of €516.93 million, which is 
22.32% of the total gross proceeds. Thus, the family firms that belong to these 2 industries are numerous 
but smaller in size. Moreover, the firms that belong to the industrial industry had total proceeds of €293 
million, which is equal to 12.65% of the total proceeds. Last, but not least, the family firms that belong 
to the basic materials and energy industries are relatively very small, with total relative proceeds of 
€11.62 million and €6.93 million, respectively, which are equal to 0.50% and 0.30% of the total gross 
proceeds. 
Regarding the decreasing number and value of IPOs in the last few years, it is worth recalling Ritter et 
al.’s (2012) argument about the amount of European IPO activity, which has fallen in the last decade, 
whereas the number of merger and acquisition (M&A) deals has risen, suggesting an increased 
preference for external growth by means of trade sales rather than internal growth financed by equity 
issues. However, we observed neither the number nor the values of the M&As in France for any firm as 
the authors suggested. Nevertheless, we can still have some ideas about the decline in the number of 
IPOs that were observed for the mentioned time horizon, which is worth researching in subsequent 
papers.  
However, what we mostly believe is that the decrease in the number and value of IPOs in the last decade 
was mainly due to the DotCom bubble burst, which decelerated IPOs afterwards until 2004–2005, with 
3 IPOs in each year. Later on, a recovery was evident in 2006 and 2007 with 7 and 6 IPOs, respectively, 
but only 2 until mid-2008 because, at that time, the deep financial crisis hit the whole world, which was 
considered by many economists as the deepest and the most severe crisis since the 1929 Great 
Depression.  
Table 33 shows the total IPOs, total gross proceeds, and average gross proceeds per industry, always 
with the amounts in millions of 2013 euros.  
Table 33: IPO summary per industry 
 INDUSTRY  
 
Basic 
Materials 
Communi-
cations 
Consumer 
Cyclical 
Consumer 
Non-
cyclical 
Energy Industrial Technology TOTAL 
No. of IPOs 1 16 15 17 1 17 19 86 
Total 
Proceeds 11.62 813.61 239.00 277.93 6.93 293.05 674.18 2,316.32 
Average 
Proceeds 11.62 50.85 15.93 16.35 6.93 17.24 35.48 26.93 
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As shown, the communications industry had the highest total proceeds of €813.61 million as well as the 
highest average proceeds per firm of €50.85 million, which is much higher than the average proceeds 
per family firm of €26.93 million. The second-highest total proceeds were raised in the technology 
industry, with average proceeds of €35.48 million per firm, which is 30% smaller than the average of 
the communications firms. The average gross proceeds per firm of the consumer cyclical and non-
cyclical and industrial industries were very close to each other, with €15.93 million, €16.35 million, and 
€17.24 million, respectively. Last, the basic material and energy industries, represented by only 1 IPO 
each, achieved total proceeds of €11.62 and €6.93 million.  
Table 34 below shows the IPOs’ weight per year and per industry according to their relative gross 
proceeds with the 2013 euro value. The table shows that almost 35% of the total gross proceeds were 
related to the communications industry and almost 29% were related to the technology industry. These 
two industries constitute the highest portion of all the IPOs, as previously discussed. The consumer 
cyclical (10.32%) and non-cyclical (12%) industries together account for around 22.32% of the total 
proceeds, and the industrial industry accounts for 12.65% of the total. Last, the basic materials and 
energy industries have negligible values, with no more than 0.80% of the total proceeds.  
Once again, the ridiculous value of IPOs in the last 5 years with respect to the total IPO proceeds is 
becoming clearer. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, from mid-2008 until 2013, firms’ proceeds raised by 
4 IPOs with a total of only €43 million did not exceed 1.86% of the total proceeds raised by all the firms. 
This shows that the 2008 financial crisis had much heavier implications than the DotCom bubble burst, 
because 5 years after the latter, which lasted from 2001 to 2005, 15 IPOs were observed with a total 
value of €453.76 million, making 19.6% of the total proceeds versus 1.86% after the 2008 crisis. Thus, 
in addition to the numerous catastrophic indicators associated with the 2008 financial crisis, it is not 
surprising that it was called the Great Recession. 
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Table 34: The IPO weight of proceeds per year and per industry 
 INDUSTRY  
Year of 
IPO 
Basic 
Materials 
Communi-
cations 
Consumer, 
Cyclical 
Consumer, 
Non-
cyclical 
Energy Industrial Technology TOTAL 
1994    0.21%   0.21% 
1995        - 
1996   0.89%  0.85% 0.77% 2.52% 
1997  0.39% 4.06%  4.24% 1.49% 10.17% 
1998  0.61% 3.63% 0.31% 1.15% 0.15% 5.84% 
1999    6.62% 0.41% 1.34% 8.38% 
2000 0.50% 6.96% 0.26% 0.85% 0.47% 18.55% 27.60% 
2001  1.05% 0.31% 0.65% 6.80% 8.81% 
2002    2.16%   2.16% 
2003    0.03%   0.03% 
2004  5.33% 0.17%   5.50% 
2005   0.70%  2.39% 3.09% 
2006  5.79% 0.45%  1.41% 7.65% 
2007  6.43% 0.33% 0.53% 0.21% 7.50% 
2008  8.58%   0.11% 8.69% 
2009        - 
2010    0.68%   0.68% 
2011    0.12% 0.30%  0.42% 
2012        - 
2013      0.76% 0.76% 
TOTAL 0.50% 35.12% 10.32% 12.00% 0.30% 12.65% 29.11% 100.00% 
We ran a correlation analysis for the dependent and independent variables with their appropriate p-
values. However, we did not include either descriptive statistics or a VIF test, because the CAR and the 
BHAR long-term performance descriptive statistics were included above and the independent variables’ 
descriptive statistics for both models were included in the previous chapter. Next, we present a 
correlation matrix for the multiple linear regression model to explain IPO long-term performance via 
ownership and control rights’ change. 
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Table 35: Correlation matrix for ‘Model 1’ 
Variable 
Correlations 
Marked correlations are significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) level 
N=75 (casewise deletion of missing data) 
up_5d Dif_CF_VO_Public FF_%_CF_Chge %_CF_Public_After 
36M_CAR_CP 0.3336*** 0.2818** 0.1803 -0.1864 
  p=.003 p=.014 p=.122 p=.109 
48M_CAR_CP 0.3118*** 0.2894** 0.2525** -0.2900** 
  p=.006 p=.012 p=.029 p=.012 
60M_CAR_CP 0.3249*** 0.3210*** 0.2959** -0.3393*** 
  p=.004 p=.005 p=.010 p=.003 
72M_CAR_CP 0.2850** 0.3497*** 0.2872** -0.2984*** 
  p=.013 p=.002 p=.012 p=.009 
36M_BHAR_CP 0.0306 0.0383 0.1692 -0.1331 
  p=.795 p=.744 p=.147 p=.255 
48M_BHAR_CP 0.0607 0.0921 0.2044 -0.2073 
  p=.605 p=.432 p=.078 p=.074 
60M_BHAR_CP 0.0429 0.2309** 0.2620** -0.2797** 
  p=.715 p=.046 p=.023 p=.015 
72M_BHAR_CP 0.0275 0.2069 0.2634** -0.2483** 
  p=.815 p=.075 p=.022 p=.032 
In the correlation table, we find a positive and statistically significant correlation between the fifth-day 
IPO underpricing and the long-term performance for the CAR but not for the BHAR. However, this 
correlation becomes weaker the longer the holding period of the IPO shares in the portfolio. For instance, 
it starts with 0.3336 and is statistically significant at the 1% level for the 3-year holding period and falls 
to 0.2850, which is statistically significant at the 5% level for the 6-year holding period.  
As mentioned before, this is due to the fad period created after the first day of issuance, which lasted for 
almost one month. We also notice that the IPO performance in the first two years in certain 
measurements and in the first three years in some other measurements is negative. However, from the 
third to the sixth year, the IPO long-term performance starts to be positive. This is a good reason for 
finding this positive correlation between the positive fifth-day underpricing and the 3-, 4-, 5-, and 6-
year holding period portfolios for the CAR measures. We also find a positive correlation that is 
statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels between the long-term performance measured by the 
CAR and the difference in cash flow and voting rights for the public shareholders on the day of issuance. 
Additionally, a positive and statistically significant correlation is found between the long-term 
performance measured by the CAR for the 4-, 5-, and 6-year holding periods and the BHAR for the 5- 
and 6-year holding periods. Last, we note a negative and statistically significant correlation between the 
long-term performance and the percentage of cash flow rights for the public shareholders. Below we 
present a correlation matrix for the multiple linear regression model to explain the IPO long-term 
performance via governance mechanisms. 
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Table 36: Correlation matrix for ‘Model 2’ 
Variable 
Correlations  
Marked correlations are significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) level 
N=75 (casewise deletion of missing data) 
up_5d LN(Board
_Size) 
CEO_ 
Founder 
Duality 
Separation_ 
Shares 
%_Inde-
pendent 
36M_CAR_CP 0.3336*** -0.1435 0.0440 0.1538 -0.2221 -0.1863 
  p=.003 p=.219 p=.708 p=.188 p=.056 p=.110 
48M_CAR_CP 0.3118*** -0.1869 0.1031 0.1922 -0.2104 -0.2048 
  p=.006 p=.108 p=.379 p=.099 p=.070 p=.078 
60M_CAR_CP 0.3249*** -0.1740 0.1138 0.2045 -0.2112 -0.2372** 
  p=.004 p=.135 p=.331 p=.078 p=.069 p=.040 
72M_CAR_CP 0.2850** -0.1501 0.1056 0.2172 -0.2218 -0.1926 
  p=.013 p=.199 p=.367 p=.061 p=.056 p=.098 
36M_BHAR_CP 0.0306 -0.0866 -0.0011 0.0682 0.0022 -0.0835 
  p=.795 p=.460 p=.993 p=.561 p=.985 p=.476 
48M_BHAR_CP 0.0607 -0.1634 -0.0008 0.1133 -0.0581 -0.0851 
  p=.605 p=.161 p=.994 p=.333 p=.621 p=.468 
60M_BHAR_CP 0.0429 -0.1465 -0.0026 0.1162 -0.2045 -0.1475 
  p=.715 p=.210 p=.982 p=.321 p=.078 p=.207 
72M_BHAR_CP 0.0275 -0.1640 -0.0461 0.0966 -0.1730 -0.1439 
  p=.815 p=.160 p=.695 p=.410 p=.138 p=.218 
Interestingly, we do not find any statistically significant correlation between the IPO long-term 
performance measured by the CAR and the BHAR in the four different holding periods and the corporate 
governance mechanisms set by the family firms on the day of their issuance, except for one correlation 
that is negative and statistically different from zero at the 5% level, which is between the five-year 
holding period return measured by the CAR and the percentage of independent directors. 
4. RESULTS OF THE LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE 
MODELS 
After discussing the main models of the IPO long-term performance and examining and reviewing the 
main descriptive statistics, we present below the results of the models used. 
4.1. Results of the Benchmark-Adjusted Abnormal Returns 
Table 37 and Table 38 below plot the benchmark-adjusted abnormal returns (AR). 
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Table 37: Monthly benchmark-adjusted abnormal returns (CP) 
T 
CP 
N Mean Med. Min. Max. Std Dev. 
1 86 28.8% 4.2% -23.5% 413.2% 72.0% 
 
Table 38: Monthly benchmark-adjusted abnormal returns (OP) 
T 
OP (T from 1 to 36)  
T 
OP (T from 37 to 72) 
N Mean Med. Min. Max. Std Dev.  N Mean Med. Min. Max. Std Dev. 
1 86 31.0% 6.4% -23.0% 457.6% 75.1%  37 82 0.4% -2.0% -26.5% 41.4% 13.2% 
2 86 0.1% -1.3% -51.8% 76.7% 16.8%  38 82 0.3% -1.0% -23.2% 39.5% 12.6% 
3 86 1.9% 0.1% -53.7% 124.6% 20.6%  39 82 2.9% -1.8% -46.5% 136.5% 23.1% 
4 86 -0.2% -0.8% -44.5% 62.4% 17.1%  40 82 -1.1% -1.8% -31.8% 53.6% 14.2% 
5 86 -1.7% -0.4% -46.3% 36.3% 14.3%  41 82 -1.5% -3.9% -28.4% 62.8% 15.0% 
6 86 -1.5% -0.1% -52.5% 57.6% 15.3%  42 82 1.6% 1.7% -38.5% 34.0% 13.3% 
7 85 -2.8% -2.4% -39.9% 75.3% 14.4%  43 82 5.1% 1.0% -35.8% 108.5% 20.6% 
8 85 -0.2% -0.6% -31.8% 142.1% 19.9%  44 82 0.7% 0.3% -34.5% 53.4% 14.9% 
9 85 -4.0% -3.9% -42.9% 95.5% 17.2%  45 81 4.0% -1.0% -61.5% 270.6% 34.5% 
10 84 -1.2% -0.6% -44.1% 38.4% 16.3%  46 81 5.3% 1.4% -33.7% 79.1% 18.6% 
11 84 3.7% 0.2% -33.3% 125.9% 25.0%  47 81 0.1% -1.2% -31.7% 53.2% 14.8% 
12 84 2.8% -0.4% -43.6% 342.4% 40.4%  48 80 10.0% 0.8% -30.1% 477.6% 59.6% 
13 84 -1.8% -2.3% -71.5% 87.2% 18.7%  49 80 -3.4% -3.7% -51.3% 34.1% 13.3% 
14 84 -3.1% -2.1% -44.1% 34.6% 13.3%  50 80 0.8% -0.5% -73.2% 123.0% 20.6% 
15 83 -2.6% -2.1% -46.6% 28.1% 13.9%  51 79 4.8% 2.0% -39.3% 98.8% 18.8% 
16 83 2.7% 0.9% -39.0% 98.5% 18.6%  52 79 -0.1% -0.1% -21.4% 32.0% 10.9% 
17 83 -1.5% -3.5% -49.2% 62.1% 17.7%  53 79 1.2% 0.2% -56.5% 29.3% 12.8% 
18 83 1.1% 0.5% -49.4% 41.3% 14.2%  54 79 3.6% 2.6% -42.4% 49.7% 14.4% 
19 83 0.0% -0.4% -50.1% 110.2% 20.1%  55 79 0.4% -0.5% -54.9% 39.3% 14.0% 
20 83 2.1% 0.8% -72.6% 78.4% 17.5%  56 78 -0.5% -1.3% -37.0% 26.9% 11.6% 
21 83 2.1% -2.6% -35.3% 217.7% 30.9%  57 77 0.5% 0.3% -37.2% 55.6% 14.5% 
22 83 2.1% -0.3% -43.0% 115.2% 20.6%  58 77 2.9% 0.9% -39.1% 96.4% 19.5% 
23 83 -0.7% -1.5% -46.1% 139.7% 21.3%  59 77 1.7% 1.3% -39.5% 44.0% 14.9% 
24 83 2.5% -0.4% -39.6% 97.1% 20.3%  60 77 -0.5% -0.9% -43.2% 40.4% 13.8% 
25 83 1.5% -0.6% -34.4% 54.0% 14.7%  61 77 1.9% 1.5% -29.5% 56.2% 11.9% 
26 82 4.1% 2.2% -40.1% 129.6% 19.9%  62 77 -0.2% 0.3% -41.4% 64.7% 15.5% 
27 82 1.2% -1.1% -31.0% 41.0% 13.3%  63 77 0.1% -0.4% -44.6% 63.8% 15.2% 
28 82 -1.7% -2.3% -51.5% 58.0% 15.5%  64 77 0.4% -0.6% -35.6% 91.3% 15.8% 
29 82 -1.5% -1.2% -53.7% 39.6% 14.2%  65 77 1.3% -1.7% -28.4% 53.8% 13.9% 
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30 82 0.8% -3.5% -39.5% 152.8% 22.1%  66 77 2.5% 2.1% -35.1% 35.0% 12.0% 
31 82 0.7% -0.9% -40.0% 76.1% 18.7%  67 77 1.9% -0.6% -56.2% 73.9% 19.7% 
32 82 1.2% 1.3% -43.4% 46.4% 17.0% 
 
68 77 2.9% 1.3% -31.5% 50.6% 14.6% 
33 82 4.9% 0.5% -40.2% 312.1% 39.5% 69 77 -0.3% -0.3% -59.9% 80.1% 18.6% 
34 82 1.6% -0.7% -38.3% 45.3% 15.0%  70 76 0.6% -0.5% -30.2% 61.4% 13.0% 
35 82 2.0% 1.9% -45.9% 52.6% 17.8%  71 76 2.7% 1.4% -36.3% 85.4% 17.2% 
36 82 1.1% 0.1% -54.6% 77.4% 20.2%  72 75 -1.5% -1.4% -55.4% 25.3% 10.8% 
The AR results show that following issuance and until the seventy-second month, the first month 
generated the highest one-month abnormal return ever, whether the shares were purchased at the OP or 
at the CP. The first-month return was equal to 31% if the shares were purchased at the OP and 28.8% if 
the shares were purchased at the CP. However, the returns based on the CP were lower, since the shares 
on average generated a positive first-day abnormal return, as we have seen and discussed in the previous 
chapter. This explains why the shares’ first-day closing price was higher than the offering price, 
therefore leading to a lower one-month abnormal return based on the CP calculation.  
However, only in the first month, a difference is observed in the monthly average abnormal return 
between the OP and the CP. Since the average abnormal return is calculated month by month and it 
represents the monthly average abnormal performance of the IPO shares over their benchmark, all the 
returns after the first month will be the same. Thus, for example, the abnormal return in the eighteenth 
month represents the price appreciation/depreciation of the IPO portfolio over its benchmark from the 
seventeenth until the eighteenth month, which is certainly the same for the OP, CP, 1M, 6M, and 12M. 
The average benchmark-adjusted abnormal return from the second until the seventy-second month is 
+0.95% per month and the median is equal to -0.50% per month. That was a good enough reason for 
deciding both to include and to exclude the first-month abnormal return when observing the IPO long-
term performance, since this extremely high one-month abnormal return clearly represents an outlier 
and is worthy of further observation. Moreover, we excluded and included the first 6 and 12 months to 
observe firms’ performance better after a while of issuance, which is after entering a somehow more 
stable phase.  
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Figure 17: AR trend from the first to the seventy-second month. 
 
As previously discussed in the section on testing the hypotheses, and as we see from the monthly 
abnormal returns, whether including or excluding the first-month returns, the IPO long-term 
performance generated positive returns. Figure 17 shows the average abnormal return trends from the 
first to the seventy-second month for the five different entry dates. We notice that the number of positive 
monthly abnormal returns is higher than the number of negative ones and that the positive monthly 
abnormal returns are on average higher in value, making these positive overall abnormal returns for the 
whole period, as we will see in the subsequent results. 
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4.2. Results of the Cumulative Benchmark-Adjusted Abnormal Returns 
Below we present the descriptive statistics for the CAR results for the CP and OP and in the Appendices 
we present the CAR results of the 1M, 6M, and 12M from the first to the seventy-second month.  
Table 39: Cumulative benchmark-adjusted abnormal returns (CP) 
T 
CAR_CP (T from 1 to 36)  
T 
CAR_CP (T from 37 to 72) 
N Mean Median Min. Max. Std Dev.  N Mean Median Min. Max. Std Dev. 
1 86 28.8% 4.2% -23.5% 413.2% 72.0%  37 82 46.8% 38.0% -212.9% 344.1% 114.6% 
2 86 28.9% 7.8% -45.9% 370.6% 68.6%  38 82 47.1% 29.7% -226.3% 339.8% 111.9% 
3 86 30.8% 8.7% -59.1% 363.7% 73.4%  39 82 49.9% 38.5% -211.3% 321.1% 115.3% 
4 86 30.6% 9.2% -82.1% 350.5% 79.1%  40 82 48.8% 34.6% -235.1% 333.5% 115.6% 
5 86 28.9% 8.6% -105.4% 357.0% 80.0%  41 82 47.2% 33.5% -244.8% 316.1% 116.6% 
6 86 27.4% 11.0% -107.0% 345.3% 78.8%  42 82 48.8% 38.1% -221.0% 333.4% 116.6% 
7 85 25.1% 8.4% -114.5% 365.7% 81.6%  43 82 53.9% 33.5% -196.8% 328.2% 115.3% 
8 85 24.8% 11.8% -122.6% 359.8% 83.7%  44 82 54.6% 34.9% -208.8% 325.5% 118.0% 
9 85 20.9% 6.6% -136.0% 352.8% 86.7%  45 81 58.9% 33.1% -207.9% 347.8% 120.3% 
10 84 19.9% 5.6% -151.4% 335.0% 88.6%  46 81 64.2% 33.8% -195.4% 386.3% 123.6% 
11 84 23.6% 7.9% -146.6% 325.7% 94.1%  47 81 64.2% 37.8% -183.0% 387.1% 123.1% 
12 84 26.4% 12.1% -151.4% 367.6% 97.3%  48 80 75.0% 41.6% -173.0% 693.7% 140.3% 
13 84 24.6% 5.7% -137.9% 363.7% 95.1%  49 80 71.5% 34.2% -178.2% 642.3% 136.7% 
14 84 21.5% 2.2% -150.4% 360.1% 97.4%  50 80 72.4% 42.1% -185.8% 765.4% 146.2% 
15 83 18.8% 3.4% -191.1% 363.7% 103.2%  51 79 76.7% 47.2% -180.8% 726.1% 145.8% 
16 83 21.5% 2.0% -152.0% 372.3% 100.9%  52 79 76.7% 44.4% -181.0% 740.3% 144.3% 
17 83 20.0% 1.7% -155.5% 354.5% 99.9%  53 79 77.9% 57.8% -183.1% 683.8% 140.5% 
18 83 21.1% 1.5% -164.9% 355.5% 100.5%  54 79 81.4% 56.7% -190.9% 692.3% 143.0% 
19 83 21.0% 7.1% -162.9% 343.0% 101.2%  55 79 81.8% 61.5% -198.3% 731.6% 146.6% 
20 83 23.1% 4.0% -148.8% 357.2% 100.8%  56 78 79.4% 63.5% -199.2% 717.1% 147.1% 
21 83 25.2% 10.4% -151.9% 360.3% 102.9%  57 77 79.9% 50.9% -204.6% 704.7% 147.6% 
22 83 27.3% 9.1% -178.9% 342.1% 104.3%  58 77 82.7% 70.1% -202.7% 703.6% 144.5% 
23 83 26.5% 13.6% -175.3% 331.2% 104.4%  59 77 84.4% 80.1% -208.1% 699.0% 148.1% 
24 83 29.0% 13.7% -162.5% 322.1% 105.2%  60 77 83.9% 63.1% -204.8% 682.3% 147.4% 
25 83 30.5% 20.1% -165.9% 316.0% 100.5%  61 77 85.7% 75.1% -207.9% 677.9% 149.5% 
26 82 36.1% 21.4% -151.3% 315.4% 100.3%  62 77 85.5% 71.1% -211.4% 673.4% 149.8% 
27 82 37.3% 22.6% -172.2% 318.7% 101.8%  63 77 85.6% 69.2% -216.6% 674.4% 152.9% 
28 82 35.6% 21.0% -160.6% 328.7% 100.8%  64 77 86.0% 65.8% -218.2% 675.6% 158.2% 
29 82 34.1% 18.1% -165.7% 334.5% 102.3%  65 77 87.3% 60.3% -223.3% 675.1% 157.8% 
30 82 34.9% 26.1% -180.9% 329.6% 103.9%  66 77 89.8% 65.3% -222.2% 710.0% 159.4% 
31 82 35.6% 25.0% -187.7% 332.0% 104.1%  67 77 91.7% 70.5% -223.1% 653.8% 156.4% 
32 82 36.8% 29.7% -190.6% 335.8% 106.1%  68 77 94.6% 76.2% -232.8% 704.4% 159.2% 
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33 82 41.7% 33.5% -195.3% 392.6% 110.6%  69 77 94.3% 73.8% -259.2% 757.3% 166.2% 
34 82 43.3% 29.2% -196.7% 390.1% 110.1%  70 76 98.6% 74.3% -260.1% 752.5% 163.1% 
35 82 45.2% 30.9% -178.2% 344.1% 108.4%  71 76 101.3% 74.2% -292.2% 774.2% 163.1% 
36 82 46.4% 34.7% -198.7% 342.7% 113.1%  72 75 104.2% 74.7% -347.5% 774.9% 162.6% 
 
Table 40: Cumulative benchmark-adjusted abnormal returns (OP) 
T 
CAR_OP (T from 1 to 36)  
T 
CAR_OP (T from 37 to 72) 
N Mean Median Min. Max. Std Dev.  N Mean Median Min. Max. Std Dev. 
1 86 31.0% 6.4% -23.0% 457.6% 75.1%  37 82 49.2% 38.9% -211.4% 343.7% 116.6% 
2 86 31.1% 8.7% -47.1% 405.8% 71.4%  38 82 49.5% 32.1% -226.3% 339.4% 113.9% 
3 86 33.1% 10.4% -60.3% 362.2% 75.6%  39 82 52.3% 40.9% -211.2% 327.4% 117.6% 
4 86 32.9% 11.9% -84.4% 349.0% 81.1%  40 82 51.2% 36.9% -235.1% 333.1% 117.8% 
5 86 31.2% 7.7% -106.6% 356.1% 81.9%  41 82 49.6% 32.8% -244.7% 322.2% 118.8% 
6 86 29.7% 9.7% -108.2% 352.0% 80.9%  42 82 51.2% 38.9% -220.9% 333.0% 118.7% 
7 85 27.3% 9.0% -115.1% 364.2% 83.6%  43 82 56.3% 38.2% -198.1% 327.8% 117.5% 
8 85 27.1% 12.3% -123.1% 358.3% 85.5%  44 82 57.0% 39.0% -207.4% 325.1% 120.1% 
9 85 23.2% 8.2% -135.9% 351.3% 88.3%  45 81 61.3% 38.3% -206.4% 346.3% 121.7% 
10 84 22.2% 5.2% -151.3% 333.5% 90.3%  46 81 66.6% 33.4% -194.0% 384.8% 125.0% 
11 84 25.9% 11.0% -146.5% 324.2% 95.5%  47 81 66.7% 39.9% -185.0% 385.6% 124.6% 
12 84 28.7% 14.9% -151.4% 366.2% 98.6%  48 80 77.4% 44.5% -175.0% 744.1% 143.5% 
13 84 26.9% 6.6% -138.5% 362.2% 96.5%  49 80 74.0% 35.5% -180.1% 692.8% 139.7% 
14 84 23.8% 1.8% -151.0% 358.6% 98.8%  50 80 74.8% 43.2% -186.8% 815.8% 149.5% 
15 83 21.2% 3.2% -189.8% 362.2% 104.8%  51 79 79.2% 50.2% -182.5% 776.5% 149.0% 
16 83 23.8% 3.1% -152.5% 370.9% 102.6%  52 79 79.1% 50.4% -182.1% 790.7% 147.6% 
17 83 22.4% 1.6% -156.0% 353.0% 101.5%  53 79 80.3% 61.7% -184.2% 734.2% 143.6% 
18 83 23.4% -1.2% -165.5% 354.0% 102.2%  54 79 83.9% 56.2% -188.6% 742.7% 146.2% 
19 83 23.4% 6.8% -163.4% 341.5% 102.9%  55 79 84.3% 61.0% -198.2% 782.0% 149.9% 
20 83 25.5% 2.0% -149.3% 355.7% 102.5%  56 78 82.0% 65.8% -197.3% 767.5% 150.4% 
21 83 27.6% 10.9% -152.5% 358.8% 104.7%  57 77 82.4% 61.0% -202.3% 755.1% 150.9% 
22 83 29.7% 8.4% -177.4% 340.6% 106.2%  58 77 85.3% 70.7% -200.4% 754.0% 148.0% 
23 83 28.9% 13.0% -173.8% 329.7% 106.2%  59 77 87.0% 79.3% -205.8% 749.4% 151.6% 
24 83 31.4% 14.4% -161.0% 320.6% 107.0%  60 77 86.5% 72.6% -202.5% 732.7% 150.9% 
25 83 32.9% 18.7% -165.8% 316.8% 102.1%  61 77 88.3% 82.5% -205.6% 728.3% 152.9% 
26 82 38.5% 22.0% -149.9% 323.0% 102.1%  62 77 88.1% 73.8% -209.0% 723.9% 153.2% 
27 82 39.7% 24.4% -170.7% 319.4% 103.7%  63 77 88.2% 72.6% -214.3% 724.9% 156.3% 
28 82 38.0% 20.4% -159.2% 329.5% 102.8%  64 77 88.6% 64.2% -215.9% 726.1% 161.6% 
29 82 36.5% 17.6% -164.2% 335.3% 104.4%  65 77 89.9% 64.5% -221.0% 725.5% 161.3% 
30 82 37.3% 38.1% -181.5% 330.4% 106.2%  66 77 92.4% 67.6% -219.9% 760.5% 162.8% 
31 82 38.0% 29.0% -186.2% 337.4% 106.4%  67 77 94.2% 70.6% -223.2% 704.3% 159.5% 
32 82 39.2% 35.1% -189.1% 336.6% 108.1%  68 77 97.2% 77.3% -233.0% 754.8% 162.5% 
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33 82 44.1% 35.6% -193.8% 392.2% 112.7%  69 77 96.9% 75.9% -259.4% 807.7% 169.5% 
34 82 45.7% 37.6% -195.2% 389.7% 112.1%  70 76 101.2% 74.1% -260.3% 802.9% 166.3% 
35 82 47.6% 32.4% -176.7% 343.7% 110.5%  71 76 103.9% 76.4% -292.3% 824.7% 166.5% 
36 82 48.8% 36.3% -197.4% 342.3% 115.2%  72 75 106.8% 75.8% -347.7% 825.4% 166.0% 
As previously discussed, among all the five different entry dates, the IPO shares purchased at the CP 
and at the OP generated on average the highest first-month abnormal returns ever of 28.8% and 31%, 
respectively, compared with an average abnormal monthly return of around only 0.95%. Accordingly, 
this has definitely had a considerable effect on the long-run CAR results from the first to the seventy-
second month and generated the highest CAR for the investment started on the first day of issuance, 
whether at the offering price or at the first-day closing price, rather than entering 1, 6, or 12 months after 
issuance, as we will see in the subsequent tables. As we observe from the two tables above, on average, 
investors entering the IPO portfolio at the CP or the OP can generate a cumulative benchmark-adjusted 
abnormal return of 104.2% and 106.8%, respectively, at the end of the seventy-second month, which 
recorded the highest CARs for both during the 6-year period. As we see in the Appendices, IPO shares 
purchased at 1M, 6M, and 12M generated a CAR in the seventy-second month of 74.8%, 73.9%, and 
78.5%, respectively. Thus, late investors who miss the opportunity to invest in the IPO on the first day 
of issuance are better off waiting 12 months before entering the IPO portfolio than entering just 1 or 6 
months later. However, investing somewhere else should generate over a 1-year period a return that is 
at least equal to or greater than the return generated if the IPO shares were to be invested after 1 or 6 
months, representing the opportunity cost. 
However, what is important to note in this result is that even when excluding the very high first-month 
abnormal returns of 28.8% and 31% by either entering the IPO portfolio at the CP or at the OP, family 
firms still generate positive CARs in the long term. These positive long-term returns start to appear at 
the end of the second year after issuance for the three entry dates, which are 1M, 6M, and 12M. This 
means that late investment in the IPO portfolio, albeit generating negative abnormal returns in the first 
few months, will achieve positive abnormal returns in the long term, reaching more than the 70% level. 
Moreover, this shows that the positive long-term returns of these family firms observed for the portfolios 
do not derive solely from the very high first-month abnormal returns, which are directly associated with 
the IPO effect, but that additionally these family firms seem to outperform their market benchmark in 
the long term, month after month, to reach levels well above 70%.  
However, it is worth noting that the IPO performance for all the 5 different entry dates shows decreasing 
abnormal returns in the first few months of issuance, just after the fifth month until the end of the second 
year. Additionally, the CARs for 1M, 6M, and 12M reach a record low of -10.8%, -9.9%, and -7.7%, 
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respectively, after 15 months of issuance. During this month too, IPO portfolios purchased at the CP 
and the OP generate a CAR of 18.8% and 21.2%, decreasing from the first-month CAR of 28.8% and 
31%, which is a loss of around 10% for both CARs. 
Therefore, it is very important to observe these results thoroughly for the following reasons. First, we 
notice that the French family firms were somehow correctly priced on the day of issuance, generating 
first-day underpricing of only around 2%, which is considered to be low compared with other firms, 
which usually generate double-digit IPO first-day abnormal returns, as described by numerous authors 
around the world. Additionally, this is apparent from observing the first-month abnormal returns 
calculated at the CP and the OP, making a difference between the two of around 2%, which is associated 
with the first-day abnormal returns. Therefore, on average, there was no serious problem in pricing these 
family firms’ shares upon issuance. 
However, compared with the 2% first-day abnormal returns, the very high first-month abnormal returns 
of around 30%, followed by steady returns for around three months and then continually decreasing 
abnormal returns for the next twelve months, reveal important implications. First, and as we argued, 
family firms could be fairly priced on the day of their issuance, generating moderate first-day 
underpricing of around 2%. Second, investors’ overoptimism about IPO short-term and prompt returns 
along with the market speculators and opportunists who seek any IPO to invest in drove the first-month 
abnormal returns as high as 30%, created by the very high demand for the IPO shares, though it was 
sometimes irrational and fundamentally weak. Third, after this fast trend that accelerated in the first 
month of issuance and stabilized for around three months, diminishing continuously over twelve 
consecutive months to record the lowest abnormal returns ever and then starting to recover all the losses 
until the end of the second year, were CARs that are shown to be higher than the first-month abnormal 
returns. However, these family firms maintained their good performance throughout the remaining 
months to reach more than 100% in the seventy-second month for the portfolios purchased at the CP 
and the OP and more than 70% for the portfolios purchased at 1M, 6M, and 12M.  
Thus, after the first month of issuance, these continuously decreasing CARs for almost two years for the 
portfolios purchased on the five different entry dates infer that IPO shares were traded much above their 
intrinsic values after the first day of issuance until almost the first three months had passed, due to the 
fad periods created by over-optimistic investors. That is why IPO portfolios generated very high first-
month abnormal returns then retreated until the end of the second year of issuance, when the recovery 
of all the losses started and continued to generate positive long-term returns.  
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Consequently, all the portfolios purchased 1, 6, and even 12 months after issuance experienced a 
negative CAR until the end of the second year of issuance, which shows that all the IPO shares were 
overvalued after one month of issuance too, until the end of the second year, when the CAR started to 
be positive. However, IPO portfolios purchased after 1 and 6 months of issuance generated a longer 
negative CAR than portfolios purchased after 12 months of issuance, which started to recover much 
sooner. Below we will see the CAR trend for the five different entry dates from the first to the seventy-
second month.  
Figure 18: CAR trend from the first to the seventy-second month. 
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4.3. Results of the Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
In this section, we will present the BHAR results for the CP and OP from the first to the seventy-second 
month. The 1M, 6M, and 12M results will be presented in the Appendices as well.  
Table 41: Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (CP) 
T 
BHAR_CP (T from 1 to 36)  
T 
BHAR_CP (T from 37 to 72) 
N Mean Median Min. Max. Std Dev.  N Mean Median Min. Max. Std Dev. 
1 86 28.8% 4.2% -23.5% 413.2% 72.0%  37 82 26.5% -20.9% -196.6% 704.1% 170.1% 
2 86 26.1% 8.0% -42.1% 377.2% 60.0%  38 82 23.8% -17.0% -211.4% 678.7% 159.5% 
3 86 31.2% 8.7% -51.6% 630.2% 89.2%  39 82 33.7% -18.2% -212.1% 1447.6% 211.8% 
4 86 37.8% 7.4% -65.5% 1155.0% 140.3%  40 82 23.5% -14.9% -231.6% 1067.4% 171.7% 
5 86 37.9% 6.6% -76.8% 1327.7% 158.6%  41 82 20.9% -18.3% -232.8% 731.6% 156.5% 
6 86 28.4% 9.4% -76.6% 956.0% 117.7%  42 82 20.7% -20.8% -231.9% 640.4% 150.8% 
7 85 21.6% 4.8% -80.2% 514.2% 81.6%  43 82 26.1% -17.4% -227.0% 757.1% 164.8% 
8 85 22.7% 3.0% -87.8% 607.7% 90.9%  44 82 31.3% -19.5% -242.7% 904.1% 179.1% 
9 85 19.4% 3.0% -91.6% 562.8% 91.6%  45 81 34.8% -19.8% -240.2% 832.8% 180.8% 
10 84 20.8% 0.1% -98.7% 725.3% 107.3%  46 81 37.1% -23.1% -246.5% 771.2% 179.1% 
11 84 29.6% -1.3% -110.0% 866.7% 136.3%  47 81 37.7% -21.3% -241.3% 838.5% 188.2% 
12 84 28.2% -1.1% -100.5% 858.2% 130.0%  48 80 42.3% -18.0% -235.2% 890.3% 184.5% 
13 84 15.9% -0.2% -113.1% 412.5% 89.9%  49 80 35.6% -21.3% -234.4% 800.2% 180.6% 
14 84 12.0% -6.5% -125.0% 409.7% 88.4%  50 80 38.1% -14.6% -242.8% 781.9% 174.3% 
15 83 12.7% -10.0% -116.7% 460.4% 98.4%  51 79 39.8% -12.7% -235.0% 823.5% 182.1% 
16 83 12.6% -12.1% -113.8% 443.2% 94.6%  52 79 34.1% -16.9% -214.9% 750.2% 163.1% 
17 83 9.4% -12.3% -118.9% 386.0% 90.4%  53 79 38.5% -16.0% -221.3% 738.4% 173.0% 
18 83 12.0% -11.1% -117.2% 480.3% 100.2%  54 79 42.6% -14.3% -215.7% 813.2% 181.7% 
19 83 11.9% -14.3% -120.5% 444.2% 97.2%  55 79 40.5% -8.3% -211.3% 787.8% 179.1% 
20 83 14.5% -11.9% -117.9% 546.3% 103.7%  56 78 39.6% -10.9% -204.3% 891.8% 188.6% 
21 83 15.9% -15.8% -126.7% 784.0% 125.7%  57 77 35.2% -16.3% -180.2% 939.8% 180.8% 
22 83 15.7% -11.0% -141.7% 565.4% 114.0%  58 77 31.9% -20.0% -187.5% 1004.3% 169.5% 
23 83 13.9% -11.2% -138.5% 498.8% 113.7%  59 77 37.5% -15.8% -185.4% 1265.0% 189.0% 
24 83 10.6% -11.4% -149.0% 486.5% 102.0%  60 77 40.0% -18.0% -177.6% 1482.1% 207.6% 
25 83 11.1% -10.0% -151.1% 410.5% 101.1%  61 77 44.8% -11.9% -173.7% 1574.4% 220.0% 
26 82 16.0% -9.9% -144.8% 556.2% 111.5%  62 77 46.4% -13.3% -190.1% 1611.0% 226.7% 
27 82 19.1% -11.2% -152.9% 538.8% 119.2%  63 77 47.9% -18.8% -185.7% 1534.7% 219.5% 
28 82 17.9% -14.5% -153.9% 608.5% 125.3%  64 77 52.7% -19.3% -196.7% 1578.8% 235.7% 
29 82 17.0% -16.1% -156.3% 640.5% 131.4%  65 77 54.9% -13.6% -200.1% 1806.0% 253.8% 
30 82 16.0% -15.2% -164.0% 702.3% 135.4%  66 77 59.7% -10.9% -190.8% 2000.6% 267.5% 
31 82 14.4% -16.3% -172.1% 740.7% 135.3%  67 77 59.7% -7.4% -182.4% 2072.6% 272.3% 
32 82 18.4% -15.2% -183.1% 869.9% 148.2%  68 77 68.4% -9.4% -165.7% 2333.9% 306.0% 
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33 82 17.2% -16.3% -172.6% 842.7% 142.6%  69 77 70.6% -7.2% -174.6% 2571.4% 326.7% 
34 82 18.7% -16.9% -172.5% 667.3% 145.4%  70 76 66.4% -5.6% -179.3% 2158.2% 285.0% 
35 82 21.9% -17.6% -179.9% 752.7% 157.5%  71 76 67.0% 3.3% -173.7% 2073.8% 276.1% 
36 82 22.8% -17.2% -185.5% 707.3% 155.6%  72 75 66.8% 5.5% -149.4% 1820.8% 255.7% 
 
Table 42: Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (OP) 
T 
BHAR_OP (T from 1 to 36)  
T 
BHAR_OP (T from 37 to 72) 
N Mean Median Min. Max. Std Dev.  N Mean Median Min. Max. Std Dev. 
1 86 31.0% 6.4% -23.0% 457.6% 75.1%  37 82 31.0% -19.5% -195.8% 880.4% 181.4% 
2 86 28.0% 8.7% -43.3% 376.2% 60.6%  38 82 27.9% -16.2% -210.6% 723.0% 168.5% 
3 86 32.9% 10.5% -52.9% 629.2% 89.0%  39 82 38.0% -17.7% -211.3% 1445.7% 219.1% 
4 86 39.5% 9.8% -66.8% 1153.9% 140.1%  40 82 27.2% -14.9% -230.6% 1065.5% 177.2% 
5 86 39.6% 6.8% -78.1% 1326.5% 158.4%  41 82 24.8% -20.0% -231.9% 729.9% 165.0% 
6 86 30.1% 8.9% -77.9% 954.9% 117.5%  42 82 24.7% -20.1% -230.9% 809.0% 161.3% 
7 85 23.3% 5.1% -80.8% 513.1% 81.7%  43 82 30.4% -16.3% -226.1% 952.6% 177.4% 
8 85 24.4% 5.7% -88.4% 606.5% 90.8%  44 82 35.8% -17.5% -241.7% 998.3% 192.0% 
9 85 20.9% 0.8% -91.5% 561.6% 91.5%  45 81 39.0% -20.7% -239.2% 1005.8% 193.5% 
10 84 22.4% 0.4% -100.2% 724.2% 107.2%  46 81 41.4% -20.5% -245.5% 956.3% 191.3% 
11 84 31.3% 2.5% -111.8% 863.7% 136.1%  47 81 42.1% -21.0% -240.4% 1051.8% 201.6% 
12 84 30.0% 2.6% -102.1% 855.3% 129.9%  48 80 46.9% -17.9% -234.3% 1113.8% 199.7% 
13 84 17.7% -1.4% -114.9% 410.1% 90.3%  49 80 39.8% -19.9% -233.5% 1002.0% 193.3% 
14 84 13.8% -9.0% -126.9% 407.4% 88.8%  50 80 42.1% -15.2% -244.4% 801.4% 183.8% 
15 83 14.5% -10.3% -118.6% 457.9% 98.7%  51 79 43.9% -12.6% -234.1% 930.6% 193.4% 
16 83 14.5% -12.4% -115.6% 440.8% 94.9%  52 79 37.4% -16.1% -216.3% 752.3% 169.6% 
17 83 11.3% -12.0% -120.9% 383.6% 90.7%  53 79 42.4% -16.1% -222.8% 829.4% 183.2% 
18 83 13.9% -11.0% -119.1% 479.1% 100.7%  54 79 46.5% -15.0% -217.1% 815.4% 191.2% 
19 83 13.9% -10.0% -122.5% 441.6% 98.1%  55 79 44.2% -8.3% -212.7% 790.1% 187.3% 
20 83 16.6% -8.4% -118.6% 543.5% 104.9%  56 78 43.0% -11.3% -205.7% 894.1% 194.4% 
21 83 18.4% -18.3% -127.5% 784.5% 127.5%  57 77 38.0% -15.8% -179.5% 939.6% 183.5% 
22 83 18.9% -13.2% -142.7% 565.9% 120.1%  58 77 35.0% -16.8% -188.8% 1004.0% 173.2% 
23 83 16.9% -11.7% -139.4% 496.5% 119.3%  59 77 41.1% -15.3% -186.7% 1264.7% 194.8% 
24 83 13.6% -11.0% -150.0% 484.0% 108.4%  60 77 43.7% -14.5% -178.8% 1481.7% 213.5% 
25 83 14.3% -9.8% -152.2% 483.6% 108.2%  61 77 48.8% -12.4% -173.0% 1574.1% 227.0% 
26 82 19.6% -9.9% -144.9% 553.5% 120.0%  62 77 51.0% -13.4% -189.3% 1610.7% 235.6% 
27 82 23.1% -10.9% -152.9% 604.4% 129.6%  63 77 52.4% -18.6% -184.9% 1534.3% 227.9% 
28 82 21.8% -14.3% -154.0% 779.5% 137.2%  64 77 57.4% -14.1% -195.9% 1578.4% 245.4% 
29 82 21.1% -15.4% -156.3% 818.3% 144.3%  65 77 59.7% -12.7% -199.3% 1805.7% 262.8% 
30 82 20.2% -15.5% -164.0% 893.0% 149.3%  66 77 63.7% -9.3% -190.0% 2000.2% 272.2% 
31 82 18.6% -15.2% -173.8% 939.3% 150.4%  67 77 63.8% -7.2% -181.6% 2072.3% 277.2% 
32 82 23.0% -14.2% -184.9% 1097.5% 166.4%  68 77 72.8% -9.1% -165.0% 2333.5% 311.1% 
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33 82 21.9% -14.8% -174.4% 1061.7% 160.7%  69 77 74.9% -2.5% -175.7% 2571.0% 330.8% 
34 82 22.7% -16.5% -174.4% 803.0% 156.2%  70 76 70.9% -6.3% -180.4% 2157.8% 290.5% 
35 82 26.4% -16.7% -181.8% 941.9% 171.0%  71 76 71.4% 5.8% -174.7% 2073.5% 281.0% 
36 82 27.6% -16.2% -187.3% 855.1% 168.3%  72 75 71.1% 9.0% -149.9% 1820.4% 261.0% 
In the tables shown above, we notice that the IPO portfolios purchased at the CP and the OP generate a 
BHAR at the end of the seventy-second month of 66.8% and 71.1%, respectively, compared with the 
CAR for the mentioned period of 104.2% and 106.8%. However, interestingly, portfolios purchased 
after 1, 6, and 12 months generated a BHAR equal to 50.3%, 61.4%, and 127.1%. This shows that by 
following the BHAR method, entering into IPO portfolios after 12 months of issuance will generate the 
highest abnormal returns in the seventy-second month than entering on any date beforehand. This 
explains why the IPO shares were traded well above their intrinsic values in the first year of issuance, 
generating such a very high BHAR for the shares purchased at 12M and held until the seventy-second 
month of their IPO date, rather than shares purchased at their CP, OP, 1M, or 6M. However, we will see 
that shares were traded above their intrinsic values during the second year as well. For instance, the 
BHAR of the portfolios purchased at 12M shows an average of -1.8% after 13 months of their IPO date, 
passing through a record low of -8.0% 17 months after the IPO date then generating only 1.7% 24 
months after the IPO date. Thus, the long-term performance in the seventy-second month from the 
portfolio IPO date can be even higher if the shares were purchased 17 months after their IPO date rather 
than at any time beforehand. Therefore, IPO shares underperformed the market just after the first month 
of issuance and until the middle of the second year, but then they started to outperform their benchmark 
for a long time. 
More specifically, IPO portfolios entered at the CP and the OP generated first-month abnormal returns 
of 28.8% and 31%, respectively. However, 17 months after their IPO date, they both generated BHARs 
of only 9.4% and 11.3%, respectively, which represented a drop in the BHARs of 19.4% and 19.7% 
from their first month. Thus, as we discussed earlier in the interpretation of the CAR results, the first-
day IPO underpricing of these French family firms of only 2% shows that on average the IPO shares 
were fairly priced at their issuance. Nevertheless, just after issuance, a fad period quickly arose, 
accompanied by investors’ overoptimism, and drove the first-month abnormal returns of around 30%, 
which tumbled afterwards but closed at the same level after 12 months of issuance. Then, in the second 
year, around 65% of these abnormal returns vanished, falling from around 30% in the first month to 
around 10% a year and a half later. That was sufficient to realize that the shares were traded well above 
their intrinsic values after issuance, leading to those high first-month abnormal returns and then 
decreasing to around 10% after a while. We also see that IPO shares purchased after 12 months could 
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have realized a higher BHAR at the end of the seventy-second month. This trend is better observed in 
the figure plotted below, which shows the BHAR trend on different entry dates from the first to the 
seventy-second month. 
Figure 19: BHAR trend for the five different entry dates. 
 
Nevertheless, it is crucial to remember that the BHARs generated at the end of the seventy-second month 
for the portfolios entered on different dates have definitely different holding periods. For instance, the 
BHAR generated for the portfolio purchased 12 months after issuance and held until the seventy-second 
month has a holding period of 60 months, whereas the portfolio purchased at the first-day closing price 
and held until the seventy-second month has a holding period of 72 months, which is a year longer. 
Thus, the BHAR has to be turned into an average effective annual rate of return when comparing two 
portfolios with different investment holding periods. However, the opportunity cost from investing in 
the second-best alternative will be taken into consideration when comparing different returns with 
different holding periods, to avoid over- or underestimating a certain investment rate of return. It is also 
worth noting that such a high first-month abnormal return is what generally entices successive investors 
to enter into forthcoming IPOs, seeking to replicate the same high return over the very short period and 
then to abandon their position. In return, such a fundamentally fictitious and temporary demand will 
drive IPO shares up for only a short period of time, before pulling them down to their lower values, 
generating a negative abnormal return. Nevertheless, as we have seen in the long-term performance of 
the French family firms by the two different measurements, IPO shares underperformed their market 
benchmark just after a few months of issuance, but in the long term they outperformed it by far, which 
is different from the commonly viewed example of IPO long-term performance.  
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4.4. Results of the Holding Period Returns 
The first two tables below report the basic descriptive statistics of the holding period returns for the IPO 
portfolios purchased at the CP and the OP, while the second two tables represent the test of the means 
of the holding period returns against 0.00% at the 5% level of statistical significance. We notice that the 
average holding period returns of the IPO portfolios purchased at the CP and at the OP are positive, with 
the lowest return after 18 months of issuance and the highest after 72 months. However, we also observe 
that their standard deviations increase with time to record the highest with respect to the average return 
measured by the coefficient of variation between the second and the third year.  
Table 43: Holding period returns (CP) 
T HPR_CP 
N Mean Median Min. Max. Std Dev. 
1 86 30.0% 4.9% -25.8% 416.4% 72.5% 
6 86 30.7% 3.9% -67.8% 985.7% 121.7% 
12 84 33.0% 0.4% -84.8% 871.7% 135.7% 
18 83 16.0% -9.1% -89.1% 551.5% 107.1% 
24 83 15.2% -12.4% -93.9% 482.7% 108.5% 
30 82 21.4% -28.3% -94.5% 751.9% 146.4% 
36 82 28.9% -23.9% -96.5% 748.3% 167.3% 
42 82 25.3% -34.3% -97.5% 807.6% 163.2% 
48 80 44.5% -30.1% -96.0% 896.2% 188.9% 
54 79 40.1% -34.7% -99.2% 817.4% 178.8% 
60 77 37.0% -22.9% -99.2% 1455.7% 203.3% 
66 77 58.9% -14.2% -99.2% 1981.3% 266.7% 
72 75 70.1% 5.3% -98.9% 1804.0% 255.7% 
Table 44: Holding period returns (OP) 
T HPR_OP 
N Mean Median Min. Max. Std Dev. 
1 86 32.4% 5.7% -27.7% 455.5% 75.6% 
6 86 32.5% 5.8% -70.7% 985.7% 121.6% 
12 84 34.8% 0.4% -86.4% 871.7% 135.7% 
18 83 18.0% -7.5% -89.1% 551.5% 107.8% 
24 83 18.4% -12.1% -93.9% 504.7% 115.4% 
30 82 25.7% -28.3% -94.5% 943.5% 160.3% 
36 82 33.7% -23.9% -96.5% 892.5% 180.4% 
42 82 29.4% -34.3% -97.5% 821.7% 173.5% 
48 80 49.2% -30.1% -96.0% 1120.4% 204.0% 
54 79 44.1% -32.9% -99.2% 817.4% 188.3% 
60 77 40.8% -22.9% -99.2% 1455.7% 209.0% 
66 77 62.9% -12.1% -99.2% 1981.3% 271.2% 
72 75 74.5% 6.4% -99.0% 1804.0% 261.0% 
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The two tables below show that the holding period returns for portfolios purchased at the CP and the 
OP are not statistically significantly different from 0.00% for all the months, just for a few. The detailed 
results table, which includes all the months from the first to the seventy-second month, shows that during 
19 different months, portfolios purchased at the CP are statistically significantly different from 0.00%, 
and during 27 different months, portfolios purchased at the OP are statistically significantly different 
from 0.00%. Therefore, portfolios purchased at the OP rather than at the CP not only generate higher 
holding period returns and higher abnormal returns calculated by the CAR and the BHAR, but also show 
more returns that are statistically significantly different from 0.00% throughout the entire investment 
period. 
4.5. Results of the Wealth Relative Ratio 
The wealth relative (WR) ratio, which takes into consideration the holding period returns of the IPO 
portfolios over the holding period returns of the benchmark, represents another facet of the buy-and-
hold abnormal returns measure. Below, a summary table showing the WR for IPO portfolios purchased 
on the five different dates is presented.  
Table 45: Wealth relative ratios 
T N OP CP 1M 6M 12M  T N OP CP 1M 6M 12M 
1 86 1.304 1.282        37 82 1.256 1.223 1.076 1.084 1.176 
2 86 1.262 1.244 1.000      38 82 1.227 1.196 1.061 1.074 1.177 
3 86 1.313 1.296 1.024      39 82 1.288 1.254 1.107 1.098 1.208 
4 86 1.355 1.338 1.040      40 82 1.236 1.205 1.063 1.062 1.182 
5 86 1.346 1.330 1.032      41 82 1.237 1.204 1.063 1.065 1.187 
6 86 1.273 1.256 0.994      42 82 1.231 1.197 1.053 1.062 1.193 
7 85 1.221 1.204 0.954 0.971    43 82 1.284 1.248 1.097 1.103 1.261 
8 85 1.219 1.202 0.957 0.971    44 82 1.343 1.306 1.156 1.162 1.357 
9 85 1.185 1.169 0.929 0.934    45 81 1.379 1.344 1.191 1.196 1.397 
10 84 1.187 1.170 0.927 0.920    46 81 1.437 1.401 1.249 1.262 1.483 
11 84 1.265 1.250 0.997 0.996    47 81 1.450 1.412 1.247 1.255 1.470 
12 84 1.260 1.244 0.997 0.998    48 80 1.522 1.480 1.298 1.323 1.580 
13 84 1.177 1.160 0.938 0.943 0.983  49 80 1.465 1.426 1.256 1.276 1.507 
14 84 1.157 1.141 0.915 0.919 0.949  50 80 1.498 1.457 1.275 1.298 1.537 
15 83 1.158 1.141 0.904 0.899 0.923  51 79 1.563 1.520 1.342 1.371 1.654 
16 83 1.154 1.136 0.907 0.907 0.941  52 79 1.505 1.466 1.302 1.330 1.603 
17 83 1.118 1.101 0.887 0.880 0.916  53 79 1.559 1.517 1.362 1.391 1.704 
18 83 1.132 1.114 0.899 0.891 0.923  54 79 1.631 1.588 1.429 1.451 1.788 
19 83 1.122 1.103 0.896 0.892 0.933  55 79 1.595 1.553 1.397 1.432 1.766 
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20 83 1.138 1.118 0.910 0.914 0.951  56 78 1.610 1.568 1.414 1.444 1.831 
21 83 1.151 1.130 0.917 0.922 0.966  57 77 1.571 1.535 1.392 1.427 1.846 
22 83 1.162 1.137 0.934 0.943 1.000  58 77 1.528 1.492 1.355 1.404 1.841 
23 83 1.148 1.124 0.936 0.940 0.989  59 77 1.601 1.558 1.416 1.468 1.975 
24 83 1.149 1.125 0.936 0.948 1.004  60 77 1.609 1.565 1.431 1.482 2.035 
25 83 1.133 1.110 0.933 0.937 0.998  61 77 1.660 1.613 1.471 1.527 2.107 
26 82 1.188 1.163 0.980 0.989 1.047  62 77 1.652 1.602 1.459 1.516 2.118 
27 82 1.216 1.188 1.007 1.016 1.085  63 77 1.639 1.591 1.447 1.505 2.095 
28 82 1.191 1.161 0.979 0.994 1.060  64 77 1.705 1.655 1.498 1.561 2.147 
29 82 1.174 1.143 0.971 0.984 1.054  65 77 1.705 1.656 1.499 1.567 2.197 
30 82 1.178 1.146 0.979 0.995 1.069  66 77 1.727 1.687 1.537 1.602 2.266 
31 82 1.169 1.137 0.976 0.995 1.079  67 77 1.692 1.652 1.509 1.568 2.227 
32 82 1.188 1.155 1.003 1.026 1.120  68 77 1.778 1.738 1.594 1.656 2.368 
33 82 1.189 1.153 1.001 1.023 1.124  69 77 1.787 1.747 1.604 1.660 2.406 
34 82 1.192 1.162 1.014 1.034 1.124  70 76 1.758 1.717 1.562 1.616 2.311 
35 82 1.216 1.184 1.041 1.064 1.157  71 76 1.764 1.722 1.570 1.620 2.312 
36 82 1.238 1.205 1.059 1.081 1.168  72 75 1.746 1.705 1.545 1.591 2.225 
Thus, since the WR results do not present dramatically newer outcomes than the ones presented by the 
BHAR, it is sufficient just to present a summary WR table, such as the one above, instead of presenting 
five different descriptive tables, one for each entry date. Additionally, the same interpretation discussed 
in the BHAR section can be repeated here. That is why we will refer to the BHAR results instead of 
duplicating the same explanations and interpretations for each result. In addition, when it comes to the 
WR trend, we notice from the figure below that the WR trends for the five different entry dates are very 
similar to the BHAR trends from the first to the seventy-second month, showing that the WR of the 
portfolios entered at 12M generated the highest WR, while the ones entered at 1M generated the lowest 
WR, but all of them were higher than 1.00.  
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Figure 20: Wealth relative ratio from the first to the seventy-second month. 
 
Last, the test of means for the WR is performed against a reference variable of 1.00 and not 0.00% as in 
the BHAR tests, since 1.00 is the reference or the benchmark to determine whether the portfolios have 
overperformed (above 1.00) or underperformed (below 1.00) the market benchmark. Once more, the 
same results for the test of the means of the BHAR are duplicated here, with the same matching months 
that are statistically significantly different from 1.00 in the WR test of means and different from 0.00% 
in the BHAR test of means. The test of means for the portfolios entered at 1M and 6M presents the 
smallest WR, which is statistically significantly different from 1.00 amongst all the other entry dates. 
Additionally, the portfolios entered at 12M do not present better results by far, since the WR seems to 
be different from 1.00 with acceptable statistically significant levels in only two months. We note that 
similar results were previously observed. 
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4.6. Results of the Capital Asset-Pricing Model 
As mentioned earlier, four regressions will be constructed for the capital asset-pricing model (CAPM) 
using a time-series analysis for an equally weighted return for the four different holding periods of three 
years (Table 46), 4 years (Table 47), 5 years (Table 48), and 6 years (Table 49).  
Table 46: CAPM results for the three-year holding period 
N=229 
Regression Summary for the Dependent Variable: 3 Years Equally Weighted 
R=0.4353; R²=0.1895; Adjusted R²=0.1859 
F(1,227)=53.073; p<0.00000; Std Error of the Estimate: 0.09207 
b* Std Err. b Std Err. t(227) p-value 
Intercept     0.012** 0.006 2.028 0.044 
MRP 0.435*** 0.060 0.844*** 0.116 7.285 0.000 
Table 47: CAPM results for the four-year holding period 
N=229 
Regression Summary for the Dependent Variable: 4 Years Equally Weighted 
R=0.4854; R²=0.2357; Adjusted R²=0.2323 
F(1,227)=69.986; p<0.00000; Std Error of the Estimate: 0.07693 
b* Std Err. B Std Err. t(227) p-value 
Intercept     0.012** 0.005 2.321 0.021 
MRP 0.485*** 0.058 0.809*** 0.097 8.366 0.000 
Table 48: CAPM results for the five-year holding period 
N=229 
Regression Summary for the Dependent Variable: 5 Years Equally Weighted 
R=0.5220; R²=0.2725; Adjusted R²=0.2693 
F(1,227)=85.019; p<0.00000; Std Error of the Estimate: 0.07062 
b* Std Err. b Std Err. t(227) p-value 
Intercept     0.011** 0.005 2.389 0.018 
MRP 0.522*** 0.057 0.819*** 0.089 9.221 0.000 
Table 49: CAPM results for the six-year holding period 
N=229 
Regression Summary for the Dependent Variable: 6 Years Equally Weighted 
R=0.5179; R²=0.2683; Adjusted R²=0.2650 
F(1,227)=83.222; p<0.00000; Std Error of the Estimate: 0.06939 
b* Std Err. b Std Err. t(227) p-value 
Intercept     0.012** 0.005 2.536 0.012 
MRP 0.518*** 0.057 0.796*** 0.087 9.123 0.000 
 First, we notice that the 3-, 4-, 5-, and 6-year equally weighted portfolio returns have a positive Jensen’s 
alpha of around 1.2% per month with statistical significance at the 5% level. These portfolios were 
constructed over 229 months, which are equivalent to 19 years. Therefore, according to the CAPM 
model and by using the time-series data analysis for the IPO portfolios constructed by holding each and 
every IPO share for 3 to 6 consecutive years, they generated statistically significant positive abnormal 
returns measured by Jensen’s alpha. 
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Hence, the attractiveness of such a type of data analysis is associated with the monthly matching of the 
IPO portfolio risk premium with the market risk premium. For example, we observe many months 
during which the IPO portfolio consisted of only one or very few firms, whereas in other months, the 
IPO portfolios could include concurrently twenty shares, depending on the timing of each IPO and the 
holding period.  
Therefore, in such a type of data analysis, no enforcement is made to group all the portfolios into a single 
raw date, as the CAR and BHAR methods do in a typical cross-sectional data analysis. Thus, while the 
latter methods give average figures of the abnormal returns above certain chosen benchmarks (such as 
a market-, industry-, or firm-specific benchmark), with descriptive statistics (i.e. a minimum, a 
maximum, a lower quartile, an upper quartile, a standard deviation, etc.), the CAPM models perform a 
regression analysis for estimating future performance via the market risk premium (and not via any other 
benchmark), with some significance levels, R-squared, adjusted R-squared, F-statistics, and estimation 
of the abnormal returns using time-series analysis. Therefore, there is no contradiction between the two 
methods since each uses different techniques and there is no preference of one method over the other 
because each gives different results and interpretations. 
Additionally, the p-values of the four regressions are statistically significant at the 0.01‰ level. We also 
note that the R-squared of the portfolio increases from 18.95% for the 3-year portfolio return to 23.57% 
for the 4-year portfolio return, 27.25% for the 5-year portfolio return, and 26.83% for the 6-year portfolio 
return. This clearly shows that the longer the length of time that the IPO shares are held in the portfolio, 
the more their returns’ variance can be explained by the market risk premium moving from the 3-year 
to the 5-year portfolio return.  
For instance, the R-squared of the 3-year portfolio risk premium of around 19% means that around 19% 
of the IPO portfolio risk premium’s variance can be explained by the market risk premium illustrated in 
the CAPM model, and around 81% can be explained by other variables that are unexplored in the CAPM. 
In addition, for the IPO portfolio that is held for the 5- and the 6-year period, around 27% of the 
portfolio’s risk premium can be explained by the CAPM and 73% remains unexplained. Moreover, the 
4 models’ adjusted R-squared figures are very close to the models’ R-squared figure. It is also worth 
noting that the standard error of the regressions decreases when moving from the 3-year to the 6-year 
portfolio return. 
On the other hand, the standardized coefficient betas for the 4 different holding periods are statistically 
significant at the 0.01% level and range from 0.435 for the 3-year holding period to 0.518 for the 6-year 
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holding period, which are less than the average market risk with a beta of 1.00. This shows that the IPO 
portfolio systematic risk decreases when the holding period increases from 3 to 6 years.  
Additionally, these results reveal that the IPO portfolios that include family firms are less risky than the 
average market portfolio. Thus, the IPO portfolios’ market risk or systematic risk seems to be lower 
than the average market risk illustrated by the CAPM model. This risk is the relevant risk to consider, 
since, through diversification, the non-systematic or firm-specific risk can ultimately be minimized by 
increasing the number of securities in the portfolio to a large number. As a result, family firm IPOs’ 
total risk seems to be lower than the average market risk, using the 4 different holding periods of 3, 4, 
5, and 6 years, as illustrated by the CAPM model. 
4.7. Results of the Fama and French Three-Factor Model 
As we performed four regressions representing the four different holding periods in the CAPM model, 
we will run four regressions in the Fama and French three-factor model as well for the same four holding 
periods of 3, 4, 5, and 6 years using the equally weighted returns. 
Table 50: Fama and French model results for the three-year holding period 
N=221 
Regression Summary for the Dependent Variable: 3 Years Equally Weighted 
R=0.6559; R²=0.4302; Adjusted R²=0.4223 
F(3,217)=54.601; p<0.0000; Std Error of the Estimate: 0.07859 
b* Std Err. b Std Err. t(217) p-value 
Intercept     0.011** 0.005 1.976 0.049 
Rm-Rf 0.776*** 0.063 1.474*** 0.119 12.394 0.000 
SMB 0.602*** 0.064 1.720*** 0.184 9.330 0.000 
HML 0.052 0.053 0.154 0.158 0.973 0.332 
Table 51: Fama and French model results for the four-year holding period 
N=221 
Regression Summary for the Dependent Variable: 4 Years Equally Weighted 
R=0.74714; R²=0.5582; Adjusted R²=0.5521 
F(3,217)=91.400; p<0.0000; Std Error of the Estimate: 0.05942 
b* Std Err. b Std Err. t(217) p-value 
Intercept     0.010** 0.004 2.536 0.012 
Rm-Rf 0.881*** 0.055 1.437*** 0.090 15.980 0.000 
SMB 0.689*** 0.057 1.691*** 0.139 12.127 0.000 
HML 0.050 0.047 0.128 0.120 1.068 0.286 
 
 
 
 
 
 
255 
 
 
Table 52: Fama and French model results for the five-year holding period 
N=221 
Regression Summary for the Dependent Variable: 5 Years Equally Weighted 
R=0.7646; R²=0.5846; Adjusted R²=0.5789 
F(3,217)=101.78; p<0.0000; Std Error of the Estimate: 0.05433 
b* Std Err. b St Err. t(217) p-value 
Intercept     0.010*** 0.004 2.660 0.008 
Rm-Rf 0.907*** 0.053 1.395*** 0.082 16.966 0.000 
SMB 0.668*** 0.055 1.546*** 0.127 12.126 0.000 
HML 0.023 0.046 0.055 0.109 0.501 0.617 
Table 53: Fama and French model results for the six-year holding period 
N=221 
Regression Summary for the Dependent Variable: 6 Years Equally Weighted 
R=0.7515; R²=0.5647; Adjusted R²=0.5587 
F(3,217)=93.841; p<0.0000; Std Error of the Estimate: 0.05465 
b* Std Err. b Std Err. t(217) p-value 
Intercept     0.010*** 0.004 2.784 0.006 
Rm-Rf 0.890*** 0.055 1.345*** 0.083 16.263 0.000 
SMB 0.646*** 0.056 1.470*** 0.128 11.465 0.000 
HML 0.005 0.047 0.013 0.110 0.117 0.907 
Interestingly, we notice that by employing the Fama and French three-factor model, which adds the size-
related factor (SMB) and the book-to-market-related factor (HML) to our family firms’ IPO portfolio, 
the R-squared dramatically increases from around 19% to 43% for the 3-year portfolio holding period 
and from around 27% to 56% for the 6-year portfolio holding period. This can be interpreted as 56% of 
the return variance of the family firms’ IPO portfolios that are acquired and held over 6 years can be 
explained by the three-factor model constructed above. This means that less than 44% of the portfolio’s 
variance remains unexplained by these variables. It is also worth noting that the 4 models’ adjusted R-
squared figures are very close to the models’ R-squared figure, rising from 42% for the 3-year portfolio 
holding period to 56% for the 6-year portfolio period. In addition, the p-values of the 4 regressions are 
statistically significant at the 0.01‰ level, with higher F-statistics than the CAPM model as well. 
We notice that the Jensen’s alphas for the four different holding periods are all positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level for the 3-year and 4-year portfolio holding periods and at the 1% level for the 
5-year and 6-year holding periods. Therefore, in this case, investors buying every family firm’s IPO 
shares and holding them for 3-, 4-, 5-, and 6-year periods can generate abnormal returns of around 1% 
per month, which is statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels.  
For the standardized coefficient betas, we notice that the book-to-market-related factor (HML) for the 
four different holding periods is not statistically significantly different from zero. The market risk 
premium (Rm-Rf) and the size-related factor (SMB) are highly statistically significantly different from 
zero at the 1‰ level and they are all positive and range for the 3-year holding period to the 6-year 
256 
 
 
holding period from 0.776 to 0.890 for the Rm-Rf and from 0.602 to 0.646 for the SMB, respectively. 
The positive and statistically significant coefficient beta for the SMB can be attributed to the fact that 
most French family firms are of a small size, as we have seen in the previous chapter. For instance, the 
average issue size of the French family firms is around €27 million, whereas the average issue size of 
typical French firms is €1,058 million and for a European firm it is €581 million. Therefore, by 
comparing the results provided by both the CAPM and the Fama and French model, we notice that the 
latter presents a much higher degree of explanation of the family firms’ IPO portfolio returns’ variance, 
which reaches 56% for the 6-year holding period compared with 27% in the CAPM model. Thus, the 
size-related factor and the book-to-market-related factor greatly enhance the overall model’s 
explanatory variable. 
4.8. Results of the Multiple Linear Regressions 
As previously discussed, we will employ two models in an attempt to explain long-term performance. 
As mentioned, the fifth-day IPO underpricing will be used as a control variable in both models. ‘Model 
1’ includes the ownership and control rights’ change, whereas ‘Model 2’ includes the corporate 
governance mechanisms.  
Below, we will plot the eight regression results for ‘Model 1’ using the CAR and the BHAR abnormal 
returns calculation methods at the first-day closing price and with 3, 4, 5, and 6 year holding periods. 
We will run these regressions in an attempt to explain IPO long-term performance through ownership 
and control rights’ change.  
Table 54: ‘Model 1’ regression for a three-year holding period using CAR (CP) 
N=82 
Regression Summary for the Dependent Variable: 36M_CAR_CP  
R=0.4355; R²=0.1897; Adjusted R²=0.1476 
F(4,77)=4.5056 p<.00253 Std Error of the Estimate: 1.0446 
b* Std Err. b Std Err. t(77) p-value 
Intercept     0.6266** 0.2435 2.5729 0.0120 
up_5d 0.2919*** 0.1039 0.6844*** 0.2435 2.8106 0.0063 
Dif_CF_VO_Public 0.1659 0.1130 4.1787 2.8474 1.4675 0.1463 
FF_%_CF_Chge 0.2941** 0.1467 1.8905** 0.9431 2.0044 0.0485 
%_CF_Public_After 0.1005 0.1499 0.9533 1.4225 0.6702 0.5047 
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Table 55: ‘Model 1’ regression for a four-year holding period using CAR (CP) 
N=80 
Regression Summary for the Dependent Variable: 48M_CAR_CP  
R=0.4315; R²=0.1862; Adjusted R²=0.1427 
F(4,75)=4.2889 p<.00353 Std Error of the Estimate: 1.2987 
b* Std Err. b Std Err. t(75) p-value 
Intercept     1.2575*** 0.3085 4.0764 0.0001 
up_5d 0.2587** 0.1053 0.7447** 0.3032 2.4564 0.0163 
Dif_CF_VO_Public 0.1513 0.1166 4.7237 3.6402 1.2976 0.1984 
FF_%_CF_Chge 0.1373 0.1488 1.0950 1.1865 0.9228 0.3591 
%_CF_Public_After -0.1162 0.1519 -1.3891 1.8163 -0.7648 0.4468 
Table 56: ‘Model 1’ regression for a five-year holding period using CAR (CP) 
N=77 
Regression Summary for the Dependent Variable: 60M_CAR_CP 
R=0.4614 R²=0.2128 Adjusted R²=0.1691 
F(4,72)=4.8672 p<.00157 Std Error of the Estimate: 1.3440 
b* Std Err. b Std Err. t(72) p-value 
Intercept     1.6235*** 0.3296 4.9254 0.0000 
up_5d 0.247** 0.1055 0.7356** 0.3141 2.3422 0.0219 
Dif_CF_VO_Public 0.1087 0.1208 3.5706 3.9682 0.8998 0.3712 
FF_%_CF_Chge 0.0937 0.1834 1.189 2.3274 0.5109 0.611 
%_CF_Public_After -0.2166 0.1828 -2.8842 2.4337 -1.1851 0.2399 
 
Table 57: ‘Model 1’ regression for a six-year holding period using CAR (CP) 
N=75 
Regression Summary for the Dependent Variable: 72M_CAR_CP 
R=0.4507 R²=0.2031 Adjusted R²=0.1576 
F(4,70)=4.4610 p<.00287 Std Error of the Estimate: 1.4923 
b* Std Err. b Std Err. t(70) p-value 
Intercept     1.7189*** 0.367 4.6837 0.0000 
up_5d 0.2463** 0.1077 0.8052** 0.3521 2.2868 0.0252 
Dif_CF_VO_Public 0.2461 0.1263 8.8591 4.5469 1.9484 0.0554 
FF_%_CF_Chge 0.0718 0.1853 1.012 2.6122 0.3874 0.6996 
%_CF_Public_After -0.088 0.1839 -1.2954 2.7077 -0.4784 0.6338 
By looking at the regression results of ‘Model 1’ for the long-term abnormal returns calculated following 
the CAR method, we notice that the R-squared ranges from the lowest figure of 18.62% for the 4-year 
holding period to the highest figure of 21.28% for the 5-year holding period with a p-value less than 1% 
for all the holding periods. We also notice a positive and statistically significant alpha at the 1% level 
for all the holding periods too, ranging from 62.66% for the 3-year holding period to 171.89% for the 
6-year holding period. In addition, ‘Model 1’ for the CAR method shows that the fifth-day IPO 
underpricing is positive and statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels. Furthermore, the family 
firms’ percentage cash flow rights change is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level only for 
the 3-year holding period and not for the remaining ones. The difference between cash flow and voting 
rights for the public shareholders and the percentage of cash flow rights after issuance for the public 
shareholders are both statistically insignificantly different from zero. Overall, we note that this model 
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shows that around 20% of the abnormal returns’ variance calculated by the CAR can be explained by 
ownership and control rights’ change on the IPO date with very high statistical significance. Below we 
present the regression results of ‘Model 1’ using the BHAR calculation method instead. 
Table 58: ‘Model 1’ regression for a three-year holding period using BHAR (CP) 
N=82 
Regression Summary for the Dependent Variable: 36M_BHAR_CP 
R=0.3719 R²=0.1383 Adjusted R²=0.0935 
F(4,77)=3.0894 p<.02053 Std Error of the Estimate: 1.4818 
b* Std Err. b Std Err. t(77) p-value 
Intercept     0.4433 0.3455 1.2832 0.2033 
up_5d 0.0232 0.1071 0.0747 0.3454 0.2163 0.8293 
Dif_CF_VO_Public -0.0485 0.1166 -1.6796 4.039 -0.4158 0.6787 
FF_%_CF_Chge 0.4703*** 0.1513 4.1583*** 1.3378 3.1083 0.0026 
%_CF_Public_After 0.1416 0.1546 1.8475 2.0177 0.9156 0.3627 
We ran the regressions for Model 1 using the BHAR for the 48, 60, and 72 holding months, but we find 
insignificant results for the independent and control variables with adjusted R-squared figures of 1.7%, 
4.5%, and 2.6%, respectively, and with models’ p-values of less than 25%, 12%, and 21%, respectively. 
Therefore, we will ignore all the results of Model 1 using the BHAR calculation with a holding period 
longer than 36 months.  
By looking at the regression results of ‘Model 1’ for the long-term abnormal returns calculated using 
the BHAR method, we notice that the R-squared drops well below the one seen using the CAR of around 
20% to 13.8% for the 3-year holding period with the model’s statistical significance at the 5% level. 
Then the R-squared drops to around 8% on average for the 3 remaining holding periods with high 
insignificance levels (p-values less than 25%, 12%, and 21%) and with insignificant coefficient betas 
for the 3 remaining holding periods (4, 5, and 6 years). However, the intercepts of ‘Model 1’ using the 
BHAR method are positive and statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% and the 1% level, 
except for the 3-year holding period.  
Therefore, we can deduce that approximately 14% of the IPO long-term performance variance measured 
by the BHAR for the 3-year holding period can be explained by ownership and control rights’ change 
on the IPO date with an acceptable statistical significance level and it cannot explained by this model 
for the 4-, 5-, and 6-year holding periods.  
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Table 59: ‘Model 2’ regression for a three-year holding period using CAR (CP) 
N=82 
Regression Summary for the Dependent Variable: 36M_CAR_CP 
R=0.3738 R²=0.1398 Adjusted R²=0.0710 
F(6,75)=2.0312 p<.07183 Std Error of the Estimate: 1.0906 
b* Std Err. B Std Err. t(75) p-value 
Intercept     0.917 0.6448 1.4222 0.1591 
up_5d 0.3083*** 0.1087 0.7227*** 0.2549 2.8353 0.0059 
LN(Board_Size) -0.0349 0.1113 -0.1105 0.3528 -0.3133 0.755 
CEO_Founder -0.0532 0.1178 -0.151 0.3343 -0.4517 0.6528 
Duality 0.042 0.1274 0.1101 0.3337 0.3299 0.7424 
Separation_Shares -0.1482 0.1086 -0.3621 0.2653 -1.3648 0.1764 
%_Independent -0.1411 0.1205 -0.6963 0.5946 -1.1711 0.2453 
Table 60: ‘Model 2’ regression for a four-year holding period using CAR (CP) 
N=80 
Regression Summary for the Dependent Variable: 48M_CAR_CP 
R=0.40279 R²=0.1622 Adjusted R²=0.0934 
F(6,73)=2.3562 p<.03896 Std Error of the Estimate: 1.3356 
b* Std Err. b Std Err. t(73) p-value 
Intercept     1.5584 0.8055 1.9348 0.0569 
up_5d 0.2884*** 0.1088 0.8302*** 0.3131 2.6514 0.0098 
LN(Board_Size) -0.0955 0.1116 -0.3764 0.4396 -0.8562 0.3947 
CEO_Founder -0.0084 0.1175 -0.0294 0.4096 -0.0717 0.943 
Duality 0.0787 0.1276 0.2534 0.4108 0.6168 0.5393 
Separation_Shares -0.1848 0.1086 -0.5692 0.3346 -1.7011 0.0932 
%_Independent -0.138 0.1209 -0.8393 0.7357 -1.1408 0.2577 
Table 61: ‘Model 2’ regression for a five-year holding period using CAR (CP) 
N=77 
Regression Summary for the Dependent Variable: 60M_CAR_CP 
R=0.4542 R²=0.2063 Adjusted R²=0.1383 
F(6,70)=3.0325 p<.01077 Std Error of the Estimate: 1.3687 
b* Std Err. b Std Err. t(70) p-value 
Intercept     1.3076 0.8269 1.5814 0.1183 
up_5d 0.2901*** 0.1079 0.8637*** 0.3213 2.6881 0.009 
LN(Board_Size) -0.0809 0.1111 -0.3355 0.4608 -0.728 0.4691 
CEO_Founder 0.0728 0.1132 0.2766 0.4301 0.6432 0.5222 
Duality 0.1184 0.1245 0.4099 0.4308 0.9515 0.3446 
Separation_Shares -0.2032 0.1077 -0.6591 0.3492 -1.8874 0.0633 
%_Independent -0.1681 0.1204 -1.0665 0.7635 -1.3969 0.1669 
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Table 62: ‘Model 2’ regression for a six-year holding period using CAR (CP) 
N=75 
Regression Summary for the Dependent Variable: 72M_CAR_CP 
R=0.4629 R²=0.2143 Adjusted R²=0.1450 
F(6,68)=3.0905 p<.00979 Std Error of the Estimate: 1.5035 
b* Std Err. b Std Err. t(68) p-value 
Intercept     2.0843** 0.9585 2.1747 0.0331 
up_5d 0.2978*** 0.1087 0.9733*** 0.3552 2.7402 0.0078 
LN(Board_Size) -0.1541 0.1129 -0.7062 0.5175 -1.3644 0.1769 
CEO_Founder 0.0109 0.1134 0.0463 0.4838 0.0958 0.924 
Duality 0.1714 0.1241 0.6611 0.4785 1.3816 0.1716 
Separation_Shares -0.2487** 0.1089 -0.8945** 0.3918 -2.2833 0.0255 
%_Independent -0.0662 0.1222 -0.4584 0.8464 -0.5416 0.5899 
In ‘Model 2’, in which we attempt to explain long-term performance calculated by the CAR for different 
portfolio holding periods via governance mechanisms, we notice that the R-squared increases from 
around 14% for the 3-year holding period to 21% for the 6-year holding period with acceptable statistical 
significance levels. We also notice that the fifth-day IPO underpricing is statistically significantly 
different from zero at the 1% level for the 4 different holding periods. The model’s results also show 
that for all the governance mechanisms the coefficient betas are statistically insignificantly different 
from zero except for the separation in shares for the 6-year holding period, which shows a negative beta 
at the 5% statistical significance level. Overall, we can deduce that the governance mechanisms 
presented in our model do not present a good level of explanation of IPO long-term performance 
measured by the CAR and these significance levels of the models result mainly from the significant 
fifth-day underpricing.  
We note here that the governance mechanisms presented in ‘Model 2’ do not present any level of 
explanation of the BHAR long-term performance for all the holding periods. Therefore, neither the R-
squared nor the adjusted R-squared are statistically significant, nor are the coefficient betas of each 
model statistically significantly different from zero. Therefore, we cannot explain BHAR long-term 
performance by relying on the corporate governance mechanisms set by the family firms on the IPO 
date. 
However, both Model 1 and Model 2 seem not to be highly reliable in explaining long-term performance 
measured by both the CAR and the BHAR for the 4 different holding periods. Although the R-squared 
for some regressions is around 20%, it changes throughout different holding periods and when shifting 
from the CAR to the BHAR method. Therefore, we can reject the hypothesis that ownership and control 
rights’ change from the pre- to the post-IPO date along with the governance mechanisms set by the 
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family firms on the issuance day present reliable and robust levels in explaining both the CAR and the 
BHAR abnormal returns from the 3-year holding period to the 6-year holding period. 
4.9. Hypothesis Testing 
We will present below the results of the hypothesis testing along with our comments and explanation.  
Hypothesis 1: French family firms’ IPO long-term performance will be as negative as other firms’ long-
term performance. 
Hypothesis 2: French family firms’ underperformance will vanish once calculated based on the offering 
price instead of the first-day closing price, revealing that no true underperformance exists. 
Below we will present a summary of the two different long-term performance calculations using the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) by assuming that 
the IPO shares were purchased at only the OP and the CP, which are sufficient for testing these two 
hypotheses.  
Table 63: Test of means for long-term performance 
T 
Test of means against the reference constant (0.00%) 
CAR_CP Mean 
and p-value 
BHAR_CP Mean 
and p-value 
CAR_OP Mean 
and p-value 
BHAR_OP Mean 
and p-value 
1 28.8%*** 0.000 28.8%*** 0.000 31.0%*** 0.000 31.0%*** 0.000 
6 27.4%*** 0.002 28.4%** 0.028 29.7%*** 0.001 30.1%** 0.020 
12 26.4%** 0.015 28.2%** 0.049 28.7%*** 0.009 30.0%** 0.037 
18 21.1%* 0.060 12.0% 0.279 23.4%** 0.040 13.9% 0.212 
24 29.0%** 0.014 10.6% 0.348 31.4%*** 0.009 13.6% 0.255 
30 34.9%*** 0.003 16.0% 0.286 37.3%*** 0.002 20.2% 0.224 
36 46.4%*** 0.000 22.8% 0.188 48.8%*** 0.000 27.6% 0.142 
42 48.8%*** 0.000 20.7% 0.218 51.2%*** 0.000 24.7% 0.170 
48 75.0%*** 0.000 42.3%** 0.044 77.4%*** 0.000 46.9%** 0.039 
54 81.4%*** 0.000 42.6%** 0.040 83.9%*** 0.000 46.5%** 0.034 
60 83.9%*** 0.000 40.0%* 0.095 86.5%*** 0.000 43.7%* 0.077 
66 89.8%*** 0.000 59.7%* 0.054 92.4%*** 0.000 63.7%** 0.043 
72 104.2%*** 0.000 66.8%** 0.027 106.8%*** 0.000 71.1%** 0.021 
The summary results presented in Table 63 come to reject the first hypothesis by clearly showing that, 
on average, IPO long-term performance is positive with sufficient statistical significance, calculated 
based upon either the IPO offering price (OP) or the first-day closing price (CP). However, abnormal 
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returns calculated using the CAR seem to be more statistically significant than the BHAR returns, but 
they both still generated positive long-term returns and are statistically significant. For instance, we can 
see that in the first, sixth, twelfth, forty-eighth, and seventy-second months, the CAR and the BHAR for 
the shares purchased at either the OP or the CP generated positive long-term performance and are 
statistically significant at the 5% level. This leads us to reject the first hypothesis, which states that 
family firms generate poorer performance than their market benchmark than any other firms do. 
However, the factors that explain such good performance will be discussed in further detail in the 
subsequent section under the regression analysis. 
In addition, we also observe in Table 63 that the IPO long-term performance calculated by either the OP 
or the CP does not change by much, and nor do the significance levels. This is mainly due to the very 
modest first-day IPO performance that these French family firms generate, which is almost 2%. This 
modest underpricing was thoroughly observed and discussed in the previous chapter, and it also appears 
in the difference of the first-month abnormal returns calculated using the OP and the CP. Thus, in the 
French family firms’ case, no important change in the long-term performance was observed by using 
either calculation, which rejects the hypothesis that long-term returns change when considering the first-
day returns. This is a very important implication, because it affects not only the firms’ long-term returns 
but also their short-term ones. Therefore, we reject the hypothesis that states that the French family firms 
will underperform their market benchmark as well as the hypothesis that states that long-term 
underperformance, if it were to exist, vanishes when including the first-day return, because we have 
seen that the difference between the two calculated returns, either at the OP or at the CP, is not 
significant.  
Hypothesis 3: For the French family firms, there is a negative relationship between IPO underpricing 
and underperformance. 
We present next the correlation between the long-term performance calculated by the CAR and BHAR 
at the OP and CP and the IPO short-term performance calculated from the first to the fifth day. The first 
two tables include the results of the CAR, while the last two include the results of the BHAR. We notice 
that the correlation between the long-term performance calculated by the CAR at both the OP and the 
CP (Table 64) and the IPO first-day underpricing seem to be very weak and insignificant for all the 
months. Nevertheless, some positive and statistically significant correlations exist between the long-
term performance and the second-day underpricing. However, positive and statistically significant 
correlations were observed between the long-term performances during all the months and the third, the 
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fourth and the fifth day underpricing. This correlation, though, starts to be quite strong in the first month, 
at around 0.66, and weakens thereafter to reach around 0.30 in the sixth month.  
Table 64: Correlation for short- and long-term IPO performance calculated using the CAR 
T Variable 
Correlations 
Marked correlations are significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) level 
N=75 (casewise deletion of missing data) 
up_1 d up_2 d up_3 d up_4 d up_5 d 
1 CAR_OP -0.0636 0.1143 0.6212*** 0.6386*** 0.6611*** p=.588 p=.329 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
6 CAR_OP -0.1524 0.1946* 0.5096*** 0.5012*** 0.5291*** p=.192 p=.094 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
12 CAR_OP -0.1441 0.1821 0.4882*** 0.4815*** 0.4937*** p=.217 p=.118 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
24 CAR_OP -0.0042 0.2233* 0.4027*** 0.3954*** 0.4153*** p=.971 p=.054 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
36 CAR_OP -0.0445 0.2379** 0.3331*** 0.3334*** 0.334*** p=.705 p=.040 p=.004 p=.003 p=.003 
48 CAR_OP -0.0392 0.1747 0.3273*** 0.3112*** 0.3101*** p=.739 p=.134 p=.004 p=.007 p=.007 
60 CAR_OP 0.0355 0.2533** 0.3488*** 0.3273*** 0.3226*** p=.763 p=.028 p=.002 p=.004 p=.005 
72 CAR_OP 0.0207 0.2828** 0.3168*** 0.3*** 0.2842** p=.860 p=.014 p=.006 p=.009 p=.013 
1 CAR_CP -0.1188 0.0662 0.6407*** 0.656*** 0.6794*** p=.310 p=.573 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
6 CAR_CP -0.2041* 0.1512 0.5153*** 0.5042*** 0.5327*** p=.079 p=.195 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
12 CAR_CP -0.1887 0.1427 0.4903*** 0.4813*** 0.4935*** p=.105 p=.222 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
24 CAR_CP -0.0431 0.1885 0.4049*** 0.3954*** 0.4156*** p=.713 p=.105 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
36 CAR_CP -0.0815 0.2065* 0.3346*** 0.3331*** 0.3336*** p=.487 p=.076 p=.003 p=.003 p=.003 
48 CAR_CP -0.0684 0.1503 0.331*** 0.313*** 0.3118*** p=.560 p=.198 p=.004 p=.006 p=.006 
60 CAR_CP 0.0085 0.2314** 0.3533*** 0.3298*** 0.3249*** p=.942 p=.046 p=.002 p=.004 p=.004 
72 CAR_CP -0.0032 0.264** 0.3196*** 0.3012*** 0.285** p=.978 p=.022 p=.005 p=.009 p=.013 
N.B. Correlation matrix of short-term and long-term returns calculated by the CAR at the OP and the 
CP. 
However, as Table 65 shows, long-term performance measured by the BHAR method mostly seems to 
be correlated with the first-day underpricing with a positive sign and statistically significant levels.  
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Table 65: Correlation for short- and long-term IPO performance calculated using the BHAR 
T Variable 
Correlations 
Marked correlations are significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) level 
N=75 (casewise deletion of missing data) 
up_1 d up_2 d up_3 d up_4 d up_5 d 
1 BHAR_OP -0.0636 0.1143 0.6212*** 0.6386*** 0.6611*** p=.588 p=.329 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
6 BHAR_OP -0.2526** 0.2773** 0.156 0.1387 0.1665 p=.029 p=.016 p=.181 p=.235 p=.153 
12 BHAR_OP -0.1662 0.1974* 0.1883 0.1713 0.1897 p=.154 p=.090 p=.106 p=.142 p=.103 
24 BHAR_OP 0.3415*** 0.2378** 0.1011 0.0787 0.0973 p=.003 p=.040 p=.388 p=.502 p=.406 
36 BHAR_OP 0.3424*** 0.1838 0.063 0.0421 0.0446 p=.003 p=.114 p=.591 p=.720 p=.704 
48 BHAR_OP 0.2755** 0.1608 0.0851 0.0539 0.0703 p=.017 p=.168 p=.468 p=.646 p=.549 
60 BHAR_OP 0.2176* 0.1785 0.0657 0.035 0.0501 p=.061 p=.125 p=.575 p=.766 p=.670 
72 BHAR_OP 0.1788 0.1365 0.0594 0.0283 0.0339 p=.125 p=.243 p=.613 p=.810 p=.773 
1 BHAR_CP -0.1188 0.0662 0.6407*** 0.656*** 0.6794*** p=.310 p=.573 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
6 BHAR_CP -0.2825** 0.2491** 0.1524 0.1337 0.1615 p=.014 p=.031 p=.192 p=.253 p=.166 
12 BHAR_CP -0.2192* 0.1561 0.1841 0.1652 0.184 p=.059 p=.181 p=.114 p=.157 p=.114 
24 BHAR_CP 0.2482** 0.185 0.0948 0.0692 0.0884 p=.032 p=.112 p=.419 p=.555 p=.451 
36 BHAR_CP 0.2678** 0.1392 0.0529 0.0282 0.0306 p=.020 p=.234 p=.652 p=.810 p=.795 
48 BHAR_CP 0.214* 0.1287 0.079 0.0443 0.0607 p=.065 p=.271 p=.501 p=.706 p=.605 
60 BHAR_CP 0.166 0.1502 0.0598 0.0277 0.0429 p=.155 p=.198 p=.610 p=.813 p=.715 
72 BHAR_CP 0.1279 0.1077 0.054 0.022 0.0275 p=.274 p=.358 p=.645 p=.851 p=.815 
N.B. Correlation matrix of short-term and long-term returns calculated by the BHAR at the OP and the 
CP. 
As a result, the IPO long-term returns of shares purchased only in their first day of issuance, whether at 
their offering price or at their first-day closing price, seem to be positively correlated with the first five 
days’ underpricing, excluding the first day based upon the CAR calculations. In addition, the IPO long-
term returns of shares purchased in any period of time seem to be positively correlated with the first-
day underpricing, except the six-month BHAR, which is negatively correlated with the first-day 
underpricing. For the remaining underpricing days, it seems that the correlation is very weak and 
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statistically insignificant. However, these two deductions differ from each other, since the CAR and the 
BHAR are originally different and may give mixed and sometimes contradictory results.  
Hypothesis 4: French family firms’ IPO long-term performance is positively associated with the timing 
of IPOs during fad periods. 
As previously discussed, 59 out of the 86 family firms’ IPOs were issued before the 2001 DotCom 
bubble burst, representing 68.6% of all the IPOs in our sample. However, as in the previous chapter, we 
will take that year as a cut-off period and test the IPO short-term performance by considering the pre- 
and post-2001 effect when testing the relation between the IPO long-term performance and determining 
whether the timing of issuance occurs before or after that year. Basically, the DotCom bubble period 
was remarkable in both the quantity and the size of IPOs issued and that is why it is considered as a fad 
period. Thus, we recall that we used the dummy variable 1 if the IPO occurred pre-2001 and 0 otherwise. 
In Table 66, we present the correlation matrices for the IPO timing and long-term performance measured 
by the CAR and the BHAR at the OP and CP. However, remarkably, we did not find any correlation, 
with any sign, during any period and at any significance level between the long-term performance and 
the pre-DotCom bubble period, although most IPOs were issued before that date, including all 19 of the 
technology firms.  
Therefore, even though it was very clear that a fad period existed before the DotCom bubble, no 
correlation was observed between the family firms’ long-term performance and the timing of their 
issues, leading us to reject the fourth hypothesis, which states that IPO long-term performance is 
positively associated with the timing of IPOs during fad periods. 
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Table 66: Correlation of IPO timing and long-term performance calculated using the CAR 
Correlations 
Marked correlations are significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), 
and 1% (***) level 
N=75 (casewise deletion of missing data)  
Pre-DotCom bubble 
T Variable Pre-DotCom Variable Pre-DotCom 
1 CAR_OP 0.0025 BHAR_OP 0.0025 p=.983 p=.983 
6 CAR_OP 0.0301 BHAR_OP 0.1158 p=.798 p=.323 
12 CAR_OP 0.0604 BHAR_OP 0.1273 p=.607 p=.276 
24 CAR_OP 0.0233 BHAR_OP 0.0202 p=.843 p=.863 
36 CAR_OP 0.0395 BHAR_OP -0.0124 p=.736 p=.916 
48 CAR_OP 0.0791 BHAR_OP 0.0201 p=.500 p=.864 
60 CAR_OP 0.0715 BHAR_OP 0.007 p=.542 p=.952 
72 CAR_OP 0.0565 BHAR_OP -0.0194 p=.630 p=.869 
1 CAR_CP 0.0242 BHAR_CP 0.0242 p=.837 p=.837 
6 CAR_CP 0.0504 BHAR_CP 0.1218 p=.667 p=.298 
12 CAR_CP 0.0787 BHAR_CP 0.1395 p=.502 p=.232 
24 CAR_CP 0.0397 BHAR_CP 0.0406 p=.735 p=.729 
36 CAR_CP 0.0552 BHAR_CP -0.0016 p=.638 p=.989 
48 CAR_CP 0.0927 BHAR_CP 0.0274 p=.429 p=.816 
60 CAR_CP 0.0847 BHAR_CP 0.0141 p=.470 p=.904 
72 CAR_CP 0.0677 BHAR_CP -0.0111 p=.564 p=.925 
N.B. Correlation matrix of the IPO timing and the long-term performance calculated by the CAR and 
the BHAR at the OP and the CP. 
Hypothesis 5: There is a positive relationship between the owners’ cash flow rights after the IPO date 
and the IPO long-term performance of French family firms. 
Table 67, Table 68, Table 69, and Table 70 below present the correlation measures between family 
firms’ long-term performance measured by the CAR and the BHAR at both the OP and the CP only and 
the ownership structure, cash flow right, and voting right changes pre- and post-IPO date for the family 
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firms and the public, the percentage of independent directors, board member equity holding, and board 
member equity holding change. 
It is shown in both tables that the correlation between the long-term performance and the percentage of 
cash flow rights of the family firms’ owners on the post-IPO date is mostly weak and statistically 
insignificant, except for the sixtieth-month CAR and BHAR at both the OP and the CP. However, 
although this correlation seems to be positive and statistically significant, it is weak. Therefore, we reject 
the hypothesis that states that the IPO long-term performance is positively associated with the owners’ 
cash flow rights after the IPO date.  
However, what we notice from the table below is that the CAR and the BHAR seem to be negatively 
correlated with the percentage of cash flow of the public shareholders after the IPO date. The higher this 
cash flow is, the worse the firms’ long-term performance is, and this result seems to be statistically 
significant. We also notice that a negative correlation exists between the CAR and the BHAR as well as 
a change in the difference of cash flow rights and voting rights pre- and post-IPO date. To recall from 
the previous chapter, mainly for family firms, a separation exists between the cash flow rights and the 
voting rights.  
However, we observe carefully the gap between the two rights pre- and post-IPO date to determine 
whether the family firms’ owners used the IPO as a means to increase their voting rights with respect to 
their cash flow rights, differently speaking to increase their minority expropriation by raising funds from 
them and not giving them sufficient voting rights. Surprisingly, we find a negative correlation between 
the long-term performance and the change in the difference between the two rights with high statistical 
significance. This shows that family firms engaging in increasing the gap between the two rights post-
IPO date are more likely to observe lower performance with respect to the benchmark. 
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Table 67: Correlation of ownership and long-term performance calculated using the CAR 
T Variable 
Correlations 
Marked correlations are significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) level 
N=67 (casewise deletion of missing data) 
%_CF_FF_
After 
%_CF_Public
_After 
Chge_Dif_CF_
VO_FF 
FF_%_CF_
Chge 
FF_%_VO_Chg
e 
1 CAR_OP 0.1767 -0.3194** -0.2517** 0.2741** 0.1697 
p=.153 p=.008 p=.040 p=.025 p=.170 
6 CAR_OP 0.0764 -0.2404* -0.319*** 0.2343* 0.1126 p=.539 p=.050 p=.009 p=.056 p=.364 
12 CAR_OP 0.0686 -0.2811** -0.4129*** 0.2555** 0.0808 p=.581 p=.021 p=.001 p=.037 p=.516 
24 CAR_OP 0.0637 -0.3318*** -0.3982*** 0.2638** 0.1186 p=.609 p=.006 p=.001 p=.031 p=.339 
36 CAR_OP 0.1165 -0.3215*** -0.3555*** 0.2873** 0.1568 p=.348 p=.008 p=.003 p=.018 p=.205 
48 CAR_OP 0.1453 -0.3668*** -0.3158*** 0.3175*** 0.2058* p=.241 p=.002 p=.009 p=.009 p=.095 
60 CAR_OP 0.2416** -0.4449*** -0.3221*** 0.3848*** 0.2647** p=.049 p=.000 p=.008 p=.001 p=.030 
72 CAR_OP 0.1776 -0.394*** -0.3646*** 0.3663*** 0.2176* p=.150 p=.001 p=.002 p=.002 p=.077 
1 CAR_CP 0.1683 -0.2984** -0.2495** 0.2607** 0.1555 p=.173 p=.014 p=.042 p=.033 p=.209 
6 CAR_CP 0.0631 -0.2139* -0.315*** 0.2167* 0.0954 p=.612 p=.082 p=.009 p=.078 p=.443 
12 CAR_CP 0.0562 -0.2573** -0.41*** 0.2391* 0.0642 p=.651 p=.036 p=.001 p=.051 p=.606 
24 CAR_CP 0.0524 -0.3124** -0.3973*** 0.2501** 0.1045 p=.674 p=.010 p=.001 p=.041 p=.400 
36 CAR_CP 0.1073 -0.303** -0.353*** 0.2749** 0.1446 p=.388 p=.013 p=.003 p=.024 p=.243 
48 CAR_CP 0.1401 -0.357*** -0.3166*** 0.3117** 0.1993 p=.258 p=.003 p=.009 p=.010 p=.106 
60 CAR_CP 0.2392* -0.4375*** -0.3231*** 0.3811*** 0.2599** p=.051 p=.000 p=.008 p=.001 p=.034 
72 CAR_CP 0.1738 -0.3859*** -0.3659*** 0.3621*** 0.2121* p=.160 p=.001 p=.002 p=.003 p=.085 
N.B. Correlation matrix of ownership structure and long-term performance calculated using the CAR 
at the OP and the CP. 
 %_CF_FF_After refers to the percentage of cash flow rights for the family firms’ owners after going 
public. 
 %_CF_Public_After refers to the percentage of cash flow rights for the public shareholders after 
going public. 
 Chge_Dif_CF_VO_FF refers to the change in the difference between cash flow rights and voting 
rights from pre- to post-IPO date. 
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 FF_%_CF_Chge refers to the percentage change of cash flow rights for the family firms’ owners. 
 FF_%_VO_Chge refers to the percentage change of voting rights for the family firms’ owners. 
Table 68: Correlation of governance and long-term performance calculated by CAR 
T Variable 
Correlations 
Marked correlations are significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) level 
N=67 (casewise deletion of missing data) 
Dif_CF_VO_Public %_Independent CF_Board_After Board_CF_Chge 
1 CAR_OP 0.224* -0.0423 0.0483 0.2338* 
p=.068 p=.734 p=.698 p=.057 
6 CAR_OP 0.2649** -0.0419 0.0631 0.1842 p=.030 p=.737 p=.612 p=.136 
12 CAR_OP 0.371*** -0.0387 -0.0208 0.2171* p=.002 p=.756 p=.868 p=.078 
24 CAR_OP 0.3141** -0.1328 0.0144 0.3147*** p=.010 p=.284 p=.908 p=.009 
36 CAR_OP 0.3057** -0.1892 0.1276 0.2852** p=.012 p=.125 p=.303 p=.019 
48 CAR_OP 0.2836** -0.2317* 0.1621 0.291** p=.020 p=.059 p=.190 p=.017 
60 CAR_OP 0.3268*** -0.2494** 0.2152* 0.3651*** p=.007 p=.042 p=.080 p=.002 
72 CAR_OP 0.374*** -0.1931 0.1881 0.2943** p=.002 p=.117 p=.127 p=.016 
1 CAR_CP 0.2153* -0.0443 0.0293 0.2134* p=.080 p=.722 p=.814 p=.083 
6 CAR_CP 0.2547** -0.043 0.0452 0.1604 p=.038 p=.729 p=.716 p=.195 
12 CAR_CP 0.3629*** -0.0395 -0.0388 0.1957 p=.003 p=.751 p=.756 p=.112 
24 CAR_CP 0.3072** -0.1362 -0.0016 0.2984** p=.011 p=.272 p=.990 p=.014 
36 CAR_CP 0.2986** -0.1931 0.1155 0.2692** p=.014 p=.117 p=.352 p=.028 
48 CAR_CP 0.2807** -0.2378** 0.155 0.2818** p=.021 p=.053 p=.210 p=.021 
60 CAR_CP 0.3252*** -0.256** 0.2096* 0.3581*** p=.007 p=.037 p=.089 p=.003 
72 CAR_CP 0.3731*** -0.1972 0.1824 0.2861** p=.002 p=.110 p=.140 p=.019 
N.B. Correlation matrix of ownership structure and long-term returns calculated using the CAR at the 
OP and the CP. 
 Dif_CF_VO_Public refers to the difference between cash flow rights and voting rights for the public 
shareholders. 
 %_Independent refers to the percentage of independent directors on the firms’ boards. 
 CF_Board_After refers to the cash flow rights allocated to the board members after going public. 
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 Board_CF_Chge refers to the cash flow rights change for the board members from pre- to post-IPO 
date. 
Table 69: Correlation of ownership and long-term performance calculated using the BHAR 
T Variable 
Correlations 
Marked correlations are significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) level 
N=67 (casewise deletion of missing data) 
%_CF_FF_After %_CF_Public_After 
Chge_Dif_CF_
VO_FF 
FF_%_CF_Ch
ge 
FF_%_VO_Ch
ge 
1 BHAR_OP 0.1767 -0.3194*** -0.2517** 0.2741 0.1697 
p=.153 p=.008 p=.040 p=.025 p=.170 
6 BHAR_OP -0.0502 -0.0173 -0.2379* 0.0379 -0.072 p=.687 p=.889 p=.053 p=.761 p=.563 
12 BHAR_OP -0.1759 -0.0549 -0.3625*** 0.0663 -0.0955 p=.155 p=.659 p=.003 p=.594 p=.442 
24 BHAR_OP -0.0403 -0.1992 -0.229* 0.1849 0.1375 p=.746 p=.106 p=.062 p=.134 p=.267 
36 BHAR_OP 0.007 -0.1498 -0.0974 0.1701 0.1797 p=.955 p=.226 p=.433 p=.169 p=.146 
48 BHAR_OP 0.0693 -0.1862 -0.1005 0.1732 0.1835 p=.577 p=.131 p=.418 p=.161 p=.137 
60 BHAR_OP 0.2382* -0.297** -0.1692 0.2645** 0.2095* p=.052 p=.015 p=.171 p=.031 p=.089 
72 BHAR_OP 0.1775 -0.2793** -0.1993 0.2813** 0.2146* p=.151 p=.022 p=.106 p=.021 p=.081 
1 BHAR_CP 0.1683 -0.2984** -0.2495** 0.2607** 0.1555 p=.173 p=.014 p=.042 p=.033 p=.209 
6 BHAR_CP -0.0559 -0.0028 -0.232* 0.0271 -0.0809 p=.653 p=.982 p=.059 p=.827 p=.515 
12 BHAR_CP -0.1822 -0.0355 -0.3545*** 0.052 -0.107 p=.140 p=.775 p=.003 p=.676 p=.389 
24 BHAR_CP -0.0715 -0.1835 -0.241** 0.177 0.1295 p=.566 p=.137 p=.049 p=.152 p=.296 
36 BHAR_CP -0.0192 -0.139 -0.1015 0.1683 0.182 p=.878 p=.262 p=.414 p=.173 p=.140 
48 BHAR_CP 0.0503 -0.1806 -0.1082 0.173 0.1854 p=.686 p=.144 p=.383 p=.162 p=.133 
60 BHAR_CP 0.2305* -0.2919** -0.1723 0.2623** 0.2069* p=.061 p=.017 p=.163 p=.032 p=.093 
72 BHAR_CP 0.1685 -0.2718** -0.2002 0.2775** 0.2111* p=.173 p=.026 p=.104 p=.023 p=.086 
N.B. Correlation matrix of governance mechanisms and long-term performance calculated using the 
BHAR at the OP and the CP. 
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Table 70: Correlation of governance and long-term performance calculated using BHAR 
T Variable 
Correlations 
Marked correlations are significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) level 
N=67 (casewise deletion of missing data) 
Dif_CF_VO_Public %_Independent CF_Board_After Board_CF_Chge 
1 BHAR_OP 0.224* -0.0423 0.0483 0.2338* p=.068 p=.734 p=.698 p=.057 
6 BHAR_OP 0.2005 0.1187 0.0109 0.0183 p=.104 p=.339 p=.930 p=.883 
12 BHAR_OP 0.2999** 0.1401 -0.1531 0.0327 p=.014 p=.258 p=.216 p=.793 
24 BHAR_OP 0.117 -0.0631 0.0281 0.2486* p=.346 p=.612 p=.821 p=.042 
36 BHAR_OP 0.0476 -0.0939 0.0955 0.1899 p=.702 p=.450 p=.442 p=.124 
48 BHAR_OP 0.0636 -0.1347 0.1518 0.1889 p=.609 p=.277 p=.220 p=.126 
60 BHAR_OP 0.2285* -0.1821 0.2082* 0.2854** p=.063 p=.140 p=.091 p=.019 
72 BHAR_OP 0.2277* -0.1657 0.1637 0.2869** p=.064 p=.180 p=.186 p=.019 
1 BHAR_CP 0.2153* -0.0443 0.0293 0.2134* p=.080 p=.722 p=.814 p=.083 
6 BHAR_CP 0.1926 0.1156 0.0049 0.0059 p=.118 p=.352 p=.968 p=.962 
12 BHAR_CP 0.2887** 0.1362 -0.1593 0.0169 p=.018 p=.272 p=.198 p=.892 
24 BHAR_CP 0.1091 -0.073 0.001 0.2439** p=.380 p=.557 p=.993 p=.047 
36 BHAR_CP 0.0383 -0.1042 0.0738 0.1873 p=.759 p=.401 p=.553 p=.129 
48 BHAR_CP 0.0601 -0.1495 0.1382 0.1872 p=.629 p=.227 p=.265 p=.129 
60 BHAR_CP 0.228* -0.1899 0.1982 0.2823** p=.064 p=.124 p=.108 p=.021 
72 BHAR_CP 0.2246* -0.1709 0.1525 0.2821** p=.068 p=.167 p=.218 p=.021 
N.B. Correlation matrix of governance mechanisms and long-term returns calculated by the BHAR at 
the OP and the CP. 
Hypothesis 6: There is a negative relationship between the IPO long-term performance and the ROA 
and net profit margin. 
From Table 71 we notice that the correlations between the long-term performance measured by the CAR 
and the BHAR at the CP and the net profit margin and return on assets seem to be very weak and 
statistically insignificant for most months, except the sixth year with the CAR and net profit margin and 
the second and fourth year with the BHAR and net profit margin (NPM) with relatively low values of 
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around -0.20. As a result, we cannot either reject or fail to reject hypothesis 6, which states that a negative 
relationship exists between the IPO long-term performance and the return on assets (ROA) and net profit 
margin. However, it is worth noting that a negative and statistically significant correlation exists between 
the firm’s size and its long-term performance measured by both the CAR and the BHAR at the CP. This 
can be interpreted as the bigger the firm’s size measured by the firm’s total assets (LN(Assets)) in the 
year of the IPO date and the firm’s total gross proceeds (LN(Proceeds)), the worse its long-term 
performance will be throughout the years.  
Table 71: Correlation of returns and long-term performance calculated using the CAR 
T Variable 
Correlations 
Marked correlations are significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) level 
N=67 (casewise deletion of missing data) 
NPM ROA LN(Proceed) LN(Assets) 
1 CAR_CP 0.0042 0.013 -0.1588 -0.2923** 
p=.973 p=.917 p=.199 p=.016 
6 CAR_CP 0.0297 0.0351 -0.139 -0.3219*** p=.811 p=.778 p=.262 p=.008 
12 CAR_CP 0.0263 0.1115 -0.2483** -0.3217*** p=.833 p=.369 p=.043 p=.008 
24 CAR_CP -0.1672 0.0874 -0.3808*** -0.2804** p=.176 p=.482 p=.001 p=.022 
36 CAR_CP -0.0932 0.094 -0.2464** -0.1826 p=.453 p=.449 p=.044 p=.139 
48 CAR_CP -0.1909 0.0586 -0.3218*** -0.2908** p=.122 p=.638 p=.008 p=.017 
60 CAR_CP -0.1572 0.0352 -0.3067** -0.2667** p=.204 p=.778 p=.012 p=.029 
72 CAR_CP -0.2618** 0.0046 -0.3037** -0.2482** p=.032 p=.970 p=.012 p=.043 
N.B. Correlation matrix of return and size variables and long-term performance calculated by the CAR 
at the CP. 
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Table 72: Correlation of returns and long-term performance calculated using the BHAR 
T Variable 
Correlations 
Marked correlations are significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) level 
N=67 (casewise deletion of missing data) 
NPM ROA LN(Proceed) LN(Assets) 
1 BHAR_CP 0.0042 0.013 -0.1588 -0.2923** 
p=.973 p=.917 p=.199 p=.016 
6 BHAR_CP 0.0221 0.0302 0.0169 -0.1939 p=.859 p=.809 p=.892 p=.116 
12 BHAR_CP 0.0348 0.1454 -0.107 -0.2902** p=.780 p=.240 p=.389 p=.017 
24 BHAR_CP -0.2129* 0.0779 -0.2556** -0.0888 p=.084 p=.531 p=.037 p=.475 
36 BHAR_CP -0.1854 0.031 -0.1312 0.0253 p=.133 p=.803 p=.290 p=.839 
48 BHAR_CP -0.2105* 0.047 -0.2341* -0.1059 p=.087 p=.706 p=.057 p=.394 
60 BHAR_CP -0.0923 0.0596 -0.2758** -0.0556 p=.458 p=.632 p=.024 p=.655 
72 BHAR_CP -0.1234 0.0381 -0.284** -0.0691 p=.320 p=.760 p=.020 p=.578 
N.B. Correlation matrix of return and size variables and long-term performance calculated using the 
BHAR at the CP. 
4.10. Robustness Check 
As we have seen, the IPO long-term performance was calculated and observed by applying different 
models and by assuming different entry dates for the IPO shares. Thus, we did not just assume that IPO 
shares were purchased at the first-day closing prices as most researchers do, but we also followed Santos 
(2010) by including and excluding the first-day abnormal returns by assuming that all IPO shares were 
purchased at the offering price once and at the first-day closing price another time. Moreover, for 
robustness, we took a step further by also assuming that all IPO shares were purchased after one month 
of issuance and after six and twelve months to observe better the portfolios’ trends and performance and 
compare them with the portfolios purchased just on the first day of issuance. However, we observed that 
long-term returns calculated by the cumulative abnormal returns method and by assuming different entry 
dates seem to be positive with a statistical significance level of 5%. However, such results were not 
confirmed with the buy-and-hold abnormal returns methods, which even showed positive long-term 
returns but they were statistically insignificant at the 5% level for the shares purchased after one month, 
six months, and twelve months of issuance.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we have attempted to observe, analyze, and explain the long-term performance of French 
family firms’ IPOs issued from 1994 to 2013 by using different return measurements and models and 
by assuming different entry dates. We have also tried to run different regression models including the 
CAPM, the Fama and French three-factor model, and some other models based on ownership and control 
rights’ change from pre- to post-IPO date and some governance mechanisms set by the family firms on 
the issuance date. As we have seen, by using different abnormal returns calculations and different entry 
dates, French family firms tend to outperform the broad market index three years after issuance. 
However, the statistical significance of this positive abnormal return depends on the model used. For 
instance, while the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) presents a significantly positive performance, the 
buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) just presents an average positive performance with low 
significance levels.  
The different entry dates that we assumed in our IPO long-term performance calculations are the date at 
the offering price period, the first-day closing price period, one month, six months, and twelve months 
after the issuance period. Thus, by assuming these five different entry dates, the long-term performance 
was calculated each time using the CAR, BHAR, wealth relatives (WR), and raw returns. In this regard, 
Santos (2010) argued that long-term performance is better off not being solely calculated using the first-
day closing price as a starting point, as performed by most researchers, but also using the offering price 
to include the first-day abnormal returns in the long-term returns calculations. Therefore, we followed 
Santos in calculating the long-term performance by starting with both the first-day closing price and the 
IPO offering price. Additionally, we assumed a starting point in the family firms’ IPO portfolio after 
one month, six months, and twelve months of issuance to allow a better assessment of overvalued 
securities and long-term performance.  
However, regarding the outperformance of the French family IPO firms in the long term, we associated 
it not with the subsequent months’ superior returns but with only the first-month abnormal returns, which 
seem to be the highest one-month abnormal return ever observed. We related this performance to the 
fad periods that were just followed by the IPO date during which investors’ overoptimism increases 
immensely, pushing the demand for IPO shares tremendously and forcing abnormal returns to be 
generated in the first month of issuance. This actually leads to positive long-term performance calculated 
using the CAR method that is statistically significantly different from zero, which was not found using 
the BHAR. Many authors have discussed and found evidence on the fad periods and the overoptimism 
of investors, especially Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) and Ritter (1991). The authors mentioned that the 
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poor long-term IPO performance may be due to fads or speculative bubbles in the early aftermarket. 
These fad periods were excessive after the first day of issuance until the first month of issuance, and 
sometimes a few months later as well. Thus, family firms’ IPO shares were traded much above their 
intrinsic value during the first two to three years of their issuance. This is what we actually found when 
we measured abnormal returns using the CAR method in the first two years and the BHAR method in 
the first three years. That is why we saw that IPO portfolios entered after one month of issuance generate 
the worst performance, rather than entering after six or twelve months of issuance up to the end of the 
second year of issuance, because thereafter family firms tend to recover all their losses and outperform 
their market benchmark in the very long term. 
Similarly, Ritter (1991) presented evidence in his paper that in most IPOs, the offering price is not too 
low, but the first aftermarket price is too high. This was also observed in the French family firms’ 
performance, which shows very moderate first-day underpricing of only around 2%, which led us to 
believe that the French family firms were fairly priced on their IPO date. However, these firms generated 
very high first-month abnormal returns created by the overoptimism of investors, speculators, and 
opportunists in the markets, who above all seek very prompt and high short-term returns, a fact that was 
also discussed and found by Ritter. That is why we observed negative abnormal returns after a short 
period of issuance until the end of the second year using the CAR method and until the end of the third 
year using the BHAR method.  
However, in contrast to many researchers, we did not find evidence of negative long-term performance 
for these family firms after the third year, especially for the IPO shares purchased at the offering price 
or at the first-day closing price according to the CAR method. Thus, as mentioned earlier, these returns 
were shown to be statistically significantly different from zero. Hence, we also found evidence that IPO 
shares were traded above their intrinsic value just after the first month of issuance and until the end of 
the second year and sometimes until the end of the third year, depending on the return method used. 
Therefore, throughout this period, IPO shares did not add any value to their shareholders above the value 
created in the first month after issuance. In addition, as we mentioned, this shows a relatively negative 
performance for the French family firms after issuance and until the end of the second year, as mentioned 
by some authors who measured IPO long-term performance after a while of issuance, such as Aggarwal 
and Rivoli (1990), who worked on an IPO return over just 250 trading days, representing 1 calendar 
year. We recall that the authors argued that poor IPO long-term performance is possible due to fads or 
speculative bubbles in the early aftermarket, which can be seen similarly in the French IPO family firms. 
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We also recall that numerous studies in different countries have confirmed underperformance after one 
(Aggarwal and Rivoli, 1990), two (Hanley, 1993), three (Ritter, 1991; Loughran et al., 1994), and five 
years (Loughran and Ritter, 1995) after issuance. Therefore, if we were to measure IPO long-term 
performance just in the first one, two, or three years, and not in the first six years as we did, and by using 
different entry dates, we would definitely find some negative underperformance during these smaller 
periods with high statistical significance. That was the main conclusion of the returns calculated using 
the cross-sectional data analysis by just looking at the firms’ return differences and excluding the time 
effect from the first to the last issuance. 
However, when the time-series data analysis was conducted using the capital asset-pricing model 
(CAPM) and the Fama and French three-factor model, long-term abnormal returns were observed with 
high statistical significance for portfolios held for 3, 4, 5, and 6 full years. Our time analysis was 
extended to cover 229 months in the CAPM model and 221 months in the Fama and French model, 
which are around 19 years. We observed that the Fama and French model presents a superior 
performance explanation to the CAPM model with an R-squared that reached 58% in the Fama and 
French model versus 27% in the CAPM model. Therefore, finding a time-series analysis model, such as 
the Fama and French model, that can explain around 60% of IPO portfolios’ variance through its three 
factors is substantial and important. We observed in these models that the French family firms have 
lower systematic risk than the average market risk. Moreover, the higher explanatory factor presented 
in the Fama and French model is the addition of the size-related factor (SMB), which is absent from the 
CAPM model. We attributed this to the fact that most French family firms are of small sizes, issuing 
around €27 million, whereas a typical French firm issues around €1,058 million in its IPO. Thus, the 
Fama and French model captures the premium generated by small-sized firms over large-sized firms. 
We also saw that the book-to-market-related factor (HML) in the Fama and French model is statistically 
insignificant and totally ignored.  
Last, by applying some other models attempting to explain IPO long-term performance using the CAR 
and the BHAR via the ownership and control rights’ change from pre- to post-IPO date and the corporate 
governance mechanisms set by the French family firms, we did not find significant and robust results 
for them. Thus, the R-squared changed dramatically from one holding period to another and from one 
return method to another. Furthermore, some variables had a significant effect over some longer periods 
and not over shorter periods and vice versa. Therefore, we could not rely on the ownership and 
governance mechanisms to explain IPO long-term performance and therefore we need some additional 
variables that were not observed in our model and that can be observed in subsequent research.  
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However, as we discussed earlier, one of the main limitations that we faced in this research is the lack 
of benchmarks other than the board market benchmark, such as the CAC All-Tradable Index, with which 
to compare our results, especially considering that many authors attributed IPOs’ poor performance to 
small capitalization and riskier firms than any other types of firms and when using different benchmarks, 
the underperformance vanishes. We have explained that since our sample dates back to 1994 and since 
most of the IPOs were issued before 2001, we could not compare our results with the CAC small and 
mid-cap indices. In subsequent research, we would choose a newer sample that starts, for example, after 
the year 2005, when at least four different market benchmarks existed, such as the CAC small, CAC 
small and mid, CAC mid, and CAC All-Tradable Index. We have also mentioned that one of the main 
limitations that we faced is the relatively small number of firms in our sample, which did not exceed 86 
firms. However, even though we attributed this small number to the fact that only French listed family 
firms were chosen to be tested, we will attempt in the future to conduct wider research by comparing 
family firms from different nearby countries, such as Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK. However, such 
types of studies require a thorough analysis of different legal, social, economic, and financial aspects, 
which differ from one country to another and which can also affect family firms’ long-term performance. 
Another limitation of our results is that we solely used the equally weighted method in all the models; 
although we initially intended to use the value-weighted method as well, due to data constraints we did 
not. In future research projects, we intend to use more than one price database to make sure that all the 
necessary data and prices are available to enable us to use different techniques and methods. 
We also intend in subsequent research projects to examine the quarterly financial reports disclosed by 
the public firms to assess their long-term performance better with the availability of ongoing 
fundamental analysis and not just by relying on IPO prospectus data, which turned out to have very low 
reliability for performance explanations in the long term. Therefore, better assessment of firms’ 
profitability should be performed throughout the years after issuance, firms’ solvency and liquidity 
problems, and credit risk and turnover measures, in addition to working capital management, cash flow 
management, investment appraisals, and others. Thus, for the performance analysis to be well covered, 
all the financial aspects of firms will be observed, assessed, and analyzed, which we intend to conduct 
in future research projects on a larger scale and for a further extended period. 
Last, three important factors that seem to affect IPO long-term performance, which have been covered 
by numerous authors but could not be tested or integrated into our data analysis and results, are the 
firms’ independent auditors on the IPO date and thereafter, the issuing firms’ underwriters, and the 
presence of venture capitalists and private equity funds in the IPO firms. All three of these parties can 
largely and deeply affect firms’ performance in the short as well as the long term, as argued by many 
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authors. Therefore, in future research projects, we also intend to observe these three important players, 
who contribute to determining and creating value for shareholders; thus, we will identify their effects 
on the IPO performance in the short and in the long term. 
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THESIS CONCLUSION 
Throughout this thesis, we have aimed to shed more light on French family firms’ capital structure by 
departing from the agency theory and the information asymmetry theory, which are fundamental theories 
in corporate finance. For this purpose, we conducted several comparative analyses between French 
family and nonfamily firms and we also tried to explain capital structure via different models. We also 
observed each family firm’s IPO prospectus and recorded the ownership and control rights change and 
the main governance mechanisms. We also calculated IPO performance in the short and the long term 
by employing different methods and models, and by using cross-sectional and time-series data analysis, 
we observed whether the ownership and control rights change and the different governance mechanisms 
affect performance, and if so, to what extent.  
Our sample consists of 90 family and 203 nonfamily firms that were part of the CAC All-Tradable Index 
from 2010 until 2013, excluding banking and finance firms. Throughout the descriptive statistics, we 
were able to prove that family firms’ capital structure is characterized by a lower level of debt than 
nonfamily firms. Moreover, family firms seem to rely less on long-term borrowing than on short-term 
borrowing, which means they prefer rolling over their short-term leverage more often and have no 
serious concern about approaching creditors every time they need additional financing. We also 
mentioned that family firms’ cost of debt is lower than that of nonfamily firms. With regard to the debt 
maturity of family firms, we mention that our results are in line with Flannery’s model (1986), who 
argued that the debt maturity of a required loan is predicted to be positively related to risk ratings and 
that low-debt maturity financing denotes low-risk ratings while high-debt maturity financing denotes 
high-risk ratings. Similarly, our results were also consistent with Diamond’s model (1991), who argued 
that firms with favorable private information and with sufficiently low risk ratings may choose short-
term debt at relatively low interest rates because of a high likelihood of being able to roll over their debt 
after one period. This might also be due to the good performance and future prospects family firms 
present at the end of the rollover period, and to the high comfort level family firms feel in sharing private 
information with their creditors when rolling over their short-term debt. With regard to the lower debt 
level of family firms, we can explain this based on Jensen (1986), who argued that the presence of firms’ 
owners inside firms increases their ability to closely monitor firms’ managers and thus decrease Type 1 
agency costs, making the disciplinary role of debt less relevant and necessary. As we mentioned, another 
explanation for the lower debt level of family firms is the lower firm size and lower level of free cash 
flows. Hence, managers are not left with high levels of free cash flow and thus do not need to increase 
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debt financing for the purpose of adopting some cash flow disciplinary instruments through debt. 
Another interpretation of firms’ capital structure through performance is related to pecking order theory. 
Moreover, as our study and several different studies indicate (e.g. Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Villalonga 
and Amit, 2006), French family firms demonstrate a better performance than their nonfamily 
counterparts, which signals their better capabilities to generate internal funds and constant cash flows. 
Hence, they depend less on external financing (both debt and equity). Through this, we found that French 
family firms’ behavior is in line with the broad capital structure theories (the market timing hypothesis, 
the trade-off theory and pecking order theory). We also proved that almost all French family firms are 
characterized by insider ownership and that managers are entrenched. Through our research, it was 
noteworthy that in almost 90% of family firms, the family is a major shareholder, part of the management 
board and board of directors, which signals low agency cost. But through the average age of the 
managers on the board of directors and the management board, we notice that family firms might suffer 
from managerial entrenchment. Overall, our study suggests a strong, negative, and causal relationship 
between family firm characteristics and the extent to which a company is leveraged. 
In chapter 2 we reviewed most theories explaining IPO underpricing, emphasizing the information 
asymmetry theory, which was thoroughly researched. Thus, whenever information asymmetries 
increase, IPO underpricing increases as a means to compensate investors for the risk they are taking in 
the absence of full information about the IPO. As we observed, the French family firms were almost 
fairly priced with an average first-day IPO underpricing of only 1.92%, a median of 0.00%, and a lower 
and upper quartile of -0.61% and 1.11%, respectively. Accordingly we have deduced that the French 
family firms are almost fairly priced on the day of IPOs with very smooth underpricing. Yet, many 
prominent authors found significant underpricing of IPO firms reaching sometimes double-digit 
underpricing, which contradicts our findings in this chapter. However, we have clearly stated that most 
IPO underpricing empirical studies do not differentiate between family and nonfamily firms, which are 
already distinctly different. However, going back to our results, we attributed this lower average first-
day IPO underpricing to the alignment of interest between the family firms’ principals and agents, in 
other words to the lower Type 1 agency costs. Moreover, family firms’ owners, who control around 
80% of the firms’ cash flow rights after the IPO, not only do not seem to easily relinquish control but 
also do not accept deeply underpricing their firms’ shares in order to benefit the public shareholders. On 
the other hand, the Type 2 agency problem discussed by Zingales (1995) is clearly present between the 
majority and the minority shareholders in these family firms. So we noticed that on average, family 
firms’ owners clearly tried to increase their control over their firms by assuring higher levels of control 
rights with respect to their levels of cash flow rights. Therefore, the minority shareholders’ expropriation 
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described by La Porta et al. (2000) seems to be very present in French family firms. Throughout our 
inspection of the firms’ IPO prospectuses we found that the gap between the cash flow rights and the 
voting rights has increased from 1.3% on the pre-IPO date to 4.6% on the post-IPO date, revealing the 
clear intention of the family firms’ owners to expropriate minority shareholders. Furthermore, 67% of 
French family firms either have double voting rights allocated to the family firms’ members while 
leaving the public shareholders with single voting rights, or allocate to themselves voting shares and 
leave the public shareholders with nonvoting shares. Also, in around 77% of French family firms, the 
CEOs hold the position of the boards’ Chair on the day of the IPO. Likewise, around 80% of the French 
family firms were managed on their IPO date by the same person who founded the firm. So as we 
mentioned, the majority of the family firms went public when they were managed by the founders 
themselves. Among the numerous benefits and reasons for going public, these founder CEOs might 
decide to go public to solve succession problems, as the average firm’s age is around 17 years. So in 
general, we found that family firms’ founders show a high level of persistence in managing and 
controlling their firms even after going public since the majority of them are present on the firms’ 
management board and supervisory board. We also found that the average board size of French family 
firms is only 4.7 members versus 10.8 for a typical French firm and 10.3 for an average board size in 12 
developed European countries (Ferreira and Kirchmaier, 2013). As we mentioned, this might be due to 
the small family firm size compared to nonfamily firms, or to the intention of family firms’ owners to 
dominate the board members by purposefully making a small board size composed mostly of family 
members. Also, the percentage of independent directors was around 20% in French family firms 
compared to 35% in a typical French firm, and 43.6% in 12 developed European countries (Ferreira and 
Kirchmaier, 2013). Here also, the domination by the French family firms’ owners over the board of 
directors is clear and substantial. In an attempt to explain IPO underpricing through ownership and 
control rights change first and through governance mechanisms second, we have employed two separate 
models including each criterion separately. In the first model, we can explain around 16.2% of the IPO 
underpricing variance through ownership and control rights change with a high statistical significance 
level. Conversely, in the second model, we can only explain around 9.8% of the IPO underpricing 
variance through governance mechanisms but with a high statistically insignificant level. We deduced 
that IPO underpricing is much more sensitive toward changes in firms’ ownership and control rights 
change rather than governance mechanisms. Yet, by looking at the IPO abnormal returns after one month 
of issuance that reach 35%, we notice that speculators and over-optimistic investors were very eager to 
acquire IPO shares and seeking high short-term returns. Thus, as ascertained in chapter 3, for these 
investors who do not seek to hold IPO shares for long, the percentage of ownership and control rights 
change seems to be more important than the governance mechanisms.  
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Likewise, in chapter 3 we have measured IPO long-term performance and tried to explain it through two 
models, one through the ownership and control rights change and the other through the governance 
mechanisms. Quite similar results of short-term performance were found for the three-year holding 
portfolio with significant statistical results for the ownership and control rights change model and 
insignificant results for the governance mechanisms model. However, both models seem to present poor 
explanatory results for the four-, five-, and six-year holding portfolios. We have also tried to employ the 
CAPM and the Fama and French Three-Factor model by assuming different entry dates in the IPO 
shares. Additionally, we have seen that French family firms tend to outperform the broad market index 
three years after issuance, while presenting poor performance from one to three months after issuance 
and until the third year. We have attributed this to the fads period created just after issuance, which led 
the IPO abnormal returns to record around 35% one month after issuance. Long-term abnormal returns 
became stagnated for almost three years in which not only were no values added for the IPO investors, 
but also losses were observed during this period. After the third year, family firms seemed to recover all 
the losses and start generating positive abnormal returns, reaching 100% with the CAR method and 67% 
with the BHAR method. However, the CAR results seem to be statistically significantly different to zero 
while the BHAR results did not. We also recall that Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) worked on IPO returns 
over just 250 trading days, and found evidence of poor performance. The authors argued that such poor 
performance is possibly due to fads or speculative bubbles in the early aftermarket, which is similarly 
seen in the French IPO family firms. We also recall that beside Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990), who worked 
on one-year IPO performance and found negative results, Hanley (1993), who worked on two-year IPO 
performance, and Ritter (1991) and Loughran et al. (1994), who worked on three-year IPO performance, 
also found negative results. As a result, we mentioned that if we were to measure IPO long-term 
performance using one, two, or three years after issuance, we would definitely find underperformance 
with high statistical significance levels. However, when measuring IPO long-term performance using 
four, five, and six years after issuance, we find positive abnormal returns. 
Hence, as we mentioned, we aim in future research projects to enlarge our sample size by including 
more than just French family firms and thus we seek to conduct a thorough comparative analysis 
between family and nonfamily firms on a bigger scale by including firms from other countries. 
Moreover, we seek to inspect the governance mechanisms extended over the sample period and not only 
taken on the IPO date to observe their effects on long-term performance. We also mentioned that it is 
preferable to work on newer sample periods to be able to find different indices to the CAC All-Tradable 
Index for considering small and middle-sized capitalization indices that started in 2005.  
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Last, we aim to include in our future projects variables other than the ownership and control rights 
change and the governance mechanisms, such as independent auditors’ reports, underwriters’ reputation, 
and the presence of venture capital and private equity funds on the firms’ boards and ownership 
throughout the sample period to gain a broader vision of IPO performance in the short and in the long 
term of family firms and to be able to conduct a comparative analysis between family and nonfamily 
firms. Moreover, if the ownership and control rights change can predict and explain around 15% of the 
variance of the first-day underpricing, we would like to know and understand which factors contribute 
most to explaining the first-day IPO underpricing and to what extent. Last, it would be interesting to 
thoroughly observe and analyze the long-term performance of family firms after going public since, as 
we see, these firms outperform their market benchmark, contradicting most research papers that confirm 
an underperformance of firms going public in the long run. Therefore, understanding such performance 
is of great interest and a high priority for researchers in family firms.  
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Appendices:  
Table 73: The Deflator Factors 
Year Deflator  Factor 
1994 1.7366 
1995 1.6438 
1996 1.5437 
1997 1.4865 
1998 1.4382 
1999 1.3914 
2000 1.3555 
2001 1.3010 
2002 1.2486 
2003 1.2094 
2004 1.1824 
2005 1.1588 
2006 1.1343 
2007 1.1025 
2008 1.0606 
2009 1.0226 
2010 1.0163 
2011 1.0126 
2012 1.0054 
2013 1.0000 
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Table 74: Cumulative benchmark-adjusted abnormal returns (1M) 
T 
CAR_1M (T from 1 to 36) 
 T 
CAR_1M (T from 37 to 72) 
N Mean Median Min Max Std.Dev 
 
N Mean Median Min Max Std.Dev 
1 0            
 
37 82 17.0% 23.0% -199.0% 287.2% 101.7% 
2 86 0.1% -1.3% -51.8% 76.7% 16.8% 
 
38 82 17.3% 14.3% -216.1% 272.7% 100.4% 
3 86 2.0% -1.0% -105.6% 129.1% 28.3% 
 
39 82 20.2% 11.6% -201.0% 309.4% 104.5% 
4 86 1.8% 0.0% -108.9% 191.5% 37.7% 
 
40 82 19.0% 13.3% -224.9% 285.8% 104.2% 
5 86 0.2% -1.3% -117.8% 200.9% 42.8% 
 
41 82 17.5% 15.3% -234.5% 305.7% 106.3% 
6 86 -1.3% -3.8% -105.6% 180.0% 40.4% 
 
42 82 19.1% 22.4% -210.8% 309.8% 106.8% 
7 85 -4.1% -5.7% -117.1% 140.1% 41.2% 
 
43 82 24.1% 24.3% -203.5% 301.6% 105.3% 
8 85 -4.4% -5.5% -119.7% 149.7% 47.0% 
 
44 82 24.9% 22.3% -209.9% 309.9% 109.2% 
9 85 -8.3% -5.7% -132.2% 145.4% 52.1% 
 
45 81 28.8% 24.9% -206.1% 307.2% 112.6% 
10 84 -9.6% -8.7% -152.1% 165.5% 56.9% 
 
46 81 34.0% 27.3% -207.6% 314.8% 114.3% 
11 84 -5.9% -1.8% -182.9% 275.8% 67.9% 
 
47 81 34.1% 30.1% -209.5% 314.0% 113.5% 
12 84 -3.1% -7.7% -165.7% 276.5% 72.3% 
 
48 80 45.6% 28.9% -208.4% 324.6% 113.2% 
13 84 -4.9% -10.2% -161.6% 261.5% 69.7% 
 
49 80 42.1% 27.8% -213.1% 320.3% 111.6% 
14 84 -8.0% -13.7% -169.0% 262.3% 72.0% 
 
50 80 43.0% 35.0% -286.4% 358.2% 119.4% 
15 83 -10.8% -13.4% -194.0% 259.4% 75.7% 
 
51 79 47.0% 31.4% -261.1% 336.4% 120.6% 
16 83 -8.2% -14.8% -155.8% 275.2% 74.1% 
 
52 79 46.9% 36.7% -265.3% 333.1% 118.8% 
17 83 -9.6% -15.6% -172.0% 274.6% 75.7% 
 
53 79 48.1% 41.1% -266.2% 346.4% 118.1% 
18 83 -8.6% -13.5% -155.5% 276.9% 75.9% 
 
54 79 51.7% 44.2% -308.7% 355.0% 121.1% 
19 83 -8.6% -8.6% -151.5% 274.7% 78.3% 
 
55 79 52.1% 48.4% -314.3% 349.7% 122.7% 
20 83 -6.5% -9.6% -157.5% 281.1% 78.5% 
 
56 78 49.9% 41.6% -317.0% 368.5% 123.6% 
21 83 -4.4% -12.7% -191.2% 286.6% 81.4% 
 
57 77 49.8% 39.6% -322.3% 384.8% 123.7% 
22 83 -2.3% -5.9% -182.0% 299.6% 84.0% 
 
58 77 52.7% 44.7% -320.5% 388.4% 120.1% 
23 83 -3.1% -6.2% -223.1% 294.7% 86.9% 
 
59 77 54.4% 45.8% -325.9% 409.8% 123.5% 
24 83 -0.6% -5.0% -171.6% 309.9% 86.6% 
 
60 77 53.9% 35.5% -322.5% 421.2% 123.8% 
25 83 0.9% 1.6% -179.6% 314.9% 84.6% 
 
61 77 55.7% 40.0% -325.7% 425.5% 126.0% 
26 82 6.4% 4.3% -140.3% 296.2% 83.9% 
 
62 77 55.5% 48.0% -329.1% 426.2% 126.5% 
27 82 7.6% 3.5% -154.1% 317.5% 86.8% 
 
63 77 55.6% 48.2% -334.4% 424.8% 128.8% 
28 82 5.9% 5.6% -148.7% 327.6% 86.0% 
 
64 77 56.0% 43.9% -336.0% 423.4% 134.2% 
29 82 4.4% -3.3% -148.2% 333.3% 87.5% 
 
65 77 57.3% 49.0% -341.1% 433.5% 133.1% 
30 82 5.2% -2.8% -163.3% 328.5% 91.6% 
 
66 77 59.8% 58.2% -340.0% 442.6% 133.8% 
31 82 5.9% 6.7% -164.2% 330.8% 91.6% 
 
67 77 61.7% 58.6% -335.3% 441.7% 131.8% 
32 82 7.1% -1.8% -167.1% 334.7% 96.1% 
 
68 77 64.6% 68.1% -335.7% 449.7% 133.9% 
33 82 12.0% 5.2% -171.8% 320.1% 97.9% 
 
69 77 64.3% 60.1% -335.4% 458.6% 139.9% 
34 82 13.5% 0.8% -173.2% 317.7% 97.3% 
 
70 76 68.1% 62.0% -339.9% 450.3% 136.2% 
35 82 15.5% 8.7% -162.5% 317.2% 97.6% 
 
71 76 70.8% 63.1% -341.0% 447.3% 137.1% 
36 82 16.6% 23.9% -187.3% 313.8% 100.5% 
 
72 75 74.8% 68.6% -354.5% 433.6% 132.1% 
 
 
 
286 
 
 
Table 75: Cumulative benchmark-adjusted abnormal returns (6M) 
T 
CAR_6M (T from 1 to 36) 
 T 
CAR_6M (T from 37 to 72) 
N Mean Median Min Max Std.Dev 
 
N Mean Median Min Max Std.Dev 
1 0           
 
37 82 18.0% 15.6% -182.1% 276.7% 94.1% 
2 0           
 
38 82 18.3% 13.1% -182.4% 262.2% 93.9% 
3 0           
 
39 82 21.1% 16.3% -184.5% 298.9% 97.0% 
4 0           
 
40 82 20.0% 18.1% -175.4% 275.3% 97.2% 
5 0           
 
41 82 18.5% 17.5% -179.7% 295.2% 99.4% 
6 0           
 
42 82 20.1% 23.9% -177.4% 299.3% 99.4% 
7 85 -2.8% -2.4% -39.9% 75.3% 14.4% 
 
43 82 25.1% 23.4% -178.2% 291.1% 98.7% 
8 85 -3.0% -3.8% -46.8% 146.5% 25.2% 
 
44 82 25.8% 21.8% -178.0% 299.4% 102.5% 
9 85 -6.9% -9.4% -72.6% 151.0% 30.4% 
 
45 81 29.5% 23.8% -179.4% 296.7% 107.6% 
10 84 -8.6% -8.2% -96.7% 156.0% 34.6% 
 
46 81 34.7% 24.8% -194.7% 318.6% 109.3% 
11 84 -4.9% -7.4% -127.5% 281.9% 51.0% 
 
47 81 34.8% 20.7% -174.3% 303.9% 108.4% 
12 84 -2.1% -5.7% -107.7% 282.7% 57.3% 
 
48 80 45.9% 28.5% -171.5% 392.1% 113.7% 
13 84 -3.9% -7.6% -114.6% 254.7% 56.7% 
 
49 80 42.5% 23.3% -171.8% 340.8% 112.1% 
14 84 -6.9% -8.0% -128.2% 254.3% 59.0% 
 
50 80 43.3% 24.5% -231.0% 463.8% 119.9% 
15 83 -9.9% -11.3% -174.8% 260.7% 62.1% 
 
51 79 47.5% 32.3% -205.7% 424.5% 121.6% 
16 83 -7.2% -16.1% -124.6% 264.7% 60.8% 
 
52 79 47.5% 32.8% -209.9% 438.7% 119.6% 
17 83 -8.7% -17.3% -140.8% 264.1% 61.4% 
 
53 79 48.7% 33.2% -210.8% 382.2% 118.2% 
18 83 -7.6% -20.3% -124.3% 266.4% 62.0% 
 
54 79 52.2% 35.1% -253.3% 390.7% 119.9% 
19 83 -7.6% -10.6% -117.2% 264.2% 65.1% 
 
55 79 52.6% 35.1% -258.9% 430.0% 122.1% 
20 83 -5.5% -9.9% -123.6% 270.6% 67.4% 
 
56 78 50.4% 35.6% -261.6% 415.5% 123.1% 
21 83 -3.5% -10.9% -135.8% 276.1% 72.8% 
 
57 77 50.5% 31.9% -267.0% 403.1% 123.5% 
22 83 -1.4% -6.4% -148.1% 289.1% 77.3% 
 
58 77 53.4% 36.7% -265.1% 402.0% 120.8% 
23 83 -2.1% -7.9% -167.7% 284.2% 80.1% 
 
59 77 55.0% 45.9% -270.5% 407.0% 123.8% 
24 83 0.4% -10.2% -131.7% 299.4% 79.3% 
 
60 77 54.5% 35.6% -267.2% 418.3% 124.0% 
25 83 1.8% -2.3% -134.7% 304.4% 75.5% 
 
61 77 56.4% 42.2% -270.3% 422.7% 126.1% 
26 82 7.3% 3.0% -125.6% 285.7% 75.9% 
 
62 77 56.2% 51.7% -273.7% 423.3% 126.6% 
27 82 8.6% 2.7% -141.4% 307.0% 79.5% 
 
63 77 56.3% 46.1% -279.0% 421.9% 128.2% 
28 82 6.9% 0.8% -129.8% 317.1% 79.3% 
 
64 77 56.6% 50.1% -280.6% 420.5% 133.8% 
29 82 5.3% -3.0% -140.3% 322.8% 80.9% 
 
65 77 57.9% 48.0% -285.7% 430.6% 132.8% 
30 82 6.1% -4.2% -179.8% 318.0% 86.5% 
 
66 77 60.4% 56.9% -284.6% 439.8% 133.3% 
31 82 6.9% -2.3% -182.6% 320.3% 88.2% 
 
67 77 62.3% 51.8% -279.9% 438.9% 130.4% 
32 82 8.1% -8.3% -190.4% 324.2% 92.8% 
 
68 77 65.2% 52.2% -280.3% 446.8% 133.1% 
33 82 12.9% -1.2% -164.5% 309.6% 90.9% 
 
69 77 64.9% 51.0% -302.8% 455.7% 138.8% 
34 82 14.5% -2.6% -185.2% 307.2% 91.3% 
 
70 76 68.0% 55.2% -303.7% 450.9% 135.1% 
35 82 16.4% 5.1% -222.8% 306.7% 93.9% 
 
71 76 70.7% 55.3% -335.7% 472.7% 136.5% 
36 82 17.6% 15.0% -167.9% 303.3% 94.4% 
 
72 75 73.9% 59.4% -391.1% 473.4% 133.5% 
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Table 76: Cumulative benchmark-adjusted abnormal returns (12M) 
T 
CAR_12M (T from 1 to 36) 
 T 
CAR_12M (T from 37 to 72) 
N Mean Median Min Max Std.Dev 
 
N Mean Median Min Max Std.Dev 
1 0           
 
37 82 20.2% 26.5% -155.2% 249.5% 85.5% 
2 0           
 
38 82 20.5% 29.5% -132.2% 258.1% 86.5% 
3 0           
 
39 82 23.3% 28.4% -160.0% 259.3% 88.8% 
4 0           
 
40 82 22.2% 32.3% -168.9% 302.1% 90.8% 
5 0           
 
41 82 20.7% 29.1% -172.7% 281.6% 92.3% 
6 0           
 
42 82 22.3% 28.0% -181.6% 281.2% 93.1% 
7 0           
 
43 82 27.3% 31.2% -182.5% 286.7% 93.0% 
8 0           
 
44 82 28.0% 25.3% -175.1% 326.2% 98.5% 
9 0           
 
45 81 32.1% 29.4% -183.6% 322.7% 103.9% 
10 0           
 
46 81 37.3% 33.6% -178.2% 338.1% 106.1% 
11 0           
 
47 81 37.4% 25.7% -169.3% 335.6% 104.7% 
12 0           
 
48 80 49.1% 46.2% -159.3% 452.2% 113.9% 
13 84 -1.8% -2.3% -71.5% 87.2% 18.7% 
 
49 80 45.6% 40.8% -164.5% 400.8% 112.2% 
14 84 -4.8% -3.4% -61.8% 79.1% 21.5% 
 
50 80 46.5% 38.6% -166.3% 523.9% 119.7% 
15 83 -7.7% -2.9% -73.2% 63.6% 25.8% 
 
51 79 50.7% 42.9% -169.0% 484.6% 121.0% 
16 83 -5.0% -3.1% -83.5% 135.8% 29.7% 
 
52 79 50.6% 43.1% -163.4% 498.8% 119.9% 
17 83 -6.5% -6.0% -97.9% 125.7% 29.8% 
 
53 79 51.8% 45.0% -157.9% 442.3% 118.7% 
18 83 -5.4% -2.1% -88.9% 126.2% 31.8% 
 
54 79 55.4% 47.8% -174.2% 450.8% 120.2% 
19 83 -5.4% -4.8% -85.6% 155.8% 39.3% 
 
55 79 55.8% 51.3% -179.8% 490.1% 123.2% 
20 83 -3.3% -5.8% -121.3% 148.3% 41.8% 
 
56 78 57.2% 50.5% -182.6% 475.6% 123.1% 
21 83 -1.3% -5.0% -106.9% 196.6% 48.8% 
 
57 77 57.0% 53.5% -187.9% 463.2% 123.5% 
22 83 0.8% 3.2% -119.6% 185.7% 56.6% 
 
58 77 59.9% 54.7% -186.1% 462.1% 121.2% 
23 83 0.1% -2.3% -127.9% 175.6% 59.3% 
 
59 77 61.6% 59.4% -191.4% 472.3% 123.9% 
24 83 2.6% 1.6% -115.0% 189.6% 58.9% 
 
60 77 61.0% 58.3% -188.1% 483.6% 123.7% 
25 83 4.0% 3.0% -112.6% 176.6% 55.6% 
 
61 77 62.9% 59.4% -191.2% 488.0% 126.0% 
26 82 9.5% 5.4% -92.5% 201.8% 56.1% 
 
62 77 62.7% 62.8% -194.7% 488.6% 127.1% 
27 82 10.8% 13.0% -103.4% 229.5% 60.7% 
 
63 77 62.8% 55.3% -199.9% 487.2% 128.4% 
28 82 9.1% 9.8% -131.5% 198.6% 62.4% 
 
64 77 63.2% 55.2% -201.5% 485.8% 133.2% 
29 82 7.5% 5.7% -158.4% 215.2% 65.3% 
 
65 77 64.5% 58.7% -206.6% 495.9% 132.3% 
30 82 8.3% 6.6% -142.0% 223.5% 72.8% 
 
66 77 67.0% 61.2% -212.5% 505.1% 133.0% 
31 82 9.1% 12.6% -144.8% 227.8% 75.7% 
 
67 77 68.8% 60.2% -239.7% 504.2% 129.7% 
32 82 10.3% 8.2% -152.6% 237.5% 80.9% 
 
68 77 71.7% 59.8% -249.5% 512.2% 133.6% 
33 82 15.2% 11.0% -143.3% 232.2% 81.9% 
 
69 77 71.5% 58.6% -275.9% 521.0% 138.5% 
34 82 16.7% 14.2% -156.3% 229.9% 81.6% 
 
70 76 73.5% 58.7% -276.8% 512.8% 135.5% 
35 82 18.7% 18.3% -189.7% 274.7% 84.5% 
 
71 76 76.2% 60.9% -308.8% 532.7% 137.2% 
36 82 19.8% 20.0% -140.9% 261.9% 85.1% 
 
72 75 78.5% 61.2% -364.2% 533.4% 137.1% 
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Table 77: Test of means of CAR (1M) 
T Test of means against reference constant (value) CAR_1M Mean Std.Dv. N Std.Err. Reference t-value df p 
6 -1.30% 40.40% 86 4.40% 0.00% -0.307 85 0.76 
12 -3.10% 72.30% 84 7.90% 0.00% -0.395 83 0.694 
18 -8.60% 75.90% 83 8.30% 0.00% -1.027 82 0.307 
24 -0.60% 86.60% 83 9.50% 0.00% -0.062 82 0.951 
30 5.20% 91.60% 82 10.10% 0.00% 0.51 81 0.611 
36 16.60% 100.50% 82 11.10% 0.00% 1.497 81 0.138 
42 19.10% 106.80% 82 11.80% 0.00% 1.619 81 0.109 
48 45.60%*** 113.20% 80 12.70% 0.00% 3.599 79 0.001 
54 51.70%*** 121.10% 79 13.60% 0.00% 3.792 78 0.000 
60 53.90%*** 123.80% 77 14.10% 0.00% 3.818 76 0.000 
66 59.80%*** 133.80% 77 15.20% 0.00% 3.922 76 0.000 
72 74.80%*** 132.10% 75 15.30% 0.00% 4.904 74 0.000 
Table 78: Test of means of CAR (6M) 
T Test of means against reference constant (value) CAR_6M Mean Std.Dv. N Std.Err. Reference t-value df p 
1     0           
6     0           
12 -2.10% 57.30% 84 6.30% 0.00% -0.337 83 0.737 
18 -7.60% 62.00% 83 6.80% 0.00% -1.1163 82 0.2676 
24 0.40% 79.30% 83 8.70% 0.00% 0.0425 82 0.9662 
30 6.10% 86.50% 82 9.60% 0.00% 0.6417 81 0.5229 
36 17.60% 94.40% 82 10.40% 0.00% 1.6871 81 0.0954 
42 20.10% 99.40% 82 11.00% 0.00% 1.8261 81 0.0715 
48 45.90%*** 113.70% 80 12.70% 0.00% 3.6106 79 0.0005 
54 52.20%*** 119.90% 79 13.50% 0.00% 3.8719 78 0.0002 
60 54.50%*** 124.00% 77 14.10% 0.00% 3.8579 76 0.0002 
66 60.40%*** 133.30% 77 15.20% 0.00% 3.9765 76 0.0002 
72 73.90%*** 133.50% 75 15.40% 0.00% 4.7963 74 0.0000 
Table 79: Test of means of CAR (12M)  
T Test of means against reference constant (value) CAR_12M Mean Std.Dv. N Std.Err. Reference t-value df p 
1     0   0.00%       
6     0   0.00%       
12     0   0.00%       
18 -5.40% 31.80% 83 3.50% 0.00% -1.549 82 0.125 
24 2.60% 58.90% 83 6.50% 0.00% 0.397 82 0.692 
30 8.30% 72.80% 82 8.00% 0.00% 1.037 81 0.303 
36 19.80%** 85.10% 82 9.40% 0.00% 2.108 81 0.038 
42 22.30%** 93.10% 82 10.30% 0.00% 2.164 81 0.033 
48 49.10%*** 113.90% 80 12.70% 0.00% 3.852 79 0.000 
54 55.40%*** 120.20% 79 13.50% 0.00% 4.097 78 0.000 
60 61.00%*** 123.70% 77 14.10% 0.00% 4.33 76 0.000 
66 67.00%*** 133.00% 77 15.20% 0.00% 4.417 76 0.000 
72 78.50%*** 137.10% 75 15.80% 0.00% 4.958 74 0.000 
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Table 80: Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (1M) 
T 
BHAR_1M (T from 1 to 36) 
 T 
BHAR_1M (T from 37 to 72) 
N Mean Median Min Max Std.Dev 
 
N Mean Median Min Max Std.Dev 
1 0           
 
37 82 10.7% -30.1% -192.7% 712.1% 149.4% 
2 86 0.1% -1.3% -51.8% 76.7% 16.8% 
 
38 82 9.1% -26.7% -207.8% 686.5% 142.2% 
3 86 2.6% -1.1% -79.8% 172.7% 30.1% 
 
39 82 17.2% -26.4% -208.4% 1232.7% 184.3% 
4 86 4.6% 0.0% -84.2% 363.0% 50.6% 
 
40 82 8.8% -22.4% -226.9% 902.9% 150.4% 
5 86 4.8% -1.9% -85.1% 424.3% 59.3% 
 
41 82 6.4% -26.6% -228.8% 612.2% 136.3% 
6 86 0.4% -5.4% -85.5% 289.2% 47.9% 
 
42 82 5.6% -26.3% -227.7% 527.3% 127.3% 
7 85 -4.2% -7.0% -91.7% 154.8% 38.7% 
 
43 82 10.0% -24.6% -222.8% 610.2% 139.4% 
8 85 -3.3% -7.3% -92.7% 155.5% 45.0% 
 
44 82 15.0% -26.9% -238.2% 760.0% 152.3% 
9 85 -6.3% -12.2% -93.8% 162.2% 48.3% 
 
45 81 18.6% -29.8% -235.8% 698.5% 154.1% 
10 84 -6.4% -13.1% -98.5% 198.2% 51.9% 
 
46 81 20.9% -26.1% -241.9% 645.4% 157.4% 
11 84 1.7% -9.4% -108.0% 529.5% 82.3% 
 
47 81 20.7% -27.2% -236.4% 650.0% 160.4% 
12 84 1.4% -14.9% -111.6% 524.5% 83.3% 
 
48 80 23.4% -22.7% -230.5% 616.3% 157.4% 
13 84 -6.5% -17.7% -112.7% 242.5% 62.5% 
 
49 80 18.3% -26.8% -229.7% 607.4% 152.4% 
14 84 -9.7% -20.6% -123.2% 240.7% 60.5% 
 
50 80 20.0% -28.2% -235.5% 606.0% 148.1% 
15 83 -10.6% -19.0% -114.3% 272.4% 64.7% 
 
51 79 22.8% -23.2% -229.7% 638.5% 155.3% 
16 83 -9.7% -24.9% -112.7% 262.0% 65.5% 
 
52 79 18.5% -27.3% -206.4% 500.7% 141.6% 
17 83 -11.3% -23.0% -118.7% 302.4% 66.6% 
 
53 79 23.4% -27.5% -212.2% 670.9% 151.9% 
18 83 -9.4% -21.7% -116.0% 401.2% 74.9% 
 
54 79 27.0% -24.0% -209.5% 749.8% 159.8% 
19 83 -9.1% -23.2% -122.4% 351.6% 72.7% 
 
55 79 25.4% -21.4% -204.7% 734.8% 160.3% 
20 83 -6.9% -22.7% -131.4% 324.6% 75.4% 
 
56 78 25.6% -25.1% -196.2% 892.6% 169.6% 
21 83 -6.8% -28.7% -132.6% 378.2% 84.5% 
 
57 77 22.6% -29.6% -177.6% 1029.8% 168.2% 
22 83 -5.9% -25.9% -136.0% 278.7% 81.9% 
 
58 77 20.0% -27.4% -177.9% 1100.2% 165.9% 
23 83 -5.4% -26.0% -131.8% 343.4% 87.7% 
 
59 77 25.5% -29.3% -173.7% 1384.7% 191.3% 
24 83 -7.8% -23.6% -142.5% 288.8% 79.8% 
 
60 77 28.2% -29.8% -168.2% 1621.8% 214.9% 
25 83 -6.8% -22.1% -144.2% 302.4% 81.4% 
 
61 77 32.2% -29.5% -170.2% 1722.6% 226.4% 
26 82 -2.9% -20.2% -139.4% 331.4% 88.6% 
 
62 77 33.7% -30.7% -185.5% 1762.6% 232.7% 
27 82 0.7% -18.5% -147.3% 343.0% 97.4% 
 
63 77 34.4% -35.0% -181.2% 1679.2% 225.3% 
28 82 -1.2% -23.7% -148.4% 399.7% 98.2% 
 
64 77 38.1% -34.0% -191.6% 1727.5% 238.9% 
29 82 -1.4% -23.3% -150.6% 423.4% 104.7% 
 
65 77 40.0% -35.6% -194.9% 1975.6% 260.6% 
30 82 -1.6% -29.0% -158.1% 469.2% 106.9% 
 
66 77 45.1% -29.3% -185.7% 2187.9% 280.6% 
31 82 -2.4% -29.7% -165.9% 497.8% 108.4% 
 
67 77 45.4% -29.8% -177.3% 2266.8% 287.3% 
32 82 1.8% -25.9% -176.4% 591.3% 122.2% 
 
68 77 54.1% -29.1% -161.1% 2552.0% 323.7% 
33 82 1.4% -23.6% -166.5% 574.4% 118.2% 
 
69 77 56.3% -26.1% -169.2% 2811.2% 349.1% 
34 82 3.4% -25.5% -167.9% 675.6% 126.0% 
 
70 76 50.5% -22.7% -175.2% 2360.0% 301.5% 
35 82 6.8% -26.0% -173.5% 760.4% 136.8% 
 
71 76 51.5% -18.2% -170.2% 2267.9% 291.7% 
36 82 7.6% -25.1% -178.6% 714.7% 136.4% 
 
72 75 50.3% -15.6% -146.1% 1992.0% 267.7% 
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Table 81: Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (6M) 
T 
BHAR_6M (T from 1 to 36) 
 T 
BHAR_6M (T from 37 to 72) 
N Mean Median Min Max Std.Dev 
 
N Mean Median Min Max Std.Dev 
1 0           
 
37 82 11.8% -26.1% -183.0% 748.7% 136.7% 
2 0           
 
38 82 10.8% -19.6% -186.4% 721.7% 130.0% 
3 0           
 
39 82 13.1% -20.3% -186.9% 634.4% 127.8% 
4 0           
 
40 82 7.3% -19.4% -201.6% 506.5% 111.7% 
5 0           
 
41 82 7.0% -23.2% -205.4% 444.1% 114.2% 
6 0           
 
42 82 6.2% -23.5% -203.8% 502.7% 110.0% 
7 85 -2.8% -2.4% -39.9% 75.3% 14.4% 
 
43 82 9.9% -21.7% -199.1% 598.9% 119.3% 
8 85 -2.7% -5.2% -43.1% 158.5% 25.8% 
 
44 82 14.5% -27.4% -213.0% 630.7% 127.8% 
9 85 -6.3% -10.5% -58.8% 172.9% 29.7% 
 
45 81 20.0% -23.8% -211.1% 634.4% 135.0% 
10 84 -7.6% -10.4% -66.6% 187.0% 34.0% 
 
46 81 23.0% -23.3% -216.1% 617.8% 144.0% 
11 84 1.1% -12.7% -70.0% 546.5% 75.5% 
 
47 81 22.1% -20.7% -209.6% 667.1% 145.2% 
12 84 1.5% -8.3% -70.2% 541.3% 77.6% 
 
48 80 27.5% -17.6% -204.7% 711.8% 150.4% 
13 84 -5.6% -10.5% -82.1% 252.7% 53.0% 
 
49 80 21.5% -18.8% -203.9% 639.1% 144.4% 
14 84 -8.5% -12.5% -82.8% 250.9% 50.8% 
 
50 80 23.9% -18.3% -198.6% 637.9% 141.2% 
15 83 -10.5% -18.4% -92.7% 283.4% 53.1% 
 
51 79 28.0% -17.5% -201.8% 672.9% 154.0% 
16 83 -9.6% -18.6% -82.4% 272.7% 52.9% 
 
52 79 22.3% -18.2% -183.0% 564.8% 135.6% 
17 83 -12.2% -19.5% -106.2% 234.9% 48.5% 
 
53 79 27.9% -20.8% -171.1% 755.9% 153.1% 
18 83 -11.0% -21.2% -109.3% 282.1% 54.1% 
 
54 79 32.1% -15.2% -182.4% 844.4% 163.8% 
19 83 -10.2% -17.8% -119.3% 271.3% 56.6% 
 
55 79 32.3% -14.7% -175.1% 827.7% 166.6% 
20 83 -6.3% -20.8% -111.4% 337.4% 64.4% 
 
56 78 32.4% -17.5% -168.5% 1004.8% 175.2% 
21 83 -5.5% -24.2% -92.2% 445.6% 78.3% 
 
57 77 30.0% -20.7% -161.5% 1158.8% 175.3% 
22 83 -3.0% -19.6% -101.5% 299.4% 75.4% 
 
58 77 29.0% -19.3% -148.4% 1237.9% 176.4% 
23 83 -3.2% -23.6% -98.6% 309.3% 77.9% 
 
59 77 35.2% -19.7% -129.2% 1557.4% 207.3% 
24 83 -4.3% -18.2% -108.1% 300.3% 74.7% 
 
60 77 38.4% -19.3% -139.3% 1823.6% 234.8% 
25 83 -5.0% -14.1% -106.1% 267.0% 72.4% 
 
61 77 43.0% -21.8% -151.1% 1936.8% 248.1% 
26 82 -0.6% -13.3% -108.3% 344.2% 82.7% 
 
62 77 44.8% -18.6% -161.9% 1981.8% 255.5% 
27 82 2.3% -14.9% -125.0% 354.9% 90.9% 
 
63 77 45.2% -21.5% -158.1% 1888.0% 246.6% 
28 82 0.8% -20.9% -129.4% 464.7% 95.5% 
 
64 77 49.9% -27.8% -166.1% 1942.4% 261.6% 
29 82 0.4% -23.1% -130.1% 491.9% 101.9% 
 
65 77 52.5% -20.1% -168.7% 2221.1% 287.5% 
30 82 0.7% -24.0% -136.2% 544.4% 105.0% 
 
66 77 56.9% -16.4% -160.5% 2459.4% 308.7% 
31 82 1.1% -25.8% -162.5% 577.2% 107.3% 
 
67 77 57.3% -16.5% -152.7% 2548.0% 316.5% 
32 82 6.8% -24.0% -174.2% 684.5% 127.0% 
 
68 77 66.8% -20.6% -138.6% 2868.4% 355.5% 
33 82 6.4% -23.8% -162.7% 664.8% 121.6% 
 
69 77 69.1% -23.0% -120.5% 3159.3% 383.9% 
34 82 7.5% -21.1% -162.1% 709.5% 125.6% 
 
70 76 62.4% -18.8% -121.6% 2652.5% 332.4% 
35 82 11.2% -25.5% -170.1% 800.4% 136.8% 
 
71 76 62.8% -9.5% -120.6% 2549.1% 320.1% 
36 82 11.6% -23.6% -177.0% 752.1% 135.6% 
 
72 75 61.4% -7.1% -124.0% 2239.5% 291.3% 
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Table 82: Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (12M) 
T 
BHAR_12M (T from 1 to 36)  
T 
BHAR_12M (T from 37 to 72) 
N Mean Median Min Max Std.Dev 
 
N Mean Median Min Max Std.Dev 
1 0           
 
37 82 19.3% -8.8% -147.0% 658.9% 127.6% 
2 0           
 
38 82 19.6% -3.6% -158.6% 635.1% 122.3% 
3 0           
 
39 82 22.3% -3.5% -159.0% 580.7% 122.5% 
4 0           
 
40 82 17.5% -3.3% -173.1% 446.4% 106.0% 
5 0           
 
41 82 17.5% -2.5% -174.6% 529.0% 113.4% 
6 0           
 
42 82 17.7% -13.4% -173.8% 595.7% 114.7% 
7 0           
 
43 82 24.1% -9.0% -170.0% 704.0% 136.0% 
8 0           
 
44 82 31.3% -8.2% -181.8% 941.2% 158.7% 
9 0           
 
45 81 39.2% -14.2% -180.0% 944.8% 169.3% 
10 0           
 
46 81 43.4% -2.1% -184.6% 1063.0% 180.5% 
11 0           
 
47 81 42.8% -8.9% -180.3% 1061.2% 182.2% 
12 0           
 
48 80 51.1% -7.1% -175.8% 1319.3% 203.4% 
13 84 -1.8% -2.3% -71.5% 87.2% 18.7% 
 
49 80 42.2% -5.2% -175.2% 1091.3% 181.9% 
14 84 -5.1% -3.8% -66.7% 71.0% 20.9% 
 
50 80 44.7% -7.4% -172.2% 1239.9% 188.1% 
15 83 -7.6% -4.4% -65.7% 61.4% 23.4% 
 
51 79 52.7% -7.4% -175.1% 1615.6% 226.6% 
16 83 -6.0% -3.8% -61.7% 155.1% 28.3% 
 
52 79 46.4% -12.0% -157.1% 1609.9% 214.2% 
17 83 -8.0% -8.5% -66.0% 138.2% 28.3% 
 
53 79 56.0% -12.4% -146.5% 2119.8% 267.8% 
18 83 -7.1% -8.2% -62.6% 143.8% 31.3% 
 
54 79 62.2% -8.2% -154.8% 2358.1% 293.7% 
19 83 -5.5% -8.7% -64.4% 206.3% 39.7% 
 
55 79 62.8% -2.4% -147.6% 2317.8% 291.7% 
20 83 -2.8% -12.2% -63.1% 193.6% 44.6% 
 
56 78 68.8% -3.4% -155.0% 2790.6% 338.4% 
21 83 -0.9% -14.3% -65.2% 444.7% 69.1% 
 
57 77 69.7% -8.9% -158.0% 3198.2% 378.5% 
22 83 3.6% -10.8% -69.6% 345.5% 73.6% 
 
58 77 70.8% -2.2% -143.1% 3412.3% 400.0% 
23 83 2.5% -14.2% -79.0% 312.5% 70.5% 
 
59 77 84.2% 7.0% -146.2% 4266.8% 495.4% 
24 83 1.7% -12.7% -89.7% 320.6% 68.1% 
 
60 77 93.2% 1.3% -168.8% 4982.2% 575.9% 
25 83 1.2% -7.3% -87.5% 341.8% 65.2% 
 
61 77 101.2% -3.2% -178.3% 5285.8% 610.9% 
26 82 5.1% -8.8% -94.7% 376.9% 72.6% 
 
62 77 104.4% 0.5% -192.2% 5407.7% 625.9% 
27 82 8.3% -6.7% -101.6% 432.8% 81.9% 
 
63 77 101.4% -0.5% -138.1% 5153.7% 597.7% 
28 82 7.0% -10.8% -104.6% 566.6% 88.6% 
 
64 77 107.9% -7.4% -186.1% 5304.0% 618.5% 
29 82 6.5% -11.0% -105.0% 596.3% 94.2% 
 
65 77 116.7% 2.4% -160.4% 6051.2% 701.2% 
30 82 7.4% -9.1% -112.8% 653.6% 98.4% 
 
66 77 125.4% 7.2% -141.4% 6687.6% 770.5% 
31 82 8.0% -13.1% -119.4% 689.2% 102.9% 
 
67 77 128.2% 9.1% -135.0% 6930.0% 797.3% 
32 82 12.4% -11.5% -121.2% 809.0% 121.2% 
 
68 77 146.0% 6.0% -158.1% 7789.4% 896.0% 
33 82 13.9% -10.6% -113.1% 783.6% 118.8% 
 
69 77 153.1% -2.1% -153.0% 8565.9% 981.9% 
34 82 14.0% -10.3% -112.7% 624.6% 115.1% 
 
70 76 135.1% 6.5% -131.4% 7204.6% 833.8% 
35 82 18.6% -7.9% -118.3% 704.0% 127.9% 
 
71 76 134.0% 2.5% -130.1% 6928.0% 801.6% 
36 82 19.1% -7.4% -129.6% 661.6% 125.8% 
 
72 75 127.1% 6.7% -110.4% 6106.2% 713.7% 
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Table 83: Test of means of BHAR (1M) 
T Test of means against reference constant (value) BHAR_1M Mean Std.Dv. N Std.Err. Reference t-value df p 
1     0           
6 0.4% 47.9% 86 5.2% 0.0% 0.069 85 0.945 
12 1.4% 83.3% 84 9.1% 0.0% 0.153 83 0.879 
18 -9.4% 74.9% 83 8.2% 0.0% -1.148 82 0.254 
24 -7.8% 79.8% 83 8.8% 0.0% -0.896 82 0.373 
30 -1.6% 106.9% 82 11.8% 0.0% -0.136 81 0.892 
36 7.6% 136.4% 82 15.1% 0.0% 0.503 81 0.616 
42 5.6% 127.3% 82 14.1% 0.0% 0.399 81 0.691 
48 23.4% 157.4% 80 17.6% 0.0% 1.332 79 0.187 
54 27.0% 159.8% 79 18.0% 0.0% 1.500 78 0.138 
60 28.2% 214.9% 77 24.5% 0.0% 1.153 76 0.252 
66 45.1% 280.6% 77 32.0% 0.0% 1.410 76 0.163 
72 50.3% 267.7% 75 30.9% 0.0% 1.626 74 0.108 
Table 84: Test of means of BHAR (6M) 
T 
Test of means against reference constant (value) BHAR_6M 
Mean Std.Dv. N Std.Err. Reference t-value df p 
1     0           
6     0           
12 1.5% 77.7% 84 8.5% 0.0% 0.176 83 0.861 
18 -11.0% 54.1% 83 5.9% 0.0% -1.855 82 0.067 
24 -4.3% 74.7% 83 8.2% 0.0% -0.527 82 0.600 
30 0.7% 105.0% 82 11.6% 0.0% 0.058 81 0.954 
36 11.6% 135.6% 82 15.0% 0.0% 0.777 81 0.440 
42 6.2% 110.0% 82 12.2% 0.0% 0.506 81 0.614 
48 27.5% 150.4% 80 16.8% 0.0% 1.636 79 0.106 
54 32.1% 163.8% 79 18.4% 0.0% 1.741 78 0.086 
60 38.4% 234.8% 77 26.8% 0.0% 1.435 76 0.155 
66 56.9% 308.7% 77 35.2% 0.0% 1.617 76 0.110 
72 61.4% 291.3% 75 33.6% 0.0% 1.824 74 0.072 
Table 85: Test of means of BHAR (12M) 
T 
Test of means against reference constant (value) BHAR_12M 
Mean Std.Dv. N Std.Err. Reference t-value df p 
1     0           
6     0           
12     0           
18 -7.1%** 31.3% 83 3.4% 0.0% -2.068 82 0.042 
24 1.7% 68.1% 83 7.5% 0.0% 0.229 82 0.819 
30 7.4% 98.4% 82 10.9% 0.0% 0.679 81 0.499 
36 19.1% 125.8% 82 13.9% 0.0% 1.373 81 0.174 
42 17.7% 114.7% 82 12.7% 0.0% 1.395 81 0.167 
48 51.1%** 203.4% 80 22.7% 0.0% 2.247 79 0.027 
54 62.2% 293.7% 79 33.0% 0.0% 1.883 78 0.063 
60 93.2% 575.9% 77 65.6% 0.0% 1.421 76 0.160 
66 125.4% 770.5% 77 87.8% 0.0% 1.428 76 0.157 
72 127.1% 713.7% 75 82.4% 0.0% 1.542 74 0.127 
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Table 86: Test of means of WR (1M) 
T 
Test of means against reference constant (value) WR_1M 
Mean Std.Dv. N Std.Err. Reference t-value df p 
1                 
6  0.9940   0.4368  86 0.0471  1.00  - 0.1270   85   0.8990  
12  0.9968   0.7639  84 0.0833  1.00  - 0.0390   83   0.9690  
18  0.8986   0.6750  83 0.0741  1.00  - 1.3690   82   0.1750  
24  0.9363   0.7951  83 0.0873  1.00  - 0.7300   82   0.4670  
30  0.9788   0.9535  82 0.1053  1.00  - 0.2020   81   0.8410  
36  1.0594   1.2319  82 0.136  1.00   0.4370   81   0.6630  
42  1.0529   1.1330  82 0.1251  1.00   0.4230   81   0.6730  
48  1.2983   1.6222  80 0.1814  1.00   1.6450   79   0.1040  
54  1.4290   2.0734  79 0.2333  1.00   1.8390   78   0.0700  
60  1.4311   2.7443  77 0.3127  1.00   1.3790   76   0.1720  
66  1.5365   3.2974  77 0.3758  1.00   1.4280   76   0.1570  
72  1.5453   3.0105  75 0.3476  1.00   1.5690   74   0.1210  
Table 87: Test of means of WR (6M) 
T 
Test of means against reference constant (value) WR_6M 
Mean Std.Dv. N Std.Err. Reference t-value df p 
6                 
12  0.9978   0.7418  84 0.0809  1.00  - 0.0270   83   0.9780  
18  0.8906   0.5765  83 0.0633  1.00  - 1.7290   82   0.0880  
24  0.9481   0.7490  83 0.0822  1.00  - 0.6310   82   0.5300  
30  0.9952   0.9200  82 0.1016  1.00  - 0.0480   81   0.9620  
36  1.0806   1.1625  82 0.1284  1.00   0.6280   81   0.5320  
42  1.0616   1.0373  82 0.1145  1.00   0.5380   81   0.5920  
48  1.3235   1.5881  80 0.1776  1.00   1.8220   79   0.0720  
54  1.4509   2.0428  79 0.2298  1.00   1.9620   78   0.0530  
60  1.4823   2.8202  77 0.3214  1.00   1.5010   76   0.1380  
66  1.6025   3.4019  77 0.3877  1.00   1.5540   76   0.1240  
72  1.5912   3.0683  75 0.3543  1.00   1.6690   74   0.0990  
Table 88: Test of means of WR (12M) 
T 
Test of means against reference constant (value) WR_12M 
Mean Std.Dv. N Std.Err. Reference t-value df p 
12                 
18  0.9231**   0.3283  83 0.036  1.00  - 2.1350   82   0.0360  
24  1.0039   0.7059  83 0.0775  1.00   0.0500   82   0.9600  
30  1.0693   0.9457  82 0.1044  1.00   0.6640   81   0.5090  
36  1.1679   1.1454  82 0.1265  1.00   1.3270   81   0.1880  
42  1.1926   1.2064  82 0.1332  1.00   1.4460   81   0.1520  
48  1.5796**   2.4536  80 0.2743  1.00   2.1130   79   0.0380  
54  1.7877   3.6176  79 0.407  1.00   1.9350   78   0.0570  
60  2.0350   6.2686  77 0.7144  1.00   1.4490   76   0.1520  
66  2.2662   7.6567  77 0.8726  1.00   1.4510   76   0.1510  
72  2.2245   6.8808  75 0.7945  1.00   1.5410   74   0.1280  
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